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dialogue
February 8, 1972
Comment

FOSCO and Discipline Code: Death Embrace

For the past semester, the proposed Discipline Code and the infamous Faculty Organization Study Committee (FOSCO) report have been buried in the subliminal reaches of the college's collective consciousness. It has been nearly nine months since a lot of people at Calvin were very excited about these matters, and understandably so, since both FOSCO and the Discipline Code constitute major attempts to define the role and function of the college itself and the relationships of the various members within the college community. That there exists between these two proposed documents a serious tension on the level of basic assumptions was sensed last spring when FOSCO released its initial report; but one should not interpret the quietude of the past few months to mean that this tension has in any way been resolved or mitigated. Recent indications are, in fact, that the conflict between the documents is as serious as ever, despite substantial revisions in FOSCO, and renewed work on the Discipline Code. Both proposals will be coming before the faculty this spring and the tensions between the documents are almost certain to provide plenty of tension within the faculty and the college as a whole.

To add to the complexity, the fates of the proposed documents have become so thoroughly intertwined that it seems as if they will reach the floor of the faculty almost simultaneously, locked, one might say, in a parliamentary death embrace: since the procedural and substantive issues in this case are totally interdependent, if not identical, the very life of either FOSCO or Discipline Code may well be at stake.

The conflict between the two documents centers around their differing positions on the role to be played by students in determining the direction of the college and the allocation of responsibility within the college. Both documents seem to agree that the original source of authority and responsibility at Calvin resides in the Board of Trustees as it represents the denomination. Both documents further agree that the primary functional locus of authority has been delegated to the faculty and administration and that a certain amount of responsibility can and should be delegated from this locus to the students.

At this point, however, the proposals diverge radically. For the Discipline Code assumes that the nature and extent of this delegated student authority (as well as the authority delegated to administrators and student-faculty committees, when their function directly concerns students) is a matter for co-operative determination by the faculty and a functionally independent, though not autonomous, student assembly; the FOSCO report, on the other hand, asserts that this determination must be reserved for the faculty alone, with students serving only in an advisory role. In fact, the whole concept of a functionally independent Student Senate was regarded by FOSCO as highly problematic in its initial report last spring. The primary mode of student participation under the FOSCO plan would be membership on faculty committees; committees immediately responsible to the faculty, the only independent decision-making body.

This divergence in basic assumptions manifests itself most clearly in the procedures for ratification outlined in the mandates of the respective committees. The Discipline Code must be ratified by the Student Senate, the faculty, and the Board of Trustees before it takes effect. FOSCO, which proposes far-reaching changes in every aspect of college life including many areas of direct concern to students, need only be passed by the faculty and the Board of Trustees. Although there has been mention of submitting certain portions of the FOSCO plan to the Student Senate for formal approval, no substantive proposals have been made along this line and, in fact, such a procedure would constitute a major change in the basic assumptions of the document.

The procedural mess with which the faculty will be faced this spring is itself a product of the conflicting assumptions of the reports. The Discipline Code, which has been volleyed back and forth among the Senate, faculty, and committee for two years now, is thrown into a state of flux by the impending decision on FOSCO. Although the proposed code was passed, in a revised version, for the second time by Student Senate last spring, the faculty at that time approved only portions of it, relegating some controversial portions back to the committee for reformulation. In another less heralded move members of the FOSCO committee moved last spring to submit the code as a whole to a joint committee of FOSCO and the Discipline Code Committee in order to bring the conflicting elements into harmony.

Although the joint committee never met, FOSCO itself undertook to rewrite the Discipline Code in conformity to the FOSCO proposal, and is now even asserting the prerogative of reporting the proposed revision to the faculty; a minor matter, perhaps, but it serves to demonstrate how thoroughly the Discipline Code has been subsumed under the FOSCO proposal.
The FOSCO revision of the Discipline Code which is currently under discussion between the committees makes at least two vitally significant, substantive changes in the code. The first deals with the ratification of amendments to the Discipline Code. In the original proposal, amendments were to be ratified in the same manner which the original mandate prescribed for the ratification of the document as a whole—by the Student Senate, the faculty, and the Board of Trustees. Although it was not within FOSCO’s jurisdiction to alter the basic ratification procedure found in the mandate, FOSCO could, and in fact did, alter the amendment ratification procedure by eliminating the Student Senate from the process.

The second proposed change involves the appeals board in the discipline structure. Presently and under the proposed Discipline Code, the Board of Appeals is a student-faculty committee consisting of three students and three faculty members. FOSCO suggests that appeals be taken to its Student Conduct Committee, a faculty committee with a faculty majority.

It is still uncertain how the Discipline Code committee and FOSCO will approach the faculty with their proposals or how the faculty will deal with the complex procedural and philosophical issues involved. But it seems apparent at this point that FOSCO has asserted its proposal as the prior issue, on which all else, particularly the Code, must depend. This development raises a host of disturbing questions: Why must the Discipline Code Committee conform itself to the FOSCO plan before that plan’s approval by the faculty? Must not the code be held in limbo in any case until the FOSCO issue is determined? How does Student Senate fit into all of this if FOSCO becomes a reality this spring; it is no time for students who are concerned about the future of the college to give way to resignation and apathy. Averting the advent of Mother FOSCO will require the responsible and articulate assertion of the principle of responsible freedom within the Calvin community.

On the other hand, it is also easy to understand the frequent confusion and frustration with which significant elements of the faculty have confronted manifestations of student independence agitation. While students were hearing the language of cooperation and functional independence, much of the faculty was thinking the language of FOSCO and in loco parentis. They cannot comprehend how they could have been so completely misunderstood for so many years.

It is imperative that concerned students maintain now that there never was a “misunderstanding.” The movement toward increased student participation and responsibility has been real, and must continue if Calvin is to continue to mature as a Christian academic community; and it is FOSCO, not the Discipline Code, which is moving against the current. Important decisions are going to be made this spring; it is no time for students who are concerned about the future of the college to give way to resignation and apathy. Averting the advent of Mother FOSCO will require the responsible and articulate assertion of the principle of responsible freedom within the Calvin community.

David Timmer

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by Thomas Jonker


“Why must I have a ‘degree’ to be what you call a ‘Teacher’?”

“Well, you must know a wide variety of subjects that you plan to teach the children. You yourself must know the material to be covered.”

“I have no more time for your silly questions. I have a lot of paper work to do.”

The Supervisor’s mentality in the above scenario is typical of the attitudes which infect almost anyone who is connected with an educational institution.

You might feel equally frustrated with the student’s “silly” questions. Not so, however, after you have read Teaching As a Subversive Activity, for Postman and Weingartner do an excellent job of challenging the assumptions made by the educational bureaucracy.

The authors introduce the book with a brief description of themselves (… “we are serious, dedicated, simple, professional educators, which means that we are romantic men… maintaining a belief in the improbability of the human condition through education.”) and their beliefs:

(a) in general, the survival of our society is threatened by an increasing number of unprecedented and, to date, insoluble problems; and (b), that something can be done to improve the situation… and… that the way schools are currently conducted does very little, and quite probably nothing, to enhance our chances of mutual survival.

They advance an exciting thesis:

That change—constant, accelerating, ubiquitous—is the striking characteristic of the world we live in and that our educational system has not yet recognized this fact.

The authors conclude that our present schools must change if, as Robert Weiner says, “it educates for obsolescence” and docility. Postman and Weingartner also point out that the instigators of change will not come from within the present structures for, “Within the Educational Establishment there are insufficient daring and vigorous ideas on which to build a new approach to education” (p xiv). The ideas of such men as Carl Rogers, Robert Weiner, Alan Watts, Marshall McLuhan and J A Richards are referred to not only because “they are relevant to current reality, but that the ideas suggest an entirely different and more relevant conception of education than our schools have so far managed to reflect.”

Schools, then, must play a separate role apart from business, government, and any other institutions which support the “status quo,” including (oh no!) the church and the home. The school must play a “subversive” role.

Our society, as is true of all societies, needs to change and modify itself to meet the unexpected problems and threats that it faces. In order for us to be “self renewing,” as John Gardner says, we need people who are in our society, but not of its mentality. We need independent thinkers who question, evaluate, and act. But there are many, many people in the ranks of bureaucracy who are afraid of this kind of change. They cannot afford to be found wrong, lest their bureaucracy, and all of the ideas and values that they strongly identify with, falter and break down.

There are three particular problems which the authors believe make it necessary for schools to be subversive. One of them has already been touched upon, that of the “bureaucratic bureaucracy”:

… Bureaucracies, in spite of their seeming indispensability, are by their nature highly resistant to change. The motto of most bureaucracies is, “Carry on, Regardless.” There is an essential mindlessness about them which causes them, in most circumstances, to accelerate entropy rather than impede it. Bureaucracies rarely ask themselves “Why?,” but only “How?” (p 12).
The other two problems referred to (bureaucracies will come up again) are the communications revolution and the change revolution. In the past fifty years the industrial age and the electric age, followed by the atomic age, have transformed our environment; “[Electronic] communication is virtually all one way: from the top down, via mass media, especially TV” (p 8). The authors ask if this “one way effect” does not alienate men, giving them fewer ways to express themselves and making fewer ideas available to them.

People say, “There has always been change.” Yes, but up until fifteen years ago change was slow—the degree of change was such that men could deal effectively with it. At that time change changed—change comes faster today than ever before:

Until the last generation it was possible to be born, grow up and spend a life in the United States without moving more than fifty miles from home. . . . Stability and consequent predictability—within ‘natural’ cycles—was the characteristic mode (p 11).

This is true of our education as well. Even if those over thirty years of age remember everything from their schooling, the authors point out that they are at best “walking encyclopedias of out-dated information.”

Many teachers in the educational “bureaucracy” believe that they are in the “information dissemination” business. This might have been appropriate fifty years ago but, because of tremendous amount of information available, is no longer of any use. As the impossibility of their task becomes more apparent, many teachers double their efforts at their “business.” Others are trying hard at “the transmission of cultural heritage” business; these teachers are so concerned with the previous 200 years that they fail to help students who are grappling with modern day problems.

Unless our schools can switch to the right business, their clientele will either go elsewhere (as many are doing), or go into a severe case of “future shock,” to use a relatively new phrase. Future shock occurs when you are confronted by the fact that the world you were educated to believe in doesn’t exist. Your images of reality are apparitions that disappear on contact. (Reaction?) One continues to act as if his apparitions were substantial—relentlessly pursuing a course of action that he knows will fail him (p 14).

Why are the authors so down on schools? For many reasons. One is the constant insistence of educators on separating method from content. Marshall Mc Luhan’s conclusion that the medium used conveys a message of its own, coupled with John Dewey’s idea that “We learn by what we do,” provides a good critique of what’s wrong in the classroom. Classrooms traditionally are organized around the teacher. The teacher tells Johnny what he must “know” and then asks him questions (quizzes, tests, etc) to make sure he knows it. What this medium put across to Johnny are a few facts perhaps but, more important, it puts across a high value on memorization and passivity. Answers are highly valued also. John Holt points out in How Children Fail that a child will give any answer, right or wrong, it makes no difference, to relieve the pressure of the unknown. This is a learned response, learned from the classroom, organized around “please the teacher (or professor)” games.

A secondary message is that, while the “content” and “method” courses are separate, they are not equal. Everybody knows that the “real” courses, the kind of which James Bryant Conant is so fond: The Heritage of Greece and Rome, Calculus, Elizabethan Drama, The Civil War. The ‘fake’ courses are the methods courses, those conspiracies of emptiness which are universally ridiculed because their finest ambition is to instruct in how to give lesson plans, etc . . . . The educators . . . have saddled themselves with a trivial definition of ‘method’ . . . . The professors of the liberal arts have, so far, escaped the ridicule they deserve for not having noticed that a “discipline” or a “subject” is a way of knowing something—in other words, a method—and that therefore, their courses are methods courses (p 18-10).

Knowledge is not something outside the student; a teacher can not teach someone knowledge. A student learns. A teacher can only facilitate that learning. This ties in with the medium being the message for, if the medium for learning is lecture and classroom (or any other teacher-oriented games), the students learns for his own survival, passivity and a willingness to accept anybody’s answer. But if the medium is learner-oriented, then, the responsibility lies with him to discover and organize reality, with emphasis on his own independence and healthy individuality.

Many educators have the same attitude as the man who, when encountering Edison’s first light bulb, responded “Oh, an electric candle!” They tend to evaluate the new in light of the old. They look for labels for things and once they’ve labeled it they feel they know it.

But what the authors suggest is entirely different from the old. They urge the development of an “inquiry environment” as an essential part of the new education. This is a process of inquiry: a growing, fluctuating, always questioning, always moving process, not susceptible to labels:

The inquiry method is not designed to do better what the old environments try to do. It works you over in entirely different ways. It activates different senses, attitudes, and perceptions; it generates a different, bolder, and more potent kind of intelligence. Thus, it will cause teachers, and their tests, and their grading systems, and their curriculums to change. It will cause college admissions requirements to change. It will cause everything about education to change (p 27).

The inquiry process is student-centered. This does not mean the lolly-pop approach of seducing students into a pre-structured set of questions and answers. It does mean encouraging confidence in the student’s self to ask ques-

continued on p 6
tions and to challenge fellow students’ thinking.

Goodwin Watson, as the authors point out, has summarized what is known about learning; some of his observations are:

*How “ready” we are to learn depends on the following diverse factors:
   a) we learn only in relation to what we already know.
   b) we learn only what is appropriate to our purposes.
   c) freedom from discouragement, the expectation of failure or threats.

*We learn best that which we participate in selecting and planning ourselves.

*Genuine participation intensifies motivation, flexibility and rate of learning.

*An autocratic atmosphere (produced by dominating teachers) produces in learners apathetic conformity, various—and frequently devious—kinds of deviance, scapegoating, or escape.

*An open nonauthoritarian atmosphere can, then, be seen as conducive to learner initiative and creativity, encouraging attitudes of self confidence, originality, self reliance, enterprise, and independence. All of which is equivalent to learning how to learn (p 148-9).

What if we could create an open environment, “what’s worth knowing?” The authors ask first, though, whether the structure of each subject (English, history, etc) is not arbitrarily pre-perceived by some authority. They object to the attitude that “this is history, and this is English, and now we are in anthropology class, as opposed to sociology class.” Keeping with learner-centered education means dropping this segmented view of reality and starting with meaning-making questions. Each of us assigns meanings to the world:

We are not saying that there isn’t anything “out there.” We are saying that the meaning of what is out there is ascribed to ‘it’ by a perceiver (p 83).

The authors tell of an old joke about a school administrator who was dismayed when he and his staff had taken great pains to prepare a new and wonderful curriculum, only to discover that the “wrong kids had showed up.” In the new education, where students ask questions to make meaning out of the world for themselves, there will be no single set of answers or answers. There will be no “wrong” answers or “wrong” kids. This will put learning back into the hands and minds of learners. But what will the “teachers” do?

Be facilitators. To help students make meaning out of our rapidly changing reality, a facilitator must know his students. He must be a master in the art of listening—to others, and himself. Carl Rogers in his book, On Becoming a Person, concludes that the results of trying to teach are either unimportant or hurtful and that he is only interested in being a learner. This is the ideal, but how do we get from where we are in the old education (“given the egg crate we have been put in”) to becoming good listeners?

The authors suggest asking “Why the hell should anyone want to be ‘taught’ my subject?” (p 142). The answers given by their student teachers seldom had anything to do with the reality outside the school. Typical answers included, “It’s required, for a diploma, etc.” Postman and Weingartner go on to describe how they then provide, in their education courses, the freedom and the responsibility to “create” a high school—its purpose, its goals, what the students are like:

The trouble starts almost immediately. These college students are the ones who were most “successful” in conventional school terms. That is, they are the ones who learned best what they were required to do: to sit quietly, to accept without question whatever nonsense was inflicted upon them, to ventriloquize on demand with a high degree of fidelity, to go down only on the down staircase, etc . . . (p 143).

The students’ reaction is one of disbelief. They can’t believe Postman and Weingartner when they turn the semester over to them:

They are all seated, notebooks open, pens poised, ready to “take notes” on “Problems and ‘Practices in the Secondary School,” in order to get some idea as to what this idiot professor thinks is important so that they can take the usual midsemester and final (multiple choice) examinations with the high probability of “getting a good grade” . . . In their anxiety at having their academic-Linus blanket taken away, their first response is to attack us for refusing to “teach them anything,” that is, for not having any “required texts,” for not lecturing, and for not administering examinations.

The two educators are romantic men. They wish for every liberal arts course to be a course in the methods of learning:

A history course should be a course in the processes of learning how to do history. And so on. But this is the most farfetched possibility of all since college teachers, continued on p 12
History and Biblical Authority

Do conservative Christians fear the effects of history on their faith?

by David Holwerda

Many people are confused by the present controversy in the Christian Reformed Church that swirls around the synodical report on "The Nature and Extent of Biblical Authority." They know that the report exists. They are not quite certain what it contains, but they have heard that it is pretty bad. Somehow rumor has it that the full authority of the Bible is being rejected, that certain theologians are trying to control God's Word with their finite reason, and that apparently these same theologians are more willing to bow before the conclusions of human historians than before the infallible truth of the Word of God.

Is the report really that bad? If it isn't how did such rumors arise? Do they have any basis in fact? Since the writer of this article also served on the committee which produced the report, some may conclude that his prejudiced opinions have little validity. But if that is not your conclusion, perhaps the following comments may help to clarify the matter and acquaint you with what is in essence a very profound theological issue.

My guess is that the rumors mentioned above arose in connection with the way in which the report formulated the nature of biblical authority. The report referred to a "problem in formulation," and that was probably not the best way to put the matter. It gives the impression that biblical authority may be after all essentially problematic, that behind it stands a very big question mark. But that is certainly not the position of the report.

The problem in formulating the nature of biblical authority consists only in different emphases in approaching that authority. One approach emphasizes that the authority of Scripture is the authority of its author. The report summarizes this approach as follows:

The nature of biblical authority is simply and solely that it is divine. God speaks and therefore Scripture has divine authority. Questions arise and distinctions must be introduced in considering what is said but not in considering with what authority it is said. It is important to note what God says, the form of the address, to whom it is spoken, for what period of time, and to see it all as it functions in the developing covenant history. There is fulfillment in Jesus Christ and therefore the authority of Scripture is qualified by the formal authority of the Bible. The committee assumed rather naively that that would be carrying coals to Newcastle. No one among us disputes anything that is contained in the statement concerning the formal authority of the Bible. The question is only whether ability arise on the level of interpretation, not on the level of authority. (Report, pp 464-465)

We shall refer to this as the formal approach to the nature of biblical authority.

The second view could then be called the material approach to the nature of biblical authority. The report summarizes this view as follows:

... the divine authority of Scripture is manifested only through its content as the saving revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and therefore the authority of Scripture is always concretely embedded in its redemptive message. Therefore, when the interpreter considers the meaning of a particular passage, how a particular Word of God once functioned and how it continues to function, he is saying something about the nature and extent of its authority. ... "Nature and extent" refer thus to the divine authority of Scripture as viewed in relationship to its content and purpose. The divine authority of Scripture is wholly unique in character precisely because it comes upon us in and through the history of revelation. This history of revelation focused on Jesus Christ qualifies the authority of Scripture.

(Report, p 465)

Most of the critics of the report apparently favor the first approach, and they see a host of evils lurking behind the second. Somehow because the report relates the authority of Scripture to its content and states that this content qualifies the authority of Scripture, these critics feel that the authority of Scripture is made to depend upon the interpreter. Thus the feeling expressed in those rumors is that human reason is taking control, and that human knowledge determines what is the authoritative Word of God.

Is this the case? Can one really get by with just asserting the formal approach to the authority of Scripture? Does the formal approach really answer all legitimate questions? Or is it only one part of any statement dealing with the nature of biblical authority?

There are some who believe it does answer all questions. Therefore, they criticize the report for not quoting all sorts of biblical texts attesting the fact that the Bible is the Word of God, that it is inspired, and that its authority cannot be broken. Indeed, the report does not contain many texts referring to the formal authority of the Bible. The committee assumed rather naively that that would be carrying coals to Newcastle. No one among us disputes anything that is contained in the statement concerning the formal authority of the Bible. The question is only whether continued on p 8
that formal statement is adequate. Therefore, the committee assumed that it had only to refer to our commonly held position (including two earlier reports dealing specifically with the inspiration and infallibility of Scripture) and then proceed directly to the real issue at hand.

As a means of further explanation it might be stated that those who believe that the formal approach is completely adequate assert that all that we can say (and all that we may say) about the authority of the Bible is that it is divine. But is that sufficient? For example, the apostle commands Christians to greet one another with a holy kiss. That command comes to us with the authority of God himself. We all agree on that. Yet we do not greet one another with a holy kiss. Does that mean that we reject the authority of the Word of God in this instance? No one among us would make that charge. We all agree that it is necessary to take into account the cultural customs and historical circumstances of that time. In other words, we all agree that the Word must be interpreted before being applied in our own time. But then aren’t we really saying something about the nature of biblical authority, that it is necessary to go beyond the formal confession that the Bible is the authoritative Word of God?

The committee thinks so. Therefore, the major part of the report presents an approach which takes into account the fact that the Bible comes to us in and through the history of revelation, and that consequently its authority is affected by ("qualified by") that history. The fact that today we substitute a handshake for the holy kiss indicates something concerning the nature of the authority that that word has for us. In other words, the report assumes that the formal and material approaches complement each other. Texts could easily be added in support of the formal approach. But since that approach is not in question, it should hardly be necessary to do so. Granted that the Bible has divine authority, the real issue before us concerns the impact that history and historical knowledge may have upon our interpretation of the Word of God.

Thus the material approach to the authority of Scripture assumes and actually incorporates within itself the formal approach. That is, it also affirms that the authority of the Bible is the authority of God himself, but it argues that when we interpret the Bible in terms of its content and with a view to its application to ourselves we are involved in the nature of its authority.

For example, traditionally we have referred to the Bible as special revelation. That word “special” refers not only to source but also to the purpose of that revelation. Its special purpose concerns redemption. That is the distinctive characteristic of biblical revelation over against general revelation. Of course, the Bible gives us a perspective on creation and on the whole of human life, but it does so in terms of its own redemptive perspective. Thus although the Bible contains statements that border on cosmology, we do not understand the Bible to be a textbook on cosmology (or for that matter on astronomy, physics, or any other science). For example, the text in Isaiah 44:22, “It is he who sits above the circle of the earth,” has not been understood among us as teaching the cosmological fact that the earth is a circle. Some conservative interpreters have tried to argue that if the church had only paid close attention to the details of Scripture, it could have avoided those centuries of believing that the earth was flat. For they say, Isaiah knew already that the earth was a circle. But did he? Is that the meaning of those words? Or does the “circle of the earth” refer only to the arch that can be drawn on a flat earth from one horizon to the other? The evidence points in that direction. Thus Isaiah made use of an ancient cosmological perspective to describe the relationship of the transcendent God to his creation.

The intent of the example given above should not be misunderstood. We are not suggesting that the Bible has nothing to say to the sciences. The doctrine of creation, for example, is extremely important for science. We are saying only that the Bible is not a textbook which simply presents a series of facts to be incorporated into our sciences. Obviously, it does provide us with important perspectives for the natural and social sciences. Now in saying all of this, we have been talking about the nature of biblical authority, haven’t we?

One more example should be sufficient. Exodus 23:19 gives the following command, “You shall not boil a kid in its mother's milk.” We would argue that this command must be understood in the light of the circumstances in which Israel existed. Thus the command is specifically a prohibition against practicing a milk-ritual as performed by Israel’s neighbors in the Baal cult. This milk-ritual was based on a magical view of influencing the deities and thus

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**Story from the Inside**

 Woody’s eyes, brown on white, grew like mud stains.
 Anne Marie, he whispered, finger hooked around his ear, Anne Marie is lost.
 Lost.
 And she’ll get whupped if she comes home.

When Anne Marie didn’t come back Saturday night neighbors failed to see the shadow crying with rain drops behind the splintered side of Ferguson’s garage.
The black body blurred by the tongue hanging dark, crouched close too cold to care that the stomach ceased to growl like a dry mutt’s whine, too empty to grind, grind.

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When Anne Marie didn’t come back Saturday night neighbors failed to see the shadow crying with rain drops behind the splintered side of Ferguson’s garage.
The black body blurred by the tongue hanging dark, crouched close too cold to care that the stomach ceased to growl like a dry mutt’s whine, too empty to grind, grind.
Eleven years
Anne Marie waits
over old and too tired
no legal slave,
just free labor
bound by blood to
battered screen
blistered steps
gray splotched drapes
midnight fights.

But the no food meals, no bones, no beans
the cordless phone
the words police
don't understand
slowly lost
Anne Marie
and Woody would never know
where she ran away.

Miriam Timmerman

was a violation of God's covenant with Israel. Israel's God could not be manipulated. Israel would receive the blessings of God on flock and field through keeping the covenant, not by milk-rituals.

This example uncovers again a basic principle. The Bible comes to us with divine authority, but the nature of that authority must be understood in relationship to the historical circumstances in which revelation is given. Hence the command of Exodus 23:19 still tells us much about the relationship of the productivity of nature to the covenant God, but it no longer comes to us as a universal command against boiling a kid-goat in its mother's milk (at least if there is no milk-ritual involved). Again, all of this has been a further explication of the nature of the divine authority of Scripture.

Most likely no one thinks that the examples given above contain anything very alarming. I am certain that even the most outspoken critics of the report could accept the interpretation of the two texts mentioned. Why then do some react negatively when this same approach is applied in other areas of Scripture? Basically, I believe, the negative reaction is caused by the fact that in the past the historical approach to the Scriptures has led to a rejection of their authority either in part or in their entirety. And this brings us to that profound theological issue mentioned earlier.

The relationship of revelation to history has been in a particular way a modern problem. Prior to the Reformation, the historical interpretation of the Bible was frequently considered to be only one possible level of interpretation, and of all levels the least important. The allegorical method was frequently considered to be the most important, and the allegorical method is completely a-historical. Historical details are only a cloak covering eternal truths. And the ingenuity of the biblical interpreter was demonstrated by the number of such truths he could find lurking behind the details of the biblical stories. History is basically unimportant to the allegorical method.

With Luther, and still more strongly with Calvin, the emphasis swung toward understanding the Bible in its historical sense. Still today Calvin's commentaries are valued precisely because of the keen historical and theological insights they contain. Our interpretation of the examples given above is based essentially on Calvin's method, even though some of the historical knowledge used was not available to Calvin. The historical interpretation of the Bible is one of the hallmarks of the Reformation.

The problem of revelation and history arose with the development of a new world-view during the age of the Enlightenment. Without attempting to survey the complexities of this development, we can say that the view which gained credence asserted that history is a realm of necessity and not of freedom, a realm completely controlled by cause and effect relationships. In addition, it was claimed that historical facts could not be the bearers of eternal truth, for every historical fact is accidental and could just as well have been something else. Finally, men believed that they knew the limits of historical reality and that they could judge what was and what was not historical fact.

When history began to be viewed in that perspective, one can understand quite readily why history and historical methodology were considered a threat to the Christian faith. One understands also the reaction of those who wished to preserve the full authority of the Bible by almost removing it from history, by stressing not its historical side but-rather that the Bible contains eternal truths. Consequently, the emphasis in evangelical churches was upon Christianity as a dogmatic system of truth.

Classical liberalism, which arose during the nineteenth century and carried over into the twentieth century, is a prime example of how biblical revelation was limited by the acceptance of a particular historical methodology. The historical methodology accepted by liberalism was essentially a positivistic one. It was patterned after the empirical methodology of the natural sciences. Thus the historian was compelled to function within a cause-and-effect framework and the limits of historical reality were rigidly determined. Anything that could not be accounted for within that framework was relegated to the realm of myth, ancient superstition, and the like. In addition, historical interpretation was controlled by an immanentistic, evolutionary worldview.

Classical liberalism thus purchased the modern mind at the expense of biblical revelation. Revelation was forced into the mold established by the presuppositions of the methodology then current in the historical sciences. Consequently, the gospel was reduced to the familiar pattern of an ethical system devoid of miracles, Virgin Birth, substitutionary atonement, resurrection, and Second Coming.
Historical methodology controlled the content and the authority of the Word of God. Instead of using biblical revelation to criticize the presuppositions of that particular historical methodology, classical liberalism allowed that methodology to set the limits for biblical revelation.

The neo-orthodox movement of the twentieth century (Barth, Bultmann, et al.) reacted against classical liberalism but not against the historical methodology employed by liberalism. Although there are important differences between Barth and Bultmann (especially when Barth in his later years moved more vigorously toward a historical view of revelation), nevertheless in general it can be said that the neo-orthodox movement sought to secure the truth of revelation in a realm above and beyond the historical. In this way they thought that they could allow the historian complete freedom in applying his critical methods to the Bible without attempting to challenge his presuppositions, because they believed that the truth of revelation existed in an arena which could not be touched by the historian. Thus to a greater or lesser degree (depending on the theologian) areas of the Bible and its authority still fell victim to the scalpel of positivistic historiography.

It is important to remember this history of the recent past. For in the minds of many evangelicals today, this still constitutes the battle to be fought and the threat to be guarded against. Thus when anyone begins to talk too much or too vigorously about the historical interpretation of Scripture, or of making use in biblical interpretation of knowledge garnered by the historian, there are some among us who can see only the threat of liberalism or of neo-orthodoxy looming on the immediate horizon. That is understandable. But it should be noted that this threat is neither necessary nor inevitable. Everything depends upon the presuppositions which undergird the historical interpretation of Scripture.

Is there then any evidence that within the Reformed community there are theologians/historians who are not sufficiently critical of the presuppositions of their historical methodology? Several statements have been made in the Netherlands that have led to questions concerning this matter. Some have asserted, for example, that the historian as historian can say nothing about the resurrection. That sounds a lot like the liberal-neo-orthodox tradition, but there is a crucial difference. Unlike liberalism and unlike Rudolf Bultmann who affirm that the resurrection did not in fact happen, these men in the Netherlands all believe that the resurrection did happen in fact and that the fact of the resurrection is central to the Christian faith. They assert only that the historian as historian can say nothing about it. In other words, although they do not allow the historian to determine the limits of reality, they do allow him to set the limits of that on which he can make pronouncements. Thus they argue that there are real events about which the historian can say nothing precisely because they are totally unique (e.g. miracles).

The synodical report we are discussing does not approve this position. Although recognizing the crucial difference between allowing historical science to define the limits of historical reality and allowing historical science to determine only that on which it may speak, the report does not allow even that convenient distinction. It argues that the presuppositions with which the Christian historian/theologian must function concerning both the biblical documents and the resurrection as historical fact, do not allow the Christian historian to assert that as an historian he can say nothing about the resurrection as a fact.

The report is thus fully aware of the need for assuming a critical stance regarding the presuppositions which undergird the historical approach to and interpretation of the Bible. And that is the crucial issue. One may not and cannot avoid the task of fully honoring the historical character of the biblical revelation. At least in our age one cannot avoid that task. But we must guard against relativizing or limiting biblical revelation by our historical approach. It is necessary to be on guard against uncritically accepting presuppositions which undercut or violate the essential character of biblical revelation. We must acknowledge that the Bible itself has something to say about the presuppositions we use in interpreting it.

Now we can finally return to the beginning. Does the report give any support to the rumors that the authority of the Bible is being limited or rejected, that its authority is being controlled by human reason, and that the conclusions of historians are more important than the truth of the Word of God? Not in the least. The report attempts to honor fully the authority of Scripture, to recognize the limits of human reason, and it is aware of the complexities involved in the historical method. The report agrees that the interpreter and the historian must submit themselves to the authority of the Word of God.

But that does not negate the necessity for interpreting the Bible—also in terms of its character as an historical revelation—and applying it to our lives today. In doing this we confess that the Bible is the Word of God and that it comes to us with divine authority. Yet we encounter that divine authority in terms of the specific content of the Bible, a content set down for us during a long history of revelation. Thus we are always faced with the necessity of interpreting the Bible for our times. Who can quarrel with that?

The report also attempts to set down some principles for interpreting the Bible as a history of redemption focused on Jesus Christ. If that interests you at all, it's about time that you read the report for yourself.
that green eyed green beaned
smile
i used to shovel
from you heart!
eight years is a
very long time
to have missed
touching your hair.

i have difficulty
in remembering that
far back.

yes it was
a long time ago—but not so too.

already my Bulova (if i had one)
has forgotten your name.

contagion.

green beans come bottled come bottled in green beans
green eyes, salted, peppered, smoked and
store away till morning
come back, come bottled with spirits
so old that even the
paper labels
have crumbled to dust
and fallen away.

i came as a bottled green bean
of eyes bound in
a rubber band green.

red was a pretty color for rubber bands
then.
(only young rubber bands can stretch like green beans.)

(bottled sunshine)
minerals, protein
(in green beans!)
whose eyes fill gallons of
bean-filled bottles
(glass from miami, baked in the sun
of the mercenary beach.)

green is a simple color,
common to my summer tree,
(i could see it through my window now,
if only my drapes were open.)

my eliot,
my coca cola
(atlanta, 1905
it's very vintage)
only the best
in bottled latifunda
would do for mendel
and his black-eyed peas.
(while not green beans, are beans)
books and pages, bottled with the beans.

o mom!

the smoke in your eyes makes mine mist over
(and pavlov never rang his bell
until i listened, having learned
to watch his clock . . .)

Robert Swets
generally speaking, are more fixated on the Trivia game than any group of teachers in the educational hierarchy (p 151).

If this isn't workable try eliminating all testing, courses, requirements, administrators, and all restrictions that confine students to sitting in classrooms. Tests, used as judgment-making tools shift the purpose of schools from learning to preparation for tests. Courses, insofar as they follow tests, are "a series of briefings for the great Trivia contest." Requirements force teachers and administrators away from helping learners learn into a role of authoritarian enforcement of "requirements." Administrators are a bureaucratic hang-up stemming from the mindlessness of "requirements." If our concern is with learners learning, then the classrooms must be seen to be often a hinderance to making meaning out of this world.

If we are to survive in a rapidly changing environment, then schools must play a "subversive" role. The educational task becomes one of getting people to forget old, irrelevant concepts and adopt new ones. We must forget the concepts of fixed things, where once you know its name you know it; the concept of cause and effect—that every effect has one cause; the concept that knowledge is outside oneself, that it comes from higher authority and is not to be questioned. New concepts of perception, languaging, and knowledge must be imparted, always keeping in mind that the medium is the message:

The new education has as its purpose the development of a new kind of person, one who—as a result of internalizing a different series of concepts—is an actively inquiring, flexible, creative, innovative, tolerant, liberal personality who can face uncertainty and ambiguity without disorientation, who can formulate viable new meanings to meet changes in the environments which threaten individual and mutual survival (p 218).

Teaching as a Subversive Activity is a serious challenge to the traditional approaches to learning and the elitist attitudes which are prevalent here at Calvin College. This is borne out in the observations of the North-Central Association Report of last April:

... there does not seem to be a great deal of imaginative or innovative teaching going on. Courses seem rather traditional and conservative.... There appears to be an unusually small amount of practicum courses, independent study, and interdisciplinary and honors work.

Our task is fairly clear. We must ask ourselves questions. Questions like, "Why is there a Calvin College?" and "What really is worth knowing?" And maybe, just for once, nobody will have the Answer.
Notes of a Pacifist Activist

An important message of peace from a prophetic conspirator

by William Van Wyk

Pacifist David Dellinger, in his collection of essays written from 1943 to 1970 [Revolutionary Nonviolence (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971)], explores many topics related to war, peace, justice, and social change. Among them, as the titles of the five main sections indicate, are World War II; The War Against Vietnam; Cuba and China; Violence, Nonviolence, and the Movement; and the Chicago Convention and After. Most Americans know Dellinger as one of the “Chicago 7 (8),” who were convicted of conspiring police brutality at the 1968 Democratic Convention; he has, however, been at the forefront of movements for social change and new awareness since he attended Union Theological Seminary and worked for change in the Newark ghetto in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s.

When World War II broke out and young men were ordered to register for the draft he refused to do so even though he would have received a “IV-D” deferment as a divinity student; he spent three years in jail as a result of his refusal to co-operate. As a person who opposed even one of America’s “good wars” he has an insight and perspective tempered by thirty years of activism; insights which might be helpful to a person today thinking seriously about war and peace. Christians especially can learn from Dellinger, who, though apparently a little shaky in his doctrine, has given a far better example of what it means to be “in the world but not of it” than most Christians of the past few decades.

Since Dellinger’s book contains thirty-five essays, it would be best to organize a discussion of it topically, as follows: (1) Dellinger’s theory of nonviolence; (2) his discussions of various occurrences of institutional violence; and (3) some critical comments on his thoughts.

Nonviolence

Perhaps because of his religious background, or perhaps because of his high moral sensitivity, Dellinger’s stand against war has much to do with morality. He wrote in 1943 in his “Statement on Entering Prison”: “I believe that all war is evil and useless. Even a so-called war of defense is evil in that it consists of lies, hatred, self-righteousness, and the most destructive methods of violence that man can invent” (p 7). And he does not buy the “cardinal tenet of Niebuhrian Protestantism, political liberalism, social-democratic socialism, and even the American Communist Party, that political realism requires a combination of moral aims and immoral means…” (1966, pp 39-40). More positively, “nonviolence is a method of love and looks forward to reconciliation based on adjustment of grievances through mutual respect rather than a selfish victory based on the power of one side to impose its will on the other” (1962, p 249).

There are many people who see pacifism in this way—as a moral issue—but then stop there. But the moralistic attitude expressed in “we’re the good guys, you’re the bad guys” misses the point. “It is wrong to kill,” they say, and keep their hands immaculate. Such a naiveté misconstrues the practical political possibilities that nonviolence has when practiced as resistance to evil, rather than a retreat from it. Dellinger’s hope for the efficiency of nonviolent resistance as a political instrument arises out of his lack of faith in its alternative—war—to accomplish what it sets out to do. “The ‘democracies’ fought and won a violent war from 1914 to 1918. But it achieved nothing—at tremendous cost. It increased all the evils we hoped it would overcome. So it is time to discard this unsuccessful method of fighting and to embrace a new method, one that will work. That method is . . . nonviolent opposition to all evil (1943, p 13). In fact, practical nonviolent resistance in the modern world rose first not as a moral position, but as a practical method for oppressed people (Indians under the British, and Blacks in America) to try to attain some degree of freedom. Nonviolence does have practical effects, says Dellinger in an essay after Martin Luther King’s assassination:

It is one of the strengths of nonviolence that those who disarm themselves are disarming their opponents. Those who voluntarily divest themselves of armaments but at the same time press forward in a just cause, making clear their willingness to die for it (as Martin Luther King certainly did), tend to rob their opponents of the weapons as well. For of what use is a machine gun or a tank if one dare not use it, because to do so is to expose oneself to the whole world as a tyrant? Even tyrants must maintain a facade of legitimacy and justice, must be able to characterize their opponents as evil men—or they gradually lose control (1968, pp 262-3).

But even though nonviolence is practical, it would not be correct to say that it is merely a tactic. One cannot consistently hold a nonviolent attitude towards only a few areas of life. It rather leads one toward a particular view of all of life. For example, people sometimes ask pacifists whether nonviolence would save America if it were attacked. Dellinger’s answer is that it would be impossible. “This is not,” he says, “because of any inherent defect in the nonviolence method, but because of a very important strength: nonviolence cannot be used successfully to

continued on p 14
protection of special privileges that have been won by violence. The British could not have continued to rule India by taking a leaf out of Ghandi's book and becoming 'non-violent.' Nor would the United States be able to maintain a dominant position in Latin America if it got rid of its armies, navies, 'special forces,' CIA-guerillas, etc" (1965, pp 374-5). Americans cannot expect to wait until a military struggle breaks out to begin practicing nonviolence. When Blacks or Vietnamese or Chicanos or Latin Americans rise in arms against American oppression, it is probably too late to expect nonviolence to "work." It is not a tactic one can pick up at any time like a gun. "How could one have stopped the Detroit and Newark and Watts uprisings in 1967 without using violence?" America could have stopped them before they started if it had lived nonviolence early enough. Nor would it make sense for us to tell oppressed people who are reacting to their oppression to "practice nonviolence" while we are standing on their necks. Nonviolence cannot merely be preached; it must rather be lived, or it is nothing at all. And it must be lived in the whole of one's life: it is simply not consistent with lies, secrecy, treachery, exploitation of men and women, selfishness, or apathy.

What this all involves is that nonviolent people have to be willing to sacrifice. This does not simply mean the willingness to go to jail for one's own rights; rather, it involves willingness to give up one's privileges for the sake of others who are suffering. Dellinger apparently finds strength to sacrifice from a feeling for the plight of oppressed people whom he is in a position to help. He wrote about how hard it was to withstand hateful stares, jail, fasts, and bitter words during a peace march through Georgia; "but the daily cruelties that the Negro suffers are not pretty either" (1969, p 300). Seeing nonviolence as a way of living and thus as a life of sacrifice, as Dellinger does, points out the irony in most people's view of nonviolence as a means of avoiding sacrifice, of avoiding changing one's style of living. "It is absurd that both the privileged elite and the timid moderates have become spokesmen these days for 'nonviolence'" (1969, p 343).

Dellinger also said something in 1943 that every conscientious objector ought to consider thoughtfully today:

For me, there is no choice between going to a camp for conscientious objectors and going to jail. I have only one choice—my ministry in response to God. If the country puts me in jail for following that ministry, that is its choice, not mine. Then my ministry will be in jail. [Christians might consider such possibilities before they decide to go into the "ministry."] But civilian public service [CPA] would be a confusing, semi-voluntary withdrawal from my lifework in order to avoid certain penalties of the war-making government.

To me the CPS system is a method of draft evasion—not of draft opposition. It is a device whereby persons who know the wrongness of war and conscription tone down their opposition in return for the theoretical advantage of avoiding open prosecution and jail.... Further, CPS is a method by which the government maintains an illusion of democracy and freedom and thus is able to keep people relatively happy and docile while it destroys them with totalitarianism and war (1943, pp 15-16).

Sacrifice is more than a gamble or a risk. It involves the "renunciation of all claims to special privileges and power at the expense of other people" (p 375).

Institutional Violence

As St Paul says, "We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers..." (Ephesians 6:12), so Dellinger insists on fighting the evil structure of many of our institutions. Since he is an American and thus knows the most about his own country's institutions and feels able to do something about them, Dellinger concentrates specifically on American structures. In addition, however, he is convinced that there are special evils in the American way of doing things that encourages imperialism, with its inevitable oppression of people in other countries. In this context he concentrates especially on World War II and America's involvement in that war, the war against Vietnam, and the Cuban revolution.

World War II. Dellinger does not believe the popular tales relating how America got into the war out of kindness to German Jews and because the US was attacked without cause by Japan. Dellinger was anti-Nazi already in the thirties after making visits to resistance movements in Germany and upon coming back to the US he worked hard, but fruitlessly, to do away with immigration quotas that kept most Jews from finding asylum here. As for Japan, Dellinger writes in 1943:

Churchill himself has admitted in Parliament that President Roosevelt committed us to war against Japan in August 1941, four months before Pearl Harbor.... We also began a policy of limited naval warfare. Naval officers have admitted that before Pearl Harbor, they
were sent on secret expeditions with orders to shoot Japanese ships and aircraft—on sight and without warning (p 9).

The question, then, is how did the US become involved in the war? Dellinger credits American and British industrialists and politicians in part for Hitler's rise to power. They supported him both to make private profits in business deals and because Hitler (and Mussolini) were destroying the labor and social movements of Europe, which obviously threatened big business and politicians. In Asia, “We introduced modern violence and robbery to the Japanese by our rape of the orient. Later we were partners with Japan in her invasion of China. American oil, steel, and munitions were sold at huge profits for that purpose . . . . We began to boycott Japan only when it began to threaten our damnable mastery of the orient . . . .” (p 9). Even the letting loose of nuclear weapons on the civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was entirely unnecessary and geared toward displaying American might in such a forceful way that she could regain domination over the whole orient. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki were atomized at a time when the Japanese were suing desperately for peace,” writes Dellinger in 1945. “The American leaders were acting with almost inconceivable treachery by denying that they had received the requests for peace, rumors of which had been trickling through the censorship for several months” (p 18).

Dellinger offers in his introduction an excellent summary of his views on America's foreign wars in general:

All were fought in the name of political democracy but increased the wealth and power of those whose businesses were exempt from democracy and subject to the most minor and indirect controls [ie, most of America's private big businesses]. Thus, in World War II, the country's youth were conscripted on the theory that the preservation of civilization was at stake. Those who refused to offer up their lives to the military were put in jail. Private Edward Slovik, who deserted, was shot as an example to others. But it was taken for granted that industry would not offer its cooperation unless guaranteed substantial profits. War contracts were issued on a guaranteed cost-plus-profit basis . . . . This is a society in which profits and property are more sacred than human life itself (pp xxi-xxii).

None of what Dellinger says about World War II seems implausible; at any rate it can at least open us to the awareness that the US certainly has not been the selfless savior of modern man.

Vietnam. The six articles on “The War Against Vietnam” are perhaps the most important of the book because they describe so graphically the American policy—and the results of that policy in terms of human responses rather than body counts, names instead of numbers—that is still being carried on today, that young people are being conscripted to carry out. US aggression in Vietnam began already in 1945 when the Vietnamese first declared their independence. The US and British re-armed 90,000 surrendered Japanese troops and sent them against the Vietnamese.

Then, five years later, it aided the French in their attempt to maintain their Indochinese colonies. President Eisenhower refused to allow free elections in 1954, contrary to the Geneva agreement, because he knew that Ho Chi Minh would win. To “preserve” Vietnamese freedom, Eisenhower forced the Vietnamese not to exercise it. That has been the story ever since, as the US has supported (and even helped to install) one military dictator after another in Vietnam.

In his first essay on Vietnam, Dellinger compares what the US is doing there to what the Nazis did in Germany. “The very mention of German atrocities in the same breath as America's 'indiscretions' and circumstantial 'excesses' in Vietnam is offensive to us,” he writes (p 34). The real lesson we should learn from Germany is “the number of ordinary, 'decent,' humane and enlightened men and women, persons very much like ourselves, who collectively formed the cast of the German tragedy.” We think the Nazis were essentially different from ourselves, and,

we have found it hard to believe that the average German was not "aware" of what was going on under the Nazis. We conveniently overlook the personal defense mechanisms which protected the Germans (as they protect us today) from emotional and spiritual awareness, even when the facts were available (p 35).

The United States is destroying life, land, and buildings in both North and South Vietnam and Dellinger has seen the ruin in both parts of the country. In South Vietnam, besides the loss of life, there have been other disastrous effects of American presence. In Saigon, for instance, a group of parentless eight to twelve year-olds (Vietnamese "street people") tugged at Dellinger's sleeves for a piastre. "Some whimpered plaintively while others smiled eagerly and looked up with irresistible faces of innocence. Most heartrending of all was the fact that the whole performance was obviously rehearsed for maximum impact. Children not only orphaned and desolate but progressively hardened and corrupted in order to survive" (p 47). "At the entrance to my hotel a little girl, perhaps eight years old, asks for money. After she gets a little, she runs back a few steps and cries defiantly: 'Ka Ka Do Americans; Ka Ka Do Americas' ('Cut the American's throats ...')". Americans who go to Vietnam with the understanding that they are helping the Vietnamese usually find that the people in Saigon—the most "pro-American" area—think differently. "There is a sullen aloofness and hostility of the general populace, which is not above making a fast dollar off the Americans . . . . A bomb explodes, a symbolic assault is made at the very center of Saigon in full view of hundreds of people, and the perpetrators are almost never caught" (p 49).

The last reaction to American imperialism in Vietnam came from guerillas—South Vietnamese who did not want foreigners to control Vietnam for the private wealth they could acquire. Then the Northerners began to support the struggle to finish liberating their land. This is roughly analogous to Lincoln sending troops to the Southern states...
to unite our country. The only difference is that had the South Vietnamese voted on whether or not to unite their country under Ho Chi Minh (Indochina's George Washington) they would have voted yes. Even America knew they would—that is why America ensured that the elections of 1954 were cancelled.

But the US has felt free to wage war with North Vietnam for wanting to unite their country under their form of government. Dellinger reports what he saw and heard in the north.

What does an American say to a Vietnamese mother who hands him [a snapshot of her three children killed by American bombs] and says "We Vietnamese do not go to the United States to fight your people. Why do you come over here to kill my children?"

What can one say to a twenty year-old girl, swathed in bandages and still in a state of shock because her mother, father, three brothers and sisters were all killed at their noonday meal when American bombers attacked the primitive agricultural village in which they lived? She herself was pulled unconscious and severely burned from the straw hut in which the rest of the family perished.

"Ask your President Johnson," she said to me "if our straw huts were made of steel and concrete" (a reference to the President's claim that our targets in North Vietnam are military structures of steel and concrete). "Ask him if our Catholic church which they destroyed was a military target ...." (p 53).

The International War Crimes Tribunal at Stockholm and Roskilde, Denmark, in 1966 and 1967 reported that 307 Catholic church buildings and 116 Buddhist temples had been destroyed by American bombs. The Catholic churches are larger, with considerably more open property surrounding them (p 95). Dellinger reports his conversation with two boys, seven and twelve, one missing his right arm, the other a leg. Trying to get away from the horrors of war, Dellinger asks them about school and tells them about the daily life of his own ten and fourteen year-olds in the US.

But there was no way we could get away from the war, as one can do in the United States by turning off the news or changing the topic.

School? Seven year-old Dai had lost his arm when his kindergarten was bombed. Ten of his classmates and the teacher were killed; nine were wounded. Twelve year-old Chinh had been on his way to school one morning with a friend when: "there was the explosion of bombs and I didn't know that my leg was cut but only that I couldn't stand up and that I couldn't walk any longer .... My friend Ve put me on his back and got me near the trenches" (p 54).

And there are countless other conversations. A girl tells of her twenty-two year-old brother who was something of a poet, but had his career ended prematurely by an American bomb. A woman tells how she volunteers to cook rice for the soldiers as they try with rifles to bring down low-flying American planes. Someone's aunt and two brothers are killed. Yet the will to fight is increased. For them, it is better dead than red-white-and-blue.

It would be silly for Americans to ask the Vietnamese to carry on a nonviolent struggle. Dellinger is convinced that all of Vietnam (and the US) would be better off in the long run if the Vietnamese would practice non-violent resistance. But he understands how "defensive violence" is a natural reaction to thirty years of western and Japanese imperialism. If an American truly believes the Vietnamese should fight nonviolently, he will begin to help here in the US where an individual Vietnamese 10,000 miles away is not bound to have much effect. People may have to give up their "respectable" places in society, and some of the privileges and luxuries that have been made possible by the Asians, Latin Americans, Africans, and many poor Americans. But the sacrifices would be nothing compared to what the Vietnamese have to go through.

What course should America take at present? "Negotiating peace" means about as much to Vietnam as it would have meant to Americans the morning after Pearl Harbor, says Dellinger. Besides pulling our troops out, America ought to offer an indemnity to the Vietnamese with no strings attached—not as a charity or bribe, the way past "aid" has been. "Of course no one should think that paying such an indemnity would make up for the death and suffering we have inflicted, but it could signify repentance and the beginnings of treating the Vietnamese with respect as equals" (p 80). This is a very important point, one which Mr Nixon and most liberal Americans have failed to see. The war against Vietnam is not an "error" which we hope will be pardoned as soon as we withdraw honorably. Rather, it stems directly from the notion of white (or western) supremacy (we wouldn't stand for Chinese troops in Guatemala, even if they were called in by the latest military coup, as happened with the US in Vietnam), the selfish private-profit motive which operates without democratic controls by the people whose lives are affected by them, and our total absence of humility as a nation.

Dellinger also has some excellent essays on America's involvement in Cuba, the Cuban revolution, and the resultant changes in social and economic spheres. He also discusses the American economic system and political assumptions in articles on Martin Luther King, the Warren Report, rebellions of Black Americans, elections (including four essays on Chicago), reflections while in jail, and attitudes and actions in the peace movement. The essays in this section tend toward redundancy, overlapping one another without shedding a proportionate amount of new light on the subjects.

A Critical Analysis

It is refreshing to read a political analyst who does not divorce his goal from the means used to reach that goal. Realizing that the means to an end is itself an end that must also be justified is one of the insights of pacifism that most people (conservatives, liberals, communists, and even many peace-movement people) fail to discern. An evil means lingers in a supposedly "good" end that it brings about. It qualifies that particular goal, making it altogether different from what it would be if another means had been used.

Dellinger's insistence that a person who oppresses others
is also oppressing himself is also quite valuable. Actually, this lesson goes back to Sunday School, where it was said that sin, though it may seem fun, is really separation from God, which is never really fun. It must be that most people forget that sort of thing in growing older; using privilege and luxury for selfish enjoyment while knowing that we could be sharing with others hurts us as well as those whom we are oppressing. White people have been hurt deeply by their oppression of Blacks—especially because they often do not even sense that something is wrong. Men have suffered because of their oppression of women. America is ruining itself right now because of what it is doing in Vietnam. One cannot live human life to the fullest when he thinks that the lives of others are cheap, when human beings become mere objects to him, and when he thinks his purpose in life is to subjugate others to himself. Nor can one repent—turn around and go the opposite direction—unless he first sees that he is heading in the wrong direction.

Dellinger also has a notion of the radical nature of sin that is surprisingly close to the biblical view. Yet Dellinger's notion is not adequate for it is still not really biblical and can lead one to antinomies. For Dellinger, evil is real. It is capable of exercising power over people. Evil is not adequately described as "mistakes" or "errors" as in the liberal theological view; to flee evil, Dellinger would probably say, one must turn around and go the other direction. But what is the source of this evil? Dellinger is too quick to say that our economic system is the source of all our problems. To be sure, capitalism, with its built-in selfishness and tendency to reduce human beings to economic objects, does have its serious evils, and Americans (especially Christians) should think about trading it in for something else. But where did capitalism, which for Dellinger is apparently the basic source of evil today, come from, if not from human beings? Is capitalism evil in itself, or is it a manifestation of human selfishness? If the evil lies fundamentally in human beings, then it hardly seems possible that humans could ever form a truly good society.

Dellinger does see evil, however, as existing in other than capitalist institutions. He says, "The Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the continued post-Stalin repression of individuals and groups advocating alternative forms and tactics for the building of communism make clear that non-capitalist societies can be brutal and dehumanizing as well" (p 341). So is it possible that a superior economic system will not be able to uproot the selfishness from man? If that economic system is based on the pretended self-sufficiency and autonomy of man, I hardly think that it could. So, the source of the antinomy in Dellinger's assumptions is that he does not allow for man to be anything but autonomous.

One final criticism has to do with an element Dellinger leaves out of his discussion of nonviolence that is fundamental to any Christian theory of nonviolence. That is the element of witness. When a Christian sacrifices of his time, goods, opportunities, "respect" (according to our pagan society's notion of respect), and "gives up his claim to privileged treatment—in short, when he does some "new thing" that people cannot understand with their present attitudes, he is witnessing that more is operating in his life than meets the other person's eyes. He has a new root, a new standard, a new source of strength. He can sacrifice because he is aware that "I am not my own but belong to the faithful God." Besides being religious talk, however, that means something. Dellinger finds his strength to sacrifice in his awareness that the suffering of other people is worse than his. But many people see others suffering and do not feel moved to do something about it. "They deserve it," or, "They don't work hard enough," or, horror of horrors: "God must have planned it that way"—all these become excuses for inaction. To take action, to find a reason to sacrifice, one must realize that it is true of all men that they are not their own. I can't blame others because I have no excuse myself. If I am better off materially than others, that is a privilege, not something owed to me. But all privileges are to be used properly—and being a "good steward" does not mean squandering what one has while others are without.

The strength that motivates a Christian's ability to sacrifice is his awareness of his belonging—not to this world, its traps, its rewards and punishments—but to his faithful Savior. If this means anything, it means that he'll dare make a fool of himself, dare to go to jail or get clubbed on the head, dare to love enemies, have the strength to decide for himself whether things like college degrees or well-paying jobs are really as important as our pagan society says they are. Dellinger has the strength to do most of these things, and undoubtedly he is moved by the Spirit and the impinging of God's own revelation upon him. But if he continues to look to man as his source of strength to carry on, he is witnessing to nothing people do not already know about, and may wind up in serious trouble later on since it has been dependence on man (though a different brand of it) that got us into all this trouble in the first place. He himself pointed out that man is selfish, and thus should be careful about getting the motive for a particular direction in life from such an unsuitable basis. Christians can, in actions of nonviolent resistance, point beyond man to Christ, whose love for man gives the Christian strength to sacrifice what appears "good" in this life.

When Christians read David Dellinger it is important to keep in mind some of these basic questions. But one ought not to disregard him, either. Most of what he says arises out of sensitive experience in some of the most important matters that people become involved in. Christians can sit back complacently keeping their head together with all the right doctrine, but if no actions arise out of that doctrine, there is no way in which one can say that he "has" it. Dellinger is challenging, not just in the words he has written, but in the life he is living; and we can learn from the words as well as the life.
Faith and Doubt in "The Oxen"

by Henrietta TenHarmsel

Christmas Eve, and twelve of the clock.
"Now they are all on their knees,"
An elder said as we sat in a flock
By the embers in hearthside ease.

We pictured the meek mild creatures where
They dwelt in their strawy pen,
Nor did it occur to one of us there
To doubt they were kneeling then.

So fair a fancy few would weave
In these years! Yet, I feel,
If someone said on Christmas Eve,
"Come; see the oxen kneel,

"In the lonely barton by yonder coomb
Our childhood used to know,"
I should go with him in the gloom,
Hoping it might be so.

Thomas Hardy; "The Oxen"
The Collected Poems of Thomas Hardy
Macmillan, 1925

The deceptively simple stanzaic form of "The Oxen" disguises an intricate pattern of ambiguities, contrasts, and metrical variations. These all emphasize the painful tension between faith and unbelief which the poem expresses. The childlike devotional atmosphere of the first two lines reveals its ambiguity in lines 3 and 4 when the reader realizes the meek submissiveness suggested by the phrase "in a flock"; the dying out (in contrast to the warm glowing) suggested by "the embers"; and the ironic implications of "hearthside ease." In the opening lines of stanzas 2 and 3 the words pictured and fancy convey not only the vivid impressions of childlike faith but also the ironic, sceptical realization that these images represent merely fancy and not fact. And in the penultimate line of the poem, the words in the gloom become doubly dark as one realizes that they suggest not only the darkness of night but also the darkness of gathering doubt.

In addition to these ambiguities a series of contrasts underlines the tension between belief and unbelief. "Then" of the first two stanzas (1. 8) is contrasted with "these years" of the last two (1. 10). The "embers" of line 4 are contrasted with "the gloom" of line 15. The ease implied by the word sat (1. 3) is displaced by the unrest of "I should go..." (1. 13). Adult feeling (1. 10) contrasts with childhood knowing (1. 14). And the negation of doubting (1. 8) stands in a meaningful position of contrast with the ironic "Hoping" of the last line.

Even more constant, however, is the poet's use of a subtly alternating metrical pattern to convey the central tension of the poem. The meter wavers continually between the trochaic (with dactylic variations) and the iambic (with anapestic variations). In a recent College English article (November, 1971) Dudley L Hascall studies in detail the subtle relationship of the trochaic and the iambic meters, between which it is often difficult to distinguish. One of his conclusions suggests that "The real psycholinguistic difference between trochaic and iambic verse seems to depend on the set of the reader toward the first syllable: if iambic, he expects it to fill a weak position; if trochaic, a strong position" (p 225). In "The Oxen" the first word immediately establishes the trochaic foot as the "strong position.

The first stanza, expressing childlike faith, begins clearly in the strong trochaic meter, with naturally integrated dactyls for variation:

1st Stanza:

Christmas Eve, and twelve of the clock.
"Now they are all on their knees,"
An elder said as we sat in a flock
By the embers in hearthside ease.

Lines 3 and 4, however, turn toward the weaker iambic, with naturally integrated anapests for variation. Just as the poet introduces the contrast of doubt to the initial faith of childhood, so he introduces a corroborating weak-strong contrast in meter:

2nd Stanza:

In the lonely barton by yonder coomb
Our childhood used to know,
I should go with him in the gloom,
Hoping it might be so.

In stanzas 2 and 3—where doubt is overtly introduced—the iambic predominates but is "disturbed" by the tendency toward trochaic (and dactylic) in the opening feet of line 7 and line 12:

3rd Stanza:

Now they are all on their knees...

Come see the oxen kneel...

The last stanza skillfully reverses the pattern of stanza 1, beginning with two iambic lines and changing in the third to one which seems trochaic. The ease with which one can change a trochaic reading of this third line to an iambic aptly suggests the poem's wavering between faith and doubt:

4th Stanza:

"In the lonely barton by yonder coomb
Our childhood used to know,"
I should go with him in the gloom...

The poet completes the meaningful alternating pattern of iamb and trochees perfectly in the final line of the poem by opening it with the expected strong trochee: Hoping. However, he then switches immediately to iambics in the last two "doubtful" feet: It might be so. In this way the metric pattern of the poem—as well as its ambiguities and contrasts—conveys the poignant vacillation between faith and doubt which the poet is expressing.
The Status of Women in Scripture

A perennial problem sheds new light on exegetical principles

by Joan Malda

In the article "A Study in Perseverance: The Feminine Mystique?" in the December 10 Dialogue, Edward Vanderberg mentioned the exegetical problem of interpreting Biblical passages regarding women and their role in the church. Although I do not pretend to be a theologian or exegete, I would like to present some views which I have tentatively accepted after doing some research in the area of the Biblical role of women. I would like to broaden the scope of the discussion, however, and concentrate on the place of women in relationship to men in general instead of specifically in matters concerning the church and its government.

The traditional Biblical view of the relationship of woman and man maintains that woman is subservient to man because she was made "after, because of, out of, and for the man" (Acts of Synod, 1950). Her role is primarily that of homemaker and helper to the man, who is the provider and aggressor. Scripture passages which emphasize the subjection of women to men are cited, such as I Corinthians 11:3, "But I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God." I Timothy 2:11-15 is also used as evidence of the male's right to dominate:

...Let a woman learn in quietness with all subjection. But I permit not a woman to teach, nor to have dominion over a man, but to be in quietness. For Adam was first formed, then Eve; and Adam was not beguiled, but the woman being beguiled hath fallen into transgression: but she shall be saved through her childbearing, if they continue in faith and love and sanctification with sobriety.

Some Biblical scholars, however, rejected this fundamentalistic approach and considered the Bible a collection of irrelevant history with some essential truths in Jesus' teaching. Adolf von Harnack, for example, the author of What is Christianity?, could easily explain away these Pauline passages by attributing the ideas to accommodation to the ideas of time, destroying any normative value for today.

In the last thirty or forty years, new efforts to interpret the Bible "realistically" have emerged. This view, represented by Swedish scholars such as Aulen and Nygren, criticized the liberal view because it "had a conscious or unconscious tendency to judge and evaluate texts and ideas from the first century by the anachronistic standards of modern Western values and sentiments." They held a more organic view of God's revelation in the Bible; their specific views on the role of women will be discussed later in the paper.

One important contribution to theology that these theologians have made has been an emphasis on interpreting the Bible historically within the particular cultural situation. Nearly all of the Bible was written by men imbedded in Jewish tradition, which generally asserted male dominance. Assuming that God did not somehow insulate the secondary authors from their cultural situation, we can safely say that they did not "winnow out all of their own cultural biases and assumptions." Paul, the chief biblical proponent of the subservient role of women, could not help but be influenced by his culture where the function of women was exclusively child-bearing and rearing, where the classification of women was with slaves and children, and where the rights of women were practically non-existent. It is not surprising that the Jewish rabbis at that time thanked God for not making them women. Nor is it unusual that Paul's cultural bias comes through in his injunctions to wives about their Christian duty to be in subjection to their husbands in Ephesians 5:22.

It is significant, however, that although Christ did not talk about the status of women, he ignored many cultural norms regarding the proper behavior towards them. In Luke 7:36-50 we read about Christ actually talking to a woman and forgiving her sins, a phenomenon which was deliberately contrary to the established custom of not speaking to any woman unless absolutely necessary. Women in Jesus' day were usually given only enough training to make them good housewives, but in Luke 10:39 Christ "taught" Mary of Bethany. It is evident through these and many other instances throughout the gospels that Christ treated women as people, not mere sex objects or slaves.

We know comparatively little about Paul's behavior towards women, except that he didn't allow them to speak in the public meetings (I Corinthians 14:34ff.), insisted that they wear veils (I Corinthians 11:3-16), etc. But these actions and ideas of Paul must be understood within the context of the many cultural influences which provide him with various predispositions. A prime example of this influence is the concept of the "creation order." According

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to this view woman is necessarily subordinate to man because she was created after man and for the purpose of filling his need for companionship. The Biblical basis for this view is found in I Corinthians 11:7-9:

... For a man indeed ought not to have his head veiled, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of the man: for neither was the man created for the woman; but the woman for the man...

Upon examination of the Scriptures we find that there is nothing inherent in the creation story which indicates anything but complete equality. In Genesis 1:27, we find, "And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." There is nothing here to indicate male superiority; neither is there anything in the Genesis 2 version of the creation story where the Bible tells of woman being made from man's rib. The word "helpmeet" (verse 20) has often been misunderstood as a word which somehow connotes inferiority. After God created the animals there still was no being which was worthy of man. Woman was created as a help, "meet" or equal to man corresponding to and complementing him.

There is also no delineation of distinct male or female vocations, but Adam and Eve are given together the command to "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the heavens, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth" (Gen 1:28). It is only when sin enters the world that inequality and the separation of sex roles do also:

Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy pain and thy conception; in pain thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee (Genesis 3:16).

The subordination of woman is not a result of her creation after man but a result of her sin.

Paul, however, inherited from his Jewish culture the view that God's creation of man before woman implied woman's inequality and therefore his message in I Corinthians 11 is written within that framework.

The nature of the Scriptural message regarding the role of women is neither absolute nor always consistent. A major factor determining the nature of the message is the cultural situation of the audience or receivers of the message. Paul seems to be inconsistent when he says in Galatians 3:28, "... there can be no male or female for all are one man in Christ Jesus," and in I Corinthians 11:7, "Man is the image of God and the glory of God: but the woman is the glory of the man."

Biblical scholars agree that Paul probably adapted his message to his listeners in these two cases. In Galatia it seems the men of the church were not putting their faith into action and were still treating Greeks, women and slaves as somewhat less deserving of salvation. In this they were guilty of conforming to the social norms which openly discriminated against these three groups. The somewhat different emphases in the Corinthian passage can be explained by the different situation in that church. Many in this church were exercising their Christian freedom to such an extent as to violently deny the social norms of the day, upsetting society and becoming a stumbling block to some inside the church. Paul wrote to specific churches about their specific problems and did not make general applications of all his suggestions to everyone.

Using this realistic interpretation of some passages about women as a starting point, we will now turn to the area of hermeneutics, or the theory of interpreting the passages for the church today. Just as in the exegetical problem (the interpretation of the historical meaning of the text), there are commonly thought to be two different approaches in the hermeneutical situation. The traditional approach insists that what was considered right for the Jews or the first Christians is right for us now, using each instructional word of the Bible in a literal and normative sense. All we have to do, according to this view, is go back to the Bible and recreate our churches after the model of the early church. In answer to the question of the role of women, the traditionalists have no doubts as to the present-day validity of Paul's decree to women that they should be in subjection to their husbands.

The modernists, on the other hand, are inclined to judge the Biblical culture in terms of our own culture. Everything less than "God as our Father, Providence, all men as God's children and the eternal value of the soul" is irrelevant to
them. Seen in this light the question of the Biblical view of women's role need not even be raised since the Bible has very little authority in any specific cultural situation today.

Both the traditionalist and the modernist views believe the Bible to be in a "pure and unambiguous form." They differ in whether or not this form is relevant to our culture. The realistic scholars, however, reject a choice between these alternatives, believing that they create a false dichotomy. They realize the difficulty of interpreting the Bible correctly, perhaps even denying the concept of a "right" or "wrong" interpretation.

This idea is expressed by Anton Fridrichsen in his Book *En Bok om Bibeln*:

*Everything in the Bible emanates from the Christ-Reality.* Thereby its absolute character as revelation is given and articulated. But implied in the fact that the Bible is a *testimony to and interpretation of the Christ event* is also the fact that it consists of words of men, contingent upon and determined by historical, sociological and psychological circumstance. Thus we have in the Bible what is absolute only in and through what is relative. It is the work of the Spirit to make the word of man in the Bible into God's absolute word for us (Quoted in Krister Stendahl, *The Bible and the Role of Women*, p 16).

The hermeneutical problem seems to lie in distinguishing what in the Bible is absolute and what is culturally relative. But if, as Fridrichsen also says, "It is the word in its historically conditioned context and content which becomes the word of God" (*ibid.*, p. 16), our problem may not be that of separating the cultural from the absolute but of understanding the message within the cultural channel.

Although this situation is not exclusively a problem in human communication, if we pose a transcendent God as the ultimate source of revelation, it takes that form because God reveals himself and his message through our communication system (language) and human communicators. It is useful to use four types of problems in human communication to further clarify the hermeneutical problem.

The first kind of problem is called an observing problem, i.e., individuals see different things either because of differences in perspective or differences in personality. Each person has a set of unique experiences which have helped to mold his personality. Since he perceives selectively, a person will therefore observe on the basis of these past experiences. For example, when a contemporary married man looks at women, he sees them differently than Paul did, simply because Paul was never married. Paul and the other New Testament writers also had a completely different time perspective than we have today. They were at the beginning of the church history continuum whereas we are much closer to the end and thus cannot equate our perspectives with theirs.

Codification of problems constitutes the second category of human communications problems. Individuals codify (organize and label) differently because of personal, cultural or subcultural differences in language. The vast differences between our culture and the cultures at the time of the writing of the Bible have created a "communications gap." This gap cannot be bridged by "playing First-Century Christian," ignoring cultural changes and the development of the Christian doctrines as traditionalists do, nor by dismissing the parts of the Bible influenced by Jewish culture as irrelevant as the modernists do, thus making the entire Bible practically useless. The former alternative adopts the codification of Paul and transplants it into the cultural setting of today, establishing it as a universal norm. The second alternative looks at Paul's codification in terms of our modern day codification, finds it does not fit, and rejects the substance of Paul's words.

Problems in expressing and receiving are two final categories of communication problems. In Biblical interpretation these problems are augmented by the fact that the human authors were not speaking directly to us. Thus they did not use language specifically intended for us; nor can we understand the message exactly as the author's listeners understood it. The intellectual and psychological difficulties of any cross-cultural communication tend to distort the message, especially in a cross-time setting such as this one.

We can see how recognition of the differences in observation and codification and of the difficulties in expression and reception clarifies the problem of the Biblical role of women by taking a closer look at the situation in this context.

The main argument that Paul and consequently the traditionalists use to support their view of male dominance is that of the "creation order." As stated before, there is nothing in the creation story which indicates anything but complete equality. When Eve sinned she first received the punishment of submission to her husband.

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dialogue

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But Paul, as a Jew, had no more reason to discredit the widely accepted cultural view of the creation order than Moses had to reject the world view of a firmament and waters under the earth. The church of today has the added benefit of several thousand years of research and study of the Scriptures. This as well as a different cultural background enables us to see the problem in a different cultural and theological light. What was the norm then has changed and additional revelation has in effect been given.

According to the realistic interpreters (with whom I am inclined to agree) Paul himself catches a glimpse of future revelation when he says in Galatians 3:28 that in Christ there is not Jew or Greek, no slave or free, no male or female. The implications of this statement are radically different from the implications of the creation order. The tension between them cannot be resolved by separating man’s relationship to God (spiritual equality of the sexes) and man’s relationship to man (practical inequality of the sexes). This harmonizing effort by the traditionalists defines a faith of abstract theology with no consistent social implication, a concept quite foreign to most Christians.

What are the results of asserting the original equality of the sexes and inequality as a result of the fall? “What this suggests is that man and woman, in striving to overcome the effects of sin, should evolve toward that real partnership on all levels which is required if the image of God is to be realized in them (Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex, p. 37).

The difficulty in Paul’s expressing and our receiving of the content of Galatians 3:28 is evident also. Although the message of this verse was not intended primarily for us, we can gain insight into an ideal which Paul sets up in his “glimpse which points beyond and even against the prevailing view and practice of the New Testament church” (Stendahl, p. 34).

Paul, of course, could not see all the social implication of his statement:

It is not surprising that Paul did not see the full implications of this transcendence. There is unresolved tension between the personalized Christian message and the restrictions and compromises imposed by the historical situation. It would be naive to think that Paul foresaw social evolution. For him, transcendence would come soon enough—in the next life. The inconsistency and ambivalence of his words concerning women could only be recognized at a later time, as a result of historical processes (Daly, p. 42).

In summary, how should we then interpret the Bible on the subject of woman’s role? First, we must avoid the “either-or” dichotomy of the traditionalists and the modernists to whom either everything or nothing is relevant. Secondly, it is necessary to understand the historical meaning of the Scriptural passages within their cultural context. Thirdly, the application of Scripture must be seen as a problem in human communication across a gap of the centuries which has inherent ambiguities and difficulties. Finally the value of nineteen centuries of Biblical study and revelation must be emphasized as the context for striving toward a re-creation and renewal of the originally created equality of man and woman.
Blessed are the peacemakers.