Foundations of skeptical theism: Cornea, core, and conditional probabilities

Stephen J. Wykstra, Indiana University Bloomington
Timothy Perrine, Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract

Some skeptical theists use Wykstra's CORNEA constraint to undercut Rowestyle inductive arguments from evil. Many critics of skeptical theism accept CORNEA, but argue that Rowe-style arguments meet its constraint. But Justin McBrayer argues that CORNEA is itself mistaken. It is, he claims, akin to "sensitivity" or "truth-tracking" constraints like those of Robert Nozick; but counterexamples show that inductive evidence is often insensitive. We here defend CORNEA against McBrayer's chief counterexample. We first clarify CORNEA, distinguishing it from a deeper underlying principle that we dub "CORE." We then give both principles a probabilistic construal, and show how, on this construal, the counterexample fails.