Theologia Viatorum: institutional Continuity and the Reception of a theological Framework From Franciscus Junius's De theologia Vera To Bernhardinus De Moor's Commentarius Perpetuus

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THEOLOGIA VIATORUM:
INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY AND THE RECEPTION OF A
THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FROM FRANCISCUS JUNIUS’S DE
THEOLOGIA VERA TO BERNHARDINUS DE MOOR’S
COMMENTARIUS PERPETUUS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF CALVIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

TODD M. RESTER
GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN
MAY 2016
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ABSTRACT

Some scholars have identified a certain amount of vagueness in continuity theses of scholarship regarding medieval, Reformation, and post-Reformation thought. A criterion of continuity is necessary in order to prosecute a continuity thesis. One way to root intellectual history within a particular social context over time is to examine a conceptual framework as it develops, changes, and even declines within an academic institution like an early modern university. Institutional continuity is a methodological approach that seeks to clarify the relationship between continuity, influence, confessionalization and deconfessionalization diachronically within an institutional context of an early modern university. The test case for this method is the prolegomenal framework of Franciscus Junius, as first propounded in *De Theologia Vera* (1594) and developed by various theologians at Leiden University, but especially as it was deployed by Bernhardinus De Moor in his seven volume *Commentarius Perpetuus* during his tenure as a theology professor at Leiden (1745-1779). This dissertation examines that prolegomenal framework in light of the pedagogical methods employed through lectures, disputations, and published works. Bernhardinus De Moor also deploys this prolegomenal framework thematically in his academic orations delivered first upon assuming the chair of theology and second as a valedictorian address at the close of his tenure as rector magnificus. A subsidiary point in the *De Theologia Vera*, the *theologia viatorum*, also is examined in terms of how it constructs the relationship between faith and reason, methodological doubt, natural and supernatural revelation, the necessity of Scripture, and academic theology as a form of scholastic piety.
CHAPTER 1: Matters of Method

When there is a relative dearth of scholarship on a particular topic or figure, it could mean *hic sunt dracones*. Then, one has a choice: either take heed that there are dangers ahead and turn back, or rejoice at the awaiting adventure, and sail straight into relatively uncharted territory. It is the latter course that is chosen here, even if the figure in question authored a magnum opus entitled *Commentarius Perpetuus*. Bernhardinus De Moor (1709-1780) was a professor of theology at Leiden University from 1745 to 1779 who sought to maintain the tenets of Protestant Reformed confessional orthodoxy in the twilight of an era that is known by some scholars as late confessional orthodoxy.¹ That he

was laboring in the twilight of an era is evidenced by the requirement of seven volumes
to articulate and defend his understanding of confessional orthodoxy. On the nature of
"late orthodoxy," Muller remarks:

Theology after 1725, in what can be called "late orthodoxy," is less secure in its
philosophical foundations, indeed, searching for different philosophical models,
less certain of its grasp of the biblical standard, and often (though hardly always)
less willing to draw out its polemic against other "orthodox" forms of
Christianity, less bound by the confessional norms of the Reformation and given
to internecine polemics. One can even speak here of a "deconfessionalization" in
the late orthodox period that reverses the process of "confessionalization" that
took place in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.2

If confessionalization describes "the ways an alliance of church and state mediated
through confessional statements and church ordinances facilitated and accelerated the
political centralization underway after the fifteenth century" then deconfessionalization is
the disintegration through a variety of pressures of that alliance.3 In the context of a
magisterial union between Church and State in the early modern period, the early modern
university was one significant buttress for that union as well as of both spheres
individually. Despite various challenges to the confessionalization thesis noted by

2 R. A. Muller, PRRD, 1:32. Muller identifies several late Reformed codifiers and representatives after
1725, namely Daniel Wyttenbach (1706-1779) a professor at Bern and Marburg, Johann Friedrich Stapfer
(1708-1775), Herman Venema (1697-1787) a professor at Franeker, John Gill (1697-1771), Alexander
Comrie (1706-1774), John Brown of Haddington (1722-1787), and Bernhardus De Moor, professor at
Franeker and Leiden (who is referred to here as Bernhardinus De Moor).

3 S. R. Boettcher, "Confessionalization: Reformation, Religion, Absolutism, and Modernity" in Compass 2
(2004): 1. For a helpful survey of the concept of confessionalization, its components, and a survey of
critiques, see Ute Lotz-Heumann’s chapter, “Confessionalization” in Reformation and Early Modern
Europe: A Guide to Research, ed. David M. Whitford (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press,
2015), 136-160. Lotz-Heumann identifies E. W. Zeeden’s term Konfessionsbildung as particularly
important as well as Wolfgang Reinhard’s usage and Heinz Schilling’s positive development of the term on
the interactions of Reformed and Lutheran interactions in Germany. For a more expansive treatment of
confessionalization and “the fundamental social process of changes in religion and church as well as in
politics and society, behavior, outlook and culture,” see Heinz Schilling, Early Modern European
Civilization and Its Political and Cultural Dynamism (UPNE, 2008), 18. Cf. Reinhard, Wolfgang,
“Pressures towards Confessionalization? Prolegomena to a Theory of the Confessional Age,” in The
Boettcher, such as critiques that the conceptualization does not address matters of crises, 
segments of religious indifference, the piety of individuals and local contexts, and 
unbelief, it is still necessary to consider the rise and fall of confessional identities.⁴ 
Notwithstanding the challenges to the thesis, Boettcher concludes that "… the most 
promising future area of research will be in intellectual and cultural history."⁵ Indeed, it is 
correct to note that so far the confessionalization theses have not been able "to account 
for the origins and quality of confessional identity in the silent majority."⁶ And while it 
certainly is true that confessionalization of a cultural or political region is not simply a 
"top-down" process from magistrate to citizen and requires the active participation and 
embrace of the populace, the role of universities in a confessionalization process—or 
even de-confessionalization process—is a ripe area for further research.
⁷ As this 
dissertation evaluates a figure in the period of deconfessionalization, one way to evaluate 
the progress of confessionalization is through an examination of a proximate source of 
the origins and quality of a confessional identity as it was propounded in a local 
university over time. Thus, it is still valuable to examine the relationship between official 
thelogical content, pedagogical instruction in particular university contexts and the 
development of systems of theology, even at the twilight of an era.

⁵ Boettcher, "Confessionalization," 5.
⁶ Boettcher, "Confessionalization," 5.
⁷ For example, Alfons Brüning in “Confessionalization in the Slavia Orthodoxa (Belorussia, Ukraine, 
Russia)? –Potential and limits of a Western Historiographical Concept" considers the boundaries of 
confessionalization as a tool of historical inquiry and raises the point that confessionalization occurs at least 
in ways that are both “top-down” and also “grass roots” in Religion and the Conceptual Boundary in 
Central and Eastern Europe, ed. T. Bremer (Springer, 2008), 66-70. Brüning’s observations broaden the 
importance of considering ways in which universities functioned as agents of confessionalization, both as 
“top-down” and “grass roots” forms, and as agents of deconfessionalization.
Specifically, with respect to content this dissertation focuses upon a cluster of ideas and doctrines that comprise the prolegomena (that henceforth will be referred to as variously *de theologia vera* or *theologia viatorum*) at Leiden University as articulated by Bernhardinus De Moor in his role as a professor of theology. The significance of the *theologia vera* and Bernhardinus De Moor is linked by Willem van Asselt when he remarks:

It is important to note that a great variety of theologians followed Junius's *De vera theologia* on the division and classification of theology … the division was still prominent in the prolegomena during the era of late orthodoxy in the eighteenth century. To give an example: Johannes a Marck and Bernhardinus De Moor very carefully worked out Junius's views on this matter.\(^8\)

It is this particular example of van Asselt that is of especial interest here. What this remark does not indicate is that one can trace a line of development from Junius through Marckius, De Moor, and others within the context of Leiden University.

With respect to method, this dissertation argues that in order to understand Bernhardinus De Moor's articulation of the prolegomena of theology in his Enlightenment context, one must trace the lines of continuity in his theology along lines of institutional continuity as it respects the conceptual content and pedagogical methods that produced his seven volume *Commentarius*.\(^9\) In order to demonstrate this thesis, it is necessary at least: 1) to articulate what is meant by institutional continuity, 2) to set forth

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\(^9\) Bernhardinus De Moor, *Bernhardini De Moor Commentarius Perpetuus in Johannis Marckii Compendium Theologiae Christianae Didactico-Elencticum*, 7 vols. (Leiden: Johannes Hasebroek, 1761-1778). Throughout the course of this dissertation, citations of De Moor (and other works from the period) could occur in two ways: either the volume number and page (e.g. 1:23) or volume number, part, chapter, and section (e.g. 1.1.1.1). This is advantageous because sometimes what is in view is a specific sentence on a specific page and in other instances the entire section is summarized or referenced as a whole.
an understanding of the doctrinal content of the theologia viatorum as articulated and
developed at Leiden University, 3) to examine the relationship between scholastic
methods and practical piety in De Moor's view, 4) to examine De Moor's stated goal for
his tenure in his inaugural oration as well as his views of theology in his valedictorian
oration as rector magnificus, 5) to establish the relationship between pedagogy
(specifically disputations) and publication of a theological system, and 6) to consider the
challenge of methodological doubt to theological method.

1.1 Continuity and Influence

Before delivering an account of the development of and analysis of continuity
within the theological prolegomena at Leiden University from 1592, with Franciscus
Junius's De Theologia Vera, to 1774 with the completion of Berhardinus De Moor's
Commentarius Perpetuus, it is necessary to articulate some brief methodological
considerations of what is—and what is not—meant here by continuity and influence.10
What is argued for here is a methodology that produces verifiable, demonstrable,
corroborated results which will in turn provide a modest narrative of Berhardinus De
Moor's use and reception of Junius's framework and the concept of the theologia
viatorum at Leiden University.

There are at least two general methodological problems that face any historical
account of a historical figure, their thoughts and writings, and the subsequent streams of
influence in the reception of their work. The first is the problem of influence and the

second that of continuity. In intellectual history, the problems of influence and continuity encompass a cluster of issues surrounding what counts first as a proper contextualized account of a person's biography and oeuvre and second the question of contemporaneous and subsequent reception of their thought. Included in a proper account is an endeavor to locate their thought within the stream of contemporaneous and antecedent intellectual currents, issues, and trajectories with the primary goal of determining their contributions, material and formal differences, and roles in their particular context. Closely related to this work is the second somewhat more difficult task of tracing the various subsequent uses, critiques, receptions, and rejections of their thought. The resultant task that necessitates an identification and taxonomy of the species of the "-ism" is by no means simple or helpful for understanding a particular passage in a particular context.

These problems become more acute when the history of a person's work and an account of their influence must compete with hagiographic accounts of that individual as the font, polestar, and norm of everything beneficial in a theological tradition. A historical account still dwells in the fallible dust of earth and can be verified and revised. On the other hand, a hagiographic account of an "-ism" ascends to a glorified state and dwells in an incorrigible realm of ideas, and now mediates as an impelling force of civilization. It is one thing to note a figure's emphases and their influence at various points in history (e.g. the influence of Calvin), and quite another to transform a person's influence into a reified force of history (e.g. some accounts of Calvinism). This is the historian's task of guarding against the dangers of an "-ism" that loses its descriptive powers and transforms into something else. One modern example of the methodological problems of tracing influence is more easily engaged after a flurry of scholarly activity
surrounding a five hundred year anniversary of someone like John Calvin has died down.

Methodologically, a history of Calvin's influence is well represented by an introductory essay by Backus and Benedict. Their reticence to endorse the utility of the term "Calvinism" is instructive, given the multiple senses of the term; it's almost plastic vagueness in light of the Reformed plurality of confessions, and "the ambivalences and the laconic nature of Calvin's thought, as well as to its intrinsic adaptability to a variety of positions, theological, political, economic, and cultural." Furthermore, "the story of Calvin's influence, readers will discover, is not the same as the history of Calvinism. All who claimed to be Calvinists were not necessarily strict followers of Calvin's own views, and some who were dedicated to keeping alive his ideas and practices sought to avoid the label of 'Calvinist'." 

Muller concurs with this estimation and expands the point noting that "since many of the major concepts and themes found in Calvin's thought were not new ideas and were not given significantly new accents by Calvin, later appearances of the concept or theme in the Reformed tradition cannot be credited directly to Calvin's influence." Besides noting seventeenth-century Reformed reticence to embrace the term Calvinist, Muller observes that even "on a few points of doctrine—notably on issues of free choice and the divine willing of the fall, Calvin had made a series of unfortunate or possibly hyperbolic

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12 Backus and Benedict, Calvin & His Influence, 2.

13 Muller also observes the umbrage and disdain that many seventeenth-century Reformed theologians took when their thought was identified as Calvinist or Calvinism in "Reception and Response: Referencing and Understanding Calvin in Seventeenth-Century Calvinism" in Calvin & His Influence, 182-83.

14 Muller in Calvin & His Influence, 195.
statements that could not be taken as normative for Reformed teaching." Muller concludes with Perry Miller's comment of the Puritans, they "did not think of [Calvin] as the fountain head of their thought, nor of themselves of a faction of which he was the founder."  

1.2 Kinds of Continuity

In a 2011 article on the reception of Calvin among the Reformed Orthodox of the later sixteenth through eighteenth centuries and the issues surrounding continuity, Carl Trueman identifies a problem of vagueness in scholarship since the 1980s that maintains a "continuity thesis" between Calvin's thought and later confessional expressions of the

---

15 Muller in *Calvin & His Influence*, 195.

16 Cited by Muller in *Calvin & His Influence*, 196 from Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (1939; reprint Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), 93. By way of contrast, one Calvin scholar has recently abandoned their previous concurrence and now appears to dissent from Backus, Benedict, and Muller, embracing an account more hyperbolic than Kuyper in their estimation of the term Calvinism. For remnants of his earlier position, consider Herman Selderhuis's comment, "Calvinism cannot be equated with Reformed Protestantism if Calvinism is understood to refer only to the theology of Calvin" in "Calvinism as Reformed Protestantism: Clarification of a term" in *Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition*, eds. J. Ballor, D. Sytsma, and J. Zuiderma (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 733. Similarly, in 2009, Selderhuis had concluded more cogently and carefully that it was preferable to speak of Reformed rather than Calvinist theology, in "Calvin, 1509-2009" in *Calvin & His influence*, 155. Now, in *Church and School*, 735, Selderhuis concludes "If Calvinism is viewed as a vision for church, theology, politics, art, and culture that flows from it, then in this term one possesses the full scope of the original Reformed Protestantism, in fact, of all Protestantism. … In short, if Calvinism is not identified with Calvin, then the term can be used extremely well as a synonym, or better still as a replacement, for the term 'Reformed Protestantism.'" By comparison to one who is also problematic in a methodological sense for advocating a Calvin-as-mastermind account, Abraham Kuyper, *Calvinism: Six Stone Lectures* (New York: F. H. Revell Co., 1899), 7, speaks with more reserve, "Historically, the name of Calvinism indicates the channel in which the Reformation moved, so far as it was neither Lutheran, nor Anabaptist, nor Socinian. In the philosophical sense, we understand by it that system of conceptions which under the influence of the master-mind of Calvin raised itself to dominance in the several spheres of life." Also Kuyper, *Calvinism*, 11, "In a given sense therefore it may be said, that the entire field which in the end was covered by the Reformation, so far as it was not Lutheran and not Socinian, was dominated in principle by Calvinism." On the methodological problems associated with "great thinker" approaches to history, see, for example, Richard Muller, *Calvin and the Reformed Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 17, and Quentin Skinner on mythologies in "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and theory* 8, no. 1 (1969): 3-53.
Reformed Orthodox.\textsuperscript{17} Trueman, in agreement with Muller and van Asselt, locates Calvin within a broad array of like-minded theologians and evaluates some of the current challenges and ambiguities that the revisionist approach poses.\textsuperscript{18} For example, scholars might agree on the fact of continuity between several historical figures or documents, but an additional layer of complexity arises when scholars disagree on the constitutive elements of that continuity. Thus, a continuity thesis can be quite vague if it does not specify the criteria of continuity and discontinuity.

According to Trueman, the reception of Calvin's texts, for example, have a double reference, "first to the way in which Calvin's texts were received, used, and transmitted by contemporaries and in subsequent generations; and, second, the way in which his ideas were adopted, adapted, and developed by other thinkers."\textsuperscript{19} Trueman continues his inquiry regarding the criteria of continuity and discontinuity as a diachronic methodology of evaluation and notes that if not carefully qualified, this methodology "might still be at root an anachronistic imposition of later doctrinal judgments on historical texts."\textsuperscript{20} Yet, "the newer scholarship represents an attempt to approach the texts as \textit{historical actions};

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17] Carl Trueman states "… the problem with this understanding of the more recent scholarship is that it fails to address which changes would constitute 'continuities' and which 'discontinuities' over a given period of time." in "The Reception of Calvin: Historical Considerations" in \textit{CHRC} 91.1-2 (Leiden: Brill, 2011): 20.
\item[18] Cf. Muller, \textit{PRRD}, 1:51, "It is highly significant, moreover, that these first codifiers of the Reformation, the second-generation followers of the initial Reformers, were also instrumental, together with a group of their associates, in the creation of the confessional (and catechetical) norms of the mid-sixteenth century—and that these Reformation era confessions set the boundaries for the development of post-Reformation orthodoxy. There is an integral relationship and continuity both in content and in intention between the work of the second-generation codifiers and the orthodoxy that developed in the late sixteenth century. …The fact of this gradual historical development toward orthodox system does not, of course, absolve the historian from examining differences between the theology of the Reformers and the theology of the orthodox; it only makes the task of examination more difficult and the problems and issues encountered more subtle."
\item[19] Trueman, 20.
\item[20] Trueman, 21.
\end{footnotes}
and that, as a result, questions of continuity or discontinuity need to be set aside or at least adopted in a highly qualified form, in the assessment of the reception of theologians such as Calvin by the later tradition.\textsuperscript{21}

In order to overcome these challenges, Trueman proposes an evaluation of any "continuity thesis" not simply be whether a term, concept, or text is in continuity or basic agreement with a previous theologian, but additionally, "How is this writer using this idea or text of [in this case] Calvin in his own situation?"\textsuperscript{22} Trueman helpfully identifies three ways in which questions of continuity can be posed, which for sake of summary I will term slightly differently as: (1) simple continuity, (2) conceptual continuity, and (3) programmatic continuity.\textsuperscript{23}

Simple continuity, or what Trueman describes as straightforward continuity, occurs when there is a high degree of conceptual stability in a thinker's language describing or defining a term or concept. In this light, the highest degree of influence in the simple continuity of a theological concept, schema, or term is when it occurs via direct citation or with relatively minor modification in confessional and catechetical documents and achieves a recognizable ecclesiastical status that would be more binding than, by comparison, simple continuity in several theologians whose work has relatively limited influence. Methodologically, this allows the question of influence to be charted in

\textsuperscript{21} Trueman 21.
\textsuperscript{22} Trueman, 21.
\textsuperscript{23} I take the cue for this typology from Trueman as he speaks in this way in "The Reception of Calvin, Historical Considerations," 21-22: "First, there is straightforward continuity of doctrine upon which all would agree. … Second, there is a continuity of philosophical framework." This philosophical framework includes such things as "ongoing patterns of philosophical and academic discourse…" "Third, there is continuity in terms of problems and questions." Cf. Carl Trueman, Histories and Fallacies: Problems faced in the Writing of History (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2011), 185.
terms of a concrete ecclesiastical adoption, endorsement, usage, and propagation in broader contexts than the original theologian's context. It also grants a measure of clarity and perspective when charting the influence of a term, concept, or schema that may not rise to the level of confessional status or ecclesiastical adoption, but is an attribute or element within a theological tradition, sect, movement, or teaching institution within a broader confessional identity. A proper use of simple continuity would delimit terms, concepts, or articulations that are unique or original to the figure, which are generally recognizable in subsequent reception.

Secondly, there is also a kind of conceptual continuity which is evident when a thinker, theologian, or philosopher deploys a philosophical or theological framework, perspective, or stable set of terminology to explain a particular text or doctrine. Such frameworks offer a much broader spectrum of possible sources for an idea or form of articulation, and thus require a higher burden of proof to verify a relationship of dependence among thinkers, and thus of influence of the one upon the other. This form of continuity can be difficult to specify in part because any philosophical or theological "-ism" is not only variegated in its expression but frequently eclectic in its transmission and reception.

A third form of continuity, what will be deemed here as programmatic continuity, is tied more to the questions and problems posed rather than the answers given. For example, Peter Lombard's *Libri Quattuor Sententiarum* provided a programmatic series of questions which in turn were commented upon by the masters of medieval universities across Europe. And thus one could reasonably claim a programmatic continuity among such varied thinkers as Aquinas, Scotus, Bonaventure, and Ockham, although these
thinkers do not stand in a relationship of strict, simple continuity. The programmatic continuity then would require a further specification within a broader tradition. As Trueman has noted, this form of continuity also has the delightfully sobering result of allowing a figure such as Calvin or Luther or Aquinas or Scotus to be seen as but one strand within a broader fabric of thought within their respective contexts, and tends to militate against the abuses of deficient approaches to history. Also with respect to a thinker's subsequent influence, their thought can be viewed as a precursor—but not necessarily an "anticipator" or proponent—of a particular theological schema because of the topics, emphases, issues, and concerns that their work raises for successive generations.

As stated in this typology, evaluating the continuity of a problem or a line of questioning can be helpful as an analytical tool provided it is carefully delimited. This third form of continuity is useful for the following reasons: (a) it assists in tracing the reception of particular questions and issues and consequently, in light of the parameters and context of the original debate, it is in theory easier to see the developmental changes within the state of the question. (b) A history of a problem also brings into focus the variety of interlocutors on a particular question to develop a synchronic spectrum of answers to the particular question raised in a particular context. This has the welcome advantage that it cannot only broaden current understanding of the period by identifying figures and schools of thought that have been overlooked, but also highlight deficiencies or advancement in the modern state of the question. In this regard, it is helpful to re-visit a theological or philosophical problem as it has been posed in times past in order to note changes in the articulations. (c) Furthermore, there is also a great amount of subtlety
involved in tracing not only the various forms a particular problem might take, but also the variety of reasons why the particular form of a question might be posed. In short, this type of programmatic approach can function in both diachronic and synchronic accounts.

One caveat that must be taken to heart is that there is a real danger of reading into a previous thinker a concept that was only developed later. This is not simply an anachronistic retrojection of a term, set of vocabularies, or framework onto a particular text or author (such as the anachronistic question of asking whether or not Augustine was a Calvinist, rather than whether the "Calvinists" reflected a form of Augustinian thought), but could take on a subtler form in which a minor comment becomes a major doctrine. Quentin Skinner's caution is applicable here,

Besides the crude possibility of crediting a writer with a meaning he could not have intended to convey, since that meaning was not available to him, there is also the (perhaps more insidious) danger of too readily "reading in" a doctrine which a given writer might in principle have meant to state, but had no intention to convey.²⁴

The caveat is most applicable to authors and thinkers who are viewed as the head of a tradition or movement, and whose words and writings are granted a degree of authority and normative function that they did not hold among their peers and even among their adherents at the time they wrote. It is one thing to speak of a figure as a conceptual forerunner, it is quite another to hold a figure up as "anticipatory" or "ahead of their time."

There is room for a fourth type or aspect of continuity, which I term "institutional continuity."²⁵ Trueman's typology seems to allow for this conception when he stated that

²⁴ Skinner, 9.
²⁵ This concept underpins the "Scholastica" project as developed for the Post-Reformation Digital Library (http://www.prdl.org) by David Sytsma, Jordan Ballor, Albert Gootjes, Richard Muller, and myself at the Junius Institute for Digital Reformation Research (http://www.juniusinstitute.org). Scholastica allows a
"theology, as a pedagogical discipline, is somewhat communal in nature."26 Both van Asselt and Muller seem to allow for this kind of classification when they note well that "it was only when Reformed academies and universities were established that formal discussion of the status and task of theology and its connection with other disciplines, especially philosophy became urgent."27 It is precisely this institutionalized character that must be examined and taken into account through a closer reading of theology within the pedagogical practices of early modern universities.28 Given the frequent interaction between Church and State by means of the University, and simultaneously the reliance of both institutions in varying ways upon the university (the training of lawyers, jurists, and theologians, the settlement of theological, philosophical, and legal questions at the behest of the magistrate or church authorities, etc.), institutional continuity seeks to answer questions of continuity and discontinuity within models of pedagogical transmission, adoption, and publication.

researcher to sort approximately 5,500 authors of the early modern period by university and even by faculty. With this tool, one can reconstruct the publication history of a faculty during a particular timeframe. As we catalog authors, we have sought to log the various institutions where a person taught. Digital tools such as these allow a researcher also to quickly reconstruct bibliographies of academic careers and faculties in order to determine possible interconnections among professors. My articulation of this concept in the following pages represents my attempt to crystallize the thoughts and reflections on the intersection of the institutionalization of confessional identities and the continuity thesis. I am grateful for the conversations and countless interactions over the years with my fellow board members at the Junius Institute, and I want to take this opportunity to publicly and freely recognize their collaborative contributions to the development and use of this operating principle in the PRDL project in service to the digital and global academic community.

26 Trueman, 24.


28 Cf. Muller, PRRD, 1:60, comments on the rise of Orthodoxy and shape of Protestant Scholastic theology in the process of institutionalization, "As we move from the initial period of Reformed theology into the early orthodox period, a major change in style can be noted. Some of this change relates directly to the increasingly formal, institutionalized character of theology in general. Protestant theology is no longer, in the latter period, reforming a church—it is establishing and protecting the church. Theology itself is more and more a creature of the schools."
An important qualification must be asserted at the outset that will be demonstrated in the course of this work: institutional continuity is neither simple continuity writ large nor does it lead to the reification of a cluster of ideas. Institutional continuity is grounded in texts, lectures, administrative documents and policies, institutionally funded publications, student disputations and examinations, inaugural orations, and so forth. It is not detached from its context or the people involved. It has no controlling power on its own. Its significance is found only to the extent and degree that historical figures utilize, explain, develop, or modify an idea or concept for pedagogical purposes over the life of an institution. Framed in this way, it must be described in an a posteriori fashion with sensitivity to the ebb and flow of its development and even decay. An a priori status is not what is argued for here. Recall that simple continuity, for example, includes the citation of one thinker by another at a subsequent time. Institutional continuity occurs when a faculty of professors utilizes and develops a specific body of content that has pedagogical value for conveying a particular perspective or confessional identity. The contours of this body of content are viewed as distinctive, if not definitive of the institution's approach. These contours are then developed or modified and deployed somewhat consistently and programmatically. Some professors may utilize more or fewer of the distinctions—perhaps even rejecting key aspects of a concept—but the programmatic distinctions can be found in some form. As we will see, this form of continuity has elements of simple continuity, conceptual continuity, and programmatic continuity reflected in the oeuvre of professors as they taught their students and built their theological opera. Institutional continuity also has the added benefit of grounding the development of a body of thought and a particular pedagogical process in a discrete
social context that can be evaluated diachronically. It is this institutional continuity as an educational process and communal context that this project assumes when evaluating Bernhardinus De Moor's use of a sixteenth-century pattern of prolegomena for the better part of the eighteenth century at Leiden University.

This is the continuity that might arise through a process of rigorous education, such as in many early modern universities or theological academies where the large majority of students literally lived with their professors and even took their meals with them. Through the process of receiving an early modern university education—lecture, study, disputation—we see quite clearly an intentional, concrete method of transmission from professor to students. We can review university records, class schedules, disputational cycles, faculty rosters, and even track curricular developments in a limited fashion in some of the content. This type of institutional continuity rests upon the stated mission of the institution and the commitments of the faculty more or less to that mission. In this regard, institutional continuity takes on aspects of all the previous three forms of continuity: (1) there are multiple instances of explicit, simple continuity; (2) there are frameworks and modes of expression that are confessionally bounded within the context of theological and philosophical commitments at the early modern university; and (3) there are programmatic assumptions regarding the form, content, and order of questions. However, what sets this form of continuity apart from simply being a broad "school" of thought is when one can find professors who view themselves as part of a succession or line of thought that is tied to the institution. This does not mean that the influence of the particular institution cannot be found beyond its halls in other universities (that would be a school or tradition of thought). In this sense institutional continuity can precede
regional or confessional identity. For example, there are instances of doctors who
graduated from Leiden University who introduced terms, conceptual schema, and
programmatic methodologies into other contexts. Such is the case with Gijsbert Voetius
who is known for his deep and broad impact at the University of Utrecht as its first—and
quite long lived—professor of theology. One might note that Voetius utilized a similar
body of content as was used at Leiden University and further observe that particular
terms or concepts were a commonplace of Reformed theology. Yet, surely it is significant
that Voetius was trained at Leiden University before accepting the professorial chair at
Utrecht. This does not mean that the body of content he learned as a student at Leiden
controls his later teaching as a professor, but who would argue that there is no simple,
conceptual, or programmatic continuity if we find advanced terms and concepts taught by
Voetius in the 1650s at Utrecht that he learned in basic form at Leiden in the 1610s. One
of the methodological benefits of such institutional continuity then, is that it broadens
scholarly understanding of diachronic developments at an institution as well as has some
benefit in tracking transmission and developments synchronically across several
theological faculties linked by networks of students and professors. With this
methodological framework in place, let us now turn to consider the biography of the
professor of theology whose work will occupy the balance of this dissertation as a test
case of this method.

1.3 Bernhardinus De Moor

Bernhardinus De Moor (1709-1780) was born in the town of Maasluis in the
Netherlands into a line of pastors and theologians.29 When he was three years old his

29 The following sections are compilations of the following relevant resources: for biographical information
and bibliographical lists of his works, see E. L. Vriemoet, Athenarum Frisicarum (Leeuward: H. Ae. de
father took a pastorate in Gouda and this is where De Moor received his formative education at the Latin School. He matriculated at the University of Leiden to study theology (1726-1730) and then subsequently at the University of Utrecht for a brief season. Afterwards he was ordained as a pastor and installed at the church in Ingen, Netherlands in 1732. Bernhardinus De Moor not only shared his name with his father and great-grandfather, but also their calling as Reformed pastors. The great-grandfather served congregations at Lopikerkapel, Benschop, Kuilenberg, and Gouda from 1647-1680. The grandfather, Bartholomaeus De Moor, was a professor at Hardewijk and was known primarily for his work in medicine, but he also published a few pieces on theology. From 1695 until his death in 1743, the father served congregations at Oud-Loosdrecht, Maasluis, and Gouda. The De Moor that is of concern to us served as the pastor of four churches in relatively rapid succession between 1732 and 1744. These were the congregations at Ingen (1732-1734), Broek in Waterland (1734-1738), Oost-Zaandam (1738-1743), and Enkhuizen (1743-1744). While De Moor was pastoring the church at

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Broek in Waterland, which is approximately five miles northeast of Amsterdam and about thirty-eight miles from Leiden University, he studied and received his doctorate in theology from the university in 1736. The next noteworthy point in De Moor's ecclesiastical service occurs in 1752 when he was the president of the Zuid-Holland synod.

On March 2, 1744 he was appointed a professor of theology at Franeker University. Although described by Boeles as a "volbloed Voetiaan," the curators of Franeker University were pleased that De Moor was "happily, however, someone who did not deny the praiseworthiness of peacefulness."31 Within a year, he received and accepted an appointment as professor of theology at Leiden University.

As far as De Moor's career at Leiden University is concerned, our primary sources for his role are the *Acta Senatus en Resoluties van Curatoren* as well as the *Bijlagen*, which are housed in the special collections of the library at Leiden University. The twentieth-century seven volume work *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Leidsche universiteit 1574-1811* by P. C. Molhuysen is an invaluable source to this end, but I have also had opportunity to view the originals.32 The *Resoluties* provide insight not only to the inner workings of the university curators but also to the involvement of the burgomasters of the city of Leiden. This source represents for researchers of both the

31 See Boeles, *Frieslands Hoogeschool*, 2:482.

32 P. C. Molhuysen, *Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Leidsche Universiteit 1574-1811* ('s-Gravenhage: Martijnus Nijhof, 1913-1924). It must be appreciated that Molhuysen is only a very slim portion of what is available, for example there are the *Archieven van Senaat en Faculteiten, 1575-1877* (ASF) in 603 volumes, packets, and dossiers, occupying 25 meters of shelf space; Leiden Universitetsbibliotheek, Bijzondere Collecties, shelfmark ubl042. There is also the *Archief van Curatoren, 1574-1815*, (AC1) in 780 volumes, packets, and dossiers, occupying 36 meters of shelf space; Leiden Universitetsbibliotheek, Bijzondere Collecties, shelfmark ubl002.
early modern period as well as early modern universities a wonderful intersection
between intellectual and social history. Ideas do in fact have consequences in localized
contexts. Because of Molhuysen's widespread availability, future references will be
keyed to Molhuysen's work even when working with the originals of the *Acta Senatus en
Faculteit (ASF), Resoluties (RC)*, or the *Bijlagen (Bijl.)*.33

From the *Acta* it is known that the professor of theology, Johannes Wesselius,
died on January 16, 1745.34 On January 29, after conferring with the theological faculty,
and with the Senate's approval, the Rector Magnificus, Joannes van den Honert, made a
motion to initiate a search for a new professor of theology, which was approved.35 No
further mention of the search process is officially mentioned until May 21, when De
Moor is referred to as the *Theologiae Professor designatus* and it is mentioned that he
wanted to take the appropriate oaths according to the ancient custom, that is, he accepted
the position.36 However, in De Moor's correspondence at Leiden University, we do find a
letter dated May 19, 1745, addressed to David van Royen, the secretary of the Curators,
in which he indicates his pleasure to come to Leiden (see Figure 1 below).37

33 This is the division and sections within Molhuysen, in the special collection of Leiden University, for the
*ASF* related to the faculty of theology, see ASF 368-387. For the *Resoluties*, see *Archief van Curatoren,
1574-1815*, 780 packets, Universiteits Leiden, shelfmark ubl002, this is customarily abbreviated at Leiden as
AC1 (packet #). What Molhuysen labels the *bijlagen* or attachments, are frequently unnumbered assorted
documents that are stitched in between numbered pages. Complicating this state of affairs is that
Molhuysen does not catalog all of the available material in the volumes surveyed, but rather selectively
records the material describing in his footnotes additional material that he does not number. Thus, the
chronological list of *bijlagen* in Molhuysen is incomplete. This in turn, means the material should be
referenced to its closest numbered folio page, which is done here when necessary.


37 Bernhardinus De Moor (1709-1780) at Franeker to David van Royen (1699-1764) at Leiden, letter in
Dutch (Franeker: 1745), Leiden University, signatuur AHM 1.
On June 15, the Senate officially hired De Moor and set the date of his inaugural oration. On June 21, 1745 De Moor delivered his inaugural oration entitled "The incomplete felicity of the militant church." On September 9, 1745, "De Moor requested and obtained holding public lectures at 1 pm." His first lectures were "on the divine law written in the literature of the Old Testament, especially on the Decalogue," a series of lectures that continued into the summer of 1747.

If not all of the schedules are retained in the Bijlagen, all are either expressly known over the course of De Moor's tenure or can be inferred. Table 1.2 is a compilation of those courses with their description. "Fall" refers to the autumn and winter terms as these were posted in September; "Spring" refers to the vernal and summer terms posted in February. Unless otherwise noted, where there are multiple terms for a course, the description for multiple terms is the same. Where the schedule is missing, the course can be inferred given the trend before and after the missing term, because there is continuity in the course descriptions in the years preceding and following the omission.

De Moor served as a professor of theology from 1745 until April 19, 1779 when the curators of the university granted him emeritus status. Their resolution reads thus, "The curators and burgomasters granted Bernhardinus De Moor, according to his request on account of his advanced age, an honorable discharge as a professor, retaining his salary, rank, and session in the Senate, until the arrival of his successor."

38 Bernhardinus De Moor, Bernhardini De Moor Oratio inauguralis de imperfecta ecclesiae militantis felicitate (Leiden: Abraham Kallewier, 1745).

39 Molhuysen, Bronnen, 5:264, "horam a meridie 1AM (primam)", cf. the ordo lectionum autumnalium et Hyemalium, 1745 in the Bijl. no. 1083, Bronnen 5:159*.

40 Molhuysen, Bijl. 1085, Bronnen, 5:161*.

41 April 19, 1779 in Molhuysen, Bronnen, 6:215, "Apr. 19. C. en B. geven Bernh. De Moor op zijn verzoek,
Weldige geachte heer,

Weer ik in aanmerking de vijfde en de zevende september 1813, te deel gedaan van den 9 dezer, het mij gisteren, wel geworden, waar uwig ik met aangenaamheid de bij het nieuwe inmaken der hand, in het voorbij van deze reeds ongeveer bepaald, het vereeuwen, welke bij mij ook als de allerzwijgstilleste vooruit. Ik hoop u door naar te gelijken, om ten einde en heeft, in typisch van Holland afgekeken.

Inmiddels beantwoord ik uwe brief: mijn oog, waar de eerste voorzorg, was voor bijzonder, ook der tweede eeuw, waar mijn oog, zowel als mijn tweede eeuw, in zijn oor, de deel geleverd zijn als mijn, is voorzichtig, en ook de vrienden, waarbij ik die, niet in gelegenheid, te vermelden, en te komen, dat ik met alle hooge ek juris.

Weldige geachte heer,

Franeker den 14. maart 1845,

Bernhardinus De Moor.

Figure 1 Bernhardinus De Moor at Franeker to David van Royen. Used by permission, Leiden University, signatuur AHM 1.

wegens hoogen ouderdom, eerst ontslag als Professor, met behoud van tractement, rang en sessie in den Senaat, zullende de jura et leges aan zijn opvolger komen."
Table 1. De Moor's Lecture Series (1745-1779)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Terms</th>
<th>Course Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1745 Fall – 1747 Spr⁴²</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will elucidate the divine laws written in the literature of the Old Testament, but especially in the Decalogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747 Fall – 1748 Spr⁴³</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will elucidate the history of the creation of our first parents from Genesis 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748 Fall – 1751 Spr⁴⁴</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will first examine the Mosaic Paradise; next he will explain the prophecies which designate the time of the Messiah to come, and then will demonstrate that they have reached their fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751 Fall – 1752 Spr⁴⁵</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will examine the dispensation of grace especially of the one justifying under the old and new economies and their passages in the Old and New Testament, which are more or less directly referenced on this matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752 Fall – 1753 Spr⁴⁶</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will expound the Lord's Prayer and, as opportunity arises, prayers [generally].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


⁴⁵ Cf. Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 5:176*n1, " D. Bernhardinus De Moor de dispensatione Gratiae cum primis iustificantis sub veteri novaque Oeconomia locisque tum Veteris tum Novi Testamenti, quae ad hoc negotium magis vel minus recte referuntur, disseret." and "De series van Febr. 1752 komt geheel met die van Sept. 1751 overeen"

⁴⁶ Cf. Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 5:176*n1, " D. Bernhardinus De Moor Orationem Dominicam exponet, eaque occasione de Precibus" and "De Series van Febr. 1753 stemt geheel met die van Sept. 1752 overeen."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1753 Fall – 1757 Spr</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will examine the Sacraments of the New Testament, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, dogmatically and polemically, and he will endeavor to address controversies and the more difficult cases, which arise concerning the administration and use of these Sacraments in the ecclesiastical realm and in practice.(^{47})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757 Fall – 1760 Spr</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will examine the Church of God. (1759) Dr. B. De Moor will examine the rule of the Church of God.(^{48})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760 Fall – 1761 Spr</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will elucidate the more well-known questions—especially philological ones—concerning the text and versions of Holy Scripture.(^{49})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761 Fall – 1769 Spr</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will teach practical theology.(^{50})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769 Fall - 1770 Spr</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will teach Church Polity.(^{51})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770 Fall – 1772 Fall</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will expound the prophecies of Zechariah.(^{52})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773 Spring – 1774 Spring</td>
<td>Dr. B. De Moor will expound on the history of Jesus's suffering.(^{53})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774 Fall – 1779 Spring</td>
<td>De Moor will treat various [passages of] Holy Scripture.(^{54})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{47}\) 1756 Spring and Fall schedules are missing, but 1753 Fall to 1755 Fall, and 1757 Spring are present with no change in phrasing.


\(^{49}\) Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 5:203*n1, "De Series van Febr. 1760 stemt geheel met die van Sept. 1759 overeen." Also, 1758 Fall schedule is missing.


\(^{51}\) Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 5:207*, "D. Bernhardinus De Moor quaeciones nobiliores, praesertim philologicas, ad textum et versiones S. Codicis spectantes enodabit."

\(^{52}\) Schedules for 1762 Spring & Fall, 1767 Spring, 1768 Fall are missing.


\(^{54}\) Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 6:7*n1, "D. Bernhardinus De Moor Politiam Ecclesiasticam."


\(^{56}\) Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 6:15*, "D. Bernhardinus De Moor Historiam Iesu patientis enarrabit."

\(^{57}\) Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 6:21*,"De Moor Varia Sacra tractabit."
Besides his normal duties as a professor, De Moor served as the rector magnificus of the university and delivered a second oration regarding the nature of theology in 1757. We will have occasion to revisit this oration in a subsequent chapter. His work as a professor of theology also brought him into close contact with specific aspects of church life. For example, in the Acta Facultatis Theologiae, which spans 1751-1812, we find that theology professors were frequently involved in the examination of ministers, other professors, or their publications at the request of various kerkeraden.58 In July of 1751 all four theology professors at Leiden were involved in the review of particular views of Anthonie van der Os at the behest of William IV of Orange in order to settle a dispute with the kerkeraad of Zwolle.59 Their duty was to determine van der Os's level of orthodoxy and also to propose articles for reconciliation. They did so on October 20, 1751. They identified three particular areas of concern. The first articles dealt with a confession that Scripture was the only rule for faith and life (Geloof en Wandel), a belief in the Trinity, and a belief in Adam's fall into sin rendering humanity incapable of holiness apart from God's justifying grace. The second article also specified certain aspects of Christ's deity that must be believed. The third article required belief that the sacrament of baptism was "not only as a sign but also as a true seal of the covenant of grace, which the faithful use, by the power of the Holy Spirit, has a comforting influence in the furtherance of the sanctification of people who have been justified by faith."60 Van

58 ASF 368.

59 ASF 368:1751. As the manuscripts bound in this tome are not paginated, and the year is noted in the marginalia, it is appropriate to simply reference by volume and year.

60 ASF 368:1751: "(III) Dat de sacramenten van het nieuwe testament … niet alleen Tekenen, maar ook ware Zegelen zyn van het Genades[ver]bond; welkes gelovig gebruyk, door de kracht des Heiligen Geests, enen troostelyken invloed heeft in de Bevordering van de Heilimaking der menschen, die door het Geloof
der Os was eventually deposed for his Anabaptist and Mennonite views, and was later rebaptized in 1758 by a Mennonite leader.\textsuperscript{61} Some viewed the requirements of the theology faculty as not tight enough.\textsuperscript{62}

We can also find De Moor's involvement in more church matters of this kind scattered throughout the pages of this tome.\textsuperscript{63} As one reads through the cases, one notes different handwriting in the records. For example, De Moor recorded the copy of the 1751 articles in the van der Os case in Dutch in the \textit{Acta} as well as another report in 1762. Schultens has a report in November 1763 in Latin and Hollebeek has a report in October 1764. In 1765, we find De Moor again but this time in Latin. We find Gillissen's Latin handwriting in 1768, and so on. We also find instances where professors are approving candidates for degrees as well as commending graduates to classis or to specific churches. Other instances demonstrate the professors' function as book reviewers on behalf of a classis, synod, or church, in which translations, treatises, or theological writings are either commended or dismissed. These cases and examinations did not occupy a tremendous amount of the professors' time, but they do indicate that the professors were actively engaged in the life of the churches and that, often at the behest of the state.

De Moor spent approximately 25\% of his teaching career at Leiden lecturing on gerechtvaardigt zijn."

\textsuperscript{61} Cf. A. van der Os, \textit{Remedie voor Doldriftigheid aan den Rotterdammer Student in de Heilige Godgeleerdheid} (Amsterdam: Kornelis de Wit, 1758).


\textsuperscript{63} E.g. ASF 368:1762.
practical theology, 40% on matters of covenant theology and redemptive historical questions regarding Christ, 12% on matters directly related to the doctrine of the church and church government, 6% on the Mosaic law, 3% on prayer, and the remainder on doctrinal matters arising from a comparison of scripture passages. In short, his teaching career is marked by an emphasis upon Christ, covenant, and personal and ecclesiastical praxis.

In the last five years of De Moor's teaching career beginning in 1774, the teaching of practical theology shifted to a younger professor, Aegidius Gillisen. Some of the systematic courses on the doctrine of the church for example, shifted to Hermannus Scholten. In 1777, Scholten began teaching a course entitled *problemata theological* until 1779 when he returned to the doctrine of the church. Meanwhile, Gillisen continued teaching practical theology. Starting in the Fall term of 1780, with the hiring of De Moor's replacement, Boers, a series of courses began on the Heidelberg Catechism, church discipline, and the Belgic Confession that would last for approximately the next ten years. By the close of the *Acta Senatus* and the *Bijlagen* in the Fall of 1793 at Leiden, Gillissen taught *theologia practica* regularly, while Boers taught rather frequently on the *theologiae theoreticae capitae*.

Figure 2. An exemplar Ordo Lectionum (1750), or course announcement poster, from ASF 304, fol. 211, shelfmark ubl042. Cf. Molhuysen, Bronnen, 164*n1, which does not number every record of the bijlagen. Used by permission of Leiden University.
De Moor’s primary academic output over the course of his career was the Commentarius perpetuus on Johannes Marckius's Compendium theologiae christianae didactico-elencticum, the last volume of which was published at just about the time that De Moor transitioned to teaching his course entitled Varia Sacra. This means that the entirety of the Commentarius was completed with respect to his courses by the time he entered into his lecture series on the Gospel accounts of the sufferings of Christ. As is easily evident from the publication history of disputations which De Moor presided over, his magnum opus is inextricably bound up with his teaching career. De Moor does have some exegetical commentaries on Scripture that are beyond the scope of the project here. But it is primarily his seven volume work that establishes his relationship to the academic disputations. The disputations are integral to the discussions of institutional continuity, the process from pedagogy to publication, and how we think about the genre of theological textbook in the early modern period.

1.4 Overview of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 is a general overview of the trajectory of Franciscus Junius's De Theologia Vera as it developed and functioned as a prolegomenal framework at Leiden. While outlining continuities and discontinuities in the consideration of the use of this framework at Leiden, Bernhardinus De Moor and Johannes Marckius represent a test case in a moderate form of institutional continuity. The burden of this chapter is not to

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67 Bernhardinus De Moor, Commentarius perpetuus in Johannis Marckii Compendium theologiae christianae didactico-elencticum, vols 1-7, (Leiden: Johannes Hasebroek, 1765-1774). The last volume of the Commentarius perpetuus is a Supplementum, which is primarily taken up as amplifications of citations after 1771, and for that reason these citations were not handled in De Moor's lectures in the time frame between 1771 and 1779. These additional citations do not represent retractions or alterations but only retrenchments of his previous positions see De Moor, Bernhardini De Moor Supplementum commentarii perpetui in Johannis Marckii Compendium theologiae christianae didactico-elencticum, 1-11.
demonstrate that everyone who taught theology at Leiden was in full agreement with the distinctions nor in agreement as to what they meant nor in how they functioned. However, one method of tracing continuity is to follow the history of a theological framework through the questions that recur rather than through the uniformity of the answers that were given. It is the case that the closer one is to Junius's work in the sixteenth century, the more similarity there is among the Reformed who taught as well as those who were trained at Leiden. This chapter is also not arguing that the only place that the archetypal/ectypal schema was deployed was at Leiden; it was not. Nor is this chapter arguing that this was the official way of doing theology at Leiden. This prolegomenal schema never attained that status like Aristotle did in the 1630s and 1640s when there were active debates about the Aristotelian synthesis. At that time, the Curators of the University intervened stipulating Aristotle's use. One way of looking at that fact is that the de theologia vera schema was generally endorsed by tacit consent and active deployment among the theological professors, and at times, even referenced by philosophy professors as well. The sharpest theological division among Leiden theology professors from the seventeenth century into the eighteenth was along a Cocceian and Voetian axis, and both sides of that dividing line utilized or referenced the distinctions well into the early nineteenth century.

This chapter's burden is to demonstrate that one can speak of degrees of continuity and discontinuity within an academic context. The schema survives from the 1590s well into the early 1800s at Leiden. Therefore, it is not a vain question to consider that fact distinctive compared to other Reformed contexts in which professors sometimes utilized it and sometimes did not. For example, there are professors that did not utilize the
archetypal/ectypal distinction to articulate theological prolegomena, until they begin their
tenure at Leiden University. Some professors and doctoral graduates at Leiden took the
distinction with them to new academic contexts where it took on a transplanted life of its
own. And in some cases, the schema only lasted the length of the importing professor's
tenure at the other academic context.

Chapter 3 is a consideration of the use of theological disputations generally, but
more specifically at Leiden. Even more specifically the consideration is always with an
eye towards the role of the disputations and their place in the corpora of Johannes
Marckius and Bernhardinus De Moor respectively. A somewhat recent debate in
Arminius scholarship raised a broader methodological question how one should think of
the authorship of disputations and their relationship to a theologian's corpus. If the
content (if not the very words) of the disputations should not be thought of as part of a
theologian's corpus, then we have a body of literature that the theologian personally
referred to as their own, but a subsequent historian does not; this conclusion will be
briefly examined as it bears upon the relationship between De Moor's class lectures,
disputations, and ultimately the Perpetuus Commentarius. Up to this point, much of the
scholarship has leaned heavily on the good work of a historian analyzing the customary
way of doing things in the Law faculty. It is appropriate to ask whether or not the
theologians did things exactly the same way. Along these lines, it is necessary to
comment upon the development of the disputational practices, the relationship between
disputations and systematic works of theology among a broader array of Reformed
theologians and academic contexts, and some observations regarding the transitions from
a professor's lecture, student disputations, and the professor's development of a
systematic theology manual. Also, there is sufficient archival material from Leiden University to substantiate the conclusions made regarding Marckius and De Moor. Not only do the disputations function as an important moment in the transfer of a body of knowledge from master to student, but over time, the disputations in their own right generate an institutional corpus of theology that can, and should be, examined as a distinctive way of understanding a localized reception of particular viewpoints. In other words, methods analyzing pedagogical instruction in an institution over time bring together the best insights and practices of social and intellectual history.

It is not an overstatement to say that universities then as now—even among scholars and professors that are geographically diverse but generally unified in a viewpoint—are known for certain distinctive emphases. For example, one can easily demonstrate that the University of Utrecht under the influence of Voetius and Hoornbeek defined theology as primarily practical whereas the University of Leiden, following Junius and the *Synopsis purioris*, emphasized that theology, as a mixed discipline is primarily a wisdom, and is therefore both theoretical and practical.

One way to examine De Moor's exposition of special revelation in conjunction with De Moor's *Perpetuus Commentarius* is to consider his inaugural oration and his valedictorian address as rector magnificus. Inaugural orations generally emphasized something a professor believed would frame their tenure at an academic institution. Chapter 4 is an examination of De Moor's orations entitled "The Incomplete Felicity of the Militant Church" and "What is excessive in the theological science" as well as their connection to his exposition of the necessity of special revelation for *theologia in hac vita*, that is, theology in this life for those who have not yet attained the beatific *visio Dei*. 
In other words, De Moor's oration is an application of the *theologia viatorum* for the life of the Church and a particular view of history as well as Christian service in the Church of Christ.

Chapter 5 is an examination of how Marckius and De Moor thought of the relationship between scholastic, academic theology and matters of theological praxis. Is it the case that the use of scholastic theology kills piety? This chapter examines two different ways of arranging questions of practical theology stemming from William Ames and Gijsbertus Voetius. Although there are a variety of Reformed approaches in the period to whether theology is a practical, theoretical, or mixed discipline, there is a general agreement that the goal of theology *in hac vita* is to inculcate true faith and true piety.

Chapter 6 is an examination of how De Moor addressed the issue of methodological doubt as he expounded Marckius's points on natural theology and situated them within debates from the 1640s until his time. In that regard, this chapter examines a portion of those sources with respect to particular controversies in the Netherlands, guided by De Moor's articulated concerns over methodological doubt and its impact upon theology, the doctrine of revelation, faith and reason, the relationship between theology and philosophy, and the necessity of special revelation for salvation. This chapter also demonstrates how De Moor answered these concerns by utilizing the *theologia viatorum*, or *theologia stadii*, to affirm a biblical natural theology and to assert the necessity of Scripture. Finally, I will conclude with some methodological observations as well as historical findings. Also, the possible ways in which these findings could aid future research endeavors will be articulated.
CHAPTER 2: De Theologia Vera at Leiden University

This chapter primarily argues that the framework of Junius's *De Theologia Vera*, while originating at Leiden and being developed most frequently there, was adapted in different university contexts through professors trained at Leiden, or influenced by professors trained at Leiden, to become a common form of prolegomena among the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Reformed. While it is true that other Reformed universities developed along similar lines, this chapter argues for degrees of institutional continuity at Leiden. Secondly, this chapter exposits what this framework was and how it was frequently deployed in its context. Given that this framework fell out of use and is only now gaining somewhat more scholarly attention, it is worth briefly mentioning its role in modern theology.

2.1 The Archetypal and Ectypal Distinction in Contemporary Theology

In the last thirty years, the importance of the archetypal and ectypal distinction in the history of systematic theology has received more attention. Wolfhart Pannenberg, commenting on the Lutheran scholastics, notes that the distinction, when properly deployed, centers the proper object of theology upon God because, "the knowledge of God that is made possible by God, and therefore by revelation is one of the basic conditions of the concept of theology as such."¹ Although Christian doctrine addresses more than simply the topic of God, Pannenberg emphasizes that from the medieval to post-Reformation era "God is the unifying point of reference for all objects and themes of

¹ Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, volume 1 (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company: Grand Rapids, 1988), 2. In the ensuing discussion, Pannenberg notes the significance of the revival of this distinction in Francisus Junius (3n2) but traces its importance for Lutheranism through Gerhard and beyond.
theology, and in this sense he is its absolute subject."² Pannenberg attributes the distinction to Duns Scotus in God's knowledge of himself (*theologia in se*), and our knowledge of God (*nostra theologia*).³ Two theological problems immediately emerge. First, there is the problem of relating the finite creature's knowledge of the infinite Creator. Secondly, there is the relationship between natural and supernatural theology, or to put it more subjectively, the type and extent of knowledge of God that an unbeliever can have.

In Pannenberg's narration of how the object of theology took a subjective turn to arrive at Schleiermacher via the older Lutherans, he is correct. But, given the strong difference of opinion between the Reformed and Lutherans on the nature of God's incommunicable knowledge of himself, and Pannenberg's usage of the Lutheran line, a stronger account of the development of the distinction among the Reformed is necessary, which we will explore momentarily. The contrast between the schemas as deployed by the Lutherans and the Reformed is significant. It is worth noting different streams at least to indicate the different paths of development from a common set of concerns.

Pannenberg believes the distinction between *theologia in se* and *theologia nostra* does not focus enough upon the incarnation in which God draws nearer to humanity. It is worth noting that Pannenberg does not mention the full typology of Franciscus Junius's distinction. Junius, who currently is believed to be the one who introduced the distinction

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² Pannenberg, 5.

³ There may be a more proximate Thomist and Dominican reception among the Reformed than the Scotists; e.g. Franciscus Gomarus, when discussing the *voluntaria Dei theologia* references “the scholastics” that “ingeniously spoke” of archetypal theology and references Thomas and the *Commentaria* of Domingo Bañez, (O.P) (1528-1604) on Thomas Aquinas, see Franciscus Gomarus, *Opera Theological Omnia*, 2 volumes, (Amsterdam: J. Janson, 1644), vol. 2, pars III, disp. 1, thesis xvi.
into Protestant circles, speaks of two kinds of true theology: archetypal, which is in fact God's infinite knowledge of himself, and ectypal theologies; the points of contact between God and his creatures. There is the *theologia unionis* that emphasizes the unique knowledge of God that the God-man Jesus Christ has. There is the *theologia visionis* that is the maximum knowledge of God that creatures can have. For example, this theology of vision is what the blessed dead and the angels have. Then there is the *theologia viatorum*, or theology in this life while the redeemed believer is striving after God in the midst of a sin-cursed world. In Junius's account, as among other Reformed theologians of the period, archetypal theology is incommunicable to the creature.

When Pannenberg identifies the supremacy of identifying the incarnation as foundational for humanity's participation in the knowledge of God, he does not mention the *theologia unionis* distinction present in many of the older Protestant theologians. For example, Junius's *theologia unionis* provides a sufficient contact point in the God-man Jesus Christ as the highest order of ectypal theology to make a similar point that Pannenberg desires to make utilizing the incarnation.  

Pannenberg is following Gerhard's and Quenstedt's articulation of the archetypal/ectypal distinction, and there is a significant divergence between the Reformed and Lutheran views as to exactly what the implications of the distinction are. Whereas the older Reformed theologians view the archetypal theology as safeguarding God's incommunicable divine knowledge of himself, the seventeenth-century Lutheran theologian, Andreas Quenstedt, argues that because of the incarnation, in which the God-man has both archetypal and ectypal theology, human beings have access to and participate in the divine archetypal theology via the human

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4 Pannenberg, 6.
nature of Christ subsisting in the hypostasis of the Son of God. This is, however according to the Reformed, to confuse archetypal theology with the ectypal, theology of union.\textsuperscript{5} Even the ectypal theology of union is unique to the God-man for the Reformed. Human beings are not able to pry into how exactly the Son of God knows, being fully human and divine. Such a knowing is \textit{sui generis}. It is one thing to say that God has accommodated himself to his people via the incarnation for their apprehension of God, it is quite another to say that because of the incarnation creatures have access to the Creator's self-knowledge.

The Reformed in their understanding of the incommunicable attributes are echoing, for example, similar points in Dominican theologians from Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal Tommaso Cajetano. Thomas Aquinas argues that even if the blessed dead did obtain the vision of God and were to see God's essence they would not know everything that God knows, nor would they know it in the way that God does.\textsuperscript{6} Cajetan comments on a similar quodlibetal question in Thomas on whether in seeing God according to his essence one sees all that God sees. He simply points out that humans only see what God wills for them to see, and do not ever glimpse God or what God knows exactly as God sees them. To assert that human beings will is a Scotist fallacy, or \textit{sophisma consequentis}.\textsuperscript{7} And in this regard, the Reformed-Lutheran debate on what kind of

\textsuperscript{5} Cf. Quenstedt, \textit{Theologia Didactico-Polemica sive Systema Theologicum} (Wittenberg: Johannes Ludolph Quenstedt), 1:3-12.

\textsuperscript{6} In Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia Iussu Impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. Edita Tomus Duodecimus Tertia Pars Summae Theologiae} (Rome: S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1906), 223, "Summa Theologica Suppl. IIIae," Q92, "De visione divinae essentiae per comparationem ad beatos," art. 1-3. In article 3, reply to objection 3: "intellectus creatus non videt divinam essentiam secundum modum ipsius essentiae, sed secundum modum proprium, qui finitus est. Unde non oportet quod eius efficacia in cognosendo ex visione praedicta amplitetur in infinitum ad omnia cognoscenda."

\textsuperscript{7} Cf. Cajetan, \textit{Summa Sacrae Theologiae}, (Antwerp: Vidua & Hæredes Ioannii Stelsii), 60, "this doubtful consequence arises from Scotus: and the rest of those asserting that in God things exist as in a voluntary
knowledge the beatific vision includes takes a different cast as it engages in questions regarding the communication of attributes transposed to the nature of God's knowledge.⁸

At this point, the analyses of van Asselt and Muller on the archetypal and ectypal distinction are a substantial advance from many narratives that dominated nineteenth and twentieth-century accounts of Reformed theology.⁹ Van Asselt represents a welcome turn in the scholarship when he addresses the archetypal and ectypal framework among the Reformed scholastics as a "fundamental christological and, thus … trinitarian structure of Reformed theology."¹⁰

In this vein of more recent scholarship of theology and philosophy in the early modern period, happily there is a growing body of literature on the archetypal/ectypal schema of prolegomena and its place in the development of Reformed thought from the medieval scholastics to the early modern period.¹¹ This schema is also receiving more

mirror. And the rationale against the argument runs thus: things are in God not only in the cause but as in a voluntary mirror, therefore the sophism of the consequent is therefore committed by inferring things in God are seen precisely as in their cause. … But [Scotus] does not infer the intent as is evident … God is a voluntary mirror, and if He wills, it is seen, and if he does not will, it is not seen …"


⁹ Willem van Asselt, "The Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-Century Reformed Thought" in WTJ 64 (2002): 319-35. Van Asselt provides a succinct overview of the issues involved in the older scholarship of Tholuck, Barth, Bizer, Althaus, and Weber that will not be recapitulated here. See also a much closer and lengthier analysis in Richard Muller, PRRD, 1:113-122, 221-269, 3:204.


attention across an array of works that are either theologies historical, systematic, or catechetical in nature. It even intersects with English literature and early modern theology. But as of yet there is not a treatment that examines the use of this schema at Leiden University by Bernhardinus De Moor, one of the late and last proponents of Protestant confessional orthodoxy in the early modern period.

2.2 The Use of *De Theologia Vera* at Leiden University from 1594 to 1676

The story of the use of *De Theologia Vera* in broader Protestant circles for the past four hundred years is, relatively speaking, only beginning to be written. Yet, it is fair to say that it was appropriated by theological systems of Reformed and even Lutheran theologians throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Willem van Asselt has observed recently, the distinctions laid out in Franciscus Junius's *De Theologia Vera* are appropriated by many in the period. The importance of these distinctions in the prolegomena has not always been fully appreciated for the full system of theology in recent times. Even Karl Barth would observe towards the end of his life that "things would have gone differently and more favorably for the history of modern theology if the foregoing distinctions, which are only apparently abstruse, had not become, at the ominous turn of the seventeenth century, a part of 'dogmatic antiquity' (according to Karl

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von Hase)." In order to understand Bernardinus De Moor's usage of this framework, it is helpful to understand in broad form the use of Junius's framework at Leiden University prior to De Moor's thirty-five year tenure as a professor of theology (1745-1780).

Although many other Reformed theologians would utilize the distinctions, it is at Leiden that these distinctions were first taught, developed, and employed, and elements of this structure were consistently utilized from 1594 through the early nineteenth century. This does not mean that other theologians and academic institutions did not utilize them, (for in fact they did), but it is fair to observe that the distinctions represent a programmatic feature of the prolegomena taught at Leiden. Much of the curricular cross-pollination at other Reformed institutions can be accounted for by direct contact with faculty and graduates of Leiden who served in other contexts. At Leiden, as faculty came and went, some of whom had been trained at Leiden and others who had not, this particular framework was utilized, engaged, critiqued, and developed to some extent.

### 2.2.1 Franciscus Junius

It is worth registering a word of caution. Franciscus Junius utilized a cluster of distinctions that demonstrated his familiarity with patristic and medieval conversations on the nature of theology. As a result it is necessary to point out that these distinctions are not Junius's invention, nor did they appear *de novo* in 1594. Instead, it is important to recognize that in Reformed circles Junius has been identified as perhaps the first Reformed Protestant to utilize these distinctions in conjunction with his approach to

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theology.\textsuperscript{17} As an aside, given his usage of the archetypal and ectypal distinction to articulate his understanding of God's relationship to the moral law (\textit{ius}) and the Mosaic legal economy (\textit{lex}) at approximately the same time as the publication of the \textit{De Theologia Vera}, there is still work to be done on the role of this schema in his thought.\textsuperscript{18}

First and foremost with respect to its structure, Franciscus Junius defines true theology as wisdom of divine matters that exists in two kinds: archetypal and ectypal theology.\textsuperscript{19} Archetypal theology is God's full knowledge of Himself and of His will, and in this sense it is unique and \textit{sui generis}.\textsuperscript{20} More correctly, archetypal theology describes an essential attribute of God and, according to Junius, "that essential, archetypal theology is a characteristic of the nature of God, and part (as we would put it) of that infinite knowledge which in God is essential."\textsuperscript{21} Therefore this type of theology is incommunicable to created beings. And, as such, Junius points out that his loose definition of archetypal theology is more properly thought of as an analogous description for our sake, since here "wisdom is predicated of God univocally but of ourselves equivocally."\textsuperscript{22} Additionally, Junius shies away from defining archetypal theology so that he does not seek to attribute a specifying characteristic to the simplest essence.\textsuperscript{23} Along

\textsuperscript{17} Muller, \textit{PRRD}, 1:112.
\textsuperscript{18} Franciscus Junius, \textit{The Mosaic Polity}, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. A. M. McGinnis (Grand Rapids: Christian Library Press, 2015), xxxiv-xxxvii. I argue that Junius adopts a basically Thomist approach to the interplay between God as good, the moral law, and positive law.
\textsuperscript{19} This portion is a summary of Junius's thirty-nine theses on theology that he defends in eighteen chapters. A list of the theses can be found in Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 85-90.
\textsuperscript{20} Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 105.
\textsuperscript{21} Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 105.
\textsuperscript{22} Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 108.
\textsuperscript{23} Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 108.
these lines, Junius distinguishes divine wisdom, which is intuitive and uncomposed that
gives rise to principles in created beings, as opposed to human wisdom, which is
discursive and operates by means of principles. After further qualifications, Junius
concludes his description of archetypal theology with astounded doxology, mimicking
Paul in Romans 11:33, "And we also halt our advance here, overcome with holy fear. For
because that abyss is one of wisdom, it is better that we should now come to the rivers
that are communicated through it and flow from it, lest its magnitude should swallow up
our weakness if we should plunge ourselves into that ocean."25

Ectypal theology contains three species—union, vision, and revelation—and is
aptly defined as theology that is accommodated to human capacity. Considered
absolutely or in itself, ectypal theology is accommodated to the one communicating it,
but considered relatively it is theology accommodated to the recipient. The theology of
union is the entire wisdom of divine matters that is communicated to the person of Christ
as the God-man.26 The theology of vision is what is communicated to those who dwell in
heaven, namely angels and the glorified saints.

The theology of revelation is *theologia in hac vita*, that is, theology
communicable to and for human beings in this life, is sometimes called *theologia nostra*.
This theology of revelation occurs either naturally and internally by nature or
supernaturally and externally by grace. Up to this point, all the forms of theology—

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26 The significance of this point not only differentiates Lutheran and Reformed conceptions of
prolegomena, but also conceptions of the *communicatio idiomatum* in the God-man. It also influences
sacramental debates. Junius specifically addresses this concern in the chapter on the theology of union in
Christ, Junius, *True Theology*, 121.
archetypal and ectypal—can be described as perduring in their own way. The theology of revelation on the other hand, albeit true, is not enduring for it will be replaced with the complete vision of God. Junius argues that even had Adam not fallen, his natural theology would need to be replaced by a perfected vision of God.\footnote{Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 154.}

With the fall of humanity into sin, the principles of natural theology "were still shared, veiled, and imperfect. But now they were completely compromised in themselves and quite confused … because of our depravity."\footnote{Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 87.} Furthermore, fallen, natural theology does not and cannot ever lead to perfection, nor can it "contain the perfection that is added by grace."\footnote{Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 87.} The fallen depravity of humanity and the failure of natural theology requires a knowledge of God and divine matters that is both supernatural with respect to its divine origin and is a theology, with respect to its mode of communication, that transcends the limitations of human reason.

Supernatural theology should also be considered absolutely in relation to itself but relatively in relation to those to whom it is communicated. Junius defines \textit{theologia nostra} in this way:

\begin{quote}
Stated absolutely, our theology is the wisdom of divine matters inspired by God according to divine truth. It has been entrusted to His servants through the word pronounced in Christ, and sealed both in the Old and New Testaments through the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, as much as is fitting to be revealed to us here for His own glory and the good of the elect.\footnote{Junius, \textit{True Theology}, 88.}
\end{quote}
Supernatural theology considered absolutely or in itself, as Scripture, is also objective according to Junius.\(^{31}\) But regardless of how it is considered, whether objectively in Scripture or subjectively in the believer, its source is God, and thus can be called inspired theology.\(^{32}\) The principal efficient and absolute cause of supernatural theology is the trinitarian God who solely inspires and authors this supernatural theology in his servants. The instrumental cause is God's spoken word or enunciative discourse which is both spiritual and corporeal. The final cause or goal of such theology can be considered twofold; primarily and remotely, the glory of God as well as secondarily and proximately, the good of the elect.

Considered in the recipient subject, that is relatively, supernatural theology is accommodated to the reason and capability of the recipient. This subjective supernatural theology cannot be demarcated precisely because the capacities and abilities of human beings varies as do the effects of fallen human nature and the effects of sanctifying grace. Thus, considered relatively and subjectively, supernatural theology in this life is incomplete as no one person comprehends the whole of it until all believers attain the final glorification of the Church. Yet, despite considering it relatively, Junius does not wish to detract from the point that this theology is true and accomplishes the role God assigns for it.\(^{33}\)

In preliminary outline, Junius has sketched a theological posture that can function with certainty with respect to the objective revelation of God in nature and the Scriptures.

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On the other hand, considered subjectively the believer starts from the position of epistemic humility due to the limitations of the depravity of human nature and the work of grace in progress that has yet to reach its fulfillment. Objectively, Scripture functions as a true and certain guide to salvation in Jesus Christ. Subjectively, in this life Christians aspire to the glorious vision of God in heaven, realizing in accordance with 1 Corinthians 13:12 that in this life they know in part and see in part, but in the next life they will know fully, seeing God face to face. It is these objective and subjective elements in supernatural theology that are also deemed theologia viatorum, "the theology of pilgrims."

Furthermore, in the exposition of thesis 5 where Junius defines all theology—natural and supernatural—as wisdom concerning divine matters, he specifies that all theology is both theoretical and practical. Theology is theoretical in that it requires contemplation and intellection of first principles, conclusions drawn from them, and their ends or goals. But theory alone is insufficient. Theology is practical in that it strives towards living before God. However, theology cannot simply consist in being a practical skill as wisdom acts from knowledge. Theology is both theoretical and practical. In seed form, we see a formulation that can and did support the weight of a deep scholarly theological exposition that also strove for practical excellence in living out theology as piety towards and before God. Throughout the seventeenth century, Reformed theologians on the continent and the British Isles continued a longstanding conversation on whether theology is essentially theoretical, practical, or in what sense it is both.

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34 Junius, True Theology, 101.

35 E.g. as a mixed discipline, see theses 10-11 on the genus of theology in Johannes Polyander et al., Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (Leiden: Elzevier, 1642), 3-4; articulating both the argument for theology as
2.2.2 Kinds of Institutional Continuity

At this point it is helpful to note that this work of Franciscus Junius became a regular part of the theological curriculum at Leiden University for at least the next two hundred years. Consequently, the usage of Junius's framework rises to the level of what has been deemed in this work, "institutional continuity." Some professors of theology would simply cite aspects of Junius's work without further comment demonstrating a simple sort of continuity. Other professors would critique particular points, but still mention and engage with the prolegomenal issues Junius raised, demonstrating conceptual and programmatic continuity. And still others would expand and deploy the conceptual framework in order to engage opposing viewpoints, demonstrating a simple, conceptual, and programmatic continuity. It is beyond the scope of this work to detail and chronicle all who utilized the distinctions just outlined. A few notable examples of two types of institutional continuity, however, will be presented.

One weaker form of institutional continuity is when there is a professor-student relationship where the student becomes a professor at their alma mater or another institution and utilizes their professor's concepts and structures in their own tenure. We also speak of a form of institutional cross-pollination or synchronic institutional continuity. Another stronger form of institutional continuity includes the professor-student relationship, but also includes instances where a professor from another institution comes to a teaching environment where a particular framework or methodology is utilized and deploys the curricular distinctions during their time at the practical discipline (from Wendelin) and as a mixed discipline (From du Moulin), see Edward Leigh, *A Treatise of Divinity Consisting of Three Books* (London: E. Griffin for William Lee, 1646), 2-3.
institution. This second form, or diachronic institutional continuity, is strongest when there is a pattern of instruction over successive generations of faculty. It is this second form that is being argued for at Leiden. This does not mean that professors repeat the distinctions by rote—although they might—but it is a much more robust form of continuity when the distinctions are maintained, developed, and defended over long periods of time. Instead the power of the distinction is in its utility as a pedagogical tool to address a particular set of problems or concerns.

Perhaps the strongest form of institutional continuity is when a university prescribes a particular work or forbids its use. This form should be distinguished from instances when external forces require subscription or proscribe the use of particular ideas, books, and so forth. For then, all institutions under the jurisdiction of the external authority are affected as well and the distinctive flavor of a particular academic context can be dulled. What is argued for here at Leiden is this middle form of institutional continuity. There is no record that the theological college of Leiden University or the University itself prescribed the use of Junius's *De Theologia Vera*. The fact that generations of theologians at Leiden employed it and graduates took it with them to new academic contexts of their own volition attests its utility.

### 2.2.2.1 Synchronic Institutional Continuity

The weaker form of institutional continuity is tied more to the professor-student relationship than to the institutional context. It is possible that a professor's student may bring their schema to a new institutional context, develop the schema, and over time start a new institutional trajectory. Although this weaker form does not seem to be the case at Leiden with respect to Junius's schema, it is worth briefly mentioning a few examples of
this weaker form as it represents a fruitful line of research related to the question of continuity and reception that is rooted in professor-student relationships and becomes part of the curriculum through the disputational cycles. The transmission is not simply that a professor read a good treatment of a topic and decided to incorporate it into their curriculum; that happens, of course, all the time. This seems to be something different.

There are notable examples of Leiden professors and students who also went on to serve as professors at other academic institutions and who utilized Junius's schema in their new academic context. Two cases that readily come to mind within the Dutch context of the seventeenth century illustrate the point rather well: Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641) and Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676). Both individuals had an immediate connection to Leiden University, Gomarus as a professor and Voetius as a student.

Gomarus served on the faculty of Leiden from 1594 to 1611 and served with Junius in the disputational teaching cycles. Gomarus's familiarity with Junius also extends to his student days (Neustadt, 1580-1582; Heidelberg 1584-1587, after his graduation from Cambridge in 1584) when Junius taught at Neustadt (1578-1579, 1581-1584) and Heidelberg (1584-1592). Besides his tenure at Leiden, there are examples of the utilization of Junius's De Theologia Vera in Gomarus's teaching at Saumur (1614-1618) and Groningen (1618-1641). For example, in a disputation on theology, Gomarus utilizes elements of the De Theologia Vera in sixty theses adding specific patristic

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citations and biblical references. Gomarus does not utilize the archetypal/ectypal distinction *per se* but rather states:

In fact, theology revealed by God is wisdom from God to the rational creature, from Himself out of sheer goodness according to the likeness and exemplar of His own theology, communicated for the public good, for a sufficient knowledge from God for the salvation of human beings, both the due gratitude of piety and of justice, and for the beatitude according to the glory of God.

Furthermore, Gomarus also utilizes the theme of God's knowledge as the *fons* and humanity's knowledge as a derivative *rivus* that Gomarus's exposition takes up the question of the analogy that exists between God's uncreated, essential knowledge and created, accommodated knowledge. It is also noteworthy that Gomarus does not mention the terms for ectypal theology: *theologia unionis, theologia visionis*, and *theologia in hac vita*. Instead, he speaks of a twofold theology of heaven and the homeland compared to a theology of earth and the road, a theology of grace as well as of glory. Theology of pilgrims is "sufficient for the office of faith and knowing the destination of blessedness." Thus Gomarus's agreement with Junius is conceptual, although many of the terms are not the same there are similarities in the conceptual framework.

Gisbert Voetius (1589-1676) served as a mainstay theological voice of the Synod of Dordt at the University of Utrecht from 1636 until his death. He was perhaps the

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40 Gomarus, *Opera Theologica omnia*, 2.3.2.

most expansive Dutch Reformed theologian of the seventeenth century for the sheer size of his theological corpus and the depth of his engagement with trans-confessional sources. In student disputations on theology at Utrecht on July 3, 1642 and July 10, 1647, Voetius deployed selected parts of Junius's framework to answer a handful of questions in the broader array of twenty-five theological problems.42 A few interesting examples demonstrate the utility of Junius's *De Theologia Vera* for theological education.

In the 1642 disputation regarding the genera of theology, Voetius follows Junius in asserting that true and false theology are not species of the same genus "any more than a pygmy, goblin, satyr, or monstrously tattooed man is contained in the same genus with a man."43 Archetypal and ectypal theology are also not species of the same genus but are analogous.44 And picking up on Junius's theoretical and practical designation, Voetius divides the question as a matter of perspective. If one considers theology as it is a theory about God, then it is must be called wisdom. On the other hand it must also be called prudence with respect to the praxis of faith, hope, love, and of all the instituted worship.45

On the question of whether theology belongs to the genus of theoretical or practical sciences Voetius is careful in his differences with Junius and Gomarus. Because he claims that the object of Christian theology in this life is not only God but also religion and the worship of God,

Therefore I prefer to say that theology is more—no, more correctly—is absolutely practical if we wish to speak precisely and properly … now in fact Christian

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43 Voetius, *Diatribae*, 3.

44 Voetius, *Diatribae*, 3.

45 Voetius, *Diatribae*, 5.
theology in this life (which is what has been defined here and which we have explained) is practical, because all its knowledge (cognitio) and γνώση is ordered from itself and through itself to practice, and in beginning from knowledge ends in practice, that is, the practice of repentance, faith, hope, love, and of comfort in this life and death.46

The object of the disagreement is not simply a quibble with Junius and Gomarus, but instead is specifically aimed more broadly at Thomas Aquinas (I q1 art. 4) and certain of his expositors who claim that theology is both practical and speculative, but weighted to the speculative side.47 Voetius is also responding to the more proximate attacks of the Remonstrants who take issue with the Heidelberg Catechism (nostra Catechesis). And in order to measure his disagreement with the utmost respect for Junius and Gomarus, Voetius states,

    I do not want to take anything away from the greatest theologians Franciscus Junius and Franciscus Gomarus, who share this opinion with the Scholastics, and the latter of which is flogged by the Remonstrants by name, but without merit. For these theologians define and consider theology both of this life and of the one to come as one connected thing, but we and our Catechism are considering only the theology of pilgrims.48

One way of considering Voetius's difference is that his definition of theology is more restricted than Junius and Gomarus, and thus, has a different accent.

    Is this difference as deep as one might suppose? Given Voetius's emphasis on the absolutely practical nature of theology in this life, it is noteworthy that on the question of whether the proximate subject of theology is the intellect or the will, he responds that the subject is the intellect because formally theology is knowledge and a species of an

46 Voetius, Diatribae, 8-9.
47 Voetius, Diatribae, 8.
48 Voetius, Diatribae, 9.
intellectual habitus. Voetius explains further that the proper object of theology is what is true, which is formally the object of an intellectual habitus, and in its logically prior moment, general faith involves an intellective act as it is a certain assent of the mind, even though special and applying faith involves an interplay between the mind and the will. One of his supporting reasons for this position is that "beatitude, and consequently the theology of the blessed, formally consists in the operation and action of the mind, just as the Scholastics dispute at Ia IIae, qu. 3, art. 4-5. Nor do our theologians reject the point." Junius makes a similar point that theology is divine wisdom that flows from knowledge to practice in the knowing subject. Voetius even takes pains to argue more expansively that in asserting the prior subject of theology as the intellect in no way denies that the terminus or end of any science or art is in the will for the sake of practice. Voetius also seeks to disagree respectfully with *ille Theologus* or *praestantissimus Theologus*, honorific references to William Ames with whom Voetius greatly sympathizes and endorses on matters of piety and practice. And so, in the face of


50 Voetius, *Diatribae*, 11.


52 Junius, *De Theologia Vera*, 139-150.


material differences between William Ames, "who tenaciously defended to his very last breath that theology is in the will and not in the mind," and Franciscus Junius as well as Gomarus, Voetius expresses a measured appreciation, appropriation, and use of them all.

These particular disputations on theology in the *Diatribae* demonstrate a programmatic sort of continuity that evidences deep appreciation and at times conceptual and simple continuity with Junius. When Voetius edited his theses in the *Diatribae* before publication in 1668, he appends a brief bibliography that includes medieval theologians, such as Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, on prolegomenal matters plus more recent writers including the Jesuit, Maximillian Sandeus, and of course, Voetius's own works on the topic. He also includes specific works from "our theologians", and at the top of the list is Franciscus Junius's *De Theologia Vera*, next Johann Heinrich Alsted's 1612 *Praecognitorum Theologicorum*, and finally John Owen's 1661 *Theologoumena Pantodapa.*

The cases of Gomarus and Voetius represent just one line of institutional continuity as professors and students who had direct contact with Junius's work and the content of the Leiden disputational cycles and then utilized Junius's work as part of their own instruction and disputations at other institutions. In the case of Gomarus, these institutions were Saumur and Groningen, and Utrecht in the case of Voetius. In the case of Gomarus the student-professor relationship could be expanded along another line to

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55 Voetius, *Diatribae*, 11.

Samuel Maresius (1599-1673) who studied with Gomarus at Saumur and followed in his teacher's footsteps becoming a professor of theology at Sedan (1625-1636) and later at Groningen (1643-1673). Maresius is also an interesting case of continuity as he had no direct contact with the disputations at Leiden, but did have contact with Gomarus, and then into the disputational cycles at Groningen as he stepped into Gomarus's position in 1643 two years after Gomarus's death. Between the tenures of Gomarus and Maresius, the structure of De Theologia Vera was utilized at Groningen from 1618 to 1673. In Maresius's work there is a deepening of the distinctions as he seeks to defend and re-emphasize them against the attacks of especially Remonstrants and Socinians.

By comparison, if we shift our focus from the professor-student relationship from Gomarus and Voetius at Leiden to Voetius and Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706) at Utrecht, we find a line of institutional continuity from 1641 to 1706 of the programmatic concerns and conceptual distinctions in De Theologia Vera. Mastricht was Voetius's student and later took on Voetius's chair from 1677-1706. Mastricht's usage of Junius is developed along three lines that correspond to his method of exposition. In the dogmatic section Mastricht simply states the distinctions positively, in the elenchtic section he addresses certain contemporary concerns, but in the practical section lists various applications detailing the spiritual dangers of false theology and the importance of true

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57 Emile Haag, *La France Protestante* (1853), 250ff.

58 Maresius's *Systema Theologicum* (Groningen: Aemilius Spinneker, 1673) is an annotated collection of the disputations and topics addressed in his tenure at Groningen. On the nature of theology, throughout the annotations Maresius defends the structure and distinctions utilized by Junius and Gomarus.


60 Petrus van Mastricht, *Theoretico-Practica Theologia* (Utrecht: Thomas Appels, 1699), 1.1.1.15.

theology as well as the means for properly pursuing the truth.\textsuperscript{62} It is also noteworthy that van Mastricht agrees with his professors Voetius and Johannes Hoornbeek (1617-1666) that the essential nature of theology in this life is practical, but pivots closer to Junius's statement that theology is theoretical and practical. Regarding the nature of theology van Mastricht asserts: "Christian theology is not theoretical, or theoretico-practical, except from its method of treatment, as we have delineated it; but it is purely and especially practical."\textsuperscript{63} With respect to the method of treatment, Christian theology demands:

\ldots what Christ means in John 17:3 and Isaiah 53:11, and it is theoretico-practical: that is, it is neither theoretical only, which rests in some sort of contemplation of the truth; nor is it practical only, which has some sort of knowledge of the truth \ldots but it conjoins theory with practice, and is an \textit{ἐπίγνωσις ἀληθείας τῆς κατ’ ἐνσέβειαν}, [Titus 1:1] a knowledge of the truth which is according to piety.\textsuperscript{64}

In substance, this is not far removed from Voetius or Junius in its fundamental concerns, especially when van Mastricht notes that it would be perfectly acceptable to describe theology by one of its synonyms, \textit{θεοσοφία}, the wisdom of God.\textsuperscript{65}

In these cases, the institutional continuity between Leiden and Utrecht in this period takes the form of cross-pollination through faculty and graduates. With respect to Junius's schema at Utrecht University, the influence originated with Gisbertus Voetius, who trained at Leiden and served at Utrecht from its founding in 1636 to his death in 1676. His intentional usage of the schema and modification of it points to a form of conceptual and programmatic continuity with Leiden on the matter of theological

\textsuperscript{62} Van Mastricht, \textit{Theoretico-Practica Theologia}, 1.1.1.26-35.

\textsuperscript{63} Van Mastricht, \textit{Theoretico-practica Theologia}, (1698), 1.1.1.34.

\textsuperscript{64} Van Mastricht, \textit{Theoretico-Practica Theologia}, (1698), 1.1.1.20.

\textsuperscript{65} Van Mastricht, \textit{Theoretico-Practica Theologia}, 1.1.1.14.
prolegomena where he utilizes similar structures but formulates differing emphases. Secondly, we also note Voetius's differences are couched in an attitude of respectful deference because Junius and Gomarus are considered authorities. In the case of Gomarus, we see a line of cross-pollination between Leiden and Saumur as well as Leiden and Groningen. With his student Maresius, who is one degree of separation from Junius, we see an employment and defense of Junius's and Gomarus's distinctions at Groningen.

2.2.2.2 Diachronic Institutional Continuity

Now we turn to the question of institutional continuity that is more diachronic in nature at Leiden University. It is already known that the schema published in the De Theologia Vera (1594) first appears and is utilized in the disputational cycles at Leiden in the tenure of Junius and Gomarus, which spans a period from 1592 to 1611. But given the rotation of professors in the cycles of disputationes, frequently termed repetitiones, it must be mentioned that it was not immediately adopted in every cycle. This is not surprising, as one might expect with the beginnings of a trajectory, the elements are present but the form is not concretely developed, nor immediately instituted. The schema's pedagogical value or explanatory value must be tested.

Consider the first twenty years or so of the schema's development. Prior to his tenure at Leiden, Junius deployed similar thematic elements of the schema in an inchoate form in the 1588 disputations or theses theologicae at Heidelberg. In the dedicatory

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epistle of the 1594 *De Theologia Vera*, Junius notes that he had promised to begin this work upon his arrival in 1592, and he thanked the curators for their patience.\(^{67}\) In 1597, Junius was the presiding professor on the first disputation of the second cycle of topics disputed in the theological collegium, which utilizes the schema.\(^{68}\) Junius died in 1602, in 1604 Gomarus presided over the first disputation of the fourth cycle entitled "On Holy Scripture," and there is no discussion of the schema.\(^{69}\) The same professor and disputation were defended again in 1607.\(^{70}\) But the concepts do appear in other disputations and contexts outside the established *repetitiones* in this period. For example, in 1605 Joannes Kuchlinus distinguishes the knowledge of God in the first thesis of his disputation "On the knowledge of God,"

> The knowledge of God can be taken in a twofold way, either as the knowledge of God wherein God knows himself, namely as eternal Father, Son, and Holy Spirit first individually (*seipso*) then each other, both in their essence and in their works, and that of themselves essentially, immutably, and most perfectly. \(^{71}\)

This is arguably similar to points that Junius had made regarding archetypal theology.

Kuchlinus explains further, or it is the knowledge of God "as a creature suited to know

\(^{67}\) F. Junius, *De Theologia Vera*, 7.

\(^{68}\) F. Junius, *Disputationum Theologicarum Repetitarum Prima. De Vera Theologia ... Praeside ... D. Francisco Ivnio SS. Theologiae ... Sustinere Adnitar Antonivs Walaevs Gandensis die X Decembris Anno 1597* (Leiden: Ioannes Patij, 1597).

\(^{69}\) F. Gomarus, *Disputationum Theologicarum Quarto Repetitarum Prima de Sacra Scriptura et Partibus Eius* (Leiden: Joannes Patius, 1604). Also note, I have not seen the third cycle in my research at Leiden University and do not know if it is extant. Any information or direction as to its location would be greatly appreciated.

\(^{70}\) F. Gomarus, *Disputationum Theologicarum Quinto Repetitarum prima de Sacra Scriptura et Partibus eius* (Leiden: Joannes Patius, 1607).

\(^{71}\) J. Kuchlinus, *Theses Theologicae de Cognitione Dei ... sub Praesidio ... Johannis Kuchlini ... pro Gratia Mensurae Doni Christi Suscipiet Casparus C. F. Barlaeus Antwerp* (Leiden: Joannes Patius, 1605), A2r. For the rest of the dissertation, citations of unnumbered pages will reference printer's marks. In instances where printer’s marks terminate in lower case roman numerals, recto and verso will be spelled out. Otherwise, recto and verso will be abbreviated "r" and "v" respectively.
God" and this in turn is knowledge as it exists in glory in heaven or on earth, "most
imperfectly." Kuchlinus's thesis encapsulates the theologia visionis and theologia
viatorum distinction succinctly. Also, Arminius seems to pay a compliment to Junius in
his first oration on the object of theology. He works through a distinction of God's
knowledge of himself and "we must consider the object [of theology] more strictly: for
we handle it to the extent that it is our theology relative to how we know God in this
life." In 1609, Gomarus mentions significant parts, terms, and themes that Junius
utilized throughout a disputation "On theology," which was outside the regular cycles of
disputations. Gomarus distinguishes between an archetypal (thesis 16) and an ectypal
theology (21).

After the Synod of Dordt when Remonstrant theologians were ejected from
Leiden University, in order to tamp down suspicion of the Leiden theology faculty, the
theology professors published a curricular syllabus entitled the Synops purioris
Theologiae Disputationibus Quinquaginta Duabus Comprehensa. The Synopsis
Purioris included fifty-two representative disputations authored by four faculty members

72 J. Kuchlinus, Theses theologicae, A2r.
73 J. Arminius, Iacobi Arminii … Opera theologica, Nunc Denuo Conjunctim Recusa (Frankfurt: Wolfgang
Hoffmann, 1635), 1:23.
74 F. Gomarus, Theses de Theologia … Praeside Francisco Gomaro … Tueri Conabitur Petrus Lansbergiuis
75 F. Gomarus, Theses de Theologia, Aiij recto. Gomarus cites Thomas Aquinas on the archetypal
distinction in the marginalia.
76 F. Gomarus, Theses de Theologia, Aiij verso.
77 J. Polyander, A. Rivet, A. Thysius, A. Walaeus, Synopsis Purioris Theologiae Disputationibus
Quinquaginta Duabus Comprehensa, 4th ed. (Leiden: Johannes & Daniel Elsevier, 1652). In the preface of
an 1881 reprint, the editor Herman Bavinck explains the circumstances of the publication of the Synopsis
Purioris in 1625, Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, Disputationibus Quinquaginta Duabus Comprehensa, 6th
(Johannes Polyander (1568-1646), André Rivet (1572-1651), Antonius Walaeus (1573-1639), and Antonius Thysius, Sr. (1565-1640)). Polyander replaced Gomarus and served as professor of theology at Leiden from 1611-1646, Rivet from 1620-1646, Walaeus from 1619-1639, Thysius from 1619-1640. Bavinck reports that these four theologians co-wrote the disputation, reviewed each other's work, and added corollaries where clarification was necessary.\(^{78}\) This work is intended by its authors to serve as a curricular landmark a "specimen of our like-minded doctrine," tested by the touchstone of Scripture and operating in light of the Synod of Dordt, for the training of candidates for the ministry.\(^{79}\)

The first disputation on sacred theology was presided over by Johannes Polyander and proceeds along the lines of Junius's *De Theologia Vera*. This disputation is brief at only six pages and thirty theses, and takes pains to establish most theses on the basis of Scripture. There are no significant differences from Junius's content, which is condensed into seventeen theses, except a minor one. Junius asserts that "theology is wisdom concerning divine matters"\(^{80}\) not as Polyander defines it as "theology is the wisdom or science concerning divine matters."\(^{81}\) Junius specifically states that "we call theology wisdom for this reason that it altogether embraces in itself, in a way evidently most excellent, all qualities that relate to intellect, knowledge (*scientia*), and saving experience, from nature and surpassing nature."\(^{82}\) The significance of this distinction

\(^{78}\) Bavinck, *Synopsis Purioris*, v.

\(^{79}\) Bavinck, *Synopsis Purioris*, xi.


\(^{81}\) Bavinck, *Synopsis Purioris*, 3.

rests in Junius's later point that wisdom makes judgments about first principles and applies the principles whereas a scientia does not make judgments or make applications. Thus, in Junius's articulation wisdom encompasses the theoretical scientia and the practical ars in a way that scientia alone does not. Now to be fair, Polyander primarily defines theology as a wisdom or knowledge because he finds scriptural evidence to do so, as it includes both principles and practice. Most importantly, according to the stated purpose of the Synopsis Purioris, the authors pledged in the preface that everything would be referred back to, compared with, and corrected by Scripture. Theology is a knowledge because, for example in Titus 1:1, Paul is an apostle of Jesus Christ for the sake of the faith of God's elect and their knowledge (ἐπίγνωσιν) of the truth.

Just as Junius emphasized the role of God's accommodation and communication to humanity via revelation, Polyander does so here. The remaining thirteen theses address specific points such as: (1) the inadequacy of natural theology for salvation and the sufficiency of Scripture (theses 18-19, 29), (2) the use of the study of Scripture, that is, theology, to render us wise for salvation (thesis 20), (3) the goal of theology as the glory of God (thesis 21), (4) the assertion that theology is theoretical and practical beginning in knowledge and proceeding to practice (theses 22-24), (5) refutations of kinds of false theology (theses 25-26), (6) the assertion that there is one will of God to redeem the human race through Christ (thesis 27) and the converse denial that believers were saved by nature prior to Moses, by the law after Moses, and by faith after Christ (thesis 28), and

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83 Junius, True Theology, 101.

(7) theology as a discipline is noetic, semantic and dianoetic, that is, it is an intellectual
habitus that utilizes signs and discursive reasoning.85 This does indicate a positive
appropriation of Junius's schema and demonstrates a willingness to reinforce and
entrench the positions at Leiden.

After the publication of the Synopsis Purioris in 1625, we find one of its
authors—not Polyander, but Walaeus—fifteen years later utilizing the same distinctions
in his Enchiridion Religionis Reformatae, or according to its full title, "A handbook of
the Reformed religion for the examination of ministerial candidates," which is basically
an abbreviated study guide.86 In the Enchiridion, this schema takes up less than one page.
Instead of speaking of archetypal theology, which is Junius's primary term, Walaeus calls
it here prototypical (πρωτότυπον) or exemplary theology, according to Junius's second
term for archetypal theology.87 The modes of ectypal theology are spoken of as
communicated by union, by vision, and by revelation. On the theology of union, Walaeus
takes a moment to explain from John 3:34 and Colossians 2:3 that "just as there are two
natures in Christ, so also there are two kinds of knowledge, one uncreated and simply
infinite; the other created or communicated to the soul of Christ, with as much measure as
could be communicated to any creature."88 The remainder of this outline is taken up with
the standard distinctions between natural revelation and supernatural revelation as well as
God's ability to inspire the prophets and apostles.

85 Bavinck, Synopsis Purioris, 5-6.
86 Antonius Walaeus, "Enchiridion Religionis Reformatae ad Ministerii Candidatorum Examen" in Antonii
88 Walaeus, Opera, 1:11.
In the lengthier treatment of his *Compendium Locorum Communium*, published in 1640, Walaeus gives the standard definitions in terms of Junius's schema but in addition deploys them polemically. For example, whereas the theology of union was stated simply in the *Enchiridion*, here it is used to engage specific theological issues current in his day. The problem is "how does the divine wisdom manifest itself in the hypostatic union to the intellect of the human nature?"\(^89\) The Lutheran ubiquitarians, according to Walaeus, introduce a confusion of the natures in a Eutychian manner by collapsing or transfusing the archetypal knowledge of God into the ectypal knowledge of Christ's human nature. The Roman Catholic theologians, on the other hand, maintained that Christ always had a divine knowledge that resulted from a constant beatific gaze of his human mind; a gaze which began at conception. Walaeus responds that the Roman Catholic view comes into conflict with passages like Luke 2:52 and Mark 13:32 that assert that Christ increased in wisdom and that Christ expressed ignorance of the last judgment. In his view, building on the theology of union, it is better to say that Christ's human mind was illumined by the Holy Spirit above all measure due to the hypostatic union which granted Christ the capacity to receive what must be revealed. Secondly, there is "a most familiar voluntary communication of the objects of this wisdom" in the revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave to Christ, according to Revelation 1:1 so that he might show his servants what must occur soon.\(^90\)

After this point Walaeus spends the remainder of the locus discussing issues that arise from the theology of revelation, "which is proper for human beings living in this

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\(^89\) Walaeus, *Opera*, 1:115.

\(^90\) Walaeus, *Opera*, 1:115.
world," that is the issues that surround the theology of pilgrims. Walaeus describes the three modes of natural revelation as the inscription of common notions based on Romans 2:15, the contemplation of created things based on Romans 1:20, and the governance of things in Acts 17:26 since God made the human race so that they might seek God, if perchance they might find him by groping.\textsuperscript{91}

From here through various questions he develops the point that the image of God in humanity is necessary for God to communicate both natural and special revelation. To the assertion that a supernatural object cannot be apprehended by the natural faculties of a human being, Walaeus responds that if the natural faculties are taken only with respect to corporeal and elementary nature, then the point is true, however, if the natural faculties of a human being include the spiritual and immortal nature of the soul, then the assertion is false.\textsuperscript{92} Walaeus is defending the doctrine of accommodation and the limited utility of natural revelation along Junius's lines. He also makes further connections with the image of God and the first use of the law, because what remains of the image of God in fallen humanity gives ground for the restraint of sin even by pagan access to fallen reason and some recognition, albeit corrupted, of the moral law. Given that some of the Remonstrants and all of the Pelagians maintained that one could attain the way of salvation through the moral effort of keeping the law if only humanity utilized its reason correctly, Walaeus connects this theology of revelation to original sin, the fall, and the resultant human depravity, but rests the ultimate answer in John 14:6, that Christ's

\textsuperscript{91} Walaeus, \textit{Opera}, 1:115.

\textsuperscript{92} Walaeus, \textit{Opera}, 1:115.
assertion that no one can come to the Father except through him indicates the necessity for the revelation of grace in Jesus Christ.93

A final example of how Walaeus expands Junius's point that supernatural revelation in the subjective knower is incomplete in this life is illustrated by Walaeus's response to spiritualists and perfectionists, those that maintain someone can attain to such a state of grace in this life that they no longer need the external leading of Scripture, but only the inner light of the Holy Spirit. Walaeus highlights key passages in the New Testament epistles where the apostles write to fathers, young men, and children (1 John 2:13), where Paul is a debtor to the wise and the unwise (Rom. 1:14), or Peter's address to the elect of God and the regenerate. None of the apostles address their work to only the immature and weak, but to the whole church of God, indicating that there is no point in this life when the objective revelation of God in the Scriptures is unnecessary.94

At this point, it is helpful to pause and note that in the mid-seventeenth century in the Netherlands, there were sides being ranged against each other; between Voetians and Cocceians. The debates were not simply over the practice of piety such as views of the Sabbath, but included such far ranging topics as the nature of Christ's mediatorial work, the reception of René Descartes's philosophy, and Cocceius's teaching of the gradual abrogation of the covenant of works and the gradual inauguration of the covenant of grace. In short, it was a time of deep and frequently bitter controversies that started at college lecterns and frequently ended in street brawls and the intervention of the

93 Walaeus, Opera, 1:116-117.
94 Walaeus, Opera, 1:121.
magistrates on matters of theology and philosophy.\textsuperscript{95} This is why it is helpful to consider the views of professors at Leiden on both sides of the debates with Johannes Hoornbeek (1617-1666) on the side of Voetius (who was at Utrecht University), and Abraham Heidanus (1597-1678) and Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669) on the other side.

Johannes Hoornbeek (1617-1666) is a fine example of a theologian who did not develop the Junian framework, but only—and almost literally—passed on to his students what was of value in other authors. He is an interesting case for several reasons.\textsuperscript{96} First, he began his theological studies at Leiden from 1633 to 1635 under many of the professors that wrote the \textit{Synopsis Purioris}, namely Thysius and Walaeus. But then, he finished his studies under Voetius at the University of Utrecht from 1635 to 1638. After serving as a pastor from 1639 to 1644, he received offers from the universities of Hardewijk and Utrecht, and accepted the position at Utrecht serving for approximately ten years (1644-1654). At this point he accepted a position at Leiden (1654-1666). Given the different emphases in Voetius on the absolutely practical nature of theology in this life, in Hoornbeek on one hand we see a willingness to utilize the Junian framework at Leiden until the question of whether theology is theoretical and practical or only practical. So for example, in his 1658 \textit{Institutiones Theologicae ex optimis auctoribus concinnatae}, which was published in Leiden for the benefit of his students we see the


\footnote{\textsuperscript{96} Biographical information is from the A. J. van der Aa, \textit{Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden} (Haarlem: J.J. van Brederode, 1867), 8:1230 and BLNP 2:259-261.
Junian schema in full supported by exact quotations from Junius and Gomarus, with rarely any commentary, if any, from Hoornbeek.97

On the topic of theology, there are thirteen theses which are supported by direct quotes primarily from Junius and Gomarus, occasionally from John Calvin and William Ames, and once from "PROF.", which I take to mean the professors of the Synopsis Purioris as it is an exact citation of thesis 30 in the first disputation on theology.98 Hoornbeek utilizes the etymological work for the term "theology" (theses 1-2), the true/false theology distinction (thesis 3), the division into archetypal and ectypal theology (thesis 4), the threefold division of ectypal theology (thesis 5), and the natural/supernatural division of revelation (thesis 6). At this point, (thesis 7) on the twofold nature of natural theology as (a) implanted and innate, and (b) acquired he deploys Calvin's Institutes and Walaeus's Loci Communes.99 On the insufficiency of natural theology (thesis 8), it is a lengthy citation of Walaeus's rejection of the Remonstrant point that the communication of grace depends upon a good use of the remnants of the fallen image of God.100 On the necessity of Scripture (theses 9-10), Hoornbeek deploys Calvin, Ames, Trelcatius Jr., and Junius.

At this point we have a distinctly practical turn in the theses where Hoornbeek interjects an emphasis that was more predominant at Utrecht into the Leiden context on

97 Johannes Hoornbeek, Institutiones Theologicae ex Optimis Auctoribus Concinnatae (Leiden: Franciscus Moyard, 1658).
99 Hoornbeek, Institutiones Theologicae, 4-5.
100 Cf. Hoornbeek, Institutiones Theologicae, 5-9 with Walaeus, Opera, 116-118
the absolutely practical nature of theology (thesis 11). Hoornbeek deploys William Ames and Johannes Maccovius (1588-1622) to reject the theoretical nature of theology and insist that it is only practical. His citation of Ames is accurate, however the selective citation of Maccovius leaves the wrong impression that Maccovius and Ames were in total agreement. Maccovius does say, as Hoornbeek cited him,

> For there is nothing revealed, nothing recognized in the Christian religion that does not tend to this end, that we may earnestly pursue piety. And so those violently err, who state that theology is analogous to the sciences, whose chief end is contemplation, for the entirety of it tends toward practice.

However, the force of this statement must be understood within Maccovius's disagreement with Ames that is the very first sentence of the locus, "Theology is a partly theoretical and partly practical discipline that teaches the method of living well and blessedly forever." In this regard, Maccovius is in fundamental agreement with Junius: theology is a mixed discipline that starts in an intellectual habitus and flows toward practice. To drive home the grievousness of Hoornbeek's partial quote, Maccovius specifically rejects the claim that theology is only a practical discipline, by pointing out that we may know that God is omniscient, but the believer does not use that point per se, instead that the contemplation of that doctrinal truth motivates a response. Maccovius observes that "this recognition of God's omnipotence, knowledge, and the rest of His attributes is so theoretical so that it may produce in us a practice. And thus, theology

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consists partly in contemplation and partly in action." In Hoornbeek's usage we lose the respectful and careful nuance that Voetius maintains regarding exactly what type of theology (theology in this life) is absolutely practical. We also lose the precise point that Maccovius was making in fundamental agreement with Junius.

What is noteworthy here in Hoornbeek is his general conformity to the Junius schema predominant in the prolegomena at Leiden while he was a professor at Leiden for Leiden students. On the other hand, if one considers his 1663 *Theologiae Practicae*, which was published in Utrecht and dedicated to the German Elector Frederick Wilhelm of Brandenburg towards the end of Hoornbeek's career at Leiden, the prolegomena on the nature of theology is missing. Instead of a discussion of archetypal and ectypal theology in the prolegomena, we have a discussion of religion as a broad term that encompasses Christian doctrine and theology. Then Hoornbeek has a brief overview of natural theology and quickly moves to supernatural theology that proceeds "from revelation not nature." Perhaps the most telling treatment of whether theology is theoretical, practical, or mixed, is his review of the medieval and philosophical debates about the nature of theoretical and practical disciplines. His first line of argument is that a discipline that subsists in theory but moves to practice cannot be called a theoretical discipline "otherwise there is no discipline that would not be theoretical." According to him, a theoretical discipline terminates in speculative contemplation and is by definition

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opposed to a practical discipline. He utilizes Vasquez's point that "a discipline must be called practical whose action is a practical knowledge, and speculative, whose action is only contemplation and speculation" and concludes that theology is practical.\footnote{Cited in Hoornbeek, \textit{Theologiae Practicae}, 6.}

Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669) is another example of a professor who started his career elsewhere (Franeker 1636-1650) and finished his career at Leiden (1650-1669). A full treatment of Cocceius's thought is not possible here.\footnote{See W. J. van Asselt, \textit{The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669)}, trans. R. A. Blacketer (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Brian J. Lee, \textit{Johannes Cocceius and the Exegetical Roots of Federal Theology: Reformation Developments in the Interpretation of Hebrews 7-10} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 62-71, 98-105, 150-179.} However, his impact was immediate with as many critics as followers. He was a prolific writer as evidenced by an \textit{Opera} that spans eight volumes. The subtitle of the sixth volume indicates that the contents were completed while he lived in Leiden. Volume six of his opera contains many of his dogmatic writings such as his \textit{Aphorismi per universam theologiam breviores & prolixiores}, the \textit{Summa Theologiae ex Scripturis repetita}, and \textit{Disputationes Selectae}. In the \textit{Aphorismi Breviores}, archetypal theology is "the exemplar of the type of revelation and of inscription on the heart."\footnote{Cocceius, \textit{Opera Omnia Theologica, Exegetica, Didactica, Polemica, Philologica} (Amsterdam: Johannes à Someren, 1673), 6:3.} The contents of ectypal theology are present, but the term is not. Instead, there is an acknowledgment that "revelation and knowledge differ in degrees in Christ as a human being and in those who are his, in relation to the way and to the homeland."\footnote{Cocceius, \textit{Opera Omnia}, 6:3.} This is not significantly different from the terms \textit{theologia unionis}, \textit{visionis}, and \textit{revelationis}. The description of theology "in relation to the way," namely an \textit{in via/in patria} distinction, references theology in this life. Cocceius displays the
influence of his conception of covenant history and progressive revelation by specifying that theology of the way also differs in degree and is distinguished "in relation to the way before Christ was given in the old testament and when he was displayed in the new."\(^{113}\)

On the question of whether theology is theoretical, practical, or mixed, Cocceius simply states it is practical. Based on aphorisms 12-15, Cocceius is concerned not to countenance the Socinian assertion that theology is theoretical or speculative in nature, given the rationalist turn in Socinian thought. However, Cocceius does defend the use of reason with several qualifications. In aphorism 20, Reason must serve, not command, Theology. In aphorism 21, "Theology does not destroy reason but perfects it and often surpasses it."\(^{114}\) An example of what surpasses reason in Cocceius's opinion is found in aphorism 22: "And so certain things must be believed which we cannot comprehend, such as the concursus of providence and the created will that freely and damably turned aside from righteousness."\(^{115}\) Furthermore, in aphorism 23, Cocceius seeks to safeguard some role for reason because otherwise one could not maintain that God had accommodated the Word of God to human intelligence.

In the *Aphorismi Prolixiores*, perhaps the most novel expansion of the framework found in Junius is Cocceius's mapping pilgrim theology (*theologia viae*) onto the fourfold state of humanity. In the state of innocence, "it is the knowledge of God for loving and worshipping him under the covenant of works."\(^{116}\) In the fallen state, it is an ignorance,

\(^{113}\) Cocceius, *Opera Omnia*, 6:3.

\(^{114}\) Cocceius, *Opera Omnia*, 6:3.

\(^{115}\) Cocceius, *Opera Omnia*, 6:3.

aversion, and boasting against God. In the state of regeneration, it is love and joy which
grows daily, but not without setbacks and failings. In the state of glory, it is the glorious
and beatific vision of God, although not of his essence.

A second difference between with Junius is that Cocceius defines archetypal
theology in this way: "in God [archetypal theology] is not that perfect knowledge by
which God knows himself but a foreknowledge (πρόγνωσις) of our conformation to His
image, and it is the type of that illumination and sanctification prepared for us."117 In
speaking of it this way, Cocceius draws the ectypal knowledge of Christ closer to the
archetypal knowledge of God. He explains "in Christ the man as servant it was a mode of
knowledge so that he was not ignorant of anything that pertained to his office and so that
he would not sin in ignorance."118 This could be taken as a material difference from
Junius and other Leiden theologians as it seems to raise the possibility that the archetypal
knowledge of God is communicable, but Cocceius very well could intend the difference
between archetypal theology and the knowledge of God's simple intelligence (scientia
simplicis intelligentiae), or necessary knowledge (scientia necessaria).119 In this
statement the archetypal knowledge is no longer what Junius would describe as an ocean
about to swallow us up, but rather God's determinate will for His people.

Abraham Heidanus served as a professor of theology at Leiden from 1648 until
his dismissal in 1676. Heidanus summarizes the Junius framework giving the primary
distinctions. However, he pans the distinctions claiming "these have been taken from

117 Cocceius, Opera Omnia, 6:19.
118 Cocceius, Opera Omnia, 6:19.
Dionysius the Areopagite and have more the sound of buzzing than soundness."120 His three reasons are: (1) "that it is not a true division, either of the genus into species, or the whole into parts, or the subject and the adjunct", (2) "it labors under being too general, for it can be applied to all things, for in this way Logic can be divided into archetypal and ectypal, similarly physics, ethics," and so forth, and (3) "indeed it is only the magnificence of the terms that commends this distinction, without these it has nothing that is real. And so not without cause do many disregard it or even neglect it."121 In his opinion, "natural theology, which treats by the light of reason of the things done by God, is the least vicious and fabulous" because it does have some basis in Romans 1 and 1 Corinthians 1, but he does not think it proper to catalogue all the errors that are commonly made in handling it.122 He also observes that most theologians in his day understand supernatural theology as "doctrine which depends upon a peculiar divine revelation made through the inspiration or speech to certain persons on this matter and consigned to writing."123 For Heidanus, theology properly speaking is:

either a simple knowledge of the articles of faith or those things which are necessary for salvation … or such doctrine and knowledge of the articles of faith, by which not only are those things necessary for salvation perceived and believed, but through which they easily explicated and deduced into principles, proved and confirmed, and defended against adversaries.124

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120 Abraham Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae in XV Locos Digestum (Leiden: Jordan Luchtmans, 1686), 2.
121 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 2.
122 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 2.
123 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 2.
124 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 2.
Elsewhere, Heidanus defines theology more directly as "the doctrine of divine things revealed by God containing the true sense from God, and which according to that sense the right worship of God is arranged."  

Heidanus goes on to deny that theology is a habitus of faith and knowledge, or that it is acquired or infused. He gives the example of a theologian that commits the sin against the Holy Spirit or sins against conscience. It is not the case that a theologian at that very instance loses or forgets their knowledge of the mysteries or dogmas. Thus, the habitus of theology can be separated from saving faith or infused faith. For "this habitus is acquired by study and toil."  

On the question of whether theology is theoretical or practical, Heidanus responds that it is mixed and furthermore the debate seems to be mostly a debate over terms. Heidanus disagrees with Ames and Scotus (and thus Hoornbeek) because it is not the case that "every act of the intellect which follows from love is practical." By the same token, says Heidanus, "if mathematics, metaphysics, or physics—which are acknowledged by all to be speculative—moved someone to admiration, delight, and love" these would become practical disciplines. But, if someone had to sculpt a statue or build a house, what good is loving or hating? But who would deny that these are practical? If a builder only considered the sort of house he might build but never put things in order to complete it but only thought about it, then his work is speculative,

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125 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 6.
126 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 3.
127 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 6.
128 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 6.
129 Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 6.
although objectively and materially it is practical. Theology is the same way, according to Heidanus.¹³⁰ In the case of Heidanus, we see critical departure from several of the themes found at Leiden up to this point, but there is still a programmatic engagement. Even though Heidanus disagrees with the positions or even questions their utility, he still feels the need to address the questions in some fashion.

With Heidanus we come almost to the close of the seventeenth century in the story of this framework. Between its first introduction with Junius in 1594 to the dismissal of Heidanus in 1676, we have already noted that theologians at Leiden utilized various aspects of Junius's framework for different purposes. By and large, up through the 1640s and 1650s the appropriation was positive, by the 1660s and 1670s we find theologians who are still engaging the distinctions programatically. Some, like Gomarus, Polyander, and Walaeus appropriate the distinctions and defend them, illustrating simple continuity. In the case of Gomarus, the framework is positively utilized to such an extent that his students Voetius and Maresius transfer the framework to their own teaching contexts. Hoornbeek, by comparison is appreciative during his tenure at Leiden, but still expresses significant differences given his own tenure as a professor at Utrecht and his training under Voetius at Utrecht. Some, like Cocceius, who come to Leiden from other teaching contexts, feel free to alter the distinctions to a certain extent in novel new directions. And some, like Heidanus, for the most part are heavily critical of them and reject them. The distinctions are employed long enough across multiple generations of professors, who engage the terms, framework, and problems in their lectures and disputations, that this rises to the level of a relatively strong level of

¹³⁰ Heidanus, Corpus Theologiae Christianae, 7.
institutional continuity. What is of interest is that the framework is modified for a variety of polemical ends to engage intra- and extra-confessional parties. Additionally, as we will see, the distinctions underwent some criticism which in turn led to further refinement, restatement, and defense.

2.3 The Use of the *De Theologia Vera* in Marckius and De Moor from 1689-1780

Now our attention must turn to De Moor and his appropriation of his professor Marckius's textbook as the parameters of his own magnum opus. We will have occasion to examine the deployment of this framework at Leiden between 1685 and 1780, over the course of Markius's and De Moor's tenures. As we will see, De Moor does not hesitate to deepen and modify the framework all the while invoking various professors that served at Leiden since Junius. As to the question of institutional continuity, thus far we have considered the conceptual and programmatic aspect of the content. Now we turn to a closer consideration of Marckius and De Moor.

There are at least three reasons for treating Marckius and De Moor together. First, most proximately, there is the explicit point that De Moor makes in his preface that his work as a theologian was intended to elaborate the system outlined by Marckius at Leiden.131 Second, this pairing reflects a concern for periodization both within broader European context and specifically in the Dutch context. The combined careers of these professors of theology at Leiden University span a period totaling seventy-seven years between 1689 and 1780 (Marckius, 1689-1731; De Moor, 1745-1780). Historians of philosophy commonly delimit the Enlightenment or Age of Reason from approximately

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131 De Moor, *Commentarius Perpetuus*, 1:*3(v).
1650 to 1780. The rise of Enlightenment ideas then overlaps a corresponding transition and decline in the theology of High Protestant Reformed Orthodoxy (1680-1725) to Late Protestant Reformed Orthodoxy (post-1725). In terms of intellectual history, Kant's publication *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) marks another significant turn in approaches toward reason, metaphysics, and the structure of human experience, and also marks a close to the early modern period and the Enlightenment from a philosophical perspective.

Some scholars point to the period of upheaval at the close of the eighteenth century as the close of the early modern period. For example, in Hobsbawm's political construction of the periodization, the early modern period closes with the French National Assembly in June of 1789 and the subsequent abolition of feudalism in August

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132 Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Isaiah Berlin, *The Roots of Romanticism*, ed. H. Hardy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); on the waves of transition across Europe, see Louis Dupré, *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 1-17, especially 5, "Finally, conditions and attitudes differed enormously from one area to another. In Western Europe the Enlightenment was mainly a movement of urban intellectuals; in the American colonies, of landed gentry. Nowhere are the differences more visible than in the field of religion. While in France the battle against 'superstition' was reaching its pitch, in Bavaria and Austria the Counter-Reformation and Baroque still flourished. French philosophes mostly rejected Christianity; German thinkers consistently sought a compromise with it. In Britain rationalists and anti-rationalists appear to have lived rather peacefully, though often incommunicatively, side by side."


134 E.g. Louis Dupré on the transition to the modern, *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture*, 2, "As nominalist theologians began to attribute the origin of all things to the inscrutable will of God, they abrogated the link of intelligibility that connected the source of reality with its created effect. As a result, by the beginning of the modern age reality had ceased to be intrinsically intelligible and God no longer provided the rational justification of the world. Henceforth meaning was no longer embedded in the nature of things: it had to be imposed by the human mind."

of the same year. And so, along the timeline of current political and philosophical
historiography, Marckius and De Moor are transitional religious figures representing
Reformed confessional orthodoxy in a rising tide of Enlightenment thought beginning in
the mid-seventeenth century and extending to the broad trends of secularization and
systematic de-confessionalization through nineteenth-century Europe. Third, the Belgica
Foederata, or the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, which began in 1581
effectively ended with a series of internal revolts encompassed in the Batavian
Revolution between 1783-1795 and formally ended with the inauguration of the Batavian
Republic on January 18, 1795. The revolutionary-minded Batavian Republic in turn gave
way to the French dominated Kingdom of Holland (1806-1810), just as in France the first
French Republic (1804) transitioned to the first French Empire (1804-1814) under
Napoleon. After the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Netherlands became the United
Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815-1830) under the house of Orange once again, except it
was expanded to include approximately the same territory as modern day Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Thus, for these reasons, it seems somewhat natural to
consider Marckius and De Moor in tandem while not extending the investigation of the
theology of pilgrims beyond the close of the early modern period.

2.3.1 The Possibility of True Theology and Atheism

Now our focus turns to how De Moor defended and deployed the trajectory of
prolegomena at Leiden University which he had received from Marckius. In the
remainder of this chapter it is appropriate to articulate Marckius's and De Moor's views
broadly and engage more pointedly with methodological doubt in a subsequent chapter.
By the time Marckius took a chair of theology at Leiden University in 1689, the division of true theology into archetypal theology and ectypal theology had been well established since 1594. It bears repeating that ectypal theology—specifically the theology of pilgrims or theology in this life—included implanted and acquired, revealed theology. That is to say, what Calvin would call the natural knowledge of God in the mid-sixteenth century, Junius included within the term *theologia insita* by 1594. On the other hand, *theologia acquisita* pointed to the knowledge of God that was arrived at via discursive means.

In opposition to the possibility of true theology—whether in its natural or supernatural form—is the view of the one Marckius terms an *Atheus*, who claims that theology reduces to "vain tradition, human credulity, superstitious fear, and political guile."\(^{136}\) De Moor reiterates Marckius's point: "Yet the Atheist denies that there is a true theology, claiming that the origin of all theology is from the vain tradition of parents or political guile, with the assistance of people's credulity and superstitious fear."\(^{137}\) Whereas Marckius does not name the proponent of this view beyond the term atheist, De Moor does. Among the ancients, De Moor first cites a common place of Cicero from *On the Nature of the Gods* against both Epicurus and Lucretius.\(^{138}\) While Epicurus maintained that fear of the gods was irrational since they dwelt in uninterrupted, remote ataraxic bliss and could hardly be bothered to take notice of human affairs, Lucretius

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\(^{136}\) Marckius, *Compendium*, 5.

\(^{137}\) De Moor, *Commentarius Perpetuus*, 1.1.1.11.

maintained that fear created the gods.\textsuperscript{139} From the perspective of a revealed, natural or supernatural theology, Epicurus's viewpoint is at best a robust agnosticism and Lucretius's at worst atheism. But the practical atheism of Epicurus and the philosophical atheism of Lucretius both undercut a doctrine of a revelatory God who intentionally communicates with human beings.

Returning to the Lucretian point that fear created the first gods in the world, the next point that De Moor pursues in tandem with this is an early modern iteration in Thomas Hobbes. According to De Moor, Hobbes asserts that the seeds and principles of religion arise from these four causes: (1) from fear of invisible spirits, (2) ignorance of second causes, (3) an unhealthy worship of invisible powers, (4) and from interpreting chance occurrences as something divine and foreknown.\textsuperscript{140} However, Hobbes specifies that these form the natural seed of religion.\textsuperscript{141} But, the point still remains that Hobbes does not have space for a true, natural theology. What space he does carve out for true religion is detached from revelation and subjected to an ultra-Erastian theory of civil authority, which subjects the church, individual conscience, and the interpretation of any purported revelation to the monarch or legislative assembly.

\textbf{2.3.2 De Moor’s Sources}

At this point De Moor refers the reader to forty-eight sections of Johannes Stapfer's \textit{Institutiones theologiae polemicae universiae}, which was first published in


\textsuperscript{141} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 57.
Due to the size of De Moor’s citation of Stapfer, it is worth briefly noting the salient points of Stapfer’s argument. In the preface to the second volume, Stapfer seeks to defend the faith against adversaries who seek to "oppose and batter down the primary and most general foundations of religion, because in fact religion is twofold, either natural or revealed, according to the different relations of man to God, and their twofold mode of dependence: either as a creature upon God as their Creator, or as a sinner being saved upon God as their Savior." Thus an attack upon natural theology vitiates not only the possibility of a natural knowledge of God, but also the possibility of revealed theology. Stapfer views his polemical task as targeting two opponents: atheists, who deny the possibility of any theology, and deists, who allow for a natural theology but not a revealed one. In his view, by denying the existence of an independent God atheists destroy human dependence upon God, and "at the very same moment they deny the obligation to direct one's actions according to the divine will, that is religion."

Stapfer defines atheism in a way that would include Epicurus and Lucretius, "Atheism is the denial of the existence of the divine or of an independent being (Entis a se), which in itself contains the account (ratio) of the whole universe. Those who have either persuaded themselves that—or at least doubt that—no such being exists, are called atheists." Contrary to modern definitions of atheism, which tend to strictly define atheism as a denial of all forms of theism, what counts as atheism here is a denial of a

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143 Stapfer, *Institutiones*, 2:[1].

144 Stapfer, *Institutiones*, 2:[1-2].

relational, independent, immaterial God, or more succinctly a denial of spiritual beings generally, and an omnipotent, omniscient, provident God specifically. Given the influence of Cicero among the Reformed from Calvin to De Moor, it is no surprise that Epicurus, Lucretius and Hobbes are classed as atheists. Cicero had argued in this way, "In the first place therefore one must deny the gods existence which is done by Democritus … and Epicurus … or those who concede the existence of the gods must confess that they are active and that in a distinguished way. Now nothing is more distinguished than the administration of the cosmos, therefore it is administered by the counsel of the gods."\(^{146}\)

Thus, a denial of miracles is simultaneously a denial of God's character as well as activity in the governance of the created order.

In addition, a charge of atheism in the period includes a host of subsidiary points that tend towards unorthodoxy. As Samuel Mintz pointed out a generation ago regarding the full gamut of Hobbes's theology and philosophy:

Hobbes said plainly enough that the universe is body, that God is part of the world and therefore body, that the Pentateuch and many other books of Scripture are redactions or compilations from earlier sources, that the members of the Trinity are Moses, Jesus, and the Apostles, that few if any miracles can be credited after the Testamental period, that no persons deserve the name of 'martyr' except those who witnessed the ascension of Christ, that witchcraft is a myth and heaven a delusion, that religion is in fact so muddled with superstition as to be in many vital places indistinguishable from it, that the Church, both in its government and its doctrine, must submit to the dictates of Leviathan, the supreme civil authority which alone can curb religious dissension and the civil disorder which it breeds.\(^{147}\)

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\(^{146}\) Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 2.30.

Given that Hobbes does endorse the cosmological argument for a materialist form of theism, it is not accurate to say he is an atheist by modern standards.\textsuperscript{148} His theological commitments, however, summarized above, are quite unorthodox and his deep skepticism extends to both miracles and revelation. It is in this spirit that the charge of atheism in the period must be understood in relation to his denial of a true, natural theology. In Hobbes’s construction, any natural theology that leads to conclusions beyond a First Cause or Prime Mover is immediately discounted. From the perspective of the confessionally orthodox theologians of the period, Hobbes' view is not a metaphysical denial of God's existence, but an untenable view that inevitably results in irreligion.\textsuperscript{149}

Stapfer will proceed to specify exemplary figures of this broad field of atheism as well as the telltale philosophical commitments of atheism, but in the opening part of the chapter on atheism, he emphasizes that atheists are the first adversaries that must be refuted as they present the largest obstacles to religion in general. Then once the path is opened to remove lesser obstacles Stapfer's stated goals are: "if possible in this order, that we may treat the controversies with the enemies of true religion, so that an atheist becomes a deist, from a deist a naturalist, and from a naturalist, a Christian; indeed the type of Christian whose faith conforms to revelation."\textsuperscript{150} The core philosophical commitments of atheism, according to Stapfer, orbit around at least these points: (1) a denial that anything beyond the material cosmos (\textit{Mundus}) is an independent substance

\textsuperscript{148} E.g. On page 56 of \textit{Leviathan}, Hobbes takes issue with the concept of God as a spiritual being, although he does leave room for arriving at a basic theistic position from the cosmological argument: "Indeed an acknowledgement of the One, Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent God could be derived more easily from an investigation of causes of natural bodies, their powers and operations, than from the fear of a future time."

\textsuperscript{149} E.g. Michael Buckley, \textit{At the Origins of Modern Atheism} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

\textsuperscript{150} Stapfer, \textit{Institutiones}, 2.6.1.
(substantia a se), (2) the concomitant point that matter is eternal (Stapfer identifies Epicurean atomism here), (3) the material cosmos is an absolutely necessary being, (4) since the material cosmos is its own efficient cause and exists without a final cause, there is no goal for the material cosmos. In this view, Hobbes is an atheist because of his tenor of skepticism and insistent materialism.

Stapfer considers the following as forms of atheism: philosophical skepticism or Pyrrhonism, Spinozism, and materialism.\(^{151}\) Pyrrhonian skepticism maintains a position of uncertainty regarding both reason and sensory perception due to their corruption and weakness, and thus denies that God can be known with certainty. "Spinozism," according to Stapfer, is "that hypothesis which states that there is only one unique substance endowed with two chief attributes, that is infinite thought and extension; however as these two attributes are variously modified, they also give rise to either various bodies or souls."\(^{152}\) Since Spinozism does not conceive of God as sapiens, that is, conscious or acting with foresight and intention, as a God that acts freely, or as a God that governs, Stapfer concurs with Christian Wolff that Spinozism eviscerates the being and character of God as well as the ability and capacity to reveal.\(^{153}\) Wolff goes on to state that Spinozism is just as harmful as atheism and worse, as it replaces a situation with no God and a pointless universe, with an impersonal, impotent God and a fatalistic, inexorable universe.\(^{154}\) What Stapfer terms modern materialism is this: "in the Materialist hypothesis

\(^{151}\) Stapfer, *Institutiones*, 2.6.5.

\(^{152}\) Stapfer, *Institutiones*, 2.6.6.


a material being or body is an independent being, for which reason it is easy to persuade a materialist that the material cosmos is an independent being." For all these reasons, in the opinion of Stapfer, Wolff, and De Moor, these three philosophical views are various overlapping components of atheism that fatally undercut natural and/or revealed theology.

The argument found in De Moor and other Reformed theologians, contra materialists like Hobbes, rests on the exegesis of biblical common places that affirm a universal, basic knowledge of God that renders human beings inexcusable (e.g. Romans 1:18-20, 2:15). In explaining such biblical passages, De Moor found ready terminology and arguments in the Greco-Roman philosophical traditions that argue for a consensus gentium, implanted or innate cognitions of the gods, and common notions. He also found these terms scattered throughout the Reformed tradition.

In response to Hobbes’s four causes of natural religion, De Moor observes that first, the extent to which there is a universal consensus of a natural theology throughout the world demonstrates that "a tradition of parents or authority of emperors cannot be conceived so efficacious that it might excite a universal consensus of this sort in the heart of all, which would be immutably implanted in the same." In support of this point besides referring to Jacob Triglandius, Sr.'s brief Oratio de Utilitate Religionis, De Moor cites Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion at length regarding the sensus divinitatis


156 Among the Lutherans, a similar argument is made by Christian Kortholt (1633-1694) in De Tribus Impostoribus Magnis Liber (Kiel: Joachim Reumann, 1680), *8v, when he identifies the followers of Herbert of Cherbury, Hobbes, and Spinoza as the primary enemies of true religion in his day.

157 De Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 1.1.1.11.
Moreover, idolatry is full proof of this concept. For we know how unwillingly man is to humble himself so that he may place other creatures over him. Accordingly, he prefers to worship wood and stone than to be considered to have no God at all. It is evident how tremendously strong is this impression of deity, which cannot be so obliterated from the human mind that it would be easier to break down the affection of his nature: just as it is certainly broken down when he freely humbles himself from his natural arrogance to humility so that he may reverence a god.\footnote{John Calvin, \textit{Institutio Christianae Religionis} (London: Thomas Vautrollerius, 1576), cited in De Moor, \textit{Commentarius Perpetuus}, 1.1.1.11.}

Calvin proceeds to argue for a \textit{sensus divinitatis} via the \textit{consensus gentium} alluding to Cicero's \textit{De Natura Deorum}.\footnote{Cf. John Calvin, \textit{Institutio}, 3.4.1, with De Moor \textit{Commentarius Perpetuus}, 1.1.1.11.} Cicero had argued in this way, in the process introducing concepts and terminology that were noted and taken up by the Reformed.

For belief in the gods has not been established by some decree, custom, or law, but rests upon the unanimous and firm consensus of all; That the gods exist is a necessary inference, since we possess implanted (\textit{insitas}) or rather innate (\textit{innatas}) cognitions of them; moreover, from which all by nature agree that it must necessarily be true. Therefore, it must be confessed that the gods exist.\footnote{Cicero, \textit{Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes XIX De Natura Deorum / Academica}, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), 1.17.}

For the most part, this argument is accepted by the Reformed as valid and deployed polemically. But in order for this argument to work, a defense of common notions would be required.

Marckius states that the theology of the race course or theology of pilgrims may also be referred to as the theology of revelation, which is broader than some kind of manifestation or display of something that was once hidden.\footnote{Marckius, \textit{Compendium} (1722), 4.} De Moor coordinates Marckius's discussion here with Franciscus Turretin's \textit{Theologia Elenchtica} and Heinrich Alting's \textit{Theologica Didactica}. Alting at the University of Heidelberg simply reports the
practice of the schools to divide theology "into archetypal and ectypal theology: and the latter again into one of union, vision, and revelation, and the latter they subdivide into natural and supernatural."162 Beyond this definition in the didactic section, Alting provides no further elaboration in the elenchtic part. Likewise at the University of Geneva, after outlining the archetypal and ectypal distinction, Turretin divides the theology of revelation into the natural and supernatural theology. Additionally, Turretin states that natural theology is either implanted (insita) or acquired (acquisita). So far this is nothing distinctive, but Turretin explains further. The implanted, natural theology arises from "the common notions that have been impressed upon someone"163 whereas acquired theology is the result of discursive reasoning, based upon the implanted theology.

Why do the Reformed argue so strongly in favor of common notions? The relationship between common notions and the natural knowledge of God has an extensive pedigree in western philosophy and theology that goes well beyond the point that De Moor or Marckius is making here. In summary fashion, Robert van den Berg traces similarities and differences between Stoic common notions and Epicurean preconceptions. Where van den Berg provides clarity is noting that in Stoic philosophy, common notions (κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ) produce or rather impress, via sense perception, basic beliefs that everyone shares. Furthermore, van den Berg observes that for the Stoics:

These common notions play an important role in philosophical arguments in two ways. On the one hand, they are the self-evident starting points of philosophical proof. Philosophical enquiry consists in filling out the initial knowledge contained in our common notions by articulating them. On the other hand, these notions also

162 Heinrich Alting, Scriptorum Theologicorum Heidelbergensium Tomus Primus Continens Locos Communes cum Didacticos tum Elenchticos, (Amsterdam: Joannes Janssonius, 1646), 1.

163 De Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 1.1.1.10.
provide a criterion of truth: any theory that conflicts with them has to be rejected.\textsuperscript{164}

This point sums up how common notions might function to both ground a natural belief in God and lead to conclusions from such a common notion. There were also at least two kinds of common notions. Given the adage that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses, Zeller explains that sensation leads to perception, perception to memory, memory to experience, and conclusions drawn from experience to conceptions which elevate us beyond sense objects. "The formation of conceptions," as Zeller explained long ago, "by means of these agencies sometimes takes place methodically and artificially, and at other times naturally and spontaneously."\textsuperscript{165} In the Stoic understanding knowledge is derived from perceptions and conclusions based on those perceptions.

In Aquinas, who follows Aristotle and the Stoics to a certain extent, common notions are described as principles (principia) that are the same in everyone, however the proper conclusions from these principles are not equivalent in all people; in fact, they may even fail.\textsuperscript{166} Thus, in principle the common notions are imprinted on all at creation, but the usage of them is varied in its result. As Stephen Grabill has shown with respect to Vermigli and David Steinmetz has demonstrated with respect to Denis the Carthusian, Philip Melanchthon, Heinrich Bullinger, and Martin Bucer, on Romans 1:18-20,

\textsuperscript{164} Robert M. van den Berg, "As we are always speaking of them and using their names on every occasion Plotinus, Enn. 3:7 [45]: Language, Experience and the Philosophy of time in Neo-Platonism" in Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism: Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop, eds. Riccardo Chiaradonna, Franco Trabattoni (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 102.


All agree that there is a general knowledge of God from creation that is accessible to human reason apart from grace. This knowledge rests in part on inferences drawn from observation of the created order (Denis, Melanchthon, Bullinger, Bucer) and in part on an innate knowledge implanted in the human mind by God (Denis, Melanchthon, Bucer).\textsuperscript{167}

Turretin, and De Moor by citation of Turretin, are in basic agreement with Thomas on the fact of impressed common notions on every person, as well as the points made by subsequent Reformers along similar lines as this interpretation seems to honor Romans 1:18-20. According to the Leiden theologians, while it is the case that humanity is stamped with the knowledge of God, this does not mean that the deleterious effects of sin have left reason and conscience untouched. Junius had made this point both in the \textit{De Theologia Vera} and his discussion of moral law in \textit{De Politiae Mosis Observatione} in the 1590s.\textsuperscript{168} Natural theology and human reason are insufficient for salvation. On one hand, Marckius and De Moor have a positive role for natural theology and an instrumental use of reason within the task of theology, and yet on the other hand, a human reason that is blunted and corrupted by sin cannot be the final arbiter of doctrine. This explains De Moor's insistence that there is a natural theology while yet at the same time allowing that arguments on the basis of natural theology are not always efficacious in convincing an atheist.

At this point it is worth pausing. The question of methodological doubt has broader implications for the relationship between faith and reason, the relationship between theology and philosophy, the nature and possibility of revelation, the purpose


\textsuperscript{168} Franciscus Junius, \textit{De Theologia Vera}, 78-80.
and efficacy of natural theology, and the role of reason in the exposition of special revelation. All of these questions are best addressed in the context of how De Moor and Marckius deal with Descartes and the reception of Cartesianism(s) in the Netherlands by the Church, State, and Academy in a subsequent chapter. De Moor's approach to the necessity of Scripture will be taken up in conjunction with the chapter on "The incomplete felicity of the militant church."

Conclusion

The deployment and defense of a locus of theology in a particular context is illustrative of its role and function within a theological system. As a particular theological topic is deployed and defended in different ways or in more developed ways over time, it is possible to discern general tendencies in terms of continuity within a confessional and even institutional context. With respect to that subspecies of ectypal theology, theology in this life or a theology of pilgrims, Johannes Marckius and Bernhardinus De Moor represent one Reformed response to Enlightenment perspectives on the relationship between faith and reason. As has been shown previously in this chapter, the theology of pilgrims is a vibrant trajectory among many Leiden theologians from the late sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century and addresses many of the issues surrounding the topics of natural and revealed theology found in the consideration of true versus false theology.

Some of the significant points to consider at the close of this chapter are that this framework is developed exegetically in terms of Romans 1 and 1 Corinthians 13. Inasmuch as it is in conversation with classic philosophy, based on these and other passages of Scripture it seeks to protect: (1) the creator-creature distinction ontologically,
(2) epistemologically, human knowledge of God is accommodated or adapted to their creatureliness, (3) humanity has some noetic capacity to know God (i.e. the *imago Dei* which includes some form of common notions), and what is debated in various degrees, some actual content of the knowledge of God, (4) humanity has a dianoetic ability of reason, (5) however, given the declension of the human race, humanity is rendered inexcusable, and finally (6) it endeavors to clear a path for Scripture as the basis for faith and securing salvation from God through a Redeemer. Finally, it also seeks to inculcate a posture of epistemic humility insofar as human knowledge of God is incomplete and dependent in this life.

Now let us turn to a closer consideration of the importance of the professor-student disputations for the transmission of theological content and the use of disputations at Leiden University.
CHAPTER 3: Disputed Practices

"You might say that I have hewn down my own vineyard since there does not seem to be anything left to do for the systematic oral instruction of students every year."¹

Bernhardinus De Moor, Preface to the reader of the *Perpetuus Commentarius*

Reflecting upon the completion of all seven volumes of his *Perpetuus Commentarius*, De Moor ponders whether or not he has printed himself out of a job requiring speech. After all, the *Commentarius* not only elaborates and expounds upon the whole of his primary textbook besides Scripture, but also incorporates original and redacted versions of disputations over which he presided. Despite such an exhaustive representation of over two decades of lectures and disputation, he concludes that there is still a place for saying more than he has written to his students. His written work, he believes, is a good starting point for the instruction of youth dedicated to the Church of God and its service.

As we consider his theological textbook, there are questions regarding the role of the disputations in its development, given that extant student disputations under his presidency are, in many cases verbatim the same as his *Commentarius* while some are not. Several subordinate questions need to be answered: (1) what was the *disputatio* in the eighteenth century at Leiden University and what role did it play in a student's education? (2) Who should be considered the author of a disputation, the student, the professor, or both? (3) What is the relationship between disputations and an institution's identity? As a result of considering these questions, several conclusions can be drawn

¹ De Moor, *Commentarius*, 1:*4r.
regarding the authorship of disputations, the relationship between lectures and disputations, and the role of theological textbooks and institutional continuity.

3.1 Overview of the disputatio

The disputatio developed in the universities of medieval Europe as an exercise for students to employ dialectic logic and rhetoric as a means to further assimilate a professor's lectio. Marenbon differentiates customary types of reading (legere) as a form of exposition within the university, the most important of which was the ordinary reading, from which the professor developed and outlined positions in the forms of questions, arguments, responses, and theses. "The purpose of the lectio" according to Elizabeth Lowe, "was not the discovery of new, or hitherto unknown knowledge, but the transmission and assimilation of the corpus auctoritatum, that is of Christian and pagan authoritative texts." Lowe continues, noting that "in contrast to the lectio (which was

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3 J. Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350) An Introduction, 17. "Texts read were texts expounded. Early medieval masters had sometimes limited themselves to brief, literal explanations of their texts, and sometimes produced lengthy commentaries in which they developed their own views in detail … Texts could be read cursorily (cursorie) or ordinarily (ordinarie). Cursory reading was limited to presenting the sense of a text, without discussing the problems it raised, and so the records of these readings are not of the greatest interest to the historian. The ordinary readings of texts, by contrast, was as much an opportunity for the development of new ideas as for the exposition of old ones." Cf. S. E. Young, Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215-1248 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 87-95.

concerned [with] the explication of the meaning of the text), the *disputatio* had as its main task the application of [a] text's meaning."⁵

Whereas the secondary literature devoted to expounding the types, purposes, and procedure of the university disputation from the medieval period forward is growing and well known, the role of the disputational exercises in the professorial development of theological systems is not as detailed.⁶ There has been rather extensive work on the importance of the public and private disputation in the Arminius controversies of the early seventeenth century, despite some debate regarding research methodology, disputation authorship, and what constitutes a professor's view.⁷ In the case of Arminius, Stanglin has carefully coordinated the extant epistolary evidence that asserts professorial authorship.⁸ There has been work on the role of disputation in the Law faculty through

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⁵ Elizabeth Lowe, *The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas*, 38. On the rise of scholastic disputation and its institutionalization in universities, see Alex J. Novikoff, *The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, practice, and performance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 34-61, 133-171. Novikoff concludes on the cultural importance of the practice is that "an idea and a literary form [i.e. disputation] originally limited to small intellectual circles in the late eleventh century evolved through multiple stages to become a cultural practice within the larger public sphere in the thirteenth, perceptible within and beyond the university context."


⁸ See table A.1. in Arminius, *Disputations*, 59.
Yet, the role of the disputational practice in the development of systematic theology from the beginnings of Leiden University in 1575 through the late eighteenth century has not yet been fully explored. At the present, more relevant to this study of De Moor, is the importance of the theological disputations for the development and shape of the theological systems of the Leiden professors of theology from the late seventeenth century through the eighteenth century. Given that De Moor is commenting upon the theological system of Johannes Marckius, whose professorial career spanned five decades at three universities (Franeker, Groningen, and Leiden); the course lectures and theological disputations of both professors are crucial as they form the backbone for their commentaries and systematic theologies. What follows is a demonstration of the common relationship between the university practice of disputations and the formation of a theological text, with conclusions regarding Bernhardinus De Moor's seven volume system of theology, a commentary on Johannes Marckius's two-volume *Compendium Christianæ theologiae*.

### 3.2 The Reformation and the University

Scholarship of the last several decades regarding the rise of the Protestant Reformation has observed that, as Lewis Spitz notes, "the magisterial Reformation was a university movement in its inception and early development." This does not in any way contradict the findings of the new social history and its focus on the social, political, and

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9 See for example, Margreet Ahsmann and Irene Sagel-Grande, *Collegium und Kolleg* (Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 175-237.

economic life of the common man. As Emmett McLaughlin observed in 1990 that there has been a welcome shift in the scholarship away from traditional methodologies focusing upon individual reformers and their theologies to socio-economic history of the common man, yet one of the greatest impacts throughout the Protestant Reformation upon popular religion was the religious motives and actions of the educated elite. Specifically, the incalculable impact of university trained pastors and theologians upon the formation, development, and reception of theology in the churches.11 It should give us pause at least, that especially in the early stages of the Protestant Reformation that "in both the content of their theology and their self-perception as theologians, Protestant divines often had more in common with their medieval predecessors than with their non-theologian contemporaries."12

This is especially true when one considers the bond between scholastic theologies and their development in academic universities, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic. It is without a doubt that the lines of questioning found in theological curricula in theological colleges throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are grounded in exegetical textual studies, loci communes, and dialectical formulations heavily grounded in or in dialogue with an eclectic Aristotelianism. As such, it would seem that a logical and necessary component for an investigation into a particular eighteenth-century theologian’s system would attend to the educational practices employed throughout their tenure as much as to the development of their system’s theological content. Furthermore,

11 R. Emmett McLaughlin, “Universities, scholasticism, and the origins of the German Reformation” History of Universities, 9 (1990), 1-43. Note well

12 McLaughlin, History of Universities, 2.
it also seems necessary to situate the trajectory of their thought within a body of educational practices at the institute in which they taught.

It is without question that a doctoral degree in theology at Leiden University placed one among the educated elite. Willem Otterspeer has observed in conjunction with other scholars that in the first century of the university, the percentage of doctoral students among all faculties ranged between 4% and 16% of the total student population. With the advent of the eighteenth century, the number of doctoral students ranged between 5% and rose to 44% in the latter part of the century. This shift is primarily due to the rise of the legal and medical professions as stepping stones from the middle to upper class. This is well attested by the statistics, as at one point in the eighteenth century 84% of doctoral students were pursuing law degrees. On the other hand, from its founding to the late eighteenth century, the percentage of students matriculating in theology remained relatively constant at 15% to 20% of the student body. But with respect to the doctoral degree, from the last quarter of the seventeenth century through the late eighteenth century, philosophy and theology hovered around 2% to 5% of the doctoral students.

What is noteworthy regarding Otterspeer’s general thesis that Leiden University was a bulwark of humanism and toleration as opposed to the narrow, dogmatic position of Reformed scholastic theology (reflecting an older more antagonistic understanding of

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13 Willem Otterspeer, *Groepsportret met Dame II: De Vesting van de Macht de Leidse Universiteit 1673-1775* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002), 212. All of the following statistics can be found in 2:210-213.


15 Otterspeer, *Groepsportret met Dame II*, 213.
the relationship between theology and the arts, between scholasticism and humanism) is
the noticeable trend that at its founding Leiden University matriculated over half of its
students in the arts and by the end of the eighteenth century that number had dwindled to
less than 10%.16 It is also noteworthy that the aforementioned statistics highlight the shift
from the liberal arts to a professional, vocational university (i.e. an emphasis upon
medicine and law) rather than an emphasis on fields more associated with the humanities
(the arts, philosophy, and theology). This may indicate that the fate of the humanities and
theology were more closely intertwined than some scholars would like to maintain. It is
at least striking that there are multiple instances of eighteenth-century orations by so-
called scholastic, theological professors heralding the point that it is a vigorous study of
the humanities that invigorates the study and defense of the Holy Scriptures, culminating
in an appeal for students to pursue courses in humanities. This also raises the point that
the older scholastic versus humanist distinction common in twentieth-century discussions
of the Reuchlin affair in the early sixteenth century does not have the same dividing line
in the eighteenth century. It may also indicate a rising bourgeois middle class who used
educational degrees in medicine and law as a ladder for socio-economic advancement. It
is certainly the case that over time the official policy of Leiden University was
increasingly more of toleration and maintaining balance in the hiring of faculty.

3.3 A Medieval Heritage of Didactic Practices

As to the role of the university in the early modern period, with special emphasis
upon Leiden University, Willem Otterspeer maintains that the primary role of the
university was in maintaining or restoring equilibrium and continuity in atmospheres of

disruption, revolution, and change. When considering the period between the medieval and the modern, it is clear that universities did function in this way. There are manifold and manifest changes underfoot on a variety of fronts: political, social, economic, ecclesiastical, philosophical, legal, and so forth. Social and political stability in the medieval period was primarily predicated upon the Constantinian synthesis of the pope and the emperor; a predication which idealized a homogenous Christian orthodoxy from peasant to prince to pope. Universities were founded by privileges granted by either the pope or the emperor, an implicit acknowledgment of the university’s stabilizing influences upon the administrative ranks of both. As Otterspeer rightly observes, “the university was an integral part of the medieval synthesis: the religious unity of the pope and the church, the political unity of the emperor and the state, and the scientific unity of philosophy and biblical knowledge.”

The studium generale, or universitas, is an enduring monument and gift of medieval educational culture and reform. At the beginning of the medieval period, ecclesiastical centers such as monasteries, cathedral schools, and scriptoria, were the primary means of corporate instruction both in theology and philosophy. By the close of the fifteenth century, Europe had more than seventy universities of different importance and size. Since the medieval master’s degree conferred the right ubique docendi within

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18 Willem Otterspeer, “The mediating role of the University,” 154.

19 See Anthony Kenny’s and Jan Pinborg’s article “Medieval Philosophical Literature” in The Cambridge history of later medieval philosophy: from the rediscovery of Aristotle to the disintegration of scholasticism, 1100-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11-42.
Christendom, it was a *studium generale*, not a *studium speciale*, or local institution with a more limited range of privilege. The first universities were founded in tandem with the granting of the privilege and official sanction from the pope and testify to their function within the ecclesiastical realm of maintaining orthodoxy and perpetuating the official teaching of the church. In the fourteenth century in the context of the Holy Roman Empire, nearly a dozen universities were founded primarily upon imperial charter with ecclesiastical collaboration. With the rise of nation states, the fracturing of Christendom, and the process of confessionalization within the realms of Protestant lands, the university more and more represented local concerns under local governments. This is not to say that students from across Europe were not trained at universities outside of their homeland, but it is to say in rather modest terms that faculties and universities did undergo a shift toward faculty and students from a more narrow range of confessional and national sympathies. Paulsen, Thilly, and Elwang remark that "the inter-territorial, not to say international freedom of transfer from one institution to another, so characteristic of the old *studium generale* was gone. Territorial boundaries or at least the boundaries of creed, also marked the limits of a university's field."\(^{20}\) This signals the increasing importance of university's as bastions of local national, political, and confessional identity.

In the medieval system, it was the papal magisterium that, by way of the ban, reigned in teachings deemed heretical, whether theological, philosophical, or scientific. With the fracturing of the medieval system, the rise of Christian denominations, and on a

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political level the rise of nation states, a proliferation of universities occurred especially in Protestant countries. But with the dawning of the early modern period, the stabilizing influence of the university did not decrease, rather in the movement from continental powers of pope and emperor to the more local powers of monarch or republic and synod, universities became more vital to the settlement of divisive questions, whether legal, philosophical, scientific, or theological. Just as each nation sought to buttress its own government and society through educational institutions training lawyers, philosophers, and scientists, fledgling Protestant denominations and national churches sheltered under the wings of these early modern states sought to buttress their own administrative systems and hierarchies through university trained clergy. This intended purpose of harmonizing the national state and a national church in the academic halls of a university is born out by Leiden University’s own claim to be a seminarium Ecclesiae et Reipublicae; quite literally a breeding ground or incubator for the Church and for the Republic. For instance, scattered throughout the bijlagen of the Archieven van de Senaat en Faculteit of Leiden University are reams of official correspondence addressed to various professors and faculties regarding legal, philosophical, and theological questions from the churches and laity, as well as local and provincial authorities.

When we turn our attention to the educational practices of the theologians in the Staten College at Leiden University, specifically from its founding during the period of confessionalization to late orthodoxy (circa 1560 – 1785), we find a vibrant academic tradition developed from medieval university models of education.21 There are several

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significant parallels between the medieval and early modern practices that should be
made. First, the traditional engagement with a primary source in a professor’s class
lecture and the subsequent disputational engagement by the student in the public and
private *exercitationes* are, in the common view of the period, the primary processes of
professorial communication and student appropriation of truth. Additionally, the cycle of
class lecture and student disputation afforded the professor further opportunity to develop
the presentation of his own theological system.

Regarding the student disputations, these must be viewed as an extension of the
broader didactic method common in universities from the late middle ages throughout the
early modern period well into the late eighteenth century. As Kenny and Pinburg
demonstrate very well, the ideological impulse for the disputational method is the
assumption that through engagement with the authoritative texts one may know and
arrive at truth. The fourteenth-century Henry of Brussels, for example, “alludes directly
to the three methods of teaching, stating that through lectures you arrive at truth and so
should be able to solve any objections. By a lecture in the form of a (fictitious)
disputation read aloud procedures for finding the truth are presented to you, and by an
actual disputation you learn to find truth by actually evaluating and solving arguments.”

cited from Grabmann, 1944, p82: “Secundo proutandum est, quod cognitio veritatis generatur in nobis
dupliciter uno modo per inventionem, alio modo per doctrinam. Si per inventionem hoc fit sic, quod aliquid
proponit primo sibi aliquam conclusionem (fol. 91v) quodam modo notam et per consequens arguit ad
utramque partem et tunc judicat, ad quam partem rationes sunt potiores adducte illi consentiens et alias
rationes dissolvens et per hoc patet, quod investigatio veritatis etc. Alio modo generatur scientia sive
cognitio veritatis per doctrinam et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo quod doctor proponat propositionem discipulo
et arguat ad partem utramque et postea uni consentiat et alia, quae sunt contra ipsam partem quam tenet,
dissolvit. [Alio modo] Et hoc modo patet etiam, quod cognitio veritatis solutio dubitatorem. Alio modo per
docrinam fit cognitio veritatis sic, quod doctor simpliciter sine omni arguitione proponit discipulo
veritatem et informat ipsum et sic item discipulus ista veritate cognita poterit argumenta solvere, que essent
A frequently recurring phrase in Siger of Brabant and Henry of Brussels, two medieval philosophers for example, is *cognitio veritatis est solutionum dubitatorum* “a knowledge of the truth is the dissolution of doubts.” Siger of Brabant for example in his book *Quaestiones super librum De causis*, comments that those who do not have a *cognitio veritatis*, that is, a knowledge of, or first-hand acquaintance with, the truth will not know when they have arrived at it, and whether or not they should stop in their quest or continue. "For doubt restrains the mind so that it may not proceed further through its consideration, just as corporeal feet are bound by a chain … [For] what is better for judgment than by hearing the rationale of both sides, likewise what is better for the judgment than for previously considered reasons to lead one through both parts: the doubt of the contradiction and the truth." 23 This sensibility is helpful as a baseline to contrast, for example, the rise of radical Cartesianism in the seventeenth century and its early partnership with experimental science where doubt is the very method. Theological and philosophical questions aside for the moment, on an educational level, such a methodology has radical implications for didactic method generally and theological method specifically, both of which are predicated on received authority and the conviction that truth is attainable. To be fair, Cartesian thought did believe that truth and certainty are attainable. The difference is that in its radical form, Cartesian method places human doubt and reason as the fulcrum for evaluating all received authorities including

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23 Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones Super Librum De causis*, the Proemium (1972), 35. “… enim mentem tenet ne ulterius per considerationem procedere possit, sicut vinculo corporali pedes tenentur. Et ideo dubitationes non praeconsiderans non valet absolvere dubitationes, quare nec attingere ad veritatem. Cognitio enim veritatis in aliqua rerum solutio est dubitatorum. Et sic in iudiciis dicitur, quod melius contingit iudicare audiendo rationes utriusque partis, similiter etiam praeconsideratis rationibus ad utramque partem contradictionis dubitationem inducentibus melius contingit iudicare veritatem.”
revealed ones. In short, from the perspective of the late medieval and early modern period, it is not a far slide from a chastening form of doubt to Pyrrhonian skepticism.

A similar point is found not in the fourteenth century but in the sixteenth. The disputation practice continued in general throughout and after the Protestant Reformation in approximately the same pattern. Consider how one Swiss Reformed professor explained the purpose of disputations and the academic and Christian virtues that must be inculcated. In 1586 Antoine La Faye wrote a dedicatory epistle justifying the use of disquisitions at the Academy of Geneva. The work in question is a collection of theological theses defended over the years at Geneva under the two theology professors, Beza and La Faye. After such hard labor to reclaim and reform the Church and Academy, "why, in the churches and schools restored according to the pure Word of God, would the custom of disputing matters of divinity be retained?" Indeed, many pious and serious persons had apparently asserted that "the simplicity of fisherman and not Aristotelian subtlety must be taught and learned" in the theological schools. "But holy matters," asserts La Faye, "as they must be handled with great judgment, so they must also be handled with greater piety, for this is like the soul of theology, and like its very eye." La Faye argues first, that one must distinguish between debating doubtful matters


26 Beza, *Theses Theologicae*, *ii recto.

27 Beza, *Theses Theologicae*, *iii verso.*
of philosophy and training students to defend the truth of the Scriptures, especially as
everyone from the prophets, Christ, and the apostles to the church fathers contended for
the faith with those teaching falsehood—indeed, all their writings contain and deployed
disputations. Second, it is the co-mingling of philosophy and theology that imports
problems. Third, the statutes of the Academy require professors and students to
inculcate piety and reverence for the Word of God and as they perform the exercise of
disputing they are not to debate in an irreverent or inappropriate manner, but according to
the pattern of sound words (2 Tim. 1:13). The goal of such exercises, says La Faye, is
for training pastors in piety, doctrine, and all Christian virtues. "All Christian doctors
must mold and shape their students so that they may so imbue them in a seasonable
fashion with the sap of these virtues so that afterwards, when they must come out of the
shade and onto the battle line, they may retain and preserve these virtues throughout their
entire life." And so, as La Faye indicates, it was a common practice in Geneva and

28 Beza, *Theses Theologicae*, *iii verso. "Prophetarum orationes, Christi ipsius conciones, Apostolorum
scripta, Pauli in primis Epistolae acutissimas & gravissimas omnium disputationes continent, quae sine
ratioicationum usu commodum excuti nullo modo possunt. Disputavit Christus cum Doctoribus, cum
patres: Irenaeus contra Gnosticos, Tertullianus contra Marcionitas, Athanasius contra Arianos,
Nazianzenus, Cyrilus, Theodoretus, Hilarius, Augustinus, & permulti alij contra innumberabiles prope
haereses: sed ita ut non fuerit nuda ingenii exercitatio vel ostentatio cum delectatione."

29 Beza, *Theses Theologicae*, *iii verso.

30 Beza, *Theses Theologicae*, *i iii recto, "Hoc nos pro nostra tenuitate, cum in aliis muneris nostri partibus,
tum in disputandi exercitatione facere studemus, ex schola nostrae legibus: quae diserte statuunt ut theses
nec curiosae, nec sophisticae, nec falsam doctrinam complectentes proponantur, & a disputando sophistice,
curiositas, sacrilega audacia corrupendi verbi Dei, mala contentio & pervicacia exulet. Ad quem typum
theses hasce expressas fuisse cognoscet, qui sincere judicare volet. Dantur autem illae nunc in lucem,
aliarum celeberrimarum scholarum exemplo: ut quid & quod modo in schola nostra doceatur ex hac
ψηφανών λόγων ὑποτυπώσει, ut & ex multis aliis nostrorum scriptis, palam omnibus fiat: simulque
pateat nos ab omni falsa & erronea doctrina, quantum quidem ex solo verbo Dei pure & ad analogiam fidei
explicato imbecillitas nostra intelligere potest, alienos esse."

31 Beza, *Theses theologicae*, *i iii recto, "Sic ergo suos discipulos fingere & formare Christiani omnes
doctores debent, ut eos mature in scholis harum virtutum succo sic imbuant, ut postea, cum ex umbra in
aciem veniendum erit, tota vita eundem retineant ac conservent."
Reformed academic institutions elsewhere to utilize the exercise of disputations in conjunction with the exposition of Scripture, as well as to publish the results. Disputations are so that students may know the Scriptures, not only by hearing but also by publicly, piously, and learnedly exercising themselves.32

Course lectures were built around either a commonly available authoritative text or materials organized and made available to the students. As Paulsen notes, “the purpose of the lectures (lectio, praelectio) was the transmission of the sum of knowledge” by use of a canonical text. "This does not mean that it was dictated to the students ... but the essential purpose of the lecture was to expound the meaning of the text."33 While reading portions of relevant authorities, (e.g. Scripture, Lombard, etc.) professors typically recited their material from memory. In turn, students were expected to take notes and recapitulate them in their rooms, committing the material to memory.

As to the types of lectures from the medieval period forward, they may generally be spoken of as ordinary, extraordinary, or cursory. The ordinary lectures were upon a textbook or series of textbooks, typically stipulated by university statute but not necessarily; the extraordinary lectures were on works or topics typically outside the required curriculum; and cursory lectures were typically brief, summative reviews of

32 Beza, *Theses theologicae*, **i recto, La Faye remarks in this letter to a sponsoring Polish noblemen "Tibi vero id gratum iucundumque fore existimavi, cum alius nominibus, tum quod in qua ipse certasses arena Theologica, posses legendis hisce thesibus recognoscere. Nam cum nullum pietatis officium patereris hic in te desiderari: ipse etiam assiduitatis & diligentiae in schola, non audiendo tantum, sed & de rebus sacris palam pie et erudite disputando omnibus aliis eras exemplum. Ut ergo tuae et aliorum voluntati satisfieret, collectae et in corpusculum quoddam redactae sunt theses annis ab hinc aliquot hic propositae et disputatae, eoque ordine digestae, ut non male fortasse methodica epitome studii theologici censeri possit: sic taenm ut in scholis hac acta ex rebus ipsis et orationis forma possit agnosci: ne quis ad amussim exacta omnia hinc requirat."

problems, questions, or controversies. The lectio proper consisted of several parts: the reading of the text or at least key selections of it; an account of the divisio, or dispositio, of the text, that is its arrangement typically by key principles or themes; the expositio addressed the primary difficulties raised by the text, whether textual or conceptual, and expounded with respect to a set of agreed upon principles; and lastly, the real or apparent controversies and their solutions. It is this last portion that segued to a student’s private recapitulation of the lecture and preparation for the disputations. As to the written genre, it is out of these university lectures that commentaries on canonical texts arose and in turn the quaestio method of inquiry.

It is known from first hand professorial accounts in the early modern period that some lectures and their corresponding theses were in fact dictated. Three brief but potent examples of the relationship between a professor's biblical exegesis, class lectures, and disputations are readily available with two works of William Whitaker (1548-1595), the regius professor of divinity at Cambridge (1580-1595), as well as John Davenant (1576-1641), the bishop of Salisbury and one time Lady Margaret professor of divinity at Cambridge University (1609-1621). William Whitaker gives a brief but revealing statement at the close of his Disputatio de Sacra Scriptura regarding the authorship and role of theses for disputations and their relationship to his lectures at Cambridge. He remarks at the very end of this treatise:

34 Kenny and Pinburg in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 19-20.


36 William Whitaker, Disputatio de Sacra Scriptura; Contra Hujus Temporis Papistas, Inprimis Robertum Bellarminum Jesuitam, Pontificium in collegio Romano, & Thomam Stapletonum ... Sex Quaestionibus Proposita & Tractata a Guilielmo Whitakero... & Collegii D. Joannis in Cantabrigiens Academia Magistro (Cambridge: Thomas Thomasius, 1588). In translation this is William Whitaker, A Disputation on
We publish this controversy by itself (though we do not intend to follow the same course with the rest, and that for very great and satisfactory reasons. The style is that which was used in delivering them orally—scholastic and concise—suitable not for expansion (which was little suited to our design), but for argument. They are published as they were taken down by some of my constant and attentive auditors, and have been afterwards reviewed by myself.37

Whitaker has provided a tremendous glimpse into the general relationship in the early modern period between a professor's lecture, the origination of the theses, and their preparation for public defense in the disputation or in publication for a treatise or textbook. At the least we see that the student's role, unless otherwise specified, was primarily as a copyist of the theses, not as the originator conceptually and perhaps not even of the very words.

The same point can be made regarding Davenant about two decades later at Cambridge. In his Praelectiones de duobus in theologia controversis capitibus, we find a treatise on two theological controversies taken from Davenant's lectures.38 The opening lines of his preface to the reader begins in this way, "What we are now publishing broadly were many years prior brought into the light [of day] in the academy of Cambridge and were dictated to my hearers. Then it seemed suitable that I wove our disputations from them …"39 You can find a similar brief statement in his Expositio Holy Scripture: against the Papists, especially Bellarmine and Stapleton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849). I am grateful to Dr. David Sytsma of Tokyo Christian University for this reference.

37 This citation has been very slightly edited from the English translation, A Disputation on Holy Scripture, 707. The Latin from Disputatio de Sacra Scriptura, Ggg iiij verso, is: "Stylus is est, qui in dictando pronunciandoque fuit, Scholasticus, concisus, non dilatationi, quae cum instituto minime congruebat, sed argumentationi inserviens. Sic enim ista edimus, quemadmodum sunt a nonnullis assiduis & studiosis auditoribus excepta, a meque recognita."


39 Davenant, Praelectiones, [4v], "Quae nunc pervulgamus, ante multus annos lucubrata fuerunt in academia Cantabrigiensi, & auditoribus meis dictata. Commodum mihi tum videbatur, disputationes nostras exordiri ab illa …"
epistolae D. Pauli ad Colossenses in which he states, again in the preface to the reader, "Accept, with a kind heart, these comments on Paul's epistle to the Colossians, in which we once exercised the raw recruits (tyrocinium) of our theological profession in the renowned academy of Cambridge." The title also clearly indicates that these comments were dictata in the academy and the basis for student theses. In short, we have in these two works Davenant's own attestation to his standard mode of operating in the university context at Cambridge in the early seventeenth century in his work as exegete, lecturer, and president for the exercise of theological novitiates.

The natural complement to the professor’s lecture, that is, the passive component of a student’s education, was the disputation, in which the student took a more active and public role in defending the professor’s position. Developed during the medieval period, the purpose of the disputation was a practical application of the principles and arguments introduced in the class lecture. The early disputational process may be summarized thus:

One of the masters, as presiding officer, then proposed theses, which the other masters were expected to attack in turn with syllogistically arranged arguments (arguere); while the bachelors assisted in defending the theses of their master by replying (respondere) to these arguments, a task in which they were guided by the Praeses, as occasion seemed to demand. Besides these disputations properly so called, at which the scholars were present merely as listeners, others were held under the guidance of masters or bachelors in which the students participated. In connection with the lectures there were exercises (exercitia) and repetitions (repetitiones) which closely approximated disputation."41

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40 John Davenant, *Expositio Epistolae D. Pauli ad Colossenses per Reverendum in Christo Patrem Joannem Sarisburiensem Episcopum in Lucem Edita: Olim ab Eodem Dominae Margaretae in Academia Cantabrigensi Professore Theologic0, Dictata*, (Cambridge: 1630), *2v, which is an unnumbered page without a printer's mark prior to page 1 and folio A1. I am taking the title page as folio *1r. "Accipe benevolo animo commentarios hosce in epistolam Pauli ad Colossenses, quibus theologicae nostrae professionis tyrocinium in celeberimma Academia Cantabrigensi olim exercuimus."

At various universities the number of disputationsthat a master’s candidate must participate in as respondentand interlocutor, or opponent, varied, but it is quite clear fromarchival material that this requirement for the degree persisted well into theeighteenth century in most quarters of European academia.

Just as there were ordinary, extraordinary, and cursory lectures, there were disputational counterparts. For example, one professor might be engaged in a course of ordinary lectures and disputationsthereas a whole faculty may be involved in a cycle of cursory disputationseach professor presiding over a particular topic in rotation. Also, in the medieval system forward there were the *quodlibetal* disputationstwhich frequently occurred during Lent or Advent regarding topics and questions outside of the standard curriculum. During the period in question at Leiden, ordinary course lectures occurred on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday; extraordinary on Wednesday and Saturday. Disputations as well as private lectures also occurred on Wednesday and Saturday. Professors typically did not teach more than four hours a week and no more than two subjects.\(^{42}\) In surveying course schedules from 1689 through 1785, neither Bernhardinus De Moor nor Johannes Marckius in their respective tenures at Leiden, being theologians, had lectures before 10 AM or after 3 PM, whereas the junior professor of medicine frequently lectured at 8 AM.\(^{43}\)

The disputationst could occur for a variety of reasons. Primarily they were for practice, both in public speaking as well as to demonstrate proficiency in the material and polemical engagement. Among the law faculty, the disputationst typically were utilized

\(^{42}\) Willem Otterspeep, *Groepsportret met Dame I*, 68.

\(^{43}\) E.g. ASF 298:7.
for practice in arguing a case and expounding the legal principles upon which the argument rested. Theological disputations could be upon a disputed question of theology, passage of scripture, biblical history, or sacred philology, among other disciplines. These disputations could be part of a customary cycle or extraordinary, being devoted to a particular topic either of interest to a student or to the professor. Private disputations were frequently referred to as *collegia*. According to Otterspeer, disputations were frequently organized within a *collegium*: “a small number of students coming together under a professor to elaborate on a certain theme or a certain book.”⁴⁴ In an enlightening comment on the role of disputations in the educational process, the seventeenth-century professor, Gronovious, once quipped regarding university education that “the lectures are like sermons, while the *collegia* are like catechism classes.”⁴⁵ Gronovius’ comment indicates that the medieval didactic model of lecture and disputation was alive and well in the late seventeenth century and early Enlightenment context at Leiden.

The public disputations could also be a modest bump in income for a professor. These fees were paid to the professor by the university on behalf of the students for their work and involvement in the public disputation. The rates were also fixed by university statute. Otterspeer notes that after the year 1600 the base salary of professors was approximately the same across faculties. It is difficult to assess exact total annual income of the professors because there are no official records of the funds collected for the

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⁴⁴ Otterspeer, “The mediating role of the University: Leiden University, Its structure and Function during the first two centuries of its existence,” 174.

housing and private tutoring of students, or for instances where theologians also served as pastors or occasional preachers. Yet, if one surveys the rationes academicae, which were entered into the university records every February, one discovers that professors were also compensated according to the number of public disputations over which they presided, as well as other official professorial duties (examinations, receiving matriculation oaths, and student visitations or conferences). So, for example, in the year spanning February 1694 to February 1695, we discover that the three theologians, Spanheim, Trigland, and Marck earned 6 florins for 6 disputations (1 florin per disputation), 3 florins, and 17 florins respectively. For comparison, the professors of law Matthaeus, Voet, and Vitriarius earned 10 florins, 11 florins, and 13 florins. From the perspective of professorial duties, in the same year, the theologians Spanheim, Trigland, and Marckius also earned income for administering examinations, receiving oaths of matriculation, and for student visitations. Factoring these duties in with their income from disputations, Spanheim, Trigland, and Marckius earned 45 florins, 59 florins, and 62 florins respectively, or about a fifth of their annual housing allowance. By comparison, the Law faculty received 10 florins, 11 florins, and 27 florins respectively; meaning that the theologians accounted for 81% of the expenditures above and beyond class lectures. Given that the professor serving as rector magnificus of the University earned 235 florins for his administrative duties in this year, we begin to see that for the theologians, these duties represented at least an extra 3% - 5% of their normal income (if

46 There are multiple examples of professors continuing dual professions, for example, as both a preacher and a theology professor, or a law professor and a doctor, or as a medical professor and a doctor, Otterspeer, Groepsportret met Dame I, 307-310. This is also found passim in Molhuysen, Bronnen, vols. 1-4.

47 ASF 298:32r-32v.
one estimates their income at f800-1200 annually for ordinary professors). In this particular year there is no record of additional expenses for the medical, philosophical, or other faculties. This trend continues along the same lines throughout the eighteenth century, with the occasional disbursement to the philosophy faculty as well. By the end of the eighteenth century, disbursements of this nature to the legal faculty surpass that of theology.

For a second example, in the year spanning February 1701 to February 1702, Marckius earned 44 florins for disputations alone (1 florin each), and 27 florins more for other professorial duties, totaling 71 florins. This was the same year in which he became professor of church history and theology. The total for the rationes academicae that year, including the f157 for the administrative duties of the rector magnificus, was f418, with the remaining f190 split among 3 theologians (f56 combined, 6 disputations), 4 law professors (f48 florins for 48 disputations), 4 medical professors (f33 florins, 9 disputations), and 2 arts professors (history and classics f42, no disputations). Records at the Leiden regional archive indicate that Marck had a change of address in 1694 from a modest, but respectable home on the Rapenburg to a 3 story mansion (Rapenburg 24); a much closer three-minute walk to the Academiegebouw. In 1707, he added a stable and carriage house behind Rapenburg 24. His will in 1731 speaks of gold and silver bullion, jewels, tapestries, wool rugs, and a carriage with a team of two horses; not at all the belongings of a poor, church mouse.

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48 ASF 298:131r-131v.


50 Scheurleer, *Het Rapenburg*, 1:457, cf. the inventory of his widow in 1747, “Rapenburg 24: Bijlage III,
With respect to De Moor, the March 3, 1745 *Resoluties van Curatoren* note that De Moor was hired on these terms: f1200 annually as an ordinary professor, f500 as an extraordinary professor, and a f300 housing allowance. On May 8, 1745 De Moor was approved to receive a relocation allowance of f300.51 His pattern of income from disputations is comparable to Marckius's over the course of his tenure.

### 3.4 Authorship of disputations in the early modern period

There is a healthy debate among modern scholars on the question of authorship of disputations, whether it was the student, the professor, or some sort of collaboration. In tandem with this question, there is also a question regarding the role of disputations in the formulation of a theologian's system. The first point to note is that a disputation should be seen as an extension of a professor's system of thought or the principles used to derive that system of thought. The default position advocated here does not require the professor to be the author of the *ipsissima verba* of the disputation in its initial publication, although the professor generally edits theses he will assist the student in defending as president of the public disputation. Unless explicitly proven otherwise, the positions in the theses are no less than a professor's views. Secondly, after the publication of the disputation, once a professor edits, redacts, or simply re-publishes the disputations within a larger work, the disputations must be viewed as the professor's views, and in cases when published under the authority and funding of an institution, as an institution's views. It is this transition from private disputation to public, endorsed work that we can speak of institutional continuity. Now, let us work towards these general conclusions.

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regarding authorship with respect to theological disputations in the renaissance and early modern period with several examples.

There is a debate among Vermigli scholars as to the relationship of Vermigli's Romans commentary, *Loci Communes*, and student disputations. Frank James, writing on the relationship between Pietro Martire Vermigli's Romans Commentary and *Loci Communes* argues that these are inextricably tied to the student disputations over which he presided.

As regius professor of divinity [at Oxford], Vermigli was obliged not only to give lectures at the divinity school, but also to officiate at theological disputations. [cf. Loach "Ref Controversies 368] Whether there was a direct connection between these disputations and his two Romans loci has generated some scholarly wrangling. S. L. Greenslade has argued that the published version of Martyr's Romans lectures was in fact an "expansion" of his Oxford lectures ... Greenslade seems to suggest that the two loci were significant revisions or even later additions to the expanded commentary and therefore bear no direct relationship to the theological disputations. If this reconstruction is accurate the loci would have no direct connection to the disputations since they would have been composed primarily in Strasbourg and Zurich ... however Jennifer Loach disputes Greenslade’s analysis, arguing instead that Martyr's theological loci had their source in the regular student disputations and were part of the original lectures.52

James concludes that the locus on justification which Vermigli published in his Genesis lectures corresponds exactly with his theses for disputations, which implies that one was derived from the other. James notes: "apparently it had been Vermigli's custom to obtain the loci of his commentaries from the student disputations. Second, it is a matter of historical record that his Oxford lectures on Romans were intertwined with formal

theological disputations as part of the regular divinity school curriculum." If the analysis of James and Loach is correct in the case of Vermigli, who received his doctorate at Padua and taught at Strasburg, Oxford, and Zürich, *ceteris paribus* in other university contexts of the period, disputations represent a key genre for unlocking both the sources and context for the development of a broad swath of theological literature.

### 3.5 Authorship of Disputations at Leiden University

With respect to Leiden University, it may very well be the case that different faculties maintained different authorship practices. Ahsmann has researched the authorship of student disputations in the law faculty at Leiden University from its founding in 1575 to 1630 and arrived at the conclusion that the disputations were primarily written by students as an exercise in building a case. This is primarily based on a fourfold argument: (1) many unprinted disputations have been found that are in the handwriting of the defendants; (2) there is epistolary evidence that some law students wrote their own theses for disputation; (3) some of the law professors cite disputations according to the respondent and not the professor; and (4) the dedication page of the disputation praises the student and not the professor. It must be understood that in the early modern period disputed cases where the goal is finding the boundaries of a legal principle's application differs in kind from an argument based on special revelation.

But notwithstanding disciplinary distinctions in *principia*, one must keep in mind the freedom given the different faculties in the decree from June 22, 1592 of the University Senate:

It was also decreed that hereafter candidates would be examined privately before a public disputation, and the matter is devoted to the Professors of each of the

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53 Vermigli, *Predestination and Justification*, xxiii.
faculties, so that they might devise the formula of examination and display it to the Curators; who would also set forth the compensation to the examiners. In addition, it was decreed that hereafter candidates would bring their theses to the professors of their faculty at home, but [the candidates]—and not another—would bring them to the beadle for the remaining professors and each of the other faculties.54

And it is exactly in light of the professors' role in preparing a student in practice disputations and examinations that one must take care in asserting a form of totally autonomous student authorship of theses across all faculties. Furthermore, there are instances where a professor explicitly informs their reader of a collaborative professor-student authorship.55 Also, in a recent translation of the Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, the editors argue primarily for the presiding professor's authorship with qualification, "The set of theses printed up beforehand by the University, was usually drafted by the presiding professor and given to the student to defend, but sometimes [theses were drafted] by the student himself and approved by the professor."56 As true as this is in general, specifically, when theological students were the "auctor et respondens" that fact was clearly printed or declared on the title page and dedication to the curators and nobles, as we will explore momentarily. Rather, than establish the custom of student authorship, this would demonstrate a student's dependence on their professor's editing and approval

54 Molhuysen, Bronnen, 1:68, cf. stipulations 4-7, of the August 5, 1604 decrees regarding the conduct of the beadle to distribute copies of the theses at the entrance of the hall as well as to make sure that the appropriate authoritative text was utilized for disputations pro gradu. Bronnen, 1:154. Cf. Ahsmann, Collegia en Colleges, 288-289.

55 Sinnema and van den Belt are certainly right to note the comments of Johannes Polyander in the Syntagma exercitationum theologicae varie orationes ac disputationes complectens (Leiden 1621) in which he is said to polish the text of student theses which were brought to him. However, one striking point that must be registered is that Polyander informs the reader that this occurred, indicating that student involvement may not have been customary or presumed by the general public. Cf. Sinnema, CHRC 92 (2012): 513-514n26-28.

of the theses for public defense. It should also be understood that theses *pro gradu* generally had "auctor et respondens" behind the students' name and were performed under a regent of their college or the *rector magnificus* of the university, as we will discuss later. But it is also the case that the professor has an extremely significant role in the content, preparation, and perhaps even the articulation of particular theses in a student's preparation for a *pro gradu* defense. Remember, professors were compensated for their involvement in preparing students for their public disputations, exams, and degree defenses. Thus, if the *ipsissima verba* of *every kind* of disputation do not belong to the professor, it is certainly not the case that students invented the material absolutely autonomously *de novo*. As we will discuss further in a moment, there are records in the eighteenth century of presiding professors issuing formal letters on behalf of the university indicating a student has passed a disputation *met succes* and was advancing well in their studies.

At the least, by the eighteenth century there were instances throughout a student's curriculum in which a student did need to defend theses that served as part of the requirements for graduation. However, it would be a leap to assume that all disputations utilized in the university context were predominantly authored by the student. Ahsmann is careful on this point. Otterspeer, based largely on Ahsmann, argues that the students were the authors of the disputations, as long as authorship is understood as unoriginal copying from common sources utilized by the professor and readily available at the library or otherwise. But Otterspeer hedges as well, noting that disputations compiled

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57 Otterspeer, *Groepsportret met Dame I*, 236 cf. citation in Den Boer, *God's Twofold Love*, 26. Den Boer attempts to utilize his principle of authorial doubt for his thesis on one theologian to blunt the force of Otterspeer's interaction with a hundred years of archival material.
under the professor's name "mostly" (or quite usually) "belonged to the praeses."\(^{58}\) This brings in the point that "student authorship" is not even the same species as "professorial authorship" if authorship should include the idea of originality. How original is it really if a student paraphrases theses from a professor's lectures, formulates them in their own words, and then re-submits the product for professorial editing prior to print and public defense? This is what must be in view with the idea of professorially-weighted, collaborative authorship of the theses.

There is an important artifact from this period that fills an important gap in this discussion. There are student editions of Marckius's *Compendium* published for the purpose of class notes. By the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Marckius' *Compendium* was sometimes published with a verso page of text and a blank recto page for notes and "*in usus primos academicae iuventutis*" and known as the *Medulla*.\(^{59}\) Given that theological disputations up to at least 1767 over which De Moor presided were keyed to Marckius, it perhaps becomes clearer how tightly we can see the coordination between De Moor's class lectures, Marckius's works, and student disputations. This provides part of the answer how we should understand the relationship between a professor's lecture and a student disputation. Admittedly the ultimate proof for that point would be

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58 Otterspeer, *Groepsportret met Dame I*, 236, "Privaat disputaties en disputaties gebundeld onder de naam van de professor waren meestal wel van de preses." The English translation in Den Boer's *God's Twofold Love*, of Otterspeer's citation takes "meestal wel" as "often" whereas I take this, in my opinion, more strongly or at least less ambiguously.

59 E.g. Hekman Library at Calvin College and Calvin Theological Seminary has such a three volume edition in their special collection. Cf. Johannes à Marck, *Johannis Marckii Christianae theologiae medulla didactico-elenchtica, ex majori opere, secundum ejus capita, & paragraphos, expressa. In usus primos academicae iuventutis*, vol. 1-3 (Amsterdam: R. & G. Wetstenios, 1716), shelfmark: BT70.M27 1716. There are editions of the *Medulla* from 1690 onwards: (Amsterdam: Gerard Borstius, 1690, 1696, 1705), (Amsterdam: R. & G. Wetstenios, 1716, 1721), and (Utrecht: J. H. Vonk van Lynden, 1742), (Utrecht: Samuel de Waal, 1772), to name a few.
exceedingly rare to find: a used copy of the *Medulla* used in De Moor's class. It would be even rarer still given that by 1774, De Moor was teaching on *biblia varia*. However, the fact remains, that there are editions of Marckius for classroom use by students for the purpose of taking notes. These notes would have been memorized and could have been easily arranged in consultation with the professor to compose student theses for disputations.

An examination of the 1712 edition of the *Medulla* in the Hekman Library at Calvin College and Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, MI is interesting for this reason: in that it demonstrates how a text might be used. First, the edition interleaves a recto and verso page of text with a recto and verso page for notes. Next, as one works through this particular copy, one observes at least four different hands at work, for example, in the notes of volume 1, and also that not every section or chapter is completely filled in. There is selective note taking that occurs around particular sections or topics. Now, it is not known in what institution(s) this specific copy was utilized or if it was only utilized privately, but it is evident that this edition was used by students and was apparently passed on or sold to other students. When we consider De Moor's various lecture series over the years and that De Moor would not simply offer a regular course of lectures starting with a "101" course and systematically working through to the curricular completion, it is easy to see why a particular copy of this book might not be filled in on every page. It is also not hard to envision students selling their used copies to other students as they graduate, which would explain the multitude of notes, various jotted systems of sigilla, and even whole paragraphs condensed into a single sentence.
A student would then have the first step towards a draft of a thesis that would be ready for defense. This would form the basis of a draft that a professor could proof, edit, or comment upon further. The phrasing of such theses could even be the professor's own words in the lecture. In this sense, we have evidence of the beginning stages of copying, collaboration, and editing.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. Donald Sinnema and Henk van den Belt suggest that variances in phrasing of theses could suggest student authorship, "The Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (1625) as a Disputation Cycle," \textit{CHRC} 92 (2012): 525. It is certainly possible that variances in theses on the same topic represent student authorship. However, it is also quite possible that the theses are dictated by the professor in a lecture, and the variances in wording may be accounted for by the student copyist. Thus, a professor's approval for print would be
Some comments on one page of this particular copy of the Medulla at Hekman Library may demonstrate the point. In the margins on section sixteen and seventeen in chapter 1 "On theology," we find marginal notes expanding the text of Marckius along the lines of De Moor's Commentarius. It is true that the history of this particular copy is unknown, but the similarity between the marginal and interlinear notes and references are striking. At the close of section sixteen, interposing interlinear and marginal notes with Marckius's text on natural theology, we read that:

… It must not be doubted that Adam in his integrity would have known of the Trinity, even without special revelation, [1] because the image of God and true wisdom were natural to him, and [2] the true God could not be properly known or worshipped unless he knew of the Trinity. [3 add: because the triune God created man, Gen. 1:26].

In the Commentarius De Moor divides the topic exactly at these points and along these lines and adds almost a page on the creation of Adam and knowledge of the Trinity.

From this point on, in section seventeen, there are two hands elaborating on the

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61 The provenance of this copy is not known, thus conclusions in this regard must be tentative, but inferences can be drawn. The hand written addenda and marginal cross references point to primary sources cited and elaborated upon in De Moor, it seems to me at this time. However, it is also known that Wesselius, Gillisen, one of De Moor's junior colleagues at Leiden, and De Moor worked off of Marckius's Medulla, see Otterspeer, Groepsportret met Dame II, 368. To be conclusive, however, I would need to determine what other universities and professors were actively expositing Marckius's Compendium in the same time period and reconstruct the print runs for the various editions. I am grateful for conversations with Dr. Adriaan Neele, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University, who indicated that the use of Marckius was widespread at Yale and Harvard in the eighteenth century. Further work on this point might prove more conclusive on the use of Marckius and De Moor in the American colonies and later the United States in the eighteenth century.


63 De Moor, Commentarius, 1:54-55.
marginalia as evidenced by different ink and different writing habits. But, both hands are elaborating upon the text along lines of argument that are fully worked out in De Moor's citations and text. In this case, sometimes the notes are filling in who the particular objector is. So for example, there are references to a passage in Spinoza and Socinus's objection that explorers found native Brazilians who have no concept of God. There is also an interlinear cross reference to section twenty and a note at the bottom regarding Edward Herbert. All of these citations can be found in De Moor at these sections. The point of this level of detail is to demonstrate that a professor's lecture, a student's notes, and authorship of theses should be viewed along a continuum, rather than as a discrete act of *de novo* originality on the student's part. This kind of handbook also indicates how a lecture might expound upon a text taught in an early modern university and provides a glimpse into the kind of linkage between a professor's lecture and student disputation.

Admittedly, this particular copy of the textbook is a significant but inconclusive example of such a relationship.

One scholar, however, on the question of the importance of theological disputation for determining the position of a particular theologian, argues:

As I see it the disputation cannot as such be used as primary source material for a careful analysis and exposition of the thought of the professor under whose presidency they were held. I base this on the following assumptions: (1) the uncertainty with respect to authorship; and (2) even in the case of certainty with respect to authorship, the remaining uncertainty as to whether or not the contents of the disputation really represent the author's viewpoint at the time.

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64 For the Brazilian reference in Socinus, cf. Hekman copy, Marckius, *Medulla*, 5 and De Moor, *Commentarius*, 1:57-58; for the reference to practical atheists such as Spinoza or Edward Herbert, see De Moor, *Commentarius*, 1:63.

65 Willem Den Boer, *The Twofold Love of God: The Theology of Jacob Arminius (1559-1609)* (Oakville: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010), 34. My primary interests in this debate between Den Boer and Stanglin are not so much on Arminius's theology or the central dogma claims of Den Boer as upon the fact that
It is true that disputational theses are intentionally broad and require a bit of unpacking in order to understand their full meaning. In one sense this is beside the point. Whether or not the theses are broad and general, they are not so vague that they do not argue and assert something an opponent could oppose publicly and which a respondent could defend. What is argued here is that the collaborative product of a professor-student interaction cannot be viewed as entirely separable from the parties involved or as isolated from the professor's lectures. Remember, the professor literally stood with the student and frequently argued the theses alongside the student to opponents. This recent scholar also argues:

The greatest objection against Stanglin’s view is that in most cases a high degree of certainty, but no absolute certainty can be achieved. Every disputation over which Arminius presided will show more or less clear traces of his involvement, also when authored by a student. However, when we are attempting to determine the nuances of Arminius's own theology, his "view" as defined above, the nature of the disputation as a pedagogical tool and the uncertainty of authorship make Arminius's disputations unsuitable as basic source material. However, even when authorship is established without any degree of doubt, it does not ipso facto guarantee that the contents of that disputation are representative of the author's thought.\footnote{Den Boer, \textit{God's Twofold Love}, 29.}

In this scholar's thinking a historian can have absolute certainty of professorial authorship of disputations and these same disputations "show more or less clear traces of [a professor's] involvement," yet the contents should be held in suspicion. This is a curious methodological argument.\footnote{Den Boer, \textit{God's Twofold Love}, 34. "The above does not mean that the disputations will not be referred to at all as a faithful representation of Arminius's views. However, there is not enough of a basis to consider the disputations and other writings to which the above-mentioned difficulties and questions do not apply as source material on the same level … The disputations are without doubt important for the climate in which …"} The result, the scholar argues, is that it is not necessary to

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Ahsmann, Stanglin, and Den Boer are: 1) working with disputations at Leiden University, and in the case of Stanglin and Den Boer, 2) working with theological disputations, and 3) drawing conclusions about a professor's corpus of theology. As this impinges on my project with De Moor, these points heighten the necessity of dealing with the methodological questions in view at the length presented here.
\end{flushleft}
class Arminius's disputations as a primary source of the same degree as other primary sources because it is impossible to uncover Arminius's deepest personal and theological motives through them.68 Such an assumption distorts the traditional process by which a theology professor moved from the composition of a lecture to a theological textbook and interjects an untenable degree of suspicion on any professor's works produced in the process of moving from lecture to disputation to systematic textbook or commentary.69 Den Boer's method minimizes the fact that professors were required by Leiden university statute to review, edit, and clarify student's theses and bring them into a form in which the professor would preside and defend with a respondent. Sinnema and van den Belt readily acknowledge from eyewitness testimony that presiding professors frequently waded into the disputations at Leiden to respond to objections and salvage the defense.70

Arminius laid out and developed his theological thought, and when they contain the same views found elsewhere, they can serve as confirmation." On the contrary, it would seem that they could only serve to generate more doubt. How would one know?

68 Den Boer, God's Twofold Love, 24. "Because we are attempting to uncover Arminius's deepest personal and theological motives, with "view" we mean someone's personal and complete conviction. … What we mean is that in such a situation, the connection between a person's conviction and a public exposition of it can actually be so distant that the latter is not in a direct sense representative of the former." This is a deeply problematic way to handle sources as well as requires a threshold of certainty and psychological analysis of the deceased, much less of the living, that is rarely, if ever, open to a historian. For example, this level of doubt and uncertainty must implicitly be extended to any public statement or presentation of any author within the context of controversy, e.g. Calvin's Institutes was revised and elaborated almost constantly within the penumbra of multiple controversies. Instead, this requirement places primacy upon the reader's judgment of what counts as the author's "complete conviction" even when authorship is not disputed. A better approach would simply be to acknowledge that the level of certainty is sufficient for determining a professor's view, without insisting upon finding the deepest conviction in a corpus of thought that may not be complete, exhaustive, or even consistent, but instead fragmentary and quite possibly unsystematic.

69 Through my examination of the theological disputations at Leiden University in my fellowship at the Scaliger Instituut (2010), I reached a similar conclusion as Stanglin, albeit separately. Therefore, I heartily commend and concur with Stanglin's methodological assessment here, "Methodological Musings on Historiography (A Rejoinder)," CHRC 92 (2012): 128.

70 E.g. Sinnema and van den Belt, CHRC 92 (2012): 521ff.
Disputations should be viewed at the least as joint statements of primarily the professor, and secondarily the student.

Keith Stanglin, by way of interaction with Ahsmann and Den Boer, observes that Ahsmann's first two arguments are inconclusive because if the professor did in fact author the disputation, one would expect the student to write down the theses by hand, whether dictated by the professor or copied from professor’s previous disputations (a well-known and common occurrence that was frequently endorsed by professors).71

Secondly, the first three arguments hinge on the question of whether there was a different practice between the law faculty and the theology faculty of the Staten College. It is not unreasonable to suppose that a would-be lawyer must practice arguing a case before the court of his peers and professors in a manner quite different from a theology student. On the other hand, Reformed Protestant theology of the period was typically bound to the authority of Scripture in a way that a lawyer would not be to the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*.72 A law student might be more encouraged to seek innovative applications and arguments than a theologian operating within a stricter confessional orthodoxy, where innovation was typically viewed as a form of theological gangrene.

Stanglin also demonstrated that during the same time period examined by Ahsmann, it was common among the theological faculty members to author the student disputations, pointing out that both professor and student were classified as its author. On one hand, the student was commended for the oral defense; on the other, the positions

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72 This would not have been unique to Leiden, consider that in Lutheran contexts some matters of theology are not up for debate, whereas all matters of law could be, "Whatever is affirmed by Scripture is undoubtedly true," Conrad Dannhauer, *Idea boni disputatoris*, (Strassburg: 1632), 34n5, cited in Daniel Felipe, "17th century German disputation handbooks" in *Disputatio 1200-1800*, 55.
articulated were assumed to belong to the professor. So, for example, Stanglin points out that both Gomarus and Arminius, when appearing before the States Holland refer to specific student disputations as representative of their opponents’ true positions. Stanglin also acknowledges that though the default assumption of the early seventeenth century theological faculty at Leiden was that the professor authored the disputational theses, there was the possibility, when a student demonstrated especial skill and facility, that they were allowed to write their own.73 One of the questions that must be raised shortly is whether, in the period of the tenures of Johannes Marckius and Bernhardinus De Moor, the authorship practices shifted.

In addition, as to the first objection, it is true that there is a large amount of unprinted disputations in students’ handwriting in the rare manuscript collections of Leiden University. Yet there are a few general points to note. First, ordinary and curricular disputations were funded by the university budget and printed by the contracted printer for that year. Generally, this was the same printer that published the posters announcing the lecture series of the coming semester. It is quite possible that the university would not fund the printing of extraordinary disputations or practice disputations, such as exercitationes. Also, if the disputation was a private disputation, then in all likelihood it would not have been printed. It is possible, however, that a student or professor of some means might personally pay for the printing of a practice

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disputation or extraordinary disputation. All of this is to say, there is more than one plausible reason why one particular disputation was not printed and another was. There is also the very real problem that not every disputation that ever occurred at Leiden is recorded or preserved. This is one reason why the problem of authorship may not be able to be conclusively demonstrated. But from the disquisitions that are extant in the late seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, they are generally associated with theological examinations which occurred in the Fall and Spring. From these, there is sufficient evidence to come to an acceptable level of certainty regarding professor's positions.

In my own examination of theological disquisitions at Leiden University from the sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century, I did find about a dozen handwritten philosophical disquisitions and some theological ones spanning from 1693 to 1731 that included the phrase after the student's name, *auctore et respondente*. The overwhelming majority of these were under the presidency of the regents and subregents of the Staten College. For example, I did find many student authored disquisitions under the presidency of D. Knibbe and A. or J. J. Schultens, respectively, in this period as well as an occasional one under Hollebeek or Aemilius. In three instances I found disquisitions by the same student and all handwritten. In AC1:135, there is a *Disputatio Philosophica De Unitate Dei*, by Jacobus Bikkus, who signs his name at its completion with "auct. &

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Resp."\(^{75}\) Next, Bikkus has a *Disputatio Philosophica de Spiritus Existentia et Vera ejus Corpore Diversitate*, without a title page or dedication page but signed with just his name at the end, indicating that this very well may be an initial draft.\(^{76}\) Also in AC1:136, one finds a handwritten disputation dated February 21 with no year, *Disputatio Philosophica de Eternitate Dei*, under the presidency of David Knibbe to be defended in the "Collegii Theologici."\(^{77}\) There is also a theological disputation by Bikkus which is entitled, *Disputatio Theologica de Divinitate S. Scripturae*, and is also signed "auct. et resp." on the dedication page, but there is no title page.\(^{78}\) There were also multiple instances of letters folded and stored with some handwritten disputation. These were most likely copies, as the text was a formal letter to the student from the regent or subregent of the theological college, who was also the president of the disputation, and indicated to the student that he had passed his disputation successfully. In the case of Bikkus, he indicated his authorship either on the title page or on the dedication page, or both. This raises the likelihood that the printer simply reproduced exactly what the student submitted handwritten for publication. If this assumption is accurate, then it is all the more striking that there are instances where a student does not identify themselves as the author but

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\(^{75}\) There is no extant title page for this particular handwritten disputation thus there is no information regarding the disputation's president, however there is a dedication page and the title is above the first thesis. Thus it will be referred to as Jacobus Bikkus, *Disputatio Philosophica de Unitate Dei* (Leiden: Leiden University, n.d.), shelfmark: ubl002, AC1:135.

\(^{76}\) There is also no extant title page or dedication for this particular draft of a handwritten disputation thus there is no information regarding the disputation's president, thus it will be referred to as Jacobus Bikkus, *Disputatio Philosophica de Spiritus Existentia et Vera ejus a corpore diversitate* (Leiden: Leiden University, n.d.), shelfmark: ubl002, AC1:135.

\(^{77}\) David Knibbe and Jacobus Bikkus, *Disputatio Philosophica de eternitate Dei quam auxilante Deo sub praeeditio Viri Clarissimi Davidis Knibbe Illustr. Ac Pr[a]cept. ... Jacobus Bikkus auct. & respond. ad diem 21 Februarij*, (Leiden University, n.d.), shelfmark: ubl002, AC1:135.

only as the respondent, where in other instances the student emphasizes their authorship as often as they can.

In the case of Bikkus's handwritten disputations, it is interesting that his *praeses* David Knibbe is not listed on any of the *Ordo lectionum* in the months prior to or during the disputations that Bikkus defended. For that matter, Knibbe is never listed on any of the *Ordo lectionum* as a lecturer or as a professor during his tenure as sub-regent between 1720 and 1748. This very well may indicate that a student found himself in somewhat of a lurch without the requirements for graduation and in need of defending disputations as part of his course of study. Such a state of affairs would explain why there are several handwritten disputations signed by a student as "auctor et respondens;" a student who was associated with a disputation president that is the regent or sub-regent of the college and that never lectured publicly. The student very well could have been working through material via a *privatum collegium*. At the bottom of every *Ordo Lectionum* that was posted in the Fall and Spring at Leiden University was a sentence to this effect, "Private collegia will be held by all professors and readers of all disciplines and languages according to the requests of students." In other words, this would explain (1) why there are not many of these disputations with "auctor et respondens" and (2) why the regent or sub-regent and not a lecturing professor oversaw the disputation. Viewed in this light, such handwritten, student authored disputations may be the outlier and not the rule, occurring as they did under irregular circumstances.

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79 E.g. Molhuysen, *Bronnen*, 5:7*, "Habebuntur ab omnibus DD. Professoribus et Lectoribus omnium disciplinarum et linguarum doctarum ad desideria studiosorum privata collegia."
At the least, this indicates that these hand written, student authored disputations functioned as a portion of their degree requirements if not specifically *pro gradu*. I did not find handwritten or printed *disputationes* or *exercitationes* defended under De Moor where the student is listed as *auctor*, but admittedly the sample of extant printed disputations relative to the corpus of the *Commentarius* is inconclusive.80 Many of the extant disputations, if not all of the disputations under De Moor's presidency, have *exami submittit* on the title page, but the student is not explicitly listed as the author. I did find and examine several inaugural dissertations for medical and law students, that is, disputations or dissertations *pro gradu*, that occurred under De Moor's authority—not presidency—while De Moor was the *rector magnificus* (1756-1757). He acted in a ceremonial capacity over all doctoral defenses at Leiden University during his rectorate and, as was customary, another professor from the respective faculty would have stepped in to oversee the doctoral candidate's defense.81

80 For a list of six extant disputations of De Moor, see *Catalogus quam 2700 Dissertationum et Orationum Theologicarum Defensarum et Habitarum ab a. 1600 usque ad 1866 in Academiis Neerlandiae, Germaniae, Sueciae, etc. Quae Venales Prostant apud Fredericum Müller*, (Amsterdam: Fred. Müller, 1867), 41.

81 These inaugural dissertations are not listed in Müller, *Catalogus*, and authorship is not attributed to De Moor, but these are listed with De Moor's name in the Leiden University archives.

Nikolaus Latterman, *Dissertatio Medica Inauguralis de Vomitu ... Quam ... ex Auctoritate ... Bernhardini De Moor ... pro Gradu Doctoratus ... Examini Subjicit* (Leiden: Quirinus Visser, 1756).

Johannes Millies, *Dissertatio Medica Inauguralis de Palpitatione Cordis ... Eruditorum Examini Submittit Johannes Millies, Haga Batavus* (Leiden: Joannes Bos, 1756).

Salomon Schinz, *Dissertatio Physico-Medica Inauguralis, de Calce Terrarum et Lapidum Calcariorum ... quam ... ex Auctoritate ... Bernhardini De Moor ... Eruditorum Examini Submittit Salomon Schinz,- Thurico Helvetius*, (Leiden: Johannes Luzac, 1756).

Isaac van Teylingen, *Dissertatio Juridica Inauguralis de Poenis ... Quam ... ex Auctoritate ... Bernhardini De Moor ... Eruditorum Examini Submittit Isaac van Teylingen* (Leiden: Samuel & Joannes Luchtmans, 1756).

Guilielmus Titsingh, *Dissertatio Juridica Inauguralis de Appellationibus ... ex Auctoritate ... Bernhardini
Among printed disputations, there are some disputations in which the respondent is specified as the author. This is actually the case for De Moor during his student days, when he participated as a respondent in disputations over which his theology professors presided (i.e. Franciscus Fabricius, Taco Hajo van den Honert, Johannes Marckius, and Johannes Wesselius). There are four sets of printed disputations forming a seven-part series in which he was listed specifically as *auctor et respondens* and also that these were submitted *publico examini*. The series is by De Moor on the essential avenging righteousness of God. The presidency of the first and second disputations were under Marckius, the third and fourth were under Fabricius, fifth and sixth Wesselius, and the seventh was under van den Honert. Given that De Moor is the author and respondent on a given theme under different professors, it is quite clear that the content is primarily weighted towards his authorship, but it is not clear who or how many of the professors assisted in his preparation for public defense. It is clear that all of his professors were willing to take responsibility publicly for the content of his theses. One may infer from

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*De Moor ... Eruditorum Examini Submittit Guillelmo Titsingh* (Leiden: Gerard Potvliet, 1756).

82 Listed by president in the series, but the respondent is De Moor,

Marckius, Johannes, *Disputatio Theologica de Justitia Vindicativa Deo Essentiali. Prima, & secunda: Quam ... sub Praesidio ... D. Johannis à Marck ... Publico Examini Submittit Bernhardinus De Moor, Auctor & Resp ...* (Lugduni Batavorum: Petrus vander Aa, 1730).

Fabricius, Franciscus, *Disputatio Theologica de Justitia Vindicativa Deo Essentiali. Tertia & Quarta: Quam ... sub Praesidio Francisci Fabricii ... Publico Examini Submittit Bernhardinus De Moor, Auctor & Resp ...* (Petrus vander Aa, 1730).

Wesselius, Johannes, *Disputatio Theologica de Justitia Vindicativa Deo essentiali. Quinta & Sexta: Quam ... sub Praesidio Johannis Wesselii ... Publico Examini Submittit Bernhardinus De Moor, Auctor & Resp ...* (Lugduni Batavorum: Petrus vander Aa, 1730).

Honert, Taco Hajo van den, *Disputatio Theologica de Justitia Vindicativa Deo Essentiali. Septima: Quam ... sub Praesidio Tac. Hajonis van den Honert ... Publico Examini Submittit Bernhardinus De Moor, Auctor & Resp ...* (Lugduni Batavorum: Petrus vander Aa, 1730).

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what we know of Marckius commissioning De Moor to elaborate upon his *Compendium* that he was probably the primary advisor for De Moor's disputation defenses.

There are also instances where the student is only designated as the respondent. For example, there are frequently a series of seven or eight printed disputationes on a particular topic under the same presiding professor but with different students. This was the case in the twenty-seven extant disputationes over which De Moor presides. All of these disputationes are for *publico examini*, but in none of them was the respondent ever designated as the author.83

One could argue that the student is understood as the author even when such a point is not explicitly stated and the variance is due to the discretion of different university printers for presentation. This is possible. That hypothesis, however, is unlikely for the following reason: there are multiple examples of theological disputationes from the eighteenth century submitted as a public exam under the same professor by the same university printer where one student is designated as the author and a different student is not.84 There are also explicit instances by the same university printer where a

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83 See Bibliography, I.A.2, Theological Disputations (alphabetized by respondent, De Moor presiding).


E.g. Donald Sinnema and Henk van den Belt note that Polyander specified nine instances out of forty-three when in his publication of the *Syntagma Exercitationum Theologicarum* (1621) his students authored the disputationes included, "The *Synopsis Purioris Theologiae* (1625) as a Disputation Cycle," 513.
student affirms his authorship on the title page and in the dedicatory letter and other instances where the student only identified themselves as the respondent. Furthermore, there are instances where students, who both had the same committee of professors and the same university printer for the purpose of their final public exams, are differentiated. In the instance of the student J. W. Loyal, his last cycle of exams was defended under the same committee as De Moor, of Marckius, Fabricius, Wesselius, and van den Honert, but he is only indicated on the title page and in the dedication as the respondent.

As to Ahsmann's second and third objections, it is quite probable that the handwritten theses are the result of conferences between the professor and student, wherein the professor proofread and edited the student’s theses. The professor would have provided the broad structure of the argument and responses either generally from


the lectures or specifically in private conference, whereas it is the student’s responsibility to fill in as it were the wording. From here a professor could have edited and clarified further. The handwritten copy then would be a collaborative effort that represented at the least the professor's views. Given a professor’s robust routine of public and private lectures, as well as public and private disputation, it is not unthinkable that some students might have needed more coaching in private, practice disputation in preparation for a public display. In that context, a handwritten student copy certainly seems plausible and likely. But if Otterspeer and Ahsmann are correct, a concept of "student authorship" that is more akin to copyist, would not qualify, according to Den Boer's principle, as the student's "view" either. Are we absolutely certain that student authored theses represent a student's deepest personal and theological motives? The threshold Den Boer sets is too high as well as too rare to achieve methodologically. Instead it seems more reasonable and cogent to argue that the theses are not exhaustive, but they are sufficiently reliable guides to at least the professor's views, and less certainly, the student's. Otherwise, why would Den Boer utilize theses as an additional confirmation of Arminius's views? It seems he functionally abandons his own principle.

As to the fourth objection, it is necessary to exercise caution. Ahsmann’s argument from the congratulatory praises that it would be odd for students to be praised

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89 Den Boer, *God's Twofold Love*, 34. “The above does not mean that the disputation will not be referred to at all as a faithful representation of Arminius's views. However, there is not enough of a basis to consider the disputation and other writings to which the above-mentioned difficulties and questions do not apply as source material on the same level … The disputations are without doubt important for the climate in which Arminius laid out and developed his theological thought, and when they contain the same views found elsewhere, they can serve as confirmation.”
for something they did not write is a fair point. These poems should be read carefully, even when a student signs the theses "auctor et respondens." Yet Stanglin’s counter-point that the congratulatory paean of praise by the respondent’s friends may in fact be due to the student’s anticipated performance whereas the content would belong to the professors is also quite reasonable. Neither of these points by themselves fully solves the question. In the case of the theological disputations over a two hundred year period, it is not always the case—and generally not, for that matter—that there are even congratulatory poems present. Joseph Freedman's prudent caution regarding authorship is laudable:

… there is no simple correct answer, and it might in many cases be best to list the presider and the respondent(s) as joint authors. In some disputations, the presider thereof identifies himself as its author as well; in other disputations, the respondent is identified as its author. But in most cases, the author is not specified. In some instances, one is able to establish authorship—with some degree of certainty or probability—on the basis of internal evidence."

90 This point is supported by Gisbertus Voetius’s remarks on student-professor authorship in the case of the Leiden philosophy professor Heereboord, “But perhaps someone will take exception that this alleged disputation of Heereboord was written by the respondent, as the letters “A and R” (i.e. auctor et respondens) seems to indicate, as they are placed next to the respondent’s name. And [one may allege] there is a helpful caution inserted in the title and on the frontispiece of the disputation. We respond to this charge: whatever may be the case regarding [the disputation], nevertheless this disputation must be viewed as presented by Heereboord because he wholly granted his public protection [or patronage] to this disputation that was written by the respondent, that he thoroughly read over, and that was printed.” in G. Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum theologicarum, 5 vols. (Utrecht: Joannes à Waesberhgius, 1648-1669), 5:513, only the Latin is included by Beck, Gisbertus Voetius, 32n97.

91 To Stanglin’s point that congratulatory poems could indicate praise for the performance rather than authorship, I did find one handwritten disputation in which the student does not indicate authorship on the title page or in the dedication, but rather writes the title page thus: "A disputation … Wilhelms van Eyken will attempt to publicly defend." See Disputatio Philosophica de Voluntate Dei … sub Praesidio … Davidis Knibbe … Publice Defendere Conabitur Wilhelms van Eyken ad Diem 20 Julius 1744 (Leiden University: 1744), shelfmark: ubl002, AC1:136.

What scholars must acknowledge methodologically is that it is well within the range of likelihood that even a jointly written document was representative of both the presiding professor's and the student's views. And what is more to the point for this dissertation they should be viewed as within the penumbra and acceptable range of an institution's view. Controversies arise when the professor's views are so discordant that they attract local or national as well as ecclesiastical or political censure for the institution.

Acknowledging Freedman's caution, it is necessary to press further to examine the internal evidence in De Moor's *Commentarius* and archival evidence at the University of Leiden.

As the printed disputations grew in prevalence as well as page length (from eight pages to thirty) it is quite probable that the content was the professor’s (the theses, arguments, and so forth) whereas the wording belonged to the student. Then before publication and in preparation for the public disputation, the student and professor reviewed and edited the content. Correlating with this point, Ku-ming Chang surveys the general transformation from oral disputational theses of the medieval period to written dissertations of the modern period at multiple European universities. Chang observes that the *praeses* was typically the professor in whose *collegium* the student participated.

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93 J. S. Freedman in *Hora Est!*, 36. Freedman also sets forth several reasons why one should examine disputations: (1) the relationship between textbooks and disputations, (2) disputations can and sometimes do include more information than what is found in a redacted textbook, (3) disputations indicate instructional process, (4) disputations provide biographical and bibliographical information with respect to the students, and (5) disputations are the first instances where new views, concepts, and schemas publicly emerge from lectures and discussions. Freedman's sixth reason is noteworthy for its agreement with a methodology that examines institutional continuity and discontinuity, "disputations provide us with a window through which we can understand how interactive instruction evolved uniquely at individual academic institutions."

and would serve as a co-respondent in the event that his student faltered in the oral
defense. Chang also provides broader evidence that in the medieval tradition through the
early modern practice, it was the praeses that proposed the questions or theses to be
disputed. The professor would then edit a collection of disputations in preparation for
print as a single volume. In support of a collaborative authorship for student disputations
on a higher level, with the weight of the content leaning toward the professor, it is
noteworthy that in the inaugural disputation of a doctoral student (inaugural because it is
the first of his career and the last before his graduation) typically there is no praeses
listed, signaling that the content was exclusively the responsibility of the doctoral student.

Chang’s general points are supported by archival material at Leiden University.
Throughout the late seventeenth century and the whole of the eighteenth century, a
dissertatio and a disputatio were by and large synonymous. A dissertation in the period
was not a massive, multi-chaptered affair demonstrating original research like it is today,
rather it was a written set of theses that were printed on behalf of the audience outlining
the primary argument, and a brief overview of the contrary arguments. It is true that at
Leiden from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, the three page disputatio
under Junius in the 1590s lengthens to a ten, twenty, or even forty page dissertatio by the
late eighteenth century. As Chang points out, this lengthening was a significant change
across Europe from the medieval procedure, as it abbreviated if not eliminated the
traditional oral presentation of the theses and thereby left more time for actual debate. By
printing the lengthier disputations in advance, one effect was that the audience was more
prepared to engage the respondent.
Chang also demonstrates elsewhere that the traditional model of dissertation development is that one should speak of the public dissertation as a joint project in different respects of unequal roles. On one hand, in many German universities the supervising professor from the respective faculty would propose and generally write the theses for defense. On the other hand, the student was responsible for the oral defense. Chang is certainly correct on the implications of the general practice,

The candidate's responsibility was to use all his knowledge and debate skills to defend the assigned thesis in public. As the thesis was usually proposed or embraced by the supervisor, the respondent's performance put the supervisor's teaching and authority at stake. A failed defense would imply that the proposed thesis and its underlying doctrine were unsustainable, thus causing damage to the professor's authority. On the other hand, the defendant's victory was no small contribution to the validation of the praeses' thesis and especially his authority. In this context a disputation that was successfully defended was a joint product of the collaborator's textual and oral contributions.

Chang also notes that it was a significant shift in dissertations at Göttingen for medical students to develop their own experiments and defend their theses without the supervising professor chairing the defense. Citing Ahsmann, Chang notes that this seems to be the case earlier at Leiden. In terms of pedagogical shifts, by the end of the eighteenth-century authorship of dissertations pro gradu was decisively weighted towards the student.

In the period examined here at Leiden, in works entitled disputatio theologica, it is frequently the case that the student is listed only as the respondent who submits the


96 Chang, "Collaborative Production," 349. Also 350, "As the traditional disputation was not a test of the respondent's originality, at times it allowed for recycled theses. The setting for the disputation allowed the respondent to demonstrate his understanding of his supervisor's teaching by successfully defending the assigned position. It mattered little whether the position was taken from the traditional Aristotelian corpus or was a thesis advocated by the professor as a new finding. Therefore, a professor sometimes assigned for new disputation a thesis that had already been defended."
disputation which is a “public and peaceful inquiry.” In other instances, such as a dissertatio theologica, the student is sometimes listed as auctor et respondens. Crossing to another faculty at about the same time, in a philosophical disputatio pneumatica on the immortality of the rational soul, the student is not listed as the respondent, but as the auctor. These instances taken together, demonstrate that Stanglin is right, the disputations represent the professor’s position, unless specifically stated otherwise. In the later eighteenth century, sometimes the title of author or respondent is simply dropped as it is for an examination. But even in the case of examinations, it is not entirely clear that the student is authoring the theses in the sense of originating them. Before proceeding to the larger commentaries and collections of disputations by Marck and De Moor, it is worth stating that the operating premise at this point is a default assumption of professorial authorship as the originator of the theses, but qualified by the recognition that both students and professors were involved in the preparation for exams and public disputations. There are also instances where the student is explicitly called the author.

97 E.g. Johannes a Marck, Johannes Ludovicus du Rouille, Disputatio Theologica de semine Abrahami futuro instar Stellatarum, ad Gen. Cap. XV. Vers. 5 Quam, Favente Deo, praeside ... Johannes a Marck ... Publicae Placidaeque disquisitioni subjicit, Johannes Ludovicus ... (Leiden: Abraham Elzevier, 1705).

98 E.g. Johannes a Marck, Stephanus Varga, Dissertatio Theologica de Naturalis Religionis Vitiostitate Prima, Secunda, Tertia, & Quarta. Quam Favente Deo T. O. M. sub praesidio ... Johannis a Marck ... Publico examini submittit auctor et respondens, Stephanus Varga, Hungarus, ad diem 16 Junii hora 9 & 10 & post merid. 2 & 3 (Leiden: Peter vander Aa, 1728).

99 E.g. Disputatio pneumatica, de immortalitate animae rationalis, prima, secunda, & tertia ... sub praesidio ... D. Wolferdi Senguerdi ... judicio omnium libere & modeste philosophantium subjicit Petrus Macare ... auctor (Leiden: Peter vander Aa, 1723).

100 E.g. Disputatio De ΠΑΝΕ ΕΠΙΟΤΣΙΩ Matth. VI. Prima et Secunda quam favente Deo T. O. M. sub praesidio Bernhardini De Moor ... publico examini submittit Gerardus Wuyster (Leiden: Samuel & Johannes Luchtmans, 1767).
There are also an equal number, if not more, examples of prefatory comments where a professor specifically refers to *meae disputationes*.

### 3.6 From Disputations to Textbooks and Commentaries

More important for the task here, it is known that De Moor asserts authorship of the *Commentarius* from student disputations. The role of professorial editing after a public defense in preparation of a volume is demonstrated if one can find student disputations which occurred before the publication of a particular volume of De Moor’s *Commentarius* and compare them to the final publication. A high or absolute degree of similarity between the two conceptually, if not verbally demonstrates that Den Boer’s general methodological principle of absolute certainty of authorship of disputations in order to determine a professor's views must be substantially abandoned, especially when a professor speaks of "my" commentary or syntagma. Another clear example would be when the general public assumes professorial authorship of theses that only appear in disputations and never reappear in another form.

It is equally important not to be too generous in assessing student authorship and rather restrictive of professorial authorship given a professor's involvement as *magister* through theses given in class, assistance prior to defenses of theses, and even editing and redaction in preparation for print. Consider that if suspicion of professorial authorship is maintained, when a professor publishes a set of disputations in his theological textbook exactly as they were originally printed, we are in the odd position of simultaneously arguing that the disputations were not the professor's view when he edited them for public defense but now can be considered such since they have been presented a second

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101 See n1.
time for a second publication. It is maintained here that the theological disputations at Leiden, at the least under Marckius and De Moor, must be viewed as the presiding professor's positions unless explicitly stated otherwise, even in the case of disputations employed for examinations, and even in the case of student "authorship." The requirement for absolutely proven, attested *ipsissima professoris verba* for disputations in order to substantiate a professor's true position or "view" is methodologically untenable and functionally unusable in evaluating primary sources such as disputations from this period.

### 3.6.1 Instances of Undisputed Authorship

What follows is a brief survey of seventeenth-century works that are collections of student disputations published under and attributed to at least one professor. In some cases, collections of disputations represent the positions not only of the individual professor but also of an entire faculty. It would seem that if student authorship of disputations were the predominating trend and in no way represented the faculty or institution, then the professors involved in the following cases would not be able to assert what they do regarding their authorship without incurring the charge of dissimulation. It would also call into question why the professors believe they are setting forth a public attestation of an institution's view. The majority of these examples are professors from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who either taught at or received their doctorate at Leiden University. Others are theologians who patterned their works after the example of these Leiden theologians.

With regard to individual professors, here are the works of two professors of theology at Leiden University. Frederic Spanheim, Sr. (1600-1649), a professor of
philosophy at Geneva and subsequently a professor of theology at Leiden and rector magnificus of the University, provides an example, albeit in a collection of disputations posthumously published in 1652. In the letter to the reader, one of his descendants asserts that Spanheim composed all of the disputations for his students. “Therefore you have here a syntagma of theological disputations, which were written in the academies of the first rank in the Reformed world, first at Geneva, then at Leiden according to the willingness and selection of the respondents, which he aired in the great assembly of hearers.”

Abraham Heidanus (1597-1648) authored Fasciculus Disputationum Theologicarum De Socinianismo, a short work of five disputations. The title page alone is sufficient to prove the point as it specifically declares Heidanus to be author praesesque, both the author and presider of the disputations. Additionally, each disputation notes the student respondent who defended the theses.

Furthermore, Samuel Desmarets (1599-1673), doctorate of theology from Leiden University, published his Collegium Theologicum sive Systema Breve Universae Theologiae while professor of theology at Groningen. The Collegium is an overview of the major heads of theology selected from eighteen disputations over which he presided. In the dedicatory letter to the curators of Groningen University, Desmarets provides a great amount of insight into the types, purposes, and occasions of disputations.

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103 Abraham Heidanus, Fasciculus Disputationum Theologicarum De Socinianismo (Leiden: Henricus Verbiest, 1659).

I am totally involved in this business. And with respect to the beginning students, like nurses customarily do with their nurslings, I endeavor to pre-chew this spiritual food, not only in both the public lectures and disputations which occur in sight of all, but also in the private ones. That is, the *collegia* as they say, which I customarily hold in addition [to the public disputations] according to the comprehension, desire, and capacity of any [student]. From these disputations, this one brief system of disputations through the whole of theology emerged, which I now lead out from the shadows of the *collegia* into the public light in your illustrious and powerful names.  

First, Desmarets distinguishes between the regularly scheduled lectures and disputations and the private tutoring and practice sessions, which he refers to as *collegia*. Secondly, he points out that the disputations in the work represent his position (*in eo totus sum*). Desmarets seems to be absolutely certain that these disputations argued by his students represent his positions, and should be judged as such. And lastly, Desmarets pointedly states that this system of theology gradually emerged in tandem with his professorial duties.

As we will see shortly in the case of Johannes Marckius and Bernhardinus De Moor, however, this link between professorial lectures, student disputations, and theological systems provides substantial insight into how Marckius for example, might generate approximately 1,200 pages of commentary on Isaiah 53 alone or how Bernhardinus De Moor might generate a seven volume commentary on Marck’s two volume *Compendium*. It was through the daily, public and private duties of the professor, constantly engaged in the training of students. Frequently, professors lodged students and

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105 Desmarets, *Collegium*, †2. Dum in eo totus sum, & Tyronibus, quod nutrices solent suis alumnis, studeo praemandere cibum hunc spiritualem, non tantum publicis illis & praelectionibus & Disputationibus quae in omnium oculus incurrunt, sed etiam privatis, uti vocant Collegiis, quae pro quoruncunque captu, studio, ingenio, soleo praeterea habere, ex eorum uno sensim emersit hoc Disputationum per universam Theologiam breve Systema, quod nunc ex Vmbra Collegij ad publicam lucem Illustr. Ac P.P.D. Vestrarum Nominibus educo.
continued the tutoring during and around the daily meals. It is no exaggeration to say that a student of theology during the period consumed and imbibed the material at nearly every moment of his waking hours. It is comments such as these from theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that not only should inform our understanding of the importance of disputations for students, but also provide insight into how a professor’s theological system or compendium was actually formed, revised, and transmitted.

We find a similar usage of student disputations in the construction of Samuel Desmarets’ *Theologiae elenchticae nova synopsis, sive index controversiarum Fidei ex S. Scripturis*. The work is directly interacting with the controversies elaborated by Jacobus Tirinus (S.J.). It is thus a manual of student disputations practicing the Reformed interpretations of scripture passages in response to Jesuit claims. An additional significance of this work is that it forms the basis or pattern, according to the Genevan professor of theology, François Turretini, for his own multi-volume work entitled *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae*. Turretin comments that his work was thrust upon him by reason of his duty to inform, or shape, youths (*informanda Iuventuti ex Muneris mihi demandati ratione*) both publicly and privately. This public and private duty is a description of the same public and private lectures and disputations that have been previously mentioned in this chapter. Throughout Turretin’s introduction, he maintains that this work is for catechumens and novitiates, that is, seminary students who are in the throes of lectures and disputations. The very format of *quaestio, status quaestionis*, and

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fontes solutionum has antecedents in the medieval, oral process of disputation. Turretin’s work does not replicate the disputation as printed for the public or private student disputation, but rather provides a manual or study guide to frame the responses in oral dispute by stating the question, the positions, and a brief outline of responses arrayed with the appropriate authorities with reference to scripture and other theologians. In that regard, it resembles more of a medieval quaestiones book which was a prelude for student disputation.

With respect to a system of theology attributed to a theological faculty, perhaps the foremost example is also the most famous of the seventeenth century among Reformed circles: the Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, whose first edition was published by the theological faculty of the Staten College at Leiden University in 1625, in the wake of the Remonstrant controversies and the Synod of Dordt.108 In the prefatory letter, after praising the nobles of Holland and West Friesland for snatching “this seminary of our churches” from the greatest dangers of the highest theological tempests, the Synopsis is presented to them as a testimony of the theology “which we profess in your Academy.” Noteworthy for the purpose here, the synopsis of disputation were authored, among other reasons, “so that the candidates of sacred letters who have been committed to our trust may seek this as the North Star with their eyes and follow it.”109

108 I developed this section of the dissertation prior to the publication of Sinnema and van den Belt’s article which utilizes Beza and La Faye’s Theses Theologicæ and the Synopsis Purioris. My development occurred in conjunction with dissertation writing seminars between 2009 and 2012 through interaction with, critique, and comments from CTS professors and colleagues. I am encouraged to note that Sinnema and van den Belt make similar observations regarding the Synopsis Purioris. For a discussion of the Synopsis Purioris, see Donald Sinnema and Henk van den Belt, "The Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (1625) as a Disputation Cycle," Church History and Religious Culture 92 (Leiden: Brill, 2012). I am also grateful for subsequent conversations with Donald Sinnema on this issue via his involvement with the Junius Institute for Digital Reformation Research colloquia.

109 Johannes Polyander, Andre Rivet, Antonius Walaeus, Antonius Thyssius, Synopsis Purioris Theologiae
The role that the four Leiden professors Johannes Polyander, Andre Rivet, Antonius Walaeus, and Antonius Thysius played in their authorship is well-known. These disputations were a pattern and guide after which students should model the content of their own theology. With respect to the internal work of the faculty of theology at Leiden University, the disputations were not intended as simply a training exercise in academic debate and discipline, but an inculcation of true and sound doctrine in the next generation of pastors and theologians. Externally, they served as a public statement and witness of the position of the theological faculty to both the state and to the national Dutch Reformed Church. To that end, these disputations were not abstract position statements. Each of the disputations had a name and a date when a student defended the theses in the course of their studies. The Synopsis was not what the faculty would teach; it was what they were teaching, just as we saw previously with Beza's and La Faye's Theses Theologicae. As a summary statement of the professors’ intention for both their lectures and their disputations, between the table of contents and the first disputation of the Synopsis is a page with two scripture passages: 2 Timothy 1:13 and 2 Timothy 3:1, 5, 7-9, 13. 2 Timothy 1:13 leads with “Hold to the pattern of sound speech which you have


110 The nineteenth-century Reformed theologian, Herman Bavinck amply attests, with reference to primary source documents, the role each professor played in the authorship of each of the disputations in the Synopsis Purioris, this investigation will not pause to consider them, but refers the reader to Bavinck’s introduction in the 1881, 6th edition of the Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (Leiden: Didericus Donner, 1881), v, "Novem disputationes primae in hoc ordine, a Polyandro, Walaeo, Thysio, ceterae (a decima usque ad ultimam alternatim a Polyandro, Riveto, Walaeo, Thysio, ita ut a Polyandro quatordecim, a Riveto undecim, a Walaeo quatuordecim et a Thysio tredecim disputationes conscriptae sint."

111 There is much to commend in Sinnema's and van den Belt's conclusions on the Synopsis purioris theologiae, one point of difference here is that given the many other collections of disputations at other institutions do in fact form manuals of theology, and in the case of De Moor, in my view this was seemingly the goal all along of the Synopsis purioris.
heard from me in faith and love in Jesus Christ." These pastor-professors viewed their work of disputations as the fulfillment of Paul’s example of an experienced pastor training a younger one.

Another example of a set of student disputations understood to be authored by the professors of a faculty is the two volume *Thesaurus disputationum theologicarum Sedanensi Academia*. This work is a combination and selection of theses of eight theologians moving through the whole corpus of theology. The dedicatory letter not only sings the high praises of each professor's brilliance in their lectures, but also the instruction of their students as represented by these theses. What is also noteworthy, for example in volume 1, is the index of student respondents listed at the beginning of the work for all 127 disputations. These disputations not only set forth the work of the academy and professor, but hold forth the students as representatives of the institutions' positions.

The fact that professor-student disputations in theology are frequently printed as representative of an institution's views and are intended to display a confessional loyalty or at least the stamp of orthodoxy, bear out Appold's observations with respect to the University of Wittenberg in approximately the same time period (1570-1710) that however one constructs authorship, the professor bore moral responsibility for their content. Yet as Stanglin notes at Wittenberg individual work was forbidden and there

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112 A similar scriptural basis is deployed in La Faye's prefatory comments in the *Theses Theologicae*, *ii recto -*ii recto.


was a stronger sense of theses as communal-work (*Gemeinschaftswerk*), something that was not required at Leiden in the time of Arminius. But, in the case at Leiden, individual work was not forbidden, but after the Arminius and Remonstrant controversies, the Canons of Dordt, and the *Synopsis Purioris*, by De Moor's time of the eighteenth century, there is a greater institutional concern and sensitivity to portray a public, confessional loyalty. As we will mention in a subsequent chapter dealing with methodological doubt and theology, the Leiden curators and burgomasters did intervene quite dramatically to forbid professors from publicly or privately discussing, publishing or disputing particular topics as it was disrupting public peace and the peace of churches. On the positive side, even some of the disputations De Moor presided over in the eighteenth century were keyed to the three forms of unity, as we will mention shortly.

3.6.2 The Role of Disputations in the corpora of Marckius and De Moor

If at most we assume professorial authorship of the disputations or at least a collaboration weighted towards professorial content before the disputation and a subsequent professorial editing for public presentation and collation into a *syntagma*, *systema*, or commentary, then we are more likely to understand the context for the component parts of the massive body of theological literature for Johannes Marckius and

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88n156. However, unlike at Wittenberg (cf. Appold, 80n257) at Leiden payment to professors for disputations continued throughout the eighteenth century. If payment of a *Zensurgebühr* is a mark of professorial authorship, then Appold's *terminus ad quem* of approximately 1730 as he mentions for Wittenberg, would not apply at Leiden.

115 Stanglin rightly observes that there are similarities between German and Dutch universities, specifically the Staten College of Leiden and the Collegium Sapientiae of Heidelberg, however, there are key differences, Cf. Stanglin, *Disputations*, 88-89.

116 There are multiple instances from 1670-1780 throughout the *Bronnen* where the Faculty Senate ponder hiring a professor whose confessional conformity to the Three Forms of Unity—the Heidelberg Catechism, the Belgic Confession, and the Canons of Dordt—is either questionable or to a similar Reformed or Lutheran confession.
Bernhardinus De Moor. Also, this would place into context otherwise peculiar statements by professors regarding disputations.

Picture in your mind’s eye twenty-one quarto sized volumes occupying seven feet of space on a bookshelf. Each volume contains approximately 700-1000 pages and combined number about 20,000 pages of text. This collection represents the career of one Johannes Marckius who was a professor of theology at three different institutions for a total of fifty years. Of this collection, only two volumes represent a systematic theology proper, the rest are exegetical. Space would not permit a thorough review of all of these works, but several common characteristics emerge. First, among the exegetical works, typically there is a page or set of pages which list the names of the students that defended the theses that compose the work. Sometimes this list coordinates the students to the particular chapters. As these students are never listed alphabetically it is probably a legitimate assumption that the order of students corresponds to the individual chapters. Secondly, at the head of these pages is typically the phrase “the most excellent youths who exercised themselves in the defense of these theses" or some similar phrase to that effect.

In the dedicatory letter for example in the work Historia Paradisi, Marckius specifically states that he began the project at Franeker based on student interest (thus it was quodlibetal) but he delayed publication of the work because only eight or so of the disputations which he wrote had been defended by students when he transferred to the faculty of Groningen. Then, at a later date he resumed the disputations on these topics at Leiden and made it through six disputations, again was interrupted, "having been called to other more necessary matters, even while I lived at Leiden" and finally decided to print
them in their current form. This at least indicates that Marck assigned some of the theses, and covered the appropriate arguments in public or private lecture, but it leaves open the question how much of the final printed text in the book is unedited from the original disputationes, or, as Marckius says, "my disputationes" before the students defended them. This particular work is comprised of sixty-two chapters and runs to 854 pages, but lists only 53 students. This might indicate that in the planning of his course lectures, Marckius had in view the disputational exercises such that he had a stock as it were of theses ready in the wings. There is also other evidence that some of his collections of class lectures were not all publicly disputed, and even that there was an ample amount of writing, editing, and refining before publication. In 1721, ten years before his death, Marckius published a sixth collection of dissertationes, but the table of contents lists these as exercitationes, and following the table of contents there is a list of 28 students that publicly defended 25 exercitationes. What is perhaps more interesting is to consider on three different chapters there are two students listed for the same chapter, indicating a sort of professorial repetitio and editorial consolidation. A similar point

117 Johannes Marckius, Historia Paradisi Illustrata Libris Quatuor Quibus non Tantum Locii Istius Plenior Descriptio Exhibetur, sed & Hominis Integritas, Lapsus, ac Prima Restitutio Declarantur, Secundum Genesios Capitaa II & III Accedit Oratio Academica de Propagati Christianismi Admirandis (Amsterdam: Gerardus Borstius, 1705), **r. We know that from Fall 1694 – Winter 1700, Marckius was involved in course lectures on the minor prophets, Molhuysen, Bronnen, 5:45*-46*, 55*, 57*, 63*, 65*, 66*, 70*. In Spring 1700, Marckius transitioned to an exposition of Song of Solomon that would last at least until he began his lectures on select passages of the New Testament in February 1703; also from 1703 through 1705 Marckius lectured on the New Testament on Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, whereas on Friday he dealt with historical issues, Molhuysen, Bronnen, 5:80*, 93*, 99*. 101*.

118 Marckius, Historia, **v, "fuerunt Disputationes meae de hoc argumento in Academia hac publice ventilatae."


120 Johannes Marckius, Johannis Marckii Sylloge Dissertationum Philologico-Theologicarum ad Selectos
could be made from Marckius's 1727 *Fasciculus Dissertationum*, in which there are twenty five disputations, but only thirteen of them are associated with student defenses of what Marckius terms *exercitationes*, and in one case a chapter is consolidated from the defenses of two students.121

When we turn our attention to Bernhardinus De Moor, who built a seven volume commentary on Marckius’s *Compendium*, the question of the authorship of disputations emerges again in an even more compound way. With everything that has been said previously regarding student and professorial authorship and collaboration with caveats and qualifications, now in the case of De Moor, we have a striking amount of clarity on the issue of professorial use and redaction. Here are several examples in the archives at Leiden University of disputations over which De Moor presided but which do not indicate that the student was the author. A few examples are sufficient to prove the point.

On October 15, 1752 from 9 AM to 11 AM, Bernhardinus De Moor presided over the first and second parts of a theological disputation “concerning the Sacraments of the New Testament in general” and Henricus Everaars was the respondent.122 On page 1 of the disputation we find that the source reference is no less than “Joh. Marckii Compend. Theolog. Caput XXIX §XXVIII” and the disputation proceeds through §XXX. This is a striking citation considering that for theological disputations, it was typically a scripture

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121 Johannes Marckius, *Johannis Marckii Dissertationum Philologico-Exegeticarum ad Selectos Textus Novi Testamenti* (Leiden: Abraham Kallewier, 1727). Students defended *exercitationes* in chapters 1-3, 5-10, 13, 15, 17, 19. On iii verso, Marckius introduces this student list with these words: "Nomina praestantissimorum Juvenum, qui repetitis vicibus publice has Exercitationes defenderunt."

passage associated with the topic. Now if we compare this to the 1768 edition of part five of the *Commentarius Perpetuus*, there is a sufficiently high degree of verbal and syntactical agreement, including turns of phrase and word patterns that one may be sufficiently and reasonably certain that if De Moor is the author, collator, and editor of the *Commentarius Perpetuus*, then he is also at least the co-author of the text of the 1752 disputation in which Everaars, the respondent, “submitted for public examination.” It is enough of a relationship that one could argue that the 1768 work is *at least* De Moor's revision and expansion of the 1752 disputation. This particular example is perhaps the most striking as the disputation pre-dates the publication of the *Commentarius* by sixteen years. This point seems to hold with disputations involved in student exams which De Moor keyed to Johannes Marckius. For example, one disputation entitled “on the time and place of prayers” which Henricus Hasebroek “submits for a public exam” and in which De Moor presides, occurs in 1767, only one year before part five of the *Commentarius* appeared in print.123 In comparison with this disputation there is absolutely no difference in wording, proofs, or citations. They are exactly identical.

The only objection to this point seems to be to deny De Moor's authorship and claim that De Moor is only an author inasmuch as he adopted the student's words. First, one must consider that the vast majority of theses that De Moor presided over were keyed to Marckius and were delivered in lecture form. This is even the case when he is not teaching a course such as, for example, prolegomena or the doctrine of God. Instead, whether it is the course on the Mosaic law (1745-1747) towards the beginning of his

career at Leiden, his lectures on the sacraments (Fall 1753-Spr 1757), or practical theology (Fall 1761 – Spr 1769), we find sections of Marckius referenced at the beginning of the disputation. In addition, I have not found any disputation that De Moor presided over either hand written or in print with the phrase following the respondent's name "auctor et respondens." And quite frankly, it seems odd to argue for independent student authorship of a set of theses keyed so closely to De Moor's lectures and overarching project of expositing Marckius.

Finally, one case is even more striking as it was involved in a minor public controversy as is evidenced in the explanatory foreword. On December 8, 1751, Adolphus Boskamp defended theological theses in Latin. This also included several theses that read like a confession of faith denying the sufficiency of natural theology. An anonymous critic takes issue with this disputation because it was not keyed to Scripture, but rather to the confessions, and reprinted the work in its entirety in Latin with a Dutch translation with Scripture proofs appended. In the preface however, the critic takes issue with the author (Auteur, Schryver) of the theses who "is a Protestant, and has the calling of a professor and pastor in the church," clearly indicating that in this instance,

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124 Adolphus Boskamp and Bernardinus De Moor. *Disputatio theologica de Paschate Sexta, cum Mantissa Thesium Theologicarum, etc. Praes. B. De Moor*, (Leiden: [S. & J. Luchtmans], 1751).

125 The translation in Dutch, *Godgeleerde Geschils-Verhandelingen over het Pascha*, (Leiden: A. Kallewier, 1751), was expanded, and was printed throughout the provinces of the Netherlands. The title page lists seventeen printers in different cities "en op andere plaatsen meer."

126 "Voorberigt" in *Godgeleerde*, A2r, "Maar dit kan geene plaats hebben behoudens de Rechtsinnigheid van den Auteur, welke een Protestant, en in die Gemeenschap het Hoogleraar en Predikant bekleedende, buiten twyffel weet en gelooft, dat het gansche Protestantendom steunt op deeze Grondwaarheit, dat namentlyk de H. Schriftuur de eenige regel van ons geloof en leven is, daar ondertusschen zyn H. Eerw: zig naulyx heeft verweerdigt een eenige dezer stellingen, uit die regel te betogen, maar zig tot dit einde genoegzaam altyd bedient van de Heidelberse Catechismus, Nederlandtse geloofs belydenis en andere menschelyke Schriften."
there is no hesitation in ascribing authorship of and responsibility for the theses to De Moor.\textsuperscript{127} There is entirely no mention of the student. This is prima facie evidence that the general Dutch public even in the mid-eighteenth century assumed that theological theses belonged to the presiding professor. Why then, should we begin with a basic methodological assumption to the contrary, given so many examples otherwise? We should start with the assumption of professorial authorship via the course lectures and see the disputations as arising out of these. Viewed holistically from lecture to disputation to publication, we are able to situate the contents, practice, and significance of the disputations.

3.7 Conclusions

In light of comments cited thus far by professors at various institutions over the course of approximately two hundred years, the pattern emerges that the professor prepared lectures and theses for the course, then proposed theses and selected students for their defense. In some cases, the professor wrote theses in advance, which were then delivered in the lectures. In other cases, the professor lectured and formulated the theses in class, and, with reference to student notes, edited these for later defense. As various citations in this chapter have indicated, this is the general practice of professors at Oxford, Cambridge, Geneva, Franeker, Groningen, and Leiden, to name a few. Additionally, in the case of Leiden University, there is also the clear statute that required professors to prepare their students for the public defense of disputations while also allowing freedom within the faculties on how to accomplish this.

\textsuperscript{127} Godgeleerde, 3, "den Auteur, een Protestant, en in die Gemeenschap het Hooglernaar- en Predikant bekleedende …"
In other instances, at Leiden University over the period surveyed from 1591 to 1780, when the student was "auctor et respondens" it was always printed, and it seems, only when applicable. It does not seem to be the case that student authorship should be assumed in an original sort of way. Or, taken in another way, it seems that the term "auctor" is applied in its fullest sense to students who are originating their own theses pro gradu. Disputations for the purpose of student examinations were generally proposed by their professor(s) and defended by the student, but as in the case of De Moor, who was "auctor et respondens" in the case of his examinations, we find a set of theses defended under four different professors with one theme. This would be a strong case for the brilliance and capability of the student. It must also be remembered that the student would still be required to have the professor's approval to defend the theses. Also, it must be remembered that not everything that was said in the oral defense is written down, which means that the theses functioned more as talking points rather than as the sum total of all that was said. Even in the case of an examination, it is not entirely clear even in cases where the student is "auctor" that the theses are totally original and have no mark of the professor.

After this investigation into the practice and role of disputations, a few conclusions can be drawn regarding the importance of disputations for evaluating a theologian’s views. First, this chapter has sought to demonstrate both in general and specifically that the disputations of a presiding theologian—and in our case De Moor—are important for evaluating the thought and development of a theologian. It is true as Ahsmann, Stanglin, Den Boer, and others noted that conclusions on the question of authorship must be carefully weighed, compared, and evaluated. Yet, contra Den Boer, a
theologian’s perspective can be gleaned at a particular time—perhaps even his very words and at least a sufficiently reliable portion of his views—via disputations. Secondly, given the strong correlation in wording between the examined disputations and the *Commentarius*, student authorship is more than likely the outlier rather than the rule. With respect to other theologians, their systems of theology, and their academic institution, only further research into the specifics of each theologian, their context, and their work will tell. But of the examples surveyed from Leiden and other Reformed university environments, the supposition that the theological system of the professor is built frequently verbatim from the disputations is sufficiently certain, unless there is documentary evidence to the contrary. In the case of Marck and De Moor, calling into question the authorship of the disputations they presided over jeopardizes authorship of the overwhelming majority of their corpus. The process seems to be that a professor lectured on a text by means of theses which were deployed in class. Students were expected to learn the theses. At a later time, students were selected to defend the theses as an exercise. At Leiden, by university statute, faculties had discretion on the way that examinations were done. The statute also indicates that professors must aid in student preparation for public defenses in the case of disputations as examinations. Secondly, there is the significant example of Johannes Marckius that many of the disputations he authored for students were not ever publicly defended. And, this held true across three different institutions: Franeker, Groningen, and Leiden. Marckius does not indicate that his practice is unique, odd, or contrary to the custom of these universities in the late seventeenth century into the first quarter of the eighteenth century. In addition, frequently the general public understood the theses to represent the position of a theologian, and in
most cases, of the institution as a whole. Third, the listing of students as "auctor et respondens" is the outlier rather than the rule and thus "auctor" is not applicable unless stated on the title page or specified in some way in the dedication. Otherwise, a respondent should be interpreted simply as a respondent. Fourth, in the case of a theologian who did not produce a later syntagma or commentary from disputations, conclusions must be guarded and perhaps much more tentative, but nonetheless sufficient conclusions may be drawn from general practices of a variety of theological faculties to determine a professor's views. Disputations must be seen in broad continuity with a professor's views. Otherwise, the disputations cannot be introduced subsequently as a tool to confirm or triangulate a professor's views. In the case of De Moor and Marckius, however, we can speak with a sufficient degree of certainty to say that the views expressed in the *disputationes*, *dissertationes*, and *exercitationes* under their presidency are their own.
CHAPTER 4: The Incomplete Felicity of the Militant Church

"Let the Holy Bible be the sole and unique norm of our theological wisdom. With this perennial font of saving knowledge and the leading of the Holy Spirit … let us strive courageously in the days ahead."¹

On Monday, June 21, 1745, Bernhardinus De Moor began his career at Leiden University with his inaugural oration entitled *The incomplete felicity of the militant Church.*² Typically, theology professors began their tenure with an oration that emphasized some point that characterized their thought or addressed a matter of proximate concern. Bernhardinus De Moor's inaugural oration is an important starting point, not simply for De Moor's career but for understanding the theological framework that informs his understanding of the faith and life that should impact the training of pastors. It also is helpful for determining his evaluation of the times in which he lived. De Moor does not import the technical terms of the archetypal/ectypal framework into his oration, but through allusion and plainer language De Moor references key issues that the framework is intended to protect. In this oration, De Moor emphasizes the insufficiency of natural theology, the importance of Scripture for saving faith, and that there awaits believers a greater felicity and joy when faith shall become sight in their glorification,


that is, the fullness of the *visio Dei* in 1 Corinthians 13:12-13.

De Moor emphasizes these points while elaborating upon the internal and external causes of the Church's imperfect felicity. The present chapter situates the necessity of Scripture within De Moor's exposition of the *theologia viatorum* first through the lens of De Moor's inaugural oration and *Commentarius* to his context and second in its trajectory at Leiden University. First, this chapter will consider a key transition point between natural theology and supernatural, revealed theology in his *Commentarius Perpetuus* on the necessity of Scripture. Then, let us turn to what the genre of inaugural orations was and their importance for gaining insight into a professor's tenure in the context of an early modern university. And finally, De Moor has two orations that demonstrate how he deploys the *theologia viatorum*: the first with respect to the church in his inaugural oration, and the second, with respect to excesses in the theological science in his valedictorian oration as he finished his one-year term in 1757 as the rector magnificus of Leiden University.

### 4.1 The Necessity of Revealed Theology and Scripture in the *Commentarius Perpetuus*

The necessity of revealed theology is a pivot point that initiates the transition from the chapter on true theology to the chapter on scripture. It paves the way for a discussion of systematic theology and scholastic theology, the former addresses the order of teaching whereas the second addresses the mode and method of discourse. This pivot shifts from the analogical distinctions that comprise theology to a more specific conversation regarding theology in this life. De Moor examines the definition of revealed theology in terms of its foundation or *principium cognoscendi*, as well as its genus and
specifying characteristics (*differentiae*). As will be discussed regarding his 1745 and 1757 orations, the necessity of revealed theology, most specifically Scripture, frames his evaluation first, of the health (or morbidity) of the church, and thus the topic has a diagnostic function ecclesiastically, as well as second, the excesses of theological method, and so the topic has a corrective function with respect to theological conclusions and doctrinal formulations.

Section 23 in Marckius's *Compendium* observes that the revealed theology which transcends natural theology in the Christian sense has to be distinguished from the heathen (*Ethnici*) and the Muslims because both seek revealed theology in various ways. The heathen do so through augury and oracles whereas the Muslims seek it from "fictive heavenly conversations and revelations."³ And here Marckius cross-references a broader conversation on the divine origin and authority of the Scriptures in his second chapter (§§V-VI). From the cited sections Marckius cross references specific disputations in two volumes of his *Exercitationes Textuales*.⁴ There is also a brief mention on the necessity of Scripture from 2 Timothy 3:16-17 in polemical engagement with Roman Catholic exeges who seek to subvert its necessity by limiting the usefulness of Scripture in chapter two, section 4.⁵

With respect to De Moor, he links the necessity of revealed theology to the


⁴ Cited as "1) Vid. Exerc. Text. I. P. VI. 2) Exerc. Text. VIII. P. VI."). NB. part VI of the *Exercitationes Textuales* is an abbreviation listed in the *Compendium* bibliography as referencing part VI which at the time of publication was described as "Deo volente." The actual title is *Johannis Marckii Sylloge Dissertationum Philologico-Theologicarum, ad Selectos Quosdam Textus Novi Testamenti: Quae Sunt Tempore Nati Christi, Literis Punctisque Hebraeorum, Parabolis Euangelicis ... Accedit Oratio Academica, de Mosaica Visione Dumeti Ardentis & non Consumpti* (Rotterdam: Nicolaus Topyn, 1721).

theologia stadii revelata on the basis of the insufficiency of natural theology, our
irrefragable obligation to worship God, and the requirement to correlate our worship to
his divine majesty and will. The primary antagonists in this discussion are the materialists
who challenge the necessity of special revelation along these lines: (1) is there actually an
avenging righteousness and an absolute requirement for the punishment of sin? (2) Is it
possible to alleviate the pangs of conscience by means of philosophy (i.e. reason), and
thereby calm our consciences? To the first question De Moor deploys Stapfer's point that
it is unnecessary to empirically demonstrate or "dispute minutely" with many things, but
rather one should appeal to their conscience's witness of imperfection. And secondly,
since conscience constantly testifies to a person's imperfection, one could lead an
objection to Scripture as the only objective comfort for a troubled conscience, but that
comfort must be appropriated by faith.

In his Institutiones Theologiae Polemicae Universae, ordine scientifico
dispositae, Stapfer asserts that human experience and conscience are sufficient to
convince someone of the existence of God, their dependence upon Him (ab illo
dependentiam) and thus such a person acknowledges there is an "inborn natural
religion."6 Furthermore, De Moor leans heavily upon a large body of theses from Stapfer
(113 sections) on "the inability of a human being to extricate themselves from infinite
evil and to restore themselves to a flawless state" all derived without reference to

OrdineScientificoDispositae,4th edition (Zürich: Heideggerus et socii, 1757), 1:228, "Et quisquis
eexistingsummiNuminis,hominisabillobdependentiam&inde nascentemReligionemNaturalem
agnoscit, is facile videt, & suas & aliorum actiones cum manifestatione Gloriar benignissimi Creatoris &
conservatoris omnium rerum, & cum ipsius Naturalis Religionis praeceptis maxime convenire: sed
optimumNumenacreaturismultotiescontentmno,ipsoquehominestionpropriamuereperniciem,lubenter
concedet."
Scripture. Stapfer's intention is to seek to arrive at the limits of reason by rational *demonstratio* in order to establish the necessity of revelation. And so, Stapfer asserts the following criterion for determining what counts as revelation:

> Therefore, that revelation is truly divine that displays such means of recovering salvation that it results in an illustration of all the divine attributes and tends toward the perfection of the whole world, especially the city of God. And it exactly compensates all punishment which could be achieved by a continual duration of moral evil, and therefore it exceeds the force of the Universe or the creature.⁷

Stapfer endeavors in section 12, §981 to disentangle matters that are above reason and contrary to reason, or to say it another way, to distinguish between those things that are mysteries and those that are impossible. "Mysteries are what cannot be demonstrated from the principles of Reason" whereas an impossibility means "what is contrary to reason is what contradicts the principles of Reason."⁸ De Moor does not quote these points directly but simply redirects the reader to a large swathe of text that includes them.

In addition, De Moor cites Bénédict Pictet's work *Theologia Christiana* on the necessity of Scripture. By comparison to De Moor, Pictet also has a rationalist turn in that the first two chapters are on first the existence of God and second on the natural knowledge of God before the discussion of theology.⁹ But it is slightly less than Stapfer, as Pictet says, "indeed, I confess that this principle [that God exists] is so evident that it should be supposed rather than proved."¹⁰ Shortly after the quote of Pictet that De Moor employs, Pictet asserts the necessity of supernatural revelation on the basis of the

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⁹ Bénédict Pictet, *Theologia christiana, ex puris sanctorum literarum fontibus hausta* (Geneva: Cramer & Perachon, [1696]).
imperfect natural knowledge that is simultaneously afflicted by the terrors of death and consciousness of sin. And then there is also the corruption of Adam and Eve due to the fall into sin.\textsuperscript{11}

De Moor also references Friederich Spanheim, Jr. on the necessity of supernatural revelation. In the paragraph just before the passage De Moor cites, Spanheim notes that supernatural revelation is necessary for true religion. Spanheim subdivides revelation into multiple axes, as it were. On one hand, one may speak of a distinction between extraordinary or ordinary revelation and on the other hand one may distinguish between "an external revelation in the Word of God, first as it is unwritten (\(\digamma\gamma\rho\alpha\varphi\omega\)) and then as written (\(\epsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\varphi\omega\)), or, as an internal revelation in the human mind, illuminated first by the Word instrumentally (Ps. 19:8-9) and then principally by the Spirit of God."\textsuperscript{12} Spanheim then articulates seven interconnected points that he argues will prove the necessity of supernatural revelation.\textsuperscript{13} (1) There is the objective insufficiency of natural revelation in God's works of creation and providence. (2) As witnessed from 1 Corinthians 2:14, there is subjectively, the natural blindness to spiritual or supernatural matters. (3) The sublime nature of the topics (God's nature, will, works, etc.). (4) There is a knowledge of God that is inaccessible to human reason. (5) Subjectively, humanity naturally desires to know the truth and also to enjoy the highest good, which can only occur through special revelation. (6) Outside of revelation, Spanheim says, experience from every age witnesses to error.

\textsuperscript{11} Pictet, \textit{Theologia Christiana}, 14.


and superstition. De Moor endorses Spanheim stating that he teaches the necessity of special revelation "vigorously."\(^{14}\) Now let us consider how De Moor utilizes several of the themes found in the *theologia viatorum*, including the necessity of special revelation and Scripture, through two orations delivered to the Leiden University faculty, students, curators, as well as the Leiden burgomasters and local nobles.

### 4.2 On Academic Orations Generally and Inaugural Orations Specifically

Historians of the early modern university as well as historians of philosophy recognize the importance of the genre of inaugural orations.\(^{15}\) R. W. Serjeantson notes that "the genre of the inaugural oration is principally associated with the universities and academies of the Low Countries and the Protestant German-speaking lands, which tended to be rather more forward about printing academic-related material than the English universities."\(^{16}\) Serjeantson proceeds to discuss the way in which professors tended to utilize their oration as an opportunity to reinforce the value of the institution as well as academic virtues. This custom is evidenced at Leiden in a variety of ways, first that there was a long standing tradition not only for professors to deliver their orations, but in many instances, these were printed for the broader public. Thus, the inaugural oration is a way for a professor to speak to the academic community and it is a way, through its publication at the university's expense, for the institution to speak to the public.

\(^{14}\) De Moor, *Commentarius*, 75.


\(^{16}\) Serjeantson, *The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe*, 128.
Regarding the *genus demonstrativum* among Renaissance rhetoricians, Skinner notes that "as for the genuine encomium … epideictic [oratory] became the most important genre."\(^{17}\) This tradition continued at Leiden. Outside of a church sermon, as institutions for the development and improvement of humanity, the universities and orations within this context served the purpose of setting forth what is worthy of praise and declamation, and more importantly what is worthy of emulation.

The oration in this period included such classic elements of the *exordium*, *propositio*, *argumentatio*, *partitio*, and *peroratio*.\(^{18}\) Cicero and Quintilian are the primary classical authorities for the structure of such eloquence and the orations of this period exhibit their influence.\(^ {19}\) The purpose of the *exordium* was to elevate the audience's attention to something weighty, something true and beautiful, something sublime. It was also the opportunity to peel away lines of thought or objections that might distract from the topic. The *propositio* is the thesis statement and the *partitio* forms the primary structure or outline of the topic. The *argumentatio* is the point at which the speaker sets forth the evidence for his or her views as well as addresses objections. The subheadings of *argumentatio* are frequently *probatio* and *refutatio* respectively. The most gripping


\(^{18}\) For a comparison with how some professors, e.g. Herman Witsius, taught students to preach, see Willem Otterspeer, *Groepsportret met Dame II: De vesting van de macht de Leidse Universiteit 1673-1775* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002), 372-373.

and climactic portion of the oration, when all the powers of wit and eloquence were
mustered, was the peroratio. This was the point when a speaker would seek to move the
hearts and change the minds of his audience. The goal here was to incite love and zeal for
good and abhorrence for evil as well as to move the audience to commit themselves
corporately to some line of action or attitude.

With this structure in mind, in the early modern university in orations a professor
had the opportunity to elevate the student's gaze beyond the immediate press of schedules
and classes to greater goals as well as to remind the faculties of common, more lasting
causes to which they separately but jointly contributed. In short, the orations provided an
opportunity to build a corporate, united educational identity, a true university, and forge a
common virtue. A few examples might demonstrate the point.

The first example is the case of the professor of theology at Franeker, Campegius
Vitringa, Jr., who served between 1693 and 1723. He began his tenure with an oration
"on the spirit and letter of religion."20 Here we find a significant argument on the
fundamenta for establishing religion. Vitringa defines religion as worship and duties.
Religion is built on the fundamenta of namely, first knowledge (scientia) of certain
dogmas and doctrines and second, faith (fides), which is comprised of a knowledge
(notitia), assent, and trust (fiducia) in God and his work that results in an internal religion
of faith, hope, trust, and obedience.21 Vitringa is also quite clear that the knowledge and
duties must flow from faith and an experience of God's love, thus he specifically argues
against a historical faith that does not progress to a true, living, and saving one that

20 Campegius Vitringa, Jr., Campegii Vitringa, filii, Oratio inauguralis, de spiritu et litera religionis
(Franeker: 1716), 32.

21 Vitringa, Oratio, 32, 37.
pervades the will and affections. This issue, of course, strikes perennial matters of piety, theology, and religion. The importance then for Franeker as a university community was to see their educational pursuits as an extension of their faith and character. With respect to the professor, it provided an opportunity to highlight to students and faculty the professor's priorities. What about an example of an inaugural oration that touches upon a matter of more contemporaneous concern?

At the University of Leiden, in 1654 we have Henricus Bornius's inaugural oration "On the true freedom of philosophizing" in the midst of recent controversies among philosophers and theologians at Leiden, among broader disturbances with other universities in the Netherlands, and the conversation of the Dutch churches. This oration is replete with classic phrases that would have resonated both with students of Aristotle as well as of theology. While displaying a deep respect for Aristotle coming off of the recent debates regarding Cartesianism, Bornius goes on to argue for philosophy's free work in examining the *theatrum naturae* by means of reason. Yet he concludes his oration with a shrewd allusion to Clement of Alexandria's endorsement of freely examining nature and argues for the liberty to pursue what is distinctly and clearly (*distincte et evidentem*) perceived in Nature. Finally, he closes with the importance of coming to a right understanding of the world in order that one might worship the Trinity. What emerges here is Bornius's demonstration that (1) he will conduct his tenure with a respectful posture towards Aristotle, (2) he will engage Cartesian thought critically, and (3) he views philosophy in its traditionally preparatory role for theology. This oration,

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22 Henricus Bornius, *Oratio Inauguralis de Vera Philsophandi Libertate ... Dicta ... Die 11 Novembris Anni MDCLIII*, (Leiden: Johannes & Daniel Elsevier, 1654).

coming as it did after a period of controversy, was intended to soothe fresh wounds and heal divisions within the faculty and students, while at the same time encouraging faithful, and free, inquiry.

4.2.1 De Moor's Inaugural Oration

When we turn our attention to Bernhardinus De Moor, we find an example of an oration that not only hints at his prolegomena but also a use of his method to address a matter of contemporaneous concern. The primary points of his oration are in its title. After paying due homage to the appropriate national dignitaries, patrons of the university, and magistrates of the city De Moor takes up the topic of the Church in his exordium and propositio. De Moor speaks first of the definition of the Church as ultimately comprised of only the elect and then moves to a discussion of its twofold state of perfection in glory and its imperfection in this life. Finally, he moves through a discussion of the nature of blessedness or felicitas, and the hindrances to the Church's happiness here and now.

With respect to the Church's imperfection, De Moor spends a majority of the argumentatio of his oration speaking upon its nature and causes by way of biblical evidence and historical events. The first issue is a result of the imago Dei and its corruption, thus the imperfection of the members of the church in this life morally, and secondly there is the imperfection or incompleteness of the Church's knowledge in this life as it awaits full communion with God. De Moor distinguishes between moral depravity and the defects of human knowledge in this life as different issues that only compound the imperfection of the militant Church.

The central biblical pivot in this oration is 1 Corinthians 13:12, which De Moor references in this way "We know in part and we prophesy in part. We now discern
through a glass darkly." As mentioned in an earlier chapter, this is a key text for framing the archetypal/ectypal distinction. De Moor also notes that "the difference between the knowledge of this life and the future life is as much as between the sight of a real object (intuitum rei ipsius) and its image displayed in a mirror." How vast is this enigmatic difference? With a nod toward the infinite distinction between the creator and the creature, and signaling the archetypal, essential knowledge of God, De Moor speaks of, "the deepest abyss of the incomprehensible divine knowledge." De Moor makes this remark in passing while discussing the point that God decreed and permitted the Fall of humanity into sin by the temptation of Satan. De Moor argues that the great distance between the initially promised Seed of the Woman and the fulfilment in Christ is much more lucid than our knowledge now when compared to the unfathomable riches and realization of God's glory for the believer in the next life.

The nature of the fall and the vast distance between humanity and God opens the path for De Moor to speak of Scripture, which he does indirectly while speaking of the work of Christ, the greatest shepherd, in gathering the Church and the role of "the efficacious operation of the divine Spirit." The Scriptures are described as "the perspicuous testimonies of the Sacred Pages" and its authors as the "God inspired writers" and these produce faith, a pious person, and make one "a partaker of the

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24 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 23, "Ex parte cognoscimus, atque ex parte vaticinamur. Cernimus nunc per speculum in aenigmate."


27 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 10.
redemption purchased through Christ."\(^{28}\)

De Moor proceeds to trace the history of the progress of the people of God from Adam through the New Testament, through the abuses of the papacy to the Reformation, and up to the Reformed Church of his day. But, he insists, the primary struggle in the militant Church is with "the corrupted and sinful flesh, one of the chief enemies with which even the holiest persons contend with throughout this whole life."\(^{29}\) Even though he acknowledges that the dominion of sin has been broken through grace to believers, yet there is the perpetual struggle "with indwelling sin and the remnants of the vice-filled flesh."\(^{30}\) And so the first causes of the Church's imperfection is found in the heart of every believer who is not yet glorified.

With respect to the imperfect felicity of the militant Church, speaking corporately, there are also internal and external causes. The internal causes of its infelicity are its abandonment of the Scriptures as well as its abandonment of true piety and worship towards God. From this assertion he outlines in summary fashion heresies and controversies that have upset the peace and happiness of the Church throughout the ages.\(^ {31}\) By highlighting ancient Trinitarian heresies, De Moor also is able to highlight particular sects and minority positions in the Netherlands, such as the Socinians. By highlighting controversies regarding the work of Christ and the grace of God, he touches upon Pelagians and then winds his way to the Remonstrants. By reference to the ancient

\(^{28}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 10-11.

\(^{29}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 35.

\(^{30}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 35.

\(^{31}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 33-34.
Greeks and Romans he is also able to address matters of the libertines, deists, and atheists of his own day.

The external causes of the Church's infelicity also include persecutions of the true religion by godless regimes. With this theme in hand, he alludes to the persecutions of Christians down through the ages, but "Time would fail me, dear hearers, if now I would call to mind the originators of the troubles with which the Christian name was at one time afflicted." From Nero to heretics to the Turks, De Moor enumerates the more renowned persecutors of the Church and then proceeds to discuss the geographic range of the Church's suffering and tortures, "but alas I should abandon the mention of these things because in telling them I would scarcely restrain my tears!"

After a brief mention of the Waldensians's treatment at the hands of the "anti-Christian tyrants" De Moor moves into matters of more proximate history with the St. Bartholomew's Eve massacre in France through the intrigues of Catharine de Medici. And while seeking to stir up a distrust of Roman Catholics—specifically France and Spain—De Moor goes on to mention the revocation of the Edict of Nantes under King Louis XIV, its impact upon Reformed pastors being sentenced to prison or the galleys, and that many French and Belgian Protestants fled to a freer land in the Netherlands. From here the pitch of the oration reached its height in invective as he railed against Emperor Charles V and his son Philip II of Spain, as well as the Inquisition. "O how blessed we are, dear listeners, for whom

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32 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 41.

33 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 42.

34 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 46-47.

it has been granted to know of these trials by hearing of them rather than experiencing them!"36 By recounting this history of persecution, De Moor called to mind the founding of the Dutch Republic and tying its fate to the progress of the Church in history. And at the same time, De Moor endeavored to stir Dutch patriotism and pride in its identification with the Dutch Reformed Church. From this point he turned to a closer examination of the schisms that have rent the Church.

Beginning with the Trinitarian controversies that divided the ancient Church, De Moor moved through the various schisms that split the Church into East and West, such as the *filioque* clause in the early medieval period and the controversies leading to the Council of Florence.37 Yet, schisms did not stop with the arrival of the Protestant Reformation. "But scarcely had the foundations of the Reformation been laid in Germany and Switzerland, Look! A fresh wound from a trivial cause, that is, a certain bickering of Luther with his co-laborers on the correct understanding of the Lord's words in the institution of the Supper was inflicted on the Church."38 The result was a split despite "our" (meaning the Reformed) "peaceful attempts" that the "Lutherans of a quite inflexible character baffled."39 Indeed, "for those who desire good for Christendom (*rei Christianae*), the bond of mutual love that the Lord instituted seems to have been converted into fuel for hatred, a token of fraternal union into a signal for war, a holy assembly (*σύναξις*) into a riot (*σύρραξις*)."40

36 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 49.
37 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 70-72.
38 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 72.
39 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 73.
40 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 73.
The Reformed were no strangers to schism either, however. The British Isles divided over church polity into Episcopalians and Presbyterians. Among the Anglicans there were divisions over the liturgy and the books of common prayer. And then there were the Brownists who separated from both for "reasons of scarcely any significance." Meanwhile, the Swiss and Palatinate churches were vexed by tumults over church discipline and the use of excommunication. And in time, the French and Swiss Reformed were in an uproar over the doctrines of grace.

Closer to home, as De Moor finishes off the *argumentatio*, he comments that "our Dutch Reformed [Church] it turned out was not so happy that it remained free from the disturbances and discord in the cause of Religion." Quickly and sharply De Moor deploys an apophasis that would have made Cicero smile, "I have nothing now that I must necessarily call to mind regarding the Arminian schism, which quite truly must be called heresy." And just so, De Moor then moves to reflect on the schisms caused by the Voetians and Cocceians. In favor of his Voetian view, De Moor notes that

While certainly several people always seemed to come to me with that name of the Voetian theologians—for what it's worth, it is clearly evident that Voetius did not pursue method of his own [making] in expounding theology or rob from theological topics of greater significance for topics that pleased himself; even if there was something unique in his views, there are hardly any who are denominated from him that can be said to be oppressive in their esteem of this great man's footsteps.

Rising above partisan spirit, to his university peers and students, in a heartfelt way, De

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41 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 74.
42 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 75.
43 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 75.
44 De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 76.
Moor then pled that he bears nothing but deep sadness for the differences *inter nos* and exhorts his hearers to lay aside the fruits of bitterness and dissension that have arisen because they must embrace each other as brethren with love and a fraternal union of their hearts. He then speaks of differences that are sincere and candid among professors in the university that have become grave cause of controversy among their students, who in turn become pastors. And as a result of the disputes repeated (*disputationes repetitae*) by these pastors among their congregations, "mutual hatreds and very frequently the most foolish quarrels arise."\(^{45}\)

One problem with such quarrels in De Moor's view is that by schisms and poor conduct, once quarrelling has become characteristic of church culture, an unbeliever might remark of someone, "He's a good so-and-so, except that he's a Christian!"\(^{46}\) But most importantly, enveloped and engrossed in such controversial problems, someone may never apply their heart to consider the highest point of theological wisdom and "those things that are first and foremost necessary to know and do for salvation are considered trivial."\(^{47}\) He transitions to an exegesis of James 4:1-12 regarding the fights and quarrels that arise in the Church and points out that the apostles like his hearers are fallen human beings too, as the apostle Paul says in Acts 14:15, "we are human beings too, liable to the same affections as you."\(^{48}\) De Moor draws the parallel for his hearers to recognize their own danger, "the feet of those bringing good news of peace are beautiful, yet they are not

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\(^{45}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 77.

\(^{46}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 77. "Bonus vir Cajus Sejus, tantum quod Christianus."

\(^{47}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 78.

\(^{48}\) Cf. Acts 14:15 and De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 78, "nos quoque homines sumus … iisdem quibus vos affectibus obnoxii."
free from every offense or free from the danger of falling."49 While De Moor believes that the militant Church will always be afflicted by schism, persecutions, and heresies, since in God's will this is a way to reign in its pride and satisfaction with this life, "but over and above these, from its lack of completed knowledge, the Church's holiness will clearly never be perfect."50

Entering into the concluding peroratio, De Moor asks, now what is left for us to do? He sets forth this call to action:

Let each of us think how we must act for our holy mother Church in our station, which we each have obtained, so that in the future we would not defile her already disfigured face anymore by our negligence, idleness, and impious affection against her. But on the contrary with all our power and efforts let us strive that we may make the Church, like the moon that with a beautiful brightness and pleasant light that shines in all directions, indeed all the more let us reflect back to the Sun the purest splendor: and let us all strain every nerve so that the blemishes that cling to this holy assembly at all times while on this earth, as much as it can be done they can be declared not to hinder Her in the least.51

In general terms, De Moor urges his hearers to flee laziness, pursue the reality of salvific Wisdom, and "let us never believe that we have at this time arrived at the pinnacle of knowledge."52 Furthermore, this requires a diligent pursuit of probity and integrity in all morals. Against persecutions, in maturity, they must strengthen their heart in order to avoid defecting from the faith. Against heresies, they must vigorously vanquish the monsters of heresies. Against schisms and disagreements, they must shun them "so that with heavenly wisdom and sincere piety, nurturing Peace may thrive and fraternal

49 De Moor, Oratio Inauguralis, 78-79.
50 De Moor, Oratio Inauguralis, 79.
51 De Moor, Oratio Inauguralis, 80.
52 De Moor, Oratio Inauguralis, 80.
Harmony may flourish."\(^{53}\)

With respect to their stations, De Moor then specifically addresses the curators of the university, the burgomasters of the city, and the nobility and admonishes them with all their plans and efforts to lead by example, that is, in wisdom with piety and in pursuit of truth with peace. Then De Moor vows and prays by God "without whom nothing occurs, through whom we can do all things; that He should give me life and strength … so that I can be useful to the youth devoted to your Academy, to God and to the Church."\(^{54}\) After acknowledging the distinguished nobleman Unico Wilhelm van Wassenaer,\(^{55}\) who was also a diplomat, counsel to the Admiralty, and governor of the Dutch East India Company, as well as addressing several other nobles for their care of the Dutch Republic and Leiden University, De Moor reminds them that God has placed them in the position of fathers of the fatherland, patrons of erudition, and avengers of truth and piety. They too must be mindful of what he has enjoined in the exercise of their duties in "the race course of this life."\(^{56}\) Then, De Moor addresses his new faculty members of the university as a whole and especially of the theological college and after pledging, "I commend and commit myself totally to you in faith and love," he exhorts them that by their actions and desires for the splendor of their name and the University's that they would always "think soberly, behave with vigor and tirelessly, love lavishly, and never

\(^{53}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 80.

\(^{54}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 81-82.


\(^{56}\) De Moor, *Oratio Inauguralis*, 83.
quarrel."  

Finally, De Moor addresses the students and charges them to commit themselves with devoted hearts to God and to the Church, serving eagerly, faithfully, and constantly. Do not be deceived, if you would embrace the honor of the ministry in order to live a lazy and leisurely life, so that you could enjoy elegance and any of your desires. You will find it quite otherwise. Church ministry is a matter of immense labor and full of the gravest trials. And the labor in this Academic palestra is just beginning! For we do not learn by way of miracle, but according to the imperfect condition of the terrestrial Church, learning by the highest diligence and all-consuming labor, which can be judged as necessary for forming and equipping a true minister of the Church.  

And while laboring in this office obeying their superiors and striving to be men of God (virí Dei), De Moor promises, "and so I offer myself to you as a leader and companion of sacred studies. I seek to diligently and courageously employ my efforts. I have now become, by right, yours entirely and I do not shrink from being worn out by studies and labors for yours and the Church's advantage. Indeed, I will count it an injury if I am not little by little consumed by serving your benefit!"  

At this point, De Moor concludes his oration with a prayer asking that God would prosper the Church, the Academy, and the Nation, especially by all diligently acting according to their station within the imperfect, militant Church until they arrive at perfection in glory as the triumphant Church.  

4.2.2 De Moor's Valedictorian Oration as Rector Magnificus  

In addition to his regular teaching duties, De Moor served as the Rector Magnificus of Leiden University from February of 1756 until February of 1757.  

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57 De Moor, Oratio Inauguralis, 83.  
58 De Moor, Oratio Inauguralis, 84-85.  
59 De Moor, Oratio Inauguralis, 85.  
60 The first entry in the Acta Senatus under De Moor's tenure occurs on February 26, 1756 and the last entry
close of his tenure, on February 8, 1757 in a ceremony filled with pomp and
circumstance, De Moor officially—and literally—passed the university seal and the
register of students (album studiosorum) into the hands of his successor. After the new
Rector Magnificus was sworn in, De Moor presented his departing address to the faculty
entitled, "An oration on what is excessive in the theological science."  

In similar terms, De Moor urges his readers that "I am discussing that doctrine
which examines God and divine matters, and the true knowledge and worship of God
revealed to us little humans who had fallen by sin from the most blessed communion of
the Divine, certainly for the salvation of Man rightly using the same, and also for
promoting the glory of the best and greatest God."  

Furthermore, this theology is revealed in creation, but God has "by far more clearly, abundantly and perfectly revealed his will to us in the
Holy Scripture." Next, in accord with his understanding of the prolegomena, he speaks

occurs February 8, 1757, see Molhuysen, Bronnen, 5:405-15.


62 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 5.

63 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 9.

64 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 10.

65 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 11. Cf. De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 12, "Theologiam … imo scientiarum omnium dicendum esse principem: quum hic ea quae ad Deum & res divinas hominumque salutem spectant, quaevis alia sublimitate ac praestantia sua longissimo intervallo superantia, ab ipso Deo, praeertim in verbo suo θεόπνευτον, absque quo mysteria regni coelorum homini peccatorii texta semper mansissent atque inaccessa, docentur."
of theology as especially a theory and also a practice, and also that theology must be
viewed with respect to this life and the next.66

So what does De Moor consider excesses in the theological science? The excesses
are abuses of the theory or practice of theology. For example, in exegetical theology, one
excess occurs in the handling and preaching of Scripture and the abusive interpretation of
prophecy. Along similar lines there is the usage of allegory and tropology contrary to the
Scriptures and usage of Paul.67 In terms of dogmatic or elenchtic theology, De Moor
refers to the ancient adage, finitum non capax infiniti, as a necessary starting point stating
"a finite mind is not capable of comprehending an infinite being, not even in those
matters whose assent natural reason demands of us."68 Thus, an excess in dogmatic
theology is measuring mysteries of the faith by human reason and utilizing doubt to do
so, and even more so as it seeks to penetrate the distinction between the creator and the
creature.69 The target here is specifically named as Socinus and his followers who call
into question God's simplicity, immensity, omnipresence, foreknowledge of free and
contingent events, and even God's justice.70 Then, beyond the attributes of God, the
Socinians then begin to work on the Trinity calling into question the eternal generation of
the Son from the Father, Christ's birth and incarnation. These Christological challenges
then call into question the nature of redemption and justification.71 And once redemption

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66 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 12-14.
67 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 42-44.
68 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 46.
69 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 46.
70 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 48.
71 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 48-50.
is in play, there is the wholesale Socinian denial of Adamic imputation and the God-
man. 72

But at its climax the abuse—τῶ NIMIO (as De Moor puts it in the text)—that is the source of all of these others is vain curiosity that indulges questions contrary to Scripture. 73 And ultimately what swings in the balance? What swings in the balance is everything from justification, effectual calling, faith, regeneration, sanctification, resurrection, and all else leading to glorification. 74 In one stroke of extended oratory, De Moor lays out here his critique of methodological doubt when viewed from the whole system of theology as he endeavors to specify all the ways in which doubt and curiosity impinge upon matters of faith. In terms of the distinction between theologia in hac vita and theologia in patria, without using those terms, De Moor also points out that the knowledge possessed by the blessed spirits is clearly impassable by a finite intellect. All the more, the excess of vain curiosity even seeks to pry into the very archetypal, essential knowledge of God by questioning the divine decrees.

After addressing the excesses of theoretical theology, De Moor then moved on to the practical ones, but he acknowledges that he is now short on time. 75 But for the sake of time, De Moor cites Wesselius's funeral oration of Marckius and speaks of the practical excess with which people desire, contrary to conscience, to ascend the ladder to heaven and, "with a scornful and damnable brazenness seek to discern infallibly, what only

72 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 50-51.
73 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 51-52.
74 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 52-62. E.g. on the question of prime matter and creation, De Moor takes a moment to critique a mechanical view of the universe, 59.
75 De Moor, Oratio de eo Quod, 63-69.
belongs to God, among the regenerate and unregenerate, and who in this manner always laid the foundations for the most dangerous schisms."\(^{76}\)

De Moor closes this oration by calling his audience to put into practice the following points: "not to be excessively wise," that is not seeking to know what God has not revealed, "to cede curiosity to faith." And:

> Let the Holy Bible be the sole and unique norm of our theological wisdom. With this perennial font of saving knowledge and the leading of the Holy Spirit, after many and oft repeated prayers poured out in faith, in learning those matters which first are conducive for rightly knowing and establishing heavenly truth that has been revealed and next for promoting the true practice of piety in ourselves and others, let us strive courageously (mascule) in the days ahead."\(^{77}\)

In this brief exhortation De Moor is bringing to bear the weight of the \textit{theologia viatorum} framework which culminates in this very last reference to 1 Corinthians 13:12 that his hearers should strive "until we know as we are also known; and, being near, gazing upon the face of divine glory we may render eternal praises to the Triune God."\(^{78}\)

### 4.3 Conclusion

As we have seen, the archetypal/ectypal distinctions and the cluster of issues that are defended there are deployed in two different but similar contexts within the university life. First, the role of orations and in this case academic orations on theology form one aspect of the institutional life of Leiden University. The evaluation here does not examine the impact of these lectures in the broader society, but it is proper to observe that De Moor translated his inaugural oration into Dutch and it was printed and distributed at

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\(^{77}\) De Moor, \textit{Oratio de eo Quod}, 67.

\(^{78}\) De Moor, \textit{Oratio de eo Quod}, 69.
Leiden University's expense to the public at large. This indicates that these orations reflected upon the prestige and renown of the university as well as signaled the erudition and learning of the professor. Secondly, there is a recurring theme of close experiential engagement with God through the Scriptures. Third, the theology of pilgrims permeates the first oration in a variety of indirect and more direct references through the use of Scripture. The second oration is primarily upon the abuses of theology but still it develops the necessity of Scripture and piety in light of the Church's pilgrimage. This leads us to the conclusion that orations are an important genre in the period and are useful for investigating as one more perspective upon a professor's theology. In this case, De Moor's orations demonstrate that, for him, the theology of pilgrims was not a set of abstruse distinctions meant to stay locked in the *collegium* or confined to the lecture hall of disputations, but was intended to serve as an invigorating conceptual motive for a lively academic community and as motivation for future pastor's in the service of their churches on the way.
CHAPTER 5: A Scholastic Piety?

"Omnia probate, quod bonum est tenete" 1 Thess. 5:21

_I read the Scholastics judiciously, not with closed eyes._

_Thus the Apostle commanded, "Test everything, keep what is good."_

_I do not reject all their points but I do not approve of them all either._

– Martin Luther to Johann von Staupitz, April, 1518

In this chapter, our focus will rest upon how representative Reformed writers utilized scholastic methods to define theology and establish piety. But before establishing how several of the theologians within the period of Reformed Orthodoxy, and specifically Bernhardinus De Moor, articulated and displayed the relation between scholasticism and piety, it is necessary to set aside some perennially recurring views in the secondary literature. This also requires a reminder as to the meaning of several terms.

5.1 Definitions of Scholasticism and Piety

First it is necessary to mention that by the term scholasticism here, a precise method is intended rather than a particular content or philosophical content. Due to the broad range of polemical meanings assigned to scholasticism in the past, twenty years ago the historian of philosophy, Ulrich Leinsle noted that "this term is fraught with so many misunderstandings that even the field of medieval studies today largely dispenses with it." This observation alone merits a reconsideration of the all too common definitions and origins of these terms as well as their application to the Reformation period.

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1 Martin Luther, ed. W. M. L. de Wette, _Dr. Martin Luthers Briefe, Sendschreiben, und Bedenken, Erster Theil Luthers Briefe bis Zu Seinem Aufenthalt auf Wartburg_ (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1825), 1:102, "Ego Scholasticos cum judicio, non clausis oculis, (illorum more) lego. Sic praecepit Apostolus: omnia probate, quod bonum est, tenete. Non rejicio omnia eorum, sed nec omnia probo."

dichotomy in a line of older (and even recurring in some present) scholarship between
scholasticism and humanism, or more for our present concern, scholasticism and piety.3

view the period of Protestant orthodoxy, both Lutheran and Reformed failed in transmitting the vital
Reformation principle due in large part to the systematization of their theologies under the influence of
scholasticism. Thus in Dorner's opinion Protestant scholasticism transmitted objective orthodoxy, but not
genuine religion or evangelical tenets like Protestant mysticism did. In this account orthodoxy and piety are
almost, but not quite mutually exclusive.

Co. 1907), idem, *Der Einfluss der Protestantischen Schulphilosophie auf die Orthod-Lutherische Dogmatik*
(Leipzig: A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Nachf., 1908). In these works, Weber is evaluating the
transition from an anti-rationalist approach to faith in the early Lutheran theologians to a rationalist
approach as evidenced by appropriations of scholasticism.

Brian G. Armstrong, *Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism and Humanism in

Cf. R. T. Kendall, *Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) and the

McGrath, leaning on Albert Schweizer, views the period of Protestant Orthodoxy after the Reformation as a
somewhat inevitable period of "petrification and scholasticism" after a period of creativity in the Protestant
Reformation. A petrification due to the development of precise formulae or confessions, see A. E.
McGrath, "Protestant Orthodoxy" in *The Science of Theology*, eds. G. R. Evans et al. (Grand Rapids:

Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology*
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 266-272. Vanhoozer offers an apparent compliment on
266n3 "It may well be that Aquinas is able to hold "scholasticism" and "pietism" together better than many
contemporary theologians." Vanhoozer's project resurrects at points an older deficiency in scholarship that
Christian scholasticism is "Greek think" as opposed to a salutary Hebraic piety. In large part this is a
continuation of Stanley Grenz and John R. Franke, *Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a
Postmodern Context* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 14, 103, 263-265. After noting that
Aquinas viewed theology as *scientia*, Vanhoozer fails to acknowledge that for Aquinas theology in this life
does have a content or theory and practice, and with respect to this life and the next, eternity is bound up in
the actions of worship. Inasmuch as Vanhoozer's project intends to build a sapiential theology in contrast to
Aquinas's purported scientific, propositionalist theology, it fails upon first contact with the sources and
calls into question his subsequent evaluation of Reformed Orthodox appropriations of both scholasticism
and Thomas. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *ST*, 1a q1 a6 respondeo, "Respondeo dicendum quod haec doctrina
maxime sapientia est inter omnes sapientias humanas, non quidem in aliquo genere tantum, sed
simpliciter." And again in 1a q1 a6 ad 1: "ergo dicendum quod sacra doctrina non supponit sua principia ab
aliqua scientia humana, sed a scientia divina, a qua, sicut a summa sapientia, omnis nostra cognitio
ordinatur." Also see the opening proemium of Thomas's *Scriptum super sententias* in which true wisdom,
the basis for all knowledge and the reference point for subsequent discussion, is only found in the
Trinitarian God but has been appropriated in a special way for the revelation through the Son. For the text
of the proemium to Thomas's *Scriptum super Sententias*, See S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia (Parma:
Peter Fiaccadori, 1858) 7:1-3. On Vanhoozer's charge of scholastic proof texting among the Protestant
orthodox, cf. R. A. Muller on the role of *dicta probantia* in *PRRD*, 1:274-275 in comparison to Vanhoozer,
270-272 on proof-texting.
In our exploration of the relation between scholasticism and piety, Muller's general definition of scholasticism is the most concise and encompassing:

>[It is] a discipline characteristic of theological system from the late twelfth through the seventeenth century. Since scholasticism is primarily a method or approach to academic disciplines it is not necessarily allied to any particular philosophical perspective nor does it represent a systematic attachment to or concentration upon any particular doctrine or concept as a key to theological system.4

In this view medieval scholasticism and Protestant scholasticism are not identical, although both are "school methods" or academic practices found in the respective medieval and early modern university contexts.5 The former provoked a call for academic reform whereas the latter incorporated the fruits of those curricular reforms within its own academic and philosophical contexts. Luca Baschera is right in noting that one significant difference between the Reformation and post-Reformation theologians, albeit not as problematic as older scholarship asserts, is "the explicit and positive appeal to medieval authorities on the part of Reformed theologians in order to corroborate their theses."6 It is also worth emphasizing yet again the simple point that the most profitable path for analyzing "school theology" is to analyze the methods, authorities, and academic

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4 Muller, PRRD, 1:37. Also of note, Luca Baschera, "Aristotle and Scholasticism" in A Companion to Peter Martyr Vermigli, eds. T. Kirby, E. Campi, and F. James, III (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 133-160, especially 138n15 in his overview of both the problem and recent scholarship reassessing the relationship between orthodoxy and scholasticism in Reformation and post-Reformation theologians.

5 Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, 35, after delineating six distinguishable types of medieval schools, Leinsle comments: "Scholastic theology therefore is not uniformly related to one type of school but rather to a process of teaching and learning that distinguishes it from other forms of theologizing." On early-modern university reform and scholasticism, 243-276.

6 Baschera, "Scholasticism and Aristotelianism," 140-141. Baschera also helpfully clarifies that the antipathy towards Roman Catholic scholasticism can be viewed through the lens of a sixteenth century periodization of scholasticism, present among some transitional theologians, into vetus, media, and nova scholastica, see especially 141n28 on Lambert Daneau's comment, "Haec vetus scholastica certe quidem prudentior adhuc erat ..." "The old scholasticism was at least certainly more prudent in handling the Word of God ..."
modes of discourse within the curricular emphases at a particular university at a particular time. Only then is it possible to develop broader narratives of continuity and discontinuity through synchronic comparison of institutions and streams of thought. This sort of approach toward institutional continuity and discontinuity in academic method is already underway. Since Bernhardinus De Moor views himself as organizing and elaborating upon the views of his predecessor Johannes Marckius, the periodization of scholasticism as an academic method to the seventeenth century can be extended to De Moor's work into the late eighteenth century at Leiden.

Second, humanism and scholasticism address different concerns methodologically and thus they are not mutually exclusive at a fundamental level. In this regard it is right to reiterate Kristeller's older yet enduring observation that in the renaissance period "the humanist movement did not originate in the field of philosophical or scientific studies, but it arose in that of grammatical and rhetorical studies." The force of this observation for Kristellar means that medieval scholasticism is not antithetical to renaissance humanism, by definition. Scholasticism represents a *quaestio* method of argument that

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7 For example, Leinsle, among other historians and medievalists, discusses the different emphases upon Scripture at Oxford University and the Sentences at the University of Paris as a difference in curriculum and priority in the discipline of theology among members of the same mendicant order of Franciscans, indicating a different institutional approach, despite approximately the same theological and philosophical doctrines, Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, 120-131.

8 Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought and its Sources* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 91. Cf. 10, regarding the Renaissance *studia humanitatis*: "This area had for its center a group of subjects that was concerned essentially neither with the classics nor with philosophy, but might be roughly described as literature. It was to this peculiar literary preoccupation that the very intensive and extensive study which the humanists devoted to the Greek and especially to the Latin classics owed its peculiar character … Moreover, the *studia humanitatis* includes one philosophical discipline, that is, morals, but it excludes by definition such fields as logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, as well as mathematics and astronomy, medicine, law, and theology, to mention only such fields as had a firmly established place in the university curriculum and in the classification schemes of the period. This stubborn fact seems to me to provide irrefutable evidence against the repeated attempts to identify Renaissance humanism with the philosophy, the science, or the learning of the period as a whole."
was applicable to a particular body of philosophical, legal, theological, and scientific corpora of writings. By the early modern period and especially by the eighteenth century, this method had been enriched and chastened by the humanistic emphases in educational disciplines such as grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and classical Greek and Latin. As Kristeller aptly puts it "humanists did not invent a new field of learning or a new professional activity, but they did introduce a new, classicist style" into already existing medieval modes of instruction of rhetoric. Thus when considering Protestant scholasticism, an apropos summary would be that it is not so much that Protestants relinquished the medieval *quaestio* method in broad form or abandoned the gains of humanism so much as grasped more firmly the tools of textual analysis and integrated them into traditional trajectories of theology, with a wide array of combinations and results.

If this is an accurate representation, then on an initial survey one should expect to find a healthy blend of interdisciplinary methods by the eighteenth century. This is in fact what one does find upon a cursory survey of titles and publications from theological the faculty into the eighteenth century. Consider a sampling of titles from the Leiden theology faculty in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: *Textuales Exercitationes ad 50 selecta loca veteris ac novis testamentis* (1694) and *Dissertationum philologico-theologicarum ad selectos quosdam textus Veteris Testamentis* (1717) by

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Johannes Marckius, Dissertatio singularis geographico-theologica de situ Paradisi terrestris (1701) and Disputatio phil.-theologica de vera notione 'agalim Jeroboami I Reg. 12:28-29 (1703) by Salomon van Til, and the Syntagma dissertationum de stylo Novi Testamenti Graeco (1702) and Rhetorica Ecclesiastica (1742) by Taco van den Honert. The first observation is that all of these works are rooted in the lectio-disputatio rhythm of academic life in the early modern university inherited from the medieval period. It is hard to miss the emphasis upon rhetoric, history, grammar, philology, and literary style. And yet, every one of these theologians and professors must be classified as post-Reformation, Protestant Orthodox, scholastic theologians. For example, Salomon van Til composed a compendium of natural and revealed theology in typical scholastic form of his day, which included Cartesians modifications. Johannes Marckius also composed a textbook of theology, which we will have more to say about later. And one could easily extend the list to other Reformed theologians at universities within and outside of the Netherlands.

Third, a definition of piety needs to be developed inasmuch as it is linked to several different philosophical and theological "-isms" in older narratives of the histories of the church, doctrine, society, philosophy, and so forth. For example, in Heppe,

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11 Johannes Marckius, Textuales Exercitationes ad 50 Selecta Loca Veteris ac Novis Testamentis (Amsterdam: Gerard Borstius, 1694), Johannes Marckius, Dissertationum Philologico-Theologicarum ad Selectos Quosdam Textus Veteris Testamentis (Leiden: Peter Vander Aa, 1717), Dissertatio Singularis Geographic-Theologica de Situ Paradisi Terrestris (1701) and Disputatio Phil.-Theologica de Vera Notione 'Agalim Jeroboami I Reg. 12:28-29 (1703) by Salomon van Til, and the Syntagma Dissertationum de Stylo Novi Testamenti Graeco (1702) and Rhetorica Ecclesiastica (1742) by Taco van den Honert.

pietism is the inward life of the heart or the religious life of the heart, but it is not necessarily rooted within the boundaries of orthodoxy and definitely not rooted in an academic scholastic context.13 In fact, piety and academic orthodoxy are largely if not totally antithetical. According to Heppe, pietism includes forms of asceticism, catechization, and religious exercises. Or to put it another way, pietism is concerned with practice over doctrine whereas "orthodoxism" is concerned with doctrine over practice. There is not agreement in the scholarship whether piety entails a particular philosophical commitment or if it is possible to maintain orthodoxy, scholastic methods, and practices of piety without contradiction. For some scholars, piety and mysticism are inextricably linked to Platonism or at least to an anti-metaphysical, anti-rationalist approach. For some, pietism took on a mystical quality hardly discernible in history as "it had no one system of theology, no one integrating doctrine, no particular type of polity, no one integrating doctrine, no geographical homogeneity. Yet … it presented a discernible historical unity."14 One wonders given Stoeffler's definition whether it is even possible to speak of Reformed, Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Anabaptist, or Remonstrant piety. Stoeffler's historical unity seems built more on a priori anti-establishment assumptions than a posteriori historical determinations.

More recent scholarship has called this older dichotomy into question by demonstrating that piety and scholastic, polemical concerns can converge in the same

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13 Heppe, *Geschichte*, 11. Additionally, Heppe also maintains that pietism is linked to nationale Volkscultur which is isolated from orthodoxy that is linked to lateinischen Scholasticismus.

individual without contradiction. Furthermore, Schuringa demonstrates that the piety of the Nadere Reformatie was not reactionary or subversive to scholasticism or orthodoxy. We will have occasion to return to that point soon enough, but now it is appropriate to turn our attention to the kinds of narratives that influence an understanding of the relationship between scholasticism and piety.

5.2 Four Views of the Relation Between Scholasticism and Piety

Frequently in the secondary literature dating back to at least the eighteenth century a parallel between medieval scholasticism and Reformed scholasticism are viewed in general as identical or at least identical in their dessicating effect, and thus some scholars paint a portrait of a functional—if not real and total—opposition between scholasticism and piety. Accounts of this schism vary along polemical lines motivated by a range of goals, for example: (1) there is an anti-Roman Catholic polemic among early modern Protestant historians that is frequently employed to justify the Protestant Reformation inasmuch as medieval scholasticism amounts to philosophy overwhelming biblical exegesis. Such a narrative is a common place among early modern Protestants even to the present day. But the subsequent deduction that proper biblical exegesis operates without reference to reason or any engagement with philosophy is highly debatable. In such a view, biblical or dogmatic theology leads to piety whereas

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15 Gregory Schuringa, "Orthodoxy, Scholasticism, and Piety in the Seventeenth-Century Further Reformation: Simon Oomius" in Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller, eds. Jordan J. Ballor, David Sytsma, Jason Zuidema (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 641-652. Cf. 647 "In this little bit of Oomius' biography, we find something that past literature pitting Reformed pietists against the scholastics would seem not to allow so easily: polemical and practical concerns valued by the same person." Cf. p647, "An examination of the three completed parts of this pastor's Institutiones further shows us that in Oomius, at least, we find Reformed scholasticism and orthodoxy and Nadere Reformatie piety existing together in harmony."

16 Schuringa, "Orthodoxy, Scholasticism, and Piety …," 649.
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scholasticism does not, whether it is found in the twelfth century or in the eighteenth. (2)
There are historians of philosophy that seek to justify a variety of concerns in nineteenth-century modern philosophy that tend away from Christian orthodoxy and organized religion. In this account, the advance towards skepticism and retreat from dogmatism opens the path to a mystical, individualistic piety. (3) There are views that hold scholasticism and piety (or sometimes simply mysticism) as existing in dialectical or antithetical tension. And finally, more closely to view three and which forms the balance of this chapter, (4) scholasticism and piety can and frequently did function in a mutually reinforcing way. It is not possible to address all of the various iterations in which the scholastic method and piety are juxtaposed in the scholarship, however, these four general views play into broader understandings of the relationship between scholasticism and piety. These views must be at least identified in order to evaluate Marckius and De Moor within the Reformed of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

5.2.1. Scholasticism and Piety in Conflict

5.2.1.1 Johann Lorenz von Mosheim's Use of Roger Bacon

With respect to the first view, it is necessary to examine a significant and historic secondary source for the view. Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1693-1755), a Lutheran church historian, does not crassly equate medieval and Protestant scholasticism, however, frequently those who cite his work do.\(^\text{17}\) Mosheim's significance is evidenced by the translation of his *Institutiones Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae et Recentiores* into

multiple languages between 1726 and 1928 with several redactions and at least one supplemental volume. Muller has described Mosheim as one of the most balanced historians of the eighteenth century for his methodological objectivity as his central concern and detail of citation in his sources. Mosheim is also identified as standing among the founders of the discipline of church history; that is, a discipline that is not a function of dogmatic theology. His textbooks and historical analysis influenced generations of theologians and pastors in their understanding of the relationship of scholasticism and piety from the mid-eighteenth century into the twentieth century.

Mosheim described scholastics and mystics in the twelfth and thirteenth century as both in their own way contributing to the destruction of true doctrine and piety that eventually led to the Protestant Reformation. He views scholastic theology in general pejoratively and ancient theology positively. Mosheim does admit that despite a division between the proponents of scholastic theology and ancient theology, in the twelfth century, scholastic theology was practiced in moderation by theologians like Peter Lombard. He lays the fault, however, upon Peter Abelard for scholastic theology’s

18 The bibliography is extensive as it was published in Latin, English, French, Dutch, and Italian undergoing multiple editions and revisions from 1726 until 1928. For the first hundred years it appeared in print in one language or another at least once a decade.


20 Muller and Bradley, 56-57.

21 This is not a distinctive argument or contribution of Mosheim. However, the citation and mustering of a vast array of primary source evidence from the medievals forward is part of his contribution.

22 On the introduction of theology into the twelfth century curriculum, Mosheim states: "To [the Trivium and Quadrivium] were now added … theology, not however that ancient theology which was devoid of system and connection and rested solely on texts of Scripture and opinions (sententiae) of the ancient fathers, but philosophical or scholastic theology." Mosheim, Institutes, 3.12.2.1 §4.
development into something entirely speculative. On practical theology, Mosheim distinguishes between scholastics and mystics, and of the two prefers the latter, with qualification. On the priority of Scripture, Mosheim describes two types of theologians in the thirteenth century in this way:

From this time therefore the teachers of theology began to be divided into two classes, the *biblici* who were called *veteres* and also *Dogmatici ac Positivi*; and the *scholastici* who were called the *Sententiarii*, and also the *novi*. The former interpreted the sacred volume—though for the most part miserably, in their schools; and confirmed them by the testimonies of scripture and tradition, without calling reason and philosophy to their aid. The latter did nothing but explain the Master of the *Sentences* or Lombard; and they brought all the doctrines of faith as well as the principles and precepts of practical religion, under the dominion of philosophy, and involved them in endless perplexities. And as these philosophical or scholastic theologians were deemed superior to the others in acumen and ingenuity, young men admired them and listened to them with the greatest attention; whereas the biblical doctors, or those of the sacred page as they were called, had very few and sometimes no pupils. This state of things prevailed generally in the schools of Europe, down to the times of Luther.

While identifying the distinct approaches between the biblical dogmaticians and the scholastics at this time, Mosheim however states the matter too broadly. Is it actually the

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23 “These *Sententiarii* as they were called, though not without faults, nor entirely free from vain and futile speculations, yet resorted to dialectical subtleties with moderation, and did not force the doctrines of revelation to yield submission to human sagacity. But contemporary with them arose another and more daring sect of theologians, who had no hesitation to apply the terms and distinctions of the dialecticians to the truths taught by revelation, and to investigate the nature and relations of those truths by the principles of logic. The author of this mode of treating theology … was Peter Abelard.” Mosheim, *Institutes* 3.12.2.3 §7.

24 In the twelfth-century: “The Latin divines who treated of the duties of the Christian life, were of two classes, the one *Scholastics* and the other *Mystics*. The former treated of the virtues as they did of the articles of faith, that is, in a dry and metaphysical manner; and they generally combined moral theology with dogmatic. The latter very often express themselves beautifully, and in a manner suited to move the soul; yet without method or discrimination, and not unfrequently they tarnish Christian gold with the dross of Platonism.” Mosheim, *Institutes* 3.12.2.3 §12; in the thirteenth, Mosheim, *Institutes*, 3.13.2.3 §§9-11; in the fourteenth, Mosheim mentions a subdivision between “the more sober Mystics” and actual fanatics, *Institutes*, 3.14.2.3 §§4-6; in the fifteenth, Mosheim mentions the role of Plato and pantheism, *Institutes*, 3.15.2.1 §5.

case that when the Biblii interpreted the Scripture entirely seposita ratione et Philosophia and that this is viewed as a positive in the period? Although Mosheim seems to imply that this is an advance, would Roger Bacon (c. 1214- c. 1292), a primary source for his comments, consider it such? When Bacon is read in context, how did he evaluate the situation? To answer that questions requires a closer reading of Bacon's comments. Mosheim references at length Roger Bacon's significant, eye-witness complaint regarding the priority of the Magister Sententiarii over the Baccalaureus Scripturae. Inasmuch as Mosheim misrepresents Bacon’s view, to that extent Mosheim’s assertions can be discounted.

5.2.1.2 Roger Bacon’s Grievances Examined

Therefore, it is worth considering Roger Bacon's comments up close. It is certainly true that the crux of Bacon's complaint is that "it is therefore evident that the text of the [theological] faculty is subject to its one master, the Summa."\(^26\) The disjunction, however, in the citation of Roger Bacon is that he is not an exemplar of a biblical exegete that lays aside reason and philosophy. The overwhelming majority of the corpus of his work is devoted to matters of physics and moral philosophy which utilize Aristotle, Socrates, Avicenna, and other philosophers while seeking to clarify and expurgate these thinkers of any non-Christian elements. More alarming perhaps to

\(^{26}\) Bacon had called this the fourth sin of the university: "The baccalaureus who lectures on the text [of Scripture] gives way to the lecturer on the Sentences, who is everywhere preferred and honored by all. For he who lectures on the Sentences has the best hour for reading, according to his choice; he has also an associate, and a chamber among the religious; but he who lectures on the Bible lacks these, and begs for an hour to read, such as shall please the lecturer on the Sentences. Also the man who lectures on the Sentences disputes everywhere, and is accounted a Master; but the other who lectures on the text cannot dispute, as was exemplified at Bologna, and in many other places; which is absurd. It is therefore manifest, that the text is subordinate in this faculty [sic theology] to the one dominant Summa." Translation checked against Mosheim, \textit{Institutes}, 3.2. 3 §8n18. Cf. Roger Bacon and John Sherren Brewer, \textit{Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera Quaedamhactenus Inedita. Vol. I. containing I.--Opus tertium. II.--Opus minus. III.--Compendium philosophiae} (London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 1859), 1:328-329.
Mosheim would be the realization that Bacon's own works includes *Commentarii in libros sententiarum* and *Compendium Studii Theologici*.27 Or to put the matter more specifically, Bacon asserts that "Anything belonging to philosophy that is not averse to the wisdom of God, but is contained in it, must be clarified."28 Or consider this exhortation regarding philosophy, "From these things it necessarily follows that we Christians must use philosophy in divine matters and take many theological things into philosophical matters, so that it may be apparent that there is one wisdom shining in both sciences."29

If Bacon's list of complaints is read in its entirety one realizes that his frustration includes the Scriptures not being used as the primary authority in the discipline of theology and that the *Sententiarii* frequently seek to answer questions via pure theological speculation when the answer is readily available through consulting theology or what is certain from the domain of philosophy or history.30 Bacon deplores ignorance parading as knowledge. That is, read as a methodological concern, the *Sententiarii* are not operating within the limits of their discipline: they do not answer questions that they can answer from Scripture, but rather dwell upon those they cannot. And inasmuch as this

27 See Roger Bacon, *Compendium of the Study of Theology*, trans. T. S. Maloney (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 33. "[Here] begins a compendium of the study of theology and in consequence of philosophy. It can and ought to be of service to the discipline of theology and it has two principal parts, etc."


29 Roger Bacon, *Opus majus*, 37. "Ex his sequitur necessario, quod nos Christiani debemus uti philosophia in divinis, & in philosophicis multa assumere theologica, ut appareat quod una sit sapientia in utraque relucens …"

30 Roger Bacon, *Opera ... Inedita*, 1:328-329.
complaint, or quartum peccatum, regarding the Sententiarii is grievous, Bacon identifies "a sin that is greater than all the aforementioned: for the text [of Scripture] is for the most part corrupted horribly in the copy of the Vulgate at Paris. … And this point of debate arises from the fighting of its editors, for as many readers as there are throughout the world, there are that many editors (correctores) or rather, greater corruptors."31 Finally, the last and worst sin of all for Bacon is that the sensus literalis is deployed in such a way that it is plagued with all manner of infinita falsitates and dubitationes intolerabiles, which would then call into question every sensus spiritualis that is based upon the literal in medieval exegesis. The result is that due to the poor exegesis of both the Sententiari and the Biblici the truth is obscured and cannot be known by Christians as it should be.32

As a solution, Bacon proposes a curricular reform for theologians that would integrate the study of Greek, Hebrew, natural history, classical Latin, archaeology, and so forth.33 As much as this does sound like the humanist program of the Renaissance, note that Bacon also argues "but by far the greater cause of error in the literal and spiritual sense occurs on account of ignorance even of the property of matters in Scripture. For the literal sense consists in the natures and properties of things, so that by suitable adaptations and accordant similarities the spiritual senses may be elicited."34 Bacon concludes, "And if the entire wisdom of philosophy were known [but it isn't] in conjunction with theology, indeed only then would the utility of philosophy appear,

31 Roger Bacon, Opera ... Inedita, 1:330.
32 Roger Bacon, Opera ... Inedita, 1:349.
33 Roger Bacon, Opera ... Inedita, 1:349-356.
34 Roger Bacon, Opera ... Inedita, 1:357.
because its utility consists in relation to its service to theology and then its own dignity would be evident.” 35 Thus, rather than divorce philosophy from the study of Scripture, Bacon, the medieval scholastic and Christian philosopher, is arguing that philosophy must once again assume its proper position of handmaiden to—rather than mistress of—theology.

Mosheim's citation of Bacon indicates in his opinion the low point to which biblical exegesis had fallen in the thirteenth century in comparison to the primacy of the Sententiarii. 36 However, in context, the focus of the citation is manifold: (1) Bacon's insistence upon the priority of Scripture in theological deliberation and instruction, which would not necessarily preclude the use of other subordinate disciplines clarified by the light of Scripture. (2) Bacon's insistence that the priority of Scripture should be evidenced by the institutional policies and resources of the university. (3) And lastly, knowing Bacon's broader corpus, he is not advocating biblical exposition seposita ratione et Philosophia as Mosheim asserts, but rather in proportion to its limits and in conjunction with other disciplines properly ordered. The problems of medieval scholasticism stem from poor methods, not the presence of one. The proper way to read Bacon's comment then is that both the Sententiarii and the Biblici needed methodological as well as institutional reform: a proper practice of philosophy subordinated to theology and a proper understanding of the text.

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35 Roger Bacon, Opera ... Inedita, 1:357-8.

36 Mosheim’s judgment of scholastics should be weighed against the exegetical works of, for example, Thomas Aquinas, and other medieval theologians in conjunction with their dogmatic textbooks.
5.2.1.3 The Reception of Mosheim’s critique of scholasticism

When our attention turns to De Moor's deployment of the *theologia viatorum* with respect to methodological doubt, it is interesting to observe that several of these themes will recur, albeit in different ways and for different reasons. Let me be clear, there is no evidence that De Moor read Roger Bacon, so I am not arguing for a Baconian influence on De Moor. But given the widespread publication, translation, and subsequent reception of Mosheim’s work, his interpretation of Bacon is cited as evidence of the dangers of scholasticism. Dangers which in turn have been imported into readings of the Protestant scholastics. These readings would also color understandings of Marckius and De Moor. Thus, Bacon's comments on the role of reason in theology in the medieval period are a significant, albeit forgotten, data point in the historical narrative of the relationship between scholasticism and piety. Bacon’s views on curricular reform and the relationship between philosophy and theology also have resonance with much of what many Reformed articulated from the sixteenth century onward.

Mosheim's account is tempered by the acknowledgement of a modest number of positive contributions within biblical scholarship and doctrinal development in this period as well as an acknowledgement that not all medieval scholastics were devoid of piety. But, the battle lines are drawn in this account along confessional and polemical concerns, lines admittedly which Mosheim did not invent, and in a dual narrative of the history of the Reformation and the decline of medieval scholasticism, true piety and theological

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37 E.g. when commenting on the fifteenth century, Mosheim mentions with praise that there were those that sought to blend the best of the *belles lettres* and composition with scholastic theology: "Of this class was Paul Cortesius, who composed a splendid work *On the Sentences*; in which, as he says, he united eloquence with theology, and explained the principal subtleties of the Scholastics in a polished style of composition." Read charitably, Mosheim is endorsing a scholastico-humanist method subordinate to the text of Scripture, Mosheim, *Institutes*, 3.15.2.3 §10.
scholasticism are largely antithetical in many of the older accounts leading up to and throughout the nineteenth century. Or to state the matter more positively, the substance of Mosheim's critique is that philosophical theologians were ruling the discipline and exegesis of the sacred page. The interpretive error is the deduction that Bacon was arguing for a biblical theology divorced from the subordinated influence and use of other disciplines. Happily, in the nineteenth century as many historians dug deeper into the sources, Bacon's complaint is frequently cited and deployed as part of a more refined narrative in some quarters of scholasticism as a method.38

From the nineteenth century forward, however, sans Bacon and Mosheim, in much subsequent scholarship persisting in historical accounts, contemporary dogmatics, and apologetic enterprises, scholasticism in any form is viewed as totally incompatible with true biblical exegesis or true Christianity, and thus it is a veritable harbinger of death for true piety. Others sense in scholasticism and mysticism a fundamental divorce

38 Johann Karl Ludwig Geissler, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte* (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1832), 2.4 §76. Geissler's account is more nuanced and even-handed. For example, he views the contest between Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux as competing academic methods surrounding the interpretation of Scripture, rather than simple biblicism or Platonic mysticism versus rationalism, Geissler, 2.4 §73. It is still noteworthy however, that at the head of his discussion of scholasticism Geissler recommends Hegel's description of scholastic theology as a starting point, cf. Geissler, 2.4 §73 and G. F. Hegel, “Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie” in *Werke*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1971-1979), 15:132.

between Thought and Belief,\textsuperscript{39} thought and experience, philosophy and spirituality,\textsuperscript{40} philosophy and biblical theology, systematic and biblical theology, and so forth.\textsuperscript{41} Worse still, whatever the abuses of medieval scholasticism actually are or are perceived to be, some impute these to the Protestant Reformed scholastics as an inevitable side effect of scholasticism-as-philosophy. The effects of such a view are evident in some measure in a broad array of theological works even still today. There is ample evidence over the past two and a half centuries since Mosheim of variations of the view that scholasticism as philosophical Aristotelianism or incipient rationalism are necessarily incompatible with the true spirit of Christianity, the true spirit of the Reformation, or the true spirit of Calvin, and so forth. As such the scholastic theologians are responsible for separating faith and life in a rationalistic manner, and bequeathing to the church a faith that is less dependent on the God of Scripture and more dependent on autonomous reason's interpretation of Scripture.

5.2.2 Humanism as a necessary precursor to Skepticism and Piety

In a variant of the first view, some extreme accounts of the philosophical origins of the Renaissance (and subsequently the Protestant Reformation and the modern age) emphasize the dissolution of medieval scholasticism and asceticism as a side-effect of the

\textsuperscript{39} On the rupture of Spirit into the struggle between Thought and Belief, see G. W. F. Hegel, \textit{Lectures on the Philosophy of History}, trans. John Sibree from German 3\textsuperscript{rd} edition (London: H. G. Bohn, 1857), 412-415. On the consciousness of a real internal harmonization of Spirit leading to the Renaissance as the Human Spirit stands on its own foundation, see 425-427. On Subjective Spirit of the Reformation and immediate engagement with God (i.e. mysticism) versus sensuous World-Spirit of Medieval Church (i.e. as Roman Catholic scholasticism corrupted spirituality into sensuality), 429-445.


\textsuperscript{41} K. R. Hagenbach, \textit{Compendium of the History of Doctrines}, Volume 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1846), e.g. 1:401, note the invocation of Hegelian categories for the struggle between Scholasticism and Piety.
antithetical principles of humanism (as a human centered philosophy) and skepticism encapsulated within the genius of Protestantism. In such an account, the true skeptic arrives at faith through doubt and reason seeking understanding, and in this sense, Protestantism is the precursor to the true seeker: the modern skeptic. For the nineteenth-century John Owen, true piety is the dissolution of theological system and even a renunciation of all supernaturalism, ever reducing orthodox Christianity to moral platitudes, social action, and simple piety.

The nineteenth-century French historian of philosophy, Victor Cousin, argues much more moderately than Owen that the philosophy of the Renaissance is a *combinaison totale* of unstable transitional philosophies. In this period, the movement is from the scholastic philosophy of Christian Aristotelianism to four competing schools: platonic idealism, peripatetic sensualism (i.e. that sensations or perceptions are more important epistemically than abstract ideas), skepticism, and mysticism. In this sort of account, the mysticism of Giordano Bruno is the anticipatory forerunner of Spinoza. Or perhaps the relation is better stated this way: "Spinoza is the geometer of the system and Bruno is its poet." According to this narrative of the history of philosophy, true piety towards God develops along pantheistic lines and is utterly opposed to the scholastic

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44 Owen, *The Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance*, 83-95. Owen identifies the Renaissance as a corrective reaction to the Church's "perversions of dogma" that gave rise to Christian supernaturalism, an exaggerated Christology of the creeds and councils, materialism, and moral corruption.


46 Cousin, *Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne*, 274-5n2, "Spinoza est le géomètre du système; Bruno en est le poète."
Christian Aristotelianism of the prior age. It is noteworthy that in this account, piety fits hand in glove with skepticism and a rejection—or at least a deep suspicion—of dogmatic formulations of supernatural, special revelation. The emphasis is upon individual liberty, autonomy, and immediacy, which mitigates historic authorities and hierarchies of thought and social structure. Again, scholasticism and true piety thus defined are antithetical, but in addition now dogmatic formulations of biblical theology are added to the term scholasticism.

5.2.3 Scholasticism and Piety in Dialectical Tension

The view that there is a real or even a functional divorce between scholasticism and piety has not always been the case. Certainly there is some truth in Adolf von Harnack's observation regarding medieval scholasticism that "Scholasticism is simply nothing but wissenschaftlich thought." However, his view moves beyond this methodological observation to a claim that scholasticism entails a content when he asserts that "Scholasticism is science, applied to religion, and—at least, till the time when it underwent self-disintegration—science setting out from the axiom that all things are to be understood from theology, that all things therefore must be traced back to theology." Consider Harnack's exposition of medieval scholasticism by his claim that:

to understand things means nothing else than to know their relation to the One and All, or to the Author ... From this it follows at once that personal piety is the presupposition of science [emphasis original]. But insofar as personal piety is the presupposition of science at that time was always thought of as contemplation of the relation of the ego to God accompanied by asceticism, Mysticism is the

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48 Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 6:25. It should also be noted that there were medieval scholastics, who utilized the *quaestio* method in more than just theology such as philosophy. Thomas Aquinas's specific responses to particular errors indicate this (e.g. *Summa Theologiae*, 1.1.1-6).
presupposition of Scholasticism; in other words, medieval science bases itself on piety, and on piety, too, which is itself contemplation, which lives therefore in an intellectual element. From this it follows, that this piety itself prompts to thought…

Harnack continues to point out that inasmuch as theology is concerned with the knowing subject, this is mystical theology; with the object known, this is scholastic theology. The result for Harnack is that knowledge and piety, though really different aspects of the same issue are naturally juxtaposed in dialectical tension, albeit positively in a reflexive and mutually reinforcing way. Harnack notes that the Scholasticism-Mysticism dichotomy breaks down since both are a way of knowing God.

The salutary point in Harnack that knowledge of God and worship of God are linked acknowledges a classic connection in Christian theology. But this is not scholasticism proper: it is a cluster of philosophical and theological doctrines that form a particular religious epistemology. His observation could be extended from the medievals to the patristics. A ready example is Augustine of Hippo. In a work of Christian piety, Augustine poses the dynamic of knowledge of God and of ourselves in the very first chapter of the Confessio Dei when he asks whether one must first call upon God and praise God or one must know God before calling upon Him. Augustine solves the question by resorting to God-given faith in Christ preached as the basis for both knowledge and worship of God. This in turn becomes the basis for enriching one's faith


through knowledge and vice versa. Augustine is an important example inasmuch as his 
*De Doctrina Christiana* became a traditional warrant for the medieval project of faith 
seeking understanding through the *quaestio* method. Yet *fides quaerens intellectum* is 
not properly speaking the *quaestio* method of medieval scholasticism, it is a goal of 
medieval piety and an epistemological commitment.

For Harnack the integrity of scholastic thought and piety were able to be 
maintained among the medievals, but not among the Protestants. However, is this really 
the case that Reformed theologians like Bernhardinus De Moor had little to no real 
interest in piety, given the massive theological edifice of his scholastic project? What 
forms could a union of scholastic method and piety assume among Reformed Protestant 
scholastics?

Contrary to Harnack, there is such a line of thought within many branches of early 
modern Protestantism. After his oft-cited maxim that nearly the entirety of our wisdom 
consists in two parts, knowledge of God and of ourselves, Calvin readily asks "yet which 
precedes and produces the other is not easy to discern" indicating the integral unity 
between knowledge and worship. Among Protestant Reformed scholastics after Calvin,

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52 E.g. Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana* in *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* (CCSL) 32, eds. K. D. 

"The discipline of disputation is especially valid for all kinds of questions in the holy writings that must be 
penetrated and solved." "Disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum quae in litteris sanctis sunt 
penetranda et dissolvenda plurimum valet."

53 Harnack's architectonic narrative on the transition from the medieval to the modern is that there was a 
shift away from the dogma of God to an individualistic focus upon subjective faith. It is this loss of the 
other and the focus on the self that precipitates the fracture between scholasticism and piety. For Harnack, 
inasmuch as Protestants also tended to drift from his definition of mysticism, the result is a dessicated shell 
of the more robust scholasticism of the medievals with the emphasis upon contemplation of God.

there are works like Franciscus Junius's *De Theologia Vera* that do strive to maintain the balance between the object and subject of theology, that is between knowledge of God and of ourselves. Marckius states it this way, "The object of theology is true religion or the knowledge and worship of God; to that end also according to the other works of God, it concerns Man." Bernhardinus De Moor, following Marckius and Junius, expands upon a similar point connecting the prolegomenal issue of humanity as the subject of theology to his treatments of humanity in its integrity, fall, and redemption and the knowledge of God in those various states.

Even if we were to accept Harnack's general observation that piety and scholasticism are integrally related, it does not follow that an emphasis upon pedagogical or systematic concerns vitiates a concern for piety, as if an academic *scientia Dei* as a discipline and an experiential *cognitio Dei* as a personal expression of faith are fundamentally opposed rather than complementary. Nor does a scholastic method commit one to a particular form or lack of piety. It would also be a deficient understanding to interject a necessary divide between the methods of biblical exegesis and the project to develop a clear theological system. All of these concerns—methodological consistency, doctrinal clarity, and practical experience—are aspects of a healthy Christian theology. It is not the purpose of this chapter to chronicle all the various ways in which the secondary literature accounts for the rise of scholastic theology among the Protestant Reformed. But

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what the foregoing demonstrates is that there has been a tendency at times in the scholarship to read a necessary antithesis between piety (whether one views this as religion, worship, practical theology, etc.) and a rigorous academic method, that is, some form of scholastic arrangement of a body of thought.

5.2.4 Scholasticism and Piety in Harmony

Recently, Gregory Schuringa demonstrates in the case of Simon Oomius a theologian who is simultaneously engaging in high scholastic argumentation and is deeply concerned about contributing to the development of personal piety. Schuringa also calls for the extension of his specific thesis with respect to Oomius generally to other Reformed Orthodox theologians concerned with both practical piety and scholastic doctrinal exposition. In this respect, we are now ready to examine Marckius and De Moor. But what should be said of the theologians who self-consciously arranged practical theology in a secondary position? Does this mean that such writers are opposed to piety and practical theology? The remainder of this chapter is an exploration of that issue in relation to Johannes Marckius and Bernhardinus De Moor.

With great appreciation for Schuringa’s method upon Oomius, a much closer read is in order of not only De Moor but also of Marckius. In so doing, several questions emerge, such as: how did these theologians describe their technical handbooks for the academic setting? Given that the Protestant Reformed theologians teaching at Leiden University in the sixteenth and seventeenth century generally described theology as a sapientia, that is, as a theoretical and practical discipline, how is it that their works tend

57 Gregory Schuringa, "Embracing Leer and Leven: the theology of Simon Oomius in the context of Nadere Reformatie orthodoxy" (Ph.D. diss., Calvin Theological Seminary, 2003).

58 G. Schuringa in Ballor, et al., Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism, 641-43.
toward more theoretical and polemical treatments? Are there curricular constraints and goals that would determine the shape and character of their treatments? And lastly, where would they place questions of piety in their academic program? Answers to these questions will demonstrate that we can speak of a range of Reformed approaches of how one locates piety and practical theology within the broader discipline of theology. The location of practical theology within a theological system is tied to how a theologian constructs the nature of theology, the distribution of its parts, and the method of exposition. As such we now turn to consider the methods of several theologians at various Dutch universities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such theologians as William Ames of Franeker University, Petrus Van Mastricht of the University of Utrecht, in addition to Marckius and De Moor at Leiden, will be compared in this regard to their placement of the practical theology.

5.2.4.1 Marckius’s and De Moor’s Method of Theological Exposition

Bernhardinus De Moor informs us in his preface to the *Commentarius* that he began this massive enterprise of a commentary on Johannes Marckius’ *Compendium Christianae Theologiae* after following in the footsteps of the greatest theologians by teaching practical theology, this would place the beginning of the project at least after 1761. This would also be four years after his treatment of 2 Peter 1.59 Afterwards he desired to turn his attention to a dogmatic and elenchtic exposition of theology. First and foremost, he wanted to publish something for the benefit of his students as a supplement to their studies. Secondly, Johannes Marckius asked De Moor to take up the task of

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further explicating his *Compendium* a few months before his death. For this reason, Bernhardinus De Moor amply cross-references the works of other Protestant Reformed scholars as well as supplements Marckius’s work with citations from the church fathers. De Moor also tells us that he is not replicating the text of the compendium in his commentary but that both should be open at the same time.

That there were student editions of Marckius's *Compendium* published for this purpose is worth pausing to note. As I mentioned in the previous chapter on disputations, by the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Marckius' *Compendium* was sometimes published with a verso page of text and a blank recto page for notes and "*in usus primos academiae iuventutis*" and known as the *Medulla*. Given that theological disputations up to 1767 over which De Moor presided were keyed to Marckius, it perhaps becomes clearer how tightly we can see the coordination between De Moor's class lectures, Marckius's works, and student disputations. This perhaps provides part of the answer how a historian could bridge the gap between a professor's lecture and a student disputation. Admittedly the ultimate proof for that point would be exceedingly rare to find: a used copy of the *Medulla* used in De Moor's class. It would be even rarer given that by 1774, De Moor was teaching on *biblia varia*. However, the fact remains there are editions of Marckius for classroom use by students for the purpose of taking notes. These notes

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60 De Moor supplies a list of the predominant church fathers in the preface of the *Commentarius*, 1:**2v.-**2v.

would have been memorized and could have been easily arranged in consultation with the professor to compose student theses for disputations.

As to why the practical uses are not appended at the end of every doctrinal section, De Moor points out that he is following the practice of Marckius. Marckius specifically states in the preface to his *Compendium*:

> And since theology not only teaches matters that must be believed theoretically but also much more so inculcates matters that must be done practically, I have by no means at all thought that these things ought to be passed over, but these things are more extensively treated than is customarily done in the chapters concerning the worship of God and the law, the Decalogue, sanctification and good works, and finally prayer and its effects. … Yet I have not followed the method of others here who customarily place practical uses under every head of theology, even when there is no controversy among us concerning the use of the matter believed.62

Marckius further explains that rather than make a general application in each chapter which anyone could easily do, he would rather spend his time on the specific errors and heresies that are now prevalent.63 Furthermore, for the training of pastors and scholars, his time is better spent in addressing the multitudinous types of problems that surface—philological, exegetical, casuistic, philosophical, and historical—in the understanding of theology. A lesser reason that he notes as well is that the application of these truths always fluctuates according to the times and contexts, indicating that practical applications may not be universal in nature. The implication being that doctrine should address questions of universal utility or general import first. After commending a diligent study of his work, Marckius comments that this work should be used for both the

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62 Marckius, *Compendium Theologiae Christianae Didactico-Elencticum*, [*4v*].

63 Marckius, *Compendium Theologiae Christianae Didactico-Elencticum*, [*4v*].
students’ disputations and sermons only when applicable to a present, pressing circumstance.64

If someone requires less information than Marckius supplies in his compendium, then he refers them to an even smaller synopsis, his Medulla.65 On the other hand, if someone requires more depth, he refers them to the larger systems of theology treating controversies and problems, the works of philologists, historians and especially the commentaries on Scripture. Besides being a reference to the works of others, this comment also points to his own work. Marckius also had authored approximately 6,000 pages of biblical commentaries, an 885 page biblical history of paradise on the first three chapters of Genesis, and approximately 7,000 pages of philological and textual disputations dealing with these sorts of problems and issues.66 In other words, the corpus of Marckius must not only be read as a whole to develop an estimation of how he addresses matters of practice and piety, but also that Marckius is sensitive to the context for which the work is written. Commentaries were for pastors and students whereas his theological handbooks were to address matters of polemical concern in a systematic way for the sake of the student seeking to pass his various university and ecclesiastical exams.

De Moor simply remarks “for the same reasons that impelled [Marckius] to remove the practical uses from each head of doctrine I have likewise refrained from attaching them to this commentary.”67 If someone would like that sort of method, De

64Marckius, Compendium Theologiae Christianae Didactico-Elencticum, **r.


66 Marckius, see Indiculos Operum in Compendium, **2v.-**3v.

67De Moor, Commentarius, *4v.
Moor heartily commends Andreas Essenius and Petrus Van Mastricht for this sort of approach. It is at least noteworthy that both Essenius and Van Mastricht were students of one of the significant luminaries of the Dutch *Nadere Reformatie*, the University of Utrecht professor, Gijsbert Voet. Essenius in turn was a professor of Wilhelmus à Brakel, Philipp van Limborch, and Voet’s grandson, Johannes Voet. Both Essenius and Van Mastricht stand in a line of theologians who employed a method that began with exegesis, advanced to doctrinal formulation, proceeded to polemical engagement, and terminated with practical uses. A method typified in the Netherlands by William Ames.

### 5.2.4.2 The Amesian Method for Inculcating Piety\(^68\)

Another theologian might be added to De Moor's list, who if not the sole source, is a significant one. The English puritan and expatriate William Ames stands near the wellspring of this stream of thought among Dutch Reformed theologians in the seventeenth century. Ames is worth consideration because on one hand he provides an impulse among some theologians to articulate practical uses and applications for every head of theology, and on the other hand, he supplies a precedent of handling all the topics of theology separately from questions of practice. Though at first this point may seem contradictory, a bit of explanation is in order.

The exegetical works of William Ames, such as his psalms commentary and his commentary on the Heidelberg catechism, clearly demonstrate his exegetical method that

meticulously terminates in practical piety. Methodologically, William Ames in his *Medulla SS Theologiae* separates theology into a two part system; first the theoretical doctrinal formulation concerning the faith, and then the observance or practice of the faith. The division is tied to Ames's definition of theology as a practical discipline rather than a speculative one and the distribution of theology into its nature and acts. This indicates, at the least, that simply because one relocates or rearranges the place of the practical uses of doctrine does not necessarily mean that they have been neglected. It also demonstrates that there is precedence within the Reformed scholastic tradition for dividing the topic differently. Thus, even though Mastricht, for example, might handle practical questions within a topic of theology alongside the exegetical, doctrinal, and polemical sections, he still views his method as contiguous with Ames, who separates the exposition of theology into a manual of doctrine and a manual of cases of conscience. Likewise, De Moor can claim Ames as a source for his method in that there is precedence for separating or concentrating practical applications for particular heads of doctrine.

For a ready example of William Ames's scholastic method and piety, the Jansson edition of Ames's *Opera* structurally depicts Ames’s pedagogical method through the arrangement of his works by the volumes in the movement from exegesis to doctrinal instruction to use, and finally to polemics. In his exegetical works, specifically his commentary on the Psalms, Ames proceeds verse by verse through the text via sections.

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70 Ames, *Opera*, 2.1-3.1

71 Ames, *Opera*, 2.3-4.
entitled Analysis, Questions, and Lessons. The analysis is logical; that is, there is always either a complete syllogism—a major premise (*propositio*), a minor premise (*assumptio*), and a conclusion (*conclusio*)—or an enthymeme, an incomplete syllogism which requires Ames to supply the unspoken premise. The analysis seeks to reveal the general aim (*scopus*) of the Psalm. The analysis in turn raises particular textual, doctrinal, and practical questions. The questions in turn demand a thorough resolution via tiered and inter-locking responses that parse the modes and aspects of the question. After a thorough line of questioning, the answers culminate in a clear set of lessons (*documenta*) or doctrines, which each have their supporting reasons or rationale (*ratio*). The reasons are developed exegetically and theologically, frequently citing collections of scripture passages to anchor a point in the classical loci of theology. The culmination of these lessons is the uses (*usus*) that are generally classified as for exhortation, instruction, admonition, rebuke, argument, and restraint, building off of 2 Timothy 3:16-17. This lengthy and thorough process is applied to each verse and sometimes even to each phrase. Occasionally this process is interrupted, not with theological loci but with interpretive prolegomena, which deal with broader issues and exegetical methods that are a source of doctrinal contention. Due to his exegetical process there is no need to develop individual, doctrinal loci, for those are already included, but there is a need to explain some aspect of his interpretive method, which precipitates a prolegomenon on a particular interpretive tool. For example, before his treatment of Psalm 2 there is a

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72 One cannot help but notice similarities in Ames's *quaestio* method and medieval commentaries. Furthermore, we find a scholastic form with a pious concern for practice. This could also be extended to the scholastic and practical theologies of Voetius and Hoornbeek, contra Heppe's treatment of Ames, Voetius, and Hoornbeek, *Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der Reformirten Kirche Nametlich der Niederlande*, 139-156.
relatively lengthy and polemical prolegomenon on the appropriation and use of types in
exegesis. He sets out the various approaches to the psalms among the Jews, the Fathers,
and “our” theologians. To scholars and students of this time period, it is also apparent
that Ames’s antecedents in this regard are the scholastic patterns of thought, vocabulary,
and argumentation arising from medieval scholasticism. Yet it must be acknowledged
that the concern for etymology, history, context, grammar, philology, rhetorical
argument, and style exhibits an engrained appreciation for humanistic reforms present in
the sixteenth century. The point is made even more when we consider the contribution
from his general Ramist pedagogical sympathies in the arrangement of topics. On the
other hand, his method probably stems from his more specific appropriation of the
Perkinsian model of exegesis he learned at Cambridge. The result is a deep concern or
rather insistence that every point of doctrine has a corresponding application in the life of
believers because holy Scripture is inspired by the Holy Spirit.

This same method is slightly modified when we turn our attention to the Sketch of
the Christian's Catechism which is an exposition of the Heidelberg Catechism based on a
Scripture passage best suited to handle the doctrines, questions, and uses raised by the
various catechism questions on the appropriate Lord’s Day. The analysis typically used
in his Scripture commentary is replaced by a brief exposition and overview of the

Orthodox approaches to Psalm 2” in Jordan J. Ballor, David Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema. Church and
School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a

74 Cf. William Perkins, Opera Omnia Theologica, in Duos Tomos Tributa, (1624). Sometimes Perkins will
elaborate upon an end and use (finis et usus) for a particular doctrine, but it is not a consistent part of his
schema when handling every doctrine. For example, after a chapter on the use of the Law, he discusses the
Commandments, which states the text of scripture, has a section entitled analysis, then a pars negativa or
selected pericope that is functionally the same, though abbreviated. The questions which normally follow the exegetical analysis are infrequent in the Sketch and when they do arise, they appear in between the lessons. The lessons (documenta), or proofs, are typically thetical statements supported by reasons, which are more lengthy explanations of doctrinal points developed from Scripture and the Heidelberg Catechism, and culminate in uses. For all practical purposes, the uses follow the same format as they do in Ames’s commentaries on Scripture.

Turning from his exegetical works to his manuals of theology, the second way to consider the question of Ames's piety is to consider the relation between doctrinal formulation and practical application in his method of elaborating theology. Ames based his division of theology into faith and obedience (observantia) on a chain of several key scripture texts which illustrate his understanding of theological doctrine and its goal. His translation of 2 Timothy 1:13 is striking to modern ears familiar with "a pattern of sound words," "Hold to the clearly defined model (expressa forma) of wholesome speech that you have heard from me, with faith and love," "having faith and a good conscience" (1 Tim. 1:19), and "Have faith in Jehovah and do good" (Ps. 37:3). He also linked his method to the example of Abraham, "And Abraham believed God …" (Gen. 15:6) and "walk unceasingly before me and be blameless" (Gen. 17:1); the commands of Christ to observe all that he commanded (Matt. 28:20); and the Pauline method in Acts 24:14-16,

75 William Ames, Guilielmi Amesii SS. Theologiae Guilielmi Amesii SS. Theologiae Doctoris ... Opera Quae Latine Scrisit, in Quique Volumina Distribute. Cum Praefatione Introductoria Matthiae Netheni SS.Th. Doctoris ... Qua Historia Vitae & Scriptorum d. Amesii Breviter Enarratur & Horum Praestantia atque Utilitas Ostenditur, 5 volumes (Amsterdam: Jansson, 1658-59). Medulla Theologica and De Conscientia may be found in volume 2.
"I believe all that has been written … I have hope in God … I train myself for the holding of a conscience without offense."  

Ames summarized the parts of theology in this way:

For since the principium of spiritual life (which is the proper object of theology) and its first act is faith, and the second act, or operation emanating from the principium, is obedience, it necessarily follows that those two parts of theology are the natural \((\text{genuina})\) ones, nor must any others be looked for.  

Next, Ames argued that in the order of nature "faith holds the first place and spiritual obedience the latter, for vital actions cannot be elicited unless the principium of life has been first implanted." And just as philosophers divide philosophy into metaphysics and ethics (their form of faith and obedience, he says, since the Peripatetics even call metaphysics theology), Ames, with qualification, endorsed Francisco Suarez's comments on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* regarding the division of theology into metaphysics and ethics. 

Suarez had asserted that human blessedness consists in the most perfect metaphysical act. 

Or as Suarez would say it, the most perfect metaphysical act conjoins knowledge and love, and thus orders all other sciences, moral virtues, prudence, and actions to their chief good and highest end. Properly qualified, the result of this line of

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76 Ames, *Opera*, 2.3-4.  
77 Ames, *Opera*, 1.4  
78 Ames’s comments that endorse a division of theology into a metaphysical or theoretical aspect and an ethical or practical aspect must be coordinated and tempered with his strong objections to Suarez’s claim that metaphysics yielded theoretical truth about God and theology yielded practical truth about God. Ames is adamant that theology has both a theoretical and practical side and provides metaphysical and moral truth about God. Otherwise, natural philosophy would render Scripture unnecessary. Cf. thesis 6 and 7 in William Ames, *Disputatio theologica contra metaphysicam*, (Leiden: Justinus Livius, 1632), 6-10. I offer this clarification and I am grateful to Dr. Aza Goudriaan, Vrij Universiteit Amsterdam, for raising in the dissertation defense the apparent contradiction between Ames’s endorsement in the *Medulla* of Suarez’s comments on the metaphysics/ethics division, and Ames’s repeated rejections of several of Suarez’s assertions.  

79 Aristotle raises the question of whether one science orders all others in, for example, Book II, chapter 2, *The Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. J. H. McMahon (London: George Bell & Sons, 1896), 57-60.  
reasoning for Ames is a methodological division into the topics of theology and theological ethics, and thus all of theology tends toward practice.

For Ames, since theology must promote practice, there is also an explicit emphasis upon the role of conscience which stands at the intersection between general doctrine and its use. The result is a rather traditional discussion of the importance of Christian obedience, virtues, and habits. The life of practical subjective application of general objective truths of Scripture is the life of piety. Ames outlines a system of piety in two textbooks of his theology, the *Medulla Theologica* (hereafter *Medulla*) and *De Conscientia et eius jure, vel casibus* (hereafter *Cases of Conscience*). Whereas book one is the doctrinal content or *principia* of faith, book two of the *Medulla Theologica* is a discussion of the general topics of piety. Among other points, Ames discusses Christian obedience, virtues, good works, faith, hope, love, the hearing of the Word, prayer, and so forth. Ames speaks generally of *observantia* as subjection to the law of God for God's glory in accord with the first petition of the Lord's Prayer and the example of Christ's prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane ("Let your will be done on earth as it is in heaven" and "not my will but yours").

Inasmuch as the will (*voluntas*) is rendered ready to hear

(Salamanca: Joannes et Andreas Renaut, 1597), 37-38. Cf. Ames’s citation of Suarez: "In perfectissimo acta metaphysica beatitudo hominis consistit, Contemplatur sumnum bonum, & ultimum finem simpliciter, Divina contemplatio formaliter, seu elicite ad hanc scientiam," Ames’s comment: “Theologia igitur in istis partibus recte tradita, Metaphysica et Ethica sua sponte evanescent, postquam ejus distributione illustre testimonium praebuerunt,” and Suarez’s original: "Addo denique, si Metaphysica consideretur quatenus in perfectissimo actu eius naturalis beatitudo hominis consistit, sic ad illam vt ad finem ordinari non solum alias scientias, sed etiam Morales virtues & prudentiam, nam haec omnia ad foelicitatem hominis ordinantur, & actiones omnes ad hunc finem optime referuntur, vt scilicet hominem disponant, aptumque reddant ad diuinam contemplationem, quae formaliter seu elicitiue ad hanc scientiam pertinet, licet habere debeat coniunctum amorem, qui ex tali contemplatione solet nasci. Atque hac etiam ratione concludit Aristoteles scientiam hanc omnibus imperare, quia contemplatur sumnum bonum & ultimum finem simpliciter; sicut enim in artibus quae ad aliqum finem subordinantur, illa architectonica est, alisque imperat, quae supremum finem in illo ordine considerat."

God's command and once understood moves toward action, this observantia is obedientia. Inasmuch as obedience is subject to the will of God and effecting righteousness, it is holiness (sanctitas). As obedience acknowledges God's authority and power, it is reverence. True Christian obedience must be characterized by a willing heart, and to that extent is the obedience of sons, whereas an obedience characterized primarily by strict obligation and motivated by fear without respect to faith in God is the obedience of slaves. The chief end of such obedience is primarily God's glory and secondly our salvation and blessedness.

Furthermore, observantia is composed of two parts: a habitual virtue and an action of virtue. As a habit, it determines a faculty to a good. Ames locates virtue within the will (voluntas) "first, because the will is the proper subject of theology, inasmuch as it is the proper principium of life as well as moral and spiritual actions." Ames further specifies that he does not mean simply the virtues as philosophers address the subject but as the Scriptures do, taking his cue from the apostle Paul in Philippians 4:8, "if there is anything virtuous, praiseworthy" and so forth. And perhaps most importantly, virtue must be located in the will because "the intellect cannot be the proper subject of virtue since the intellectual habits, although they may be the most perfect, do not render a person good, nor does any sensitive appetite." Thus, "virtue not only inclines one to

82 Ames, Opera, 2:194-5.
83 Ames, Opera, 2:195.
85 Ames, Opera, 2:201-202
good, but also to acting well, because a mode of action chiefly flows from virtue."88 From this point, Ames asserts the superiority of theology over philosophical ethics precisely because in his opinion ethics is only concerned with external morals whereas theology addresses the internal affections.89

With respect to the enumeration of the virtues, Ames refers to Aristotle's enumeration of them as an adaptable rule.90 And differing from Aristotle, Ames instead insists that however the virtues are enumerated they must be derived from the Scriptures.91 From this point, Ames endeavors to coordinate the cardinal virtues of prudence, righteousness (iustitia, or justice), temperance, and fortitude to their analogs in Scripture.92 With respect to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love, Ames coordinates these toward God. "Faith is the virtue by which we, while clinging to the faithfulness of God, strive towards Him, so that we pursue what he sets before us."93 The marks of faith are five: (1) knowledge of a matter testified by God, (2) pious affection towards God, (3) assent to the truth testified (veritas testata) with pious affection toward God the witness (Deus testis), (4) rest of the soul in God, and (5) a choosing (electio) or apprehension of what is witnessed.94 And in these five marks, at the beginning we see the

88 Ames, Operum, 2:203.
89 Ames, Operum, 2:204.
90 Lesbia regula
91 Ames, Operum, 2:203.
92 For example, in his discussion of religion, Ames divides observantia into religion and justice. Religion is with respect to piety towards God, justice is with respect to our neighbor, and temperance denotes the means of restraining worldly desires. But this does not mean that we could not also speak of religion as love towards God and justice as love towards our neighbor, Ames, Operum, 2:218.
93 Ames, Operum 2:225.
94 Ames, Operum 2:225.
first part of theology, the exposition of theology as matters attested by God and at the end we see the beginnings of moral action. In the middle is the subjective work of grace in the believer. Hope is the virtue expectation of what God has promised, however, its foundation is faith. On the other hand, Christian assurance (fiducia), which is commonly spoken of as a mark of true faith, "is nothing other than hope confirmed." Finally, "love is the virtue by which we love God as our chief end." Whereas Roman Catholic theologians insisted that love was the basis for the justification of faith, Ames insists the opposite is true, "faith is the first foundation of the spiritual edifice in man, not only because it initiates the edifice, but also because faith sustains and contains all its parts, just as it also has the nature of a root, because it confers the strength to bear fruit." It is no surprise then that subsequent chapters pursue practices of piety directed towards God and neighbor as motivated by faith, hope, and love. With respect to God, these include the hearing of the Word in reading and preaching, prayer, oaths, the lot, worship. With respect to neighbors, these include love, justice, kindness, chastity, truthfulness.

In the preface to his work *Cases of Conscience* (as De Conscientia is frequently translated), Ames indicates that he is continuing with the same method that he utilized in the second book of the *Medulla Theologica*. He will define the topic then he will proceed to elaborate its offices towards God and towards one's neighbor. Here Ames articulates

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his view of the nature and function of conscience for a life of obedience. Or, to state it more precisely, this work explores the relationship between the practical judgment of the intellect and the will as it respects matters of piety. Building on the previous exploration of theology, virtue, and faith, Ames speaks of human conscience as "a person's judgment of themselves as it is subject to the judgment of God."99 And just as theology tends towards practice, conscience here is not a theoretical judgment but a practical one. It is not a habit according to Ames, but in agreement with "the best of the scholastics," it is a practical judgment of the intellect. Whereas a habit inclines toward action, conscience possesses operation that it exercises immediately.100 Furthermore, to the extent that conscience is informed by the Word of God, it has "in itself the force of the divine will and thus it conducts the plight of God himself."101

Ames illustrates the force and nature of conscience and the connection between general doctrine and personal application in the following practical syllogisms:

Anyone who lives in sin shall die.
I live in sin.
Therefore, I will die.

Anyone who believes in Christ shall not die but live.
I believe in Christ.
Therefore I will not die but live.102

The work then of theology according to Ames is to present the truth of God, indicate the internal applications to a believer, and guide a believer toward a proper appropriation of


100 Ames, *De conscientia*, 2.


102 Ames, *De conscientia*, 3.
the promises of God. Furthermore, theology as it directs toward love of God and love of neighbor also inculcates certain beliefs, virtues, judgments of oneself, and actions. Practical piety in this regard is a natural and necessary result of one's theology. With respect to his method Ames does not separate scholastic distinctions from practical implications for personal piety. Ames models a method that differentiates scholastic topics from practical application within the context of a theological textbook while at the same time driving the trajectory of the entire work towards an experiential piety.

5.2.4.3 Mastricht’s Theoretical-Practical Approach

In the case of Petrus Van Mastricht, we have a theologian who specifically structures every head of theology in his *Theoretico-Practica Theologia*—in some cases every theorem—with exegetical, didactic, polemical, and practical sections. Van Mastricht is another significant counter-example to the thesis that there was a hard bifurcation into piety and scholasticism among the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Protestant Reformed. Van Mastricht spent most of his career in the universities of Duisberg and Utrecht, during which time he built a systematic theology off of his class lectures and student disputations. Additionally, he also wrote a systematic theology that examined Cartesian thought point for point through every head of doctrine without so much as any point of practical application. If his *Novitatum Cartesianarum Gangraena*

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103 Material in this section on Mastricht, Hoornbeek, and Voetius was developed in conjunction with the introduction for publication of my translation of Petrus van Mastricht, *The Best Method of Preaching* (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2013).

104 Mastricht, *Theoretico-Practica Theologia*, (1699).

were the only piece extant of Van Mastricht’s corpus, one might be tempted to classify him as only a polemical scholastic. On the other hand, if one only had Van Mastricht’s massive treatment *De Salvifica Fide*, one might classify him as a pious, experimental preacher. Since we have both, we have a theologian with a broad range of interests both in the impact of philosophy upon theology as well as in the vibrant faith of individual church members. The key then is in understanding the significance of the scope and sequence of the author’s work. Where Van Mastricht excels is in his ability to move from text to practice through the doctrinal and polemical aspects. In every edition of Van Mastricht’s *Theoretico-Practica Theologia*, the “paralipomena” section, “the best method of preaching,” is either prefatory or the last attachment to the whole work, signaling at the least that Van Mastricht insisted upon a pastoral edge to his compendium. And at the same time, in the doctrinal and polemical sections of his work, he does not hesitate to refer a reader to other more scholastic disputations, treatises, or systems since his work did not treat the matter exhaustively.

The structure of Van Mastricht’s work is also informative as well, that despite having a practical section of every head of theology, the parts two and three of the *Theoretico-Practica Theologia* are devoted to moral and ascetic theology (or the practice of piety), signaling again an appreciation of Ames's method. In this regard, it mirrors the two part system of Ames’s *Medulla*. Out of over 1,300 pages however, only the last 121 pages treat moral theology and the practice of piety directly. In this regard it is markedly different than Ames’s work because Ames’ makes a rather even division between the two in the amount of space allocated. On the other hand, Ames does not engage polemically as deep as Mastricht, nor does Ames develop each head of theology from the exegesis of
one primary Scripture passage. Mastricht then represents a deepening of method both in
the level of exegesis, doctrinal development, polemical engagement, and practical
application.

Two significant influences upon Mastricht's theological perspective, didactic
method, and approach to pastoral ministry were professors at Utrecht. Gisbertus Voetius
was a theologian who shaped Mastricht's approach to philosophy, theology, piety, and the
pastoral ministry. Among historians of philosophy, Voetius is a theologian most known
for his vocal and visceral rejection of Cartesian philosophy and opposition to theologians
who sought to synthesize Cartesian method and principles with Reformed theology.
Defending Christian Aristotelianism, the Senate of the University condemned Cartesian
thought in March 1642 while Voetius was regius professor of the University of Utrecht.
Among historical theologians, however, Voetius is known for his participation at the
Synod of Dordt and opposition to the Remonstrants, support and use of the *Synopsis
Purioris* as a professor, commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, volumes of scholastic
theological disputations at the University of Utrecht, a curricular plan of education for
seminarians, and his influence upon Dutch Reformed church polity.106 As much as
Hoornbeek, Voetius was devoted to practical theology, for example, he outlines his
approach to practical theology in a series of six disputations. Voetius also devotes two
volumes of disputations to practical questions of piety and worship. Voetius is another

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106 For a bibliography of the works of Voetius, see: A.J. van der Aa, *Biographisch Woordenboek der
Protestant Reformed representative of the integration of practical piety and scholastic orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{107}

At first, given his heavily qualified defense of the use of scholastic theology as a polemical tool for engaging Roman Catholic theologians, it might seem counter-intuitive to assert that Voetius was a proponent of practical theology, given how heavily the older scholarship juxtaposes practical piety and scholastic theology.\textsuperscript{108} But what exactly does Voetius mean by scholastic theology? Here again we find the importance of a careful definition, and Voetius provides five different ways to speak of it.

In the disputation "On Scholastic Theology," Voetius taught that etymologically by scholastic theology one means "scholastic theology is described as 'from the school'"\textsuperscript{109} and then Voetius, before setting forth a proper sense, specifies four ways it can be taken. (1) Taken as broadly as possible it includes everything taught whether well or poorly; whether by the inspired writers of the Old and New Testament, by learned but fallible doctors, or by erroneous heretics; whether in public or in private schools or assemblies. (2) Taken in a broad sense, it is the formula and method of theology in


\textsuperscript{108}E.g. Edwin Charles Dargan, \textit{A History of Preaching: Volume II, From the Close of the Reformation Period to the End of the Nineteenth Century, 1572-1900} (Hodder & Stoughton, 1912), 78-80. Voetius is held forth as a dry, somewhat pietistic scholastic given to topical preaching whereas Cocceius is portrayed as a true biblical exegete who was concerned with application and practice.

\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Theologia scholastica dicitur a schola}
European schools "after the entrance of the anti-Christian corruption of religion" which must be distinguished from ecclesiastical or church theology that prevailed earlier and in the better ages "which was not only in the churches but also in the schools and theological colleges." On this point, Voetius subdivides the topic again specifying the state of theological education in the medieval period and notes (a) a textual or Bible-based theology, albeit in his estimation poorly executed, (b) dogmatic questions, (c) canonists, and (d) "summistical" or casuist theology. (3) If taken strictly then scholastic theology is "a formula and method of theology" that treats of the four books of the Sentences and then moves to disputationes and commentaries on the Sentences, Thomas, and others. (4) The quodlibetal questions and select passages (eclogarii) from a variety of patristic fathers and church teachings. Finally, Voetius offers a beneficial sense that he would endorse and remarks "For we think between scholastic theology (scholastica theologia) and a scholastic (scholasticus)—that is, a didactic and elenchtic professor of theology—there is as much distance from the scholastic Sententiarii as the whole of heaven." 110

Voetius engages the question of whether scholastic theology ought to be retained through Roman Catholic authors in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, specifically Petrus Canus and Possevinus. Voetius answers that they should take their own advice and cites their own words back to them: "but in every oration, remember O Reader, that I defend the school's teaching (doctrina) that has been established on the foundation of the sacred writings."111 Secondly, "let no one call themselves a scholastic theologian except

110 "De Scholastica Theologia" in Gijsbertus Voetius, Gisberti Voeti ... Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum (Utrecht: Joannes a Waesberg, 1648), 1.12-29.

111 Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum, 1:28.
those who make conclusions (ratiocinetur) about God and divine matters fittingly, prudently, and learnedly from the holy writings and decrees."112 Furthermore, Voetius answers the charge against Protestants that they are not interested in intellectual and reasoned theology with these points: (1) "we do not banish reason, the light of nature, logic, and philosophy—the handmaidens of theology—from the theological school." (2) "We do not reject a systematic (acromatica) method of treating theology didactically and elenchtically in the schools, but we studiously and continuously pursue and develop them." (3) The rejection of papal scholastic theology is not the same as affirming a true and solid theology.113

We must also consider Voetius's response to the following questions: (1) "Could someone be a learned didactic and elenchtic theologian who is a stranger to scholastic theology? Absolutely not … how, I ask, could someone solidly refute it … if one did not read or understand it."114 (2) "Is the study of and familiarity with scholastic theology in any way consistent with practical theology?" and (3) "does familiarity with and consideration of the former corrupt and overturn the latter?" Voetius responds "'Yes' to the former [2], 'No' to the latter [3]. No more than a meticulous exposition of practical theology overturns the other: 'Test everything; hold fast to what is good (1 Thess. 5[:21])' William Perkins and William Ames are two outstanding examples of practical theologians."115 From this point Voetius concludes the disputation with

113 Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum, 1:28.
114 Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, 1:28-29.
115 Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, 1:28-29.
recommendations for the curriculum of Reformed seminarians: not only should scholastic theologians among the ancient and modern authors be read but especially their philosophical terms and distinctions should be understood. And after seminarians read them in the schools, "if possible, it should be dealt with in a friendly exercise (exercitatio) or collegium of examiners and disputants."¹¹⁶ This must occur in their study of metaphysics, in their theologico-philosophical exercitia. Since the Roman Catholic scholastics must be met theologically and philosophically as well as publicly and privately, it would also be appropriate and utilissime for students to read through some scholastic disputation on those occasions.

In the first part of a series of academic disputations in 1646 on practical theology, Voetius defines it this way:

Practical theology taken broadly can denote all theology whatsoever in relation to the Holy Scriptures, either, it is taught from them or in commentaries upon Scripture, the loci communes, or catechisms, because the entire theology of pilgrims (omnis theologia viatorum) is in its own kind a practical discipline, and no part of it can be handled correctly or fully which is not dealt with practically, that is, with application to the practice of repentance, faith, hope, and love; or for the use of comfort or exhortation.¹¹⁷

In short order, Voetius fires off the names of Alsted, Alting, Gomarus, Daneau, Zanchi, Polanus, Aretius, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Zepper, Melanchthon, Musculus, Wendelin, Tilenus, Maccovius, Johannes Gerard, Calvin, Franciscus Junius and the professors of the Leiden Synopsis Purioris. He endorses their works as ultimately able to be turned


¹¹⁷ See Gijsbertus Voetius, Gisberti Voeti ... Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum Pars Tertia (Utrecht: Joannes a Waesberg, 1649), 3:1.
towards practice whether they subdivide the discipline of theology into didactic, elenchtic, problematic, historical theology like Alting; natural, didactico-polemical, catechetical, practical or casuistic, or prophetic theology like Alsted; or Christian physics, ethics, and politics like Daneau. He also points to the different genres such as theses, syntagma, loci communes, commentaries, and so forth. Voetius embraces all of these variations since all these classifications and genres do not multiply theologies, but rather what is "devised is only a different method or order and mode of learning and teaching it [theology] according to people's capacity and ability." Voetius explains further why practical theology could be reduced simply to matters of faith and repentance, but with respect to theological education, this should only be done relatively.

The entirety of dogmatic and practical theology, or rather didactic, elenchtic, historical, and problematic theology can be reduced to faith and repentance, and implicitly everything is contained under those two common topics. And in this sense the practice of faith and repentance coincides with practical theology. But explicitly, those two common topics do not possess all that is required for theological and pastoral (concionatoria) instruction, and so those topics are not sufficient, at least not as they are handled in the academic theses, or in the compendia of the loci communes.

When viewed from this angle, it is not surprising that Voetius's student, Petrus van Maastricht is in agreement with Voetius that practical and scholastic theology (properly understood) are not inherently antithetical, but both are needed as an aspect of theological education.

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119 Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, 3:1.

120 Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, 3:18.
education for the training of pastors. The latter being a polemical tool and the former being the all engulfing application of any theological deliberations.

Another influence upon Mastricht, Johannes Hoornbeek, is perhaps best known as the author of the two volume work *Theologia Practica* (vol. 1: 1663, vol. 2: 1666), a pastor within the Dutch Further Reformation (*Nadere Reformatie*) movement, and a professor of theology and Old Testament at both the University of Leiden and the University of Utrecht. *The New Herzog – Schaaf Encyclopedia* describes Hoornbeek as representative of "the type of an orthodox theologian of the Netherlands, combining with the scholastic method the most earnest zeal for a life of practical piety." Hoornbeek was also renowned as a polemical theologian for his work, *Summa controversiarum Religionis*, as well as a practical theologian for such works treating among other things: evangelizing "the Indians and the heathen" in the New World, the observance of the Decalogue, Sabbath keeping, the art of dying well, and an oration concerning prudence, or on the study of peace and concord. Hoornbeek typifies the environment of high scholastic orthodoxy and practical piety that framed Mastricht's formative years.

Hoornbeek asserts that true Christian theology is essentially practical because

Theology never teaches one only to speculate but always directs the action of the will towards some object whether good or evil, so that we may detest and flee the

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latter and truly so that we may love and pursue the former, and at every point in the same mode and order be directed to God.¹²⁴

In this context of directing the action of the will, Hoornbeek notes that in its concern for good and evil, virtue and vice, and holiness, theology is moral or spiritual and thus practical. The most practical skill, science, or doctrine is the one that directs to the highest good. In this view, the practical and speculative are diametrically opposed.

For this reason there is not any doctrine or science — and this includes theological doctrine or science — that can be called theoretical and practical simultaneously. Not because there are not those things about which a theologian theorizes (θεορεῖ): as a matter of fact one first perceives all things and must consider their characteristics, before preceding to their practice, but because one never only and chiefly speculates, or considers speculating alone as an adequate end.¹²⁵

As Hoornbeek points out this does not mean that practical theology does not consider theory, but that it does so always with an eye towards practice.¹²⁶

Since the nature of theology is essentially practical, this also leads to the question of how theology must be taught. Shortly after emphasizing the importance of Scripture in the Protestant Reformation and scriptural exegesis in theology, Hoornbeek turns his attention to the handling or treatment of theology.

Certainly the handling or method of handling [theology] proceeds by steps: the first step is to dogmatics, then polemics, and from there to practice: which is the course of students: nor is theology or any of its heads absolved, until after it establishes what must be maintained and pursued with respect to the truth, likewise so you may know how one can withstand and defend against any enemies and objections; and finally so that it may be heard as one hears the most august queen, who teaches how someone ought to live with reference to her

¹²⁶ Hoornbeek, *Theologiae Practicae*, 1:**2v.*
command and dignity, and thus theology in itself is never disjoined or separated from practice.\textsuperscript{127}

Mastricht is in fundamental agreement with Hoornbeek with respect to the essential nature of theology as well as with respect to the proper method of instruction. For example, in his final edition of the \textit{Theoretico-Practica Theologia}, regarding the nature of theology Mastricht asserts: "Christian theology is not theoretical, or theoretico-practical, except from its method of treatment, as we have delineated it; but it is purely and especially practical."\textsuperscript{128} With respect to the method of treatment, Christian theology demands

\ldots what Christ means in John 17:3 and Isaiah 53:11, and it is theoretico-practical: that is, it is neither theoretical only, which rests in some sort of contemplation of the truth; nor is it practical only, which has some sort of knowledge of the truth \ldots but it conjoins theory with practice, and is an $\epsilonπ\gammaνωσις \ \alpha\lambda\nu\thetaεις \ \tauης \ \kappa\alpha\tau'$ $\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu$, [Titus 1:1] a knowledge of the truth which is according to piety.\textsuperscript{129}

Both Hoornbeek and Mastricht use the following comment of Lactantius on the point to summarize their position that whatever we know we must do:

Neither can religion be separated from wisdom, nor wisdom from religion: because God is the same one who must be known, which is wisdom, and honored, which is religion; though wisdom precedes, religion follows. The prior is to know God, the latter is to worship God.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{127} Hoornbeek, \textit{Theologiae Practicae} (1663), 1:11.

\textsuperscript{128} Mastricht, \textit{Theoretico-Practica Theologia} (1698), 1.1.1.34.

\textsuperscript{129} Mastricht, \textit{Theoretico-Practica Theologia} (1698), 1.1.1.20.

Regarding the method of theology, Mastricht emphasizes starting with examining and expositing the whole of the Scriptures on a topic, didactically establishing the definition and boundaries of a doctrine, then polemically engaging erroneous views, and finally elucidating how the doctrines discussed impact the life of the believer.131

5.2.4.4 Marckius on the Knowledge and Worship of God

In the case of Marckius, who has a corpus of texts spanning multiple genres of theological discourse, the point is all the more salient, it is quite appropriate to refer a pastor to a commentary for an exposition and application of a biblical text and on the other hand refer the theologian to a body of disputations for solutions to theological and philosophical problems. And this is exactly what Marckius does throughout the text of the Compendium. At the end of each section, if relevant there are cross references to his commentaries, histories, and exegetical and philological disputations.

In comparing chapter 11 “On the worship of God and His Law as its norm” section 1 of Marckius’s Compendium with De Moor’s Commentarius, the first thing one notes in Marckius is the first line: “The knowledge of God leads us to His worship; religion certainly comes under both terms, but especially under the latter term.”132 De Moor elaborates: “We pass from the knowledge of God to His worship, to which the knowledge of Him leads; for which reason religion certainly comes under both terms of the knowledge and worship of God, but especially under the term divine worship, specifically in the vernacular language, where it is the solemn term, Godtsdienst [sic

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131 Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia (1698), 1.1.1.5.

132 Marckius, Compendium, 200.
God’s service].”¹³³ From here, in typical scholastic fashion there is an etymological treatment of the term in both Marckius and De Moor, who provides further lexical and exegetical resources.

Regarding section two of the chapter, Marckius points out that it is appropriate to outline this point both theoretically and practically in terms of the fittingness, necessity and usefulness of the worship of God. After several Scripture citations and basic points, Marckius cites his other works. On the same section, De Moor elaborates upon each of these pointing out it is fitting to contemplate the infinite perfection and majesty of God, the creation and its conservation, and all the more as believers contemplate their gracious redemption, that they have been made partakers of all spiritual benefits. The worship of God is necessary as it arises from (1) the goal of the God who works, (2) the commandment, (3) its enforcement by a threat, (3) human dependence; as such, worship is the basis of every humble prayer for life and salvation submitting to God’s will. The worship of God is useful as it reminds human beings of God’s attributes. The sufficiency of God indicates that God is most abundantly powerful to supply all the needs of creatures. Also the righteousness of God reminds human beings that righteousness will be rewarded and wickedness punished. God’s goodness leads creatures to God as their highest good. As God’s promises are sealed with an oath, by which God comes in the experience of the worshipper. And with one last practical-polemical flourish on section 2, De Moor comments, “This usefulness of divine worship is not destroyed by the doctrine concerning a gracious justification without merit because its goodness and reward abides

¹³³De Moor, *Commentarius*, 2.11.1.
for those worshipping God, who lavishes [these things] from His grace, not from merit.”

Section three on the worship of God comprises one sentence in Marckius:

“For furthermore, its nature ought to be properly contemplated; we assert that the worship of God is an obedience rendered by full subjection and confidence in the triune God [and] second has been prescribed in his law.” On this point De Moor directs the reader to the practical and theoretical contrast between Marckius’ definition and a problem raised by Thomas Hobbes. De Moor cites the work of pastor and philosopher, Gisbertus Cocquius, entitled *Hobbesianismi Anatome*, in which “from the tracts *De homine*, *De Cive*, and *Leviathan* … [Hobbes’s] apostasy from the Christian religion is demonstrated and refuted.” In *De Cive*, Hobbes defines honor and worship in this way, “Honor, properly speaking is nothing other than an opinion that another's power is conjoined with goodness. Moreover, worship is an external act as a sign of internal honor.” There are several practical problems that Hobbes’ definition raises. Perhaps the most glaring problem for Marckius and De Moor that Hobbes develops in these sections on worship is that worship is always in reference to power and can only occur freely without compulsion when done privately. Likewise public thanksgiving is always an action of appeasement for benefits received. Thus his definition undercuts a free, sincere public

134 De Moor, *Commentarius* 2.11.2.
135 Marckius, *Compendium*, 201.
worship of God since for Hobbes it is always under compulsion by the command of the state.

Cocquius’s response to Hobbes, which De Moor cites, is manifold, but one portion is sufficient to demonstrate the practicality of this polemic. If honor consists only in external acts, then God could be truly worshipped only by external signs of honor, something which, according to Psalm 50, Isaiah 1, and Isaiah 29, God detests. Psalm 51:19 specifically states that “the sacrifice of God is a broken and contrite heart.” John 4:24 also is significant: “God is spirit, thus he also desires to be worshipped in spirit and in truth.” Therefore, according to Cocquius, “honor consists in the mind, mouth, and deed, so also does worthy worship of God; also in the same way honor is not true honor if the internal affection of the soul is absent; so likewise if it is lacking in worship, that worship is not worthy worship of God but hypocrisy.” Additionally, according to Cocquius, Hobbes introduces a separation between internal and external worship, something Scripture forbids.

This brief exercise in working through a few sections of Marckius, De Moor’s comments, and De Moor’s citations on several points demonstrate the way that De Moor sought to both provide a conceptual framework as well as the citations necessary to make extremely practical points regarding Christian worship, faith, and piety. It is also noteworthy that De Moor does not quote Cocquius but rather is content to provide quite specific citations. It is true that De Moor may not be as effusive or descriptive of the practical point as Voetius, Hornbeeck, Van Mastricht, or Ames may be, but it is not the case that De Moor or Marckius are disinterested in the practical implications of doctrine,

but by referencing the aforementioned practical theologians indicates his sensitivity to the point. Whereas someone like Van Mastricht is more likely to cut the doctrinal and polemical section short in order to add a practical section, Marckius and De Moor would rather explore the doctrinal and polemical section with much more depth and length, referencing those who make the practical applications. For Marckius, his intention in writing an 850 page theological compendium was to guide a student through the corpus of his work—over 20,000 pages of commentaries, histories, and disputations—in preparation for oral theological exams. De Moor, by the same token, sought to coordinate Marckius’ compendium to the broader world of Reformed theology for the same reason. The result is certainly a concern for the right exposition and understanding of doctrine, but both of these theologians are quite clear that they have located the practical aspects of theology under certain heads for the sake of brevity and ease of reference, not because they deny the importance of the topic.

5.3 Conclusion

Scholastic method and concern for piety are not antithetical in the thought of the Reformed theologians surveyed. With William Ames, one whom Heppe identifies as an exemplar of Reformed pietism, we find a concern for practical theology wedded to a modified quaestio method of exposition. Additionally, we find a division of theology into topics of doctrine, virtues, and conscience. With Voetius, Hoornbeek, and Mastricht,

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140 Doede Nauta in his entry on De Moor, _BLNP_, 3:275, observes that De Moor’s citations from these theologians is to show deference to a 1731 request of the Zuid-Holland Synod for more emphasis on practical theology. On the familiarity of the Leiden theology faculty with synodical requests for practical theology, see Donald Sinnema, “The Attempt to Establish a Chair in Practical Theology at Leiden University (1618-1626)” in Ballor et al. _Church and School_, 415-441.

141 Heinrich Heppe, _Geschichte des Pietismus und der Mystik in der Reformierten Kirche, Namentlich der Niederlande_, (Leiden: Brill, 1879), 140-143.
theology is viewed as first and foremost a practical discipline as in this life it is always ordered to practice. However, this does not mean that theology does not have a theory or a practice, but it is always ordered to the glory of God and the salvation of the individual. In De Moor and Marckius, although they disagree with Hoornbeek and argue that theology is both theoretical and practical, they still agree with Voetius, Hoornbeek, and Mastricht that the task of theology is ordered to the glory of God and the salvation of the individual. Thus, as an academic discipline, theology is both scholarly in its method and pious, or worshipful, in relation to its goal, God.

The fourth view articulated in this chapter indicates that among the representative Reformed scholastics examined there is basic agreement on the integral relationship between a scholastic method and a practical piety. There is, however, a diversity of opinions on whether theology is primarily a wisdom or a practice. Secondly, there are various approaches to how practical points should be articulated: separated from the doctrinal and exegetical sections or conjoined to them. And finally, this opens a pathway to examine methodological distinctions across institutions as well as to examine religious practices within a particular national context or geographic region of a shared confessional heritage.
CHAPTER 6: Doubt Clearly Perceived

Philosophy and Divinity are so interwoven by the schoolmen that it cannot be safe to separate them; new philosophy will bring in new divinity; and freedom in the one will make men desire a liberty in the other.¹

Simon Patrick at Cambridge

to his Friend, Mr. G.B. at Oxford, May 1662

6.1 Natural Theology, Methodological Doubt, Faith and Reason

Simon Patrick's remark in seventeenth-century England encapsulates a deep and perennial concern in university life from the medieval period onward through the eighteenth century. With the rise of philosophies in the seventeenth century that either intentionally severed or incidentally weakened the relationship between faith and reason, and thus between theology and philosophy as academic disciplines, there was more at stake than the priority of theology over other disciplines. One essential way to understand the tensions between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, and certainty and doubt in this period is to remember that, for the Reformed, the theologia viatorum is first and foremost proper to believers and ultimately addresses these issues as they impinge on worship and religion.² For a worship and religion that proceeds by faith, challenges to faith undercut true religion and thus tend towards atheism and irreligion.

From the majority Reformed perspective of the period, natural theology corrupted by human reason does provide some knowledge of God, but it is mixed with error and

¹ Simon Patrick, A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitudinarians: Together with some Reflections upon the New Philosophy (London: 1669), 22.

² For example, see Amandus Polanus, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae (Hanover: Typis Wechelianis, apud Claudium Marnium, & haeredes Johannis Aubrii, 1610), I.9, "Theologia viatorum est sapientia rerum divinarum a Christo per Spiritum Sanctum cum hominibus hic in terra degentibus per gratiosam inspirationem communicata, ut lumine intellectus contemplentur Deum, & res divinas ipsius per sua incrementa, Deumque recte colant, donec in caelo claram & perfectam ejus visionem consequantur ad gloriam ipsius."
rests upon human opinion, and therefore lacks the competency to yield certainty with respect to salvation as it does not proceed from and by faith in Christ. Thus an introduction of impulses into theology and philosophy that disintegrate, dislocate, or denigrate the role of faith and call into question the certainty attained by it, was viewed as atheistic in the period, if not in intention at least in result. The polemical bestiary of heterodoxy and the role of reason in the eighteenth century according to De Moor and others included central issues raised by the Socinians, Cartesians, Spinoza, Hobbes,


For an overview of Cartesianism at Leiden University, specifically, see Willem Otterspeer, Groepsportret met Dame II: De Vesting van de Macht de Leidse Universiteit 1673-1775 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002), 51-61.


and their sympathizers in the seventeenth century were only exacerbated in the eighteenth century. At the root of many of these questions is how and to what extent human reason and methodological doubt play in the role of understanding the faith.

### 6.1.1 Theologia Stadii and Natural Theology

In order to appreciate De Moor's treatment of these particular issues, it is helpful to sketch a few of the issues that informed his context and debates at Leiden that characterize the transition from the heyday of the Canons of Dordt to the zenith of Enlightenment reason in the late eighteenth century. More specifically to the project at hand here, De Moor elaborates upon the order and points made by Marckius by engaging, among others, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hobbes in the section on theologia stadii. Since Hobbes is addressed under the chapter on scholastic piety and the worship of God, Descartes, Spinoza, and several of the sources De Moor musters will occupy a portion of our chapter here. Given that De Moor's comments and sources range from Reformed authors in the sixteenth century to his own day, this treatment must be selective. But what is clear in both Marckius's and De Moor's expositions is that the issues surrounding the *imago Dei* and natural theology are primarily tied to Romans 1. Marckius formulates the question of natural theology in a somewhat traditional approach, tailoring his method to his particular context (see Fig. 4.1 below). Also, note that passages in Romans 1 and 2

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8 See E. van der Wall, "Orthodoxy and Scepticism in the early Dutch Enlightenment," 121, "Cartesianism—scepticism—atheism: these are the keywords of the philosophico-theological conflict waged by the Dutch Calvinists during the early years of the Enlightenment. Central to this dispute was the application of Cartesian tenets to theology … In the Dutch Reformed Church the debate on scepticism in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries thus took place within the conflict over the reception of the 'new philosophy'." Van der Wall proceeds to elaborate upon the conflicts between the Voetians and Cocceians in the late seventeenth century into the eighteenth century on the reception of Cartesian thought into biblical exegesis and formulation.
recur in the exposition of this head of theology explicitly four times and arguably a fifth
time implicitly on the insufficiency of natural theology for salvation.

Table 2. *Theologia Stadii* in Marckius and its Scriptural bases

| §X. Definition of *theologia stadii* and its various synonyms. True theology is a theology of revelation. | (1 Cor. 13:9; 2 Tim. 3:15, 17; 1 John 2:20-21) |
| §XI. The *a priori* proof of its existence; an atheist's denial of natural theology, response to an atheist. | (Rom. 1:19; 2:14-15) |
| §XII. Division by principia (*theologia naturalis* and *revelationis*); First subdivision of *theologia naturalis* as subjective and innate; differentiation of subjective, innate natural theology into theoretical and practical aspects. | (Ps. 8:4; Isa. 40:26; Job. 12:7-10; Ps. 19:2-5; Acts 14:17, 17:25, 27; Rom. 1:20) |
| §XIII. Second subdivision of *theologia naturalis* as objective and acquired. | (Ps. 14:1; 10:4; 53:2; Heb. 11:6) |
| §XIV. Rejection of methodological doubt as well as its impact on theology: specifically a rejection of *universalis dubitatio* given the emergence of the Spinozists. | (Ps. 14:1; 10:4; 53:2; Heb. 11:6) |
| §XV. In what sense the idea of God must be admitted and when arguments from it are valid and invalid. | (Ps. 14:1; 10:4; 53:2; Heb. 11:6) |
| §XVI. Natural theology in Adam and what constitutes the *imago Dei*. Assertion that Adam's natural theology included without special revelation: (1) the moral law, (2) the Triune God to whom worship was owed and by whom creation occurred, "although their equality of substance (Δμοσίου ακ ἰσότιμου) was not as of yet revealed." | (Ps. 14:1; 10:4; 53:2; Heb. 11:6) |
| §XVII. Response to Socinian (and some Arminian) denials of natural theology. Arguments on particular Scripture passages | (Ps. 14:1; 10:4; 53:2; Heb. 11:6) |
| §XVIII. The contents of natural theology (both innate and acquired). What natural theology does and does not teach. | (Matt. 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 4:18, 5:8) |
| §XIX. The insufficiency of natural theology for salvation, generally speaking. | (John 17:3; 1 John 2:23; Acts. 4:12, 10:43; John 14:6; Mark 16:17) |
In this brief overview, several themes emerge that De Moor will elaborate upon: the necessity of revelation, the asymmetrical relationship between faith and reason, the insufficiency of natural theology for salvation, the necessity of special revelation for salvation and true worship, the proper and improper uses of reason, and responses to a range of theological and philosophical opinions on proper epistemological methodology. By examining these particular tensions and how the issues were couched in Marckius and De Moor's context, this will bring into focus what exactly De Moor is defending and how he utilized the *theologia viatorum* framework to argue his viewpoints.

### 6.1.2.1 Relationships between theology and philosophy

The *theologia viatorum* was a significant methodological and epistemological statement in theological prolegomena defending both the need for special revelation and the authority of Holy Scripture from the late sixteenth century through the early nineteenth century. It functioned as a basic schema to maintain the traditional and asymmetrical relationship of the two disciplines of theology and philosophy, against the rising tide of a natural philosophy increasingly divorced from faith. Given the deep

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disagreements occurring in philosophy during the Enlightenment and the generally eclectic appropriation of Aristotle among the Reformed, this theological framework increasingly had to be defended and explained as theologians and philosophers engaged, appropriated, and critiqued new philosophies, approaches, and questions. And while one must take care to sedulously work through "the many significant teachers in the academies and universities, whose work has all too often been ignored in the broader surveys" by a philosophy writ small, it is not an overgeneralization or excess in engaging "philosophy writ large in the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz" insofar as it informs a much more specific and localized context. It is precisely because of the methodological approach of engaging in questions of institutional continuity and discontinuity of localized frameworks, models, or schools of thought that one can understand how "philosophy writ large" intersects and impacts "philosophy writ small," and vice versa. Indeed, in many cases the tensions that developed at Leiden University for example, are due to more sweeping, external pressures from a variety of international and domestic sources such as, in the words of the period: heterodoxy, atheism, and unregenerate reason. Our consideration here of a raft of points is precisely because De Moor endeavors to encompass all of the issues in a brief but comprehensive way.

10 On Aristotelian eclecticism in the Reformation and post-Reformation orthodoxy, see R. A. Muller, "Reformation, Orthodoxy, "Christian Aristotelianism,“ and the eclecticism of early modern philosophy" in Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis / Dutch Review of Church History, vol. 81, no. 3 (2001): 306-25. Muller notes well in "Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism", Trinity Journal, 19NS (1998), 81-96, esp. 81, "To indicate the continuance and development of Christian Aristotelianism and to argue that it must be taken into account when examining the relationship between the theology of the later Middle Ages and the thought of the Reformers or the relationship between the post-Reformation era and the thought of earlier times, whether the Middle Ages or the Reformation is not at all to make the claim that each and every thinker from the thirteenth through the seventeenth century drew on Aristotle in the same way or to the same degree."

Discussion among the Dutch theologians since at least Junius frequently centered on the inadequacy of natural theology for salvation, and thus its incompleteness for the task of worship given a fallen humanity.\textsuperscript{12} Or to state the matter slightly differently, by the mid-eighteenth century there is a great deal of pressure from natural philosophy and early modern scientific methods to utilize a demonstrative, empirical form of proof that grants certainty as opposed to an established or privileged authority such as Scripture that is received as certain in an \textit{a priori} fashion. From the mid-seventeenth century to the eighteenth century, there were consistent border wars and skirmishes on the division of the disciplines regarding an array of issues surrounding the relationship between theology and philosophy, such as the role of reason in the interpretation of Scripture, certainty derived from human opinion, natural theology and natural religion, and so forth. But there is also internal pressure from within as some Leiden theologians and philosophers are questioning the traditional formulations and revising them according to the new philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is in these intramural debates within the walls of the Dutch universities and within the Dutch borders that inform how various theologians, including De Moor viewed philosophy writ large and its impact on faith, theology, and the training of pastors.

\textbf{6.1.2.1 Dutch Reformed Responses to Radical Cartesians}

Given the aforementioned kinds of controversy surrounding natural theology, natural religion, reason, and Scripture, it is not a surprise that a Dutch Reformed

theologian would write *The Gangrene of the Cartesian Innovations.* It is also quite clear what the general tone and tenor of the anti-Cartesian Dutch Reformed theologians was in relation to the rise and ascendancy of Cartesian methodological doubt and reduction of all substances to thought and extension. For Petrus van Mastricht, as for other Reformed theologians, the epistemological matter is the issue of doubt, certainty, and authority. Cartesian epistemology is built upon the axiom that true knowledge is the result of clear and distinct ideas. Secondly, one arrives at clear and distinct ideas through a process of methodological doubt which examines all presuppositions, assumptions, and conclusions. Ideally, this process results in either the falsification of a previously held proposition or an underlying clear and distinct idea is affirmed which produces the justification for a truth claim. More than likely, however, the result of this process is that one can only affirm a proposition tentatively or hypothetically with a suspension of judgment. However, as we will see, despite Descartes's stated boundaries, his views were frequently appropriated in more radical ways.

Furthermore, despite the warnings sounded by many orthodox Protestant theologians regarding Descartes’ views on methodological doubt, Descartes did attempt to hedge his Roman Catholic orthodoxy by stating that reason must submit to faith, and thus his reason would submit to the Pope in matters of faith. Note for example this statement in his *Principia Philosophiae* concerning his attempt to prevent this methodological doubt from being systematically applied to matters of theology:

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Moreover contrary to all the rest, this must be fixed in our mind as the highest rule, that those things that have been revealed to us by God must be believed as the most certain of all things, even though the light of reason would seem perhaps to suggest something else to us as something most clear and evident, yet we must cling to faith in the divine authority alone rather than to our own private judgment.\textsuperscript{15}

Does this mean the matter is settled and the Reformed orthodox are simply over-reacting?

Taken at face value, on the point that reason must stop short of analyzing special revelation, in this regard, on paper he is not much different than the Reformed that bound philosophy by reason. However, this is not the way he was understood by the more conservative voices of Reformed orthodoxy as well as by many of his proponents because the issues in play are much deeper.

For many philosophers and theologians of the late seventeenth century onward, philosophy and theology should be maintained separately.\textsuperscript{16} What is clear, however, is that Descartes does not intend to challenge the traditional distinction between faith and reason. One significant issue in the broader context is the status of philosophy as the handmaiden of theology. And so, at least three broad positions emerge as to the relation between theology and philosophy: (1) theology is the queen and philosophy the handmaiden, (2) its opposite, philosophy is the queen and theology the handmaiden, or

\textsuperscript{15} René Descartes, \textit{Principiorum Philosophia}, 1.70. “Praeter caetera autem, memoriae nostrae pro summa regula est infigendum, ea quae nobis a Deo revelata sunt, ut omnium certissima esse credenda: & quamvis forte lumen rationis, quam maxime claram & evidens, aliu quid nobis suggererere videtur, soli tamen auctoritati divinae potius, quam proprio nostro judicio, fidem esse adhibendum.” Cf. De Moor’s comments upon the same \textit{Commentarius Perpetuus}, 1.1.21.

(3) the two disciplines are entirely separate, with one not bounding or conditioning the other. There are attendant corollaries here regarding the role of reason and faith, and the kinds of assent and certainty they require. The first position represents the typical Reformed theologians and philosophers. The second position represents a variety of starting points, but an agreement on the priority of philosophy, including natural philosophy. This second view can be found in a range of views such as the more radical Cartesians in the seventeenth century as well as what that were later termed atheists, Spinozists, naturalists, deists, and Epicureans by the close of the eighteenth century. And the last position represents some moderate or semi-Cartesian Reformed theologians. Some Reformed Cartesian theologians (e.g. Christoph Wittich in *Theologia Pacifica*) maintained that one could in fact maintain a respectful, but impermeable barrier between philosophy and theology. In this view philosophy would be the realm of reason
and rational discourse and theology would be—if not irrational—a-rational and a matter of faith. This state of affairs of epistemic respect and equality, however, would not last long. Given the somewhat traditional view that Philosophiam esse ancillam Theologiae, it was not long before philosophers of the age began to argue that the handmaiden should attain epistemic suffrage and more controversially, inform and even govern theology. To the anti-Cartesian Reformed of the era, such a move would unite the rationalism of the Socinians with an atheistic naturalism.

Some, initially known as radical Cartesians, were not content to let the matter stand. Their thinking ran thus: if philosophy alone can give us clear and distinct ideas upon which to base all knowledge and scientific discovery, then certainly such a philosophy could clarify and improve the foundations of theology. With such a stated goal in mind, the acids of methodological doubt were not only unleashed upon the doctrine of God, the existence of the soul, and the nature of man, but upon the very principium cognoscendi of theology, Scripture itself. Doctrines regarding the possibility of knowledge of God, the essence of God, his attributes, the nature of humanity, and the existence of the soul were increasingly cordoned off as the terrain of the philosopher rather than the theologian. Scripture was appropriate for matters of morality, virtue, obedience, and faith, but the weightier matters of philosophy—essence, substance, truth, and reason—were for the philosopher alone.

For the anti-Cartesian theologians, the arguments of the radical Cartesians sounded too much like the Socinian version of the role of reason as arbiter and interpreter of Scripture. For example, consider the older Socinian argument regarding the two

Controversiarum (Leiden: Elsevier, 1645), 1-11.
natures of Christ and the boundaries of reason: “Indeed we assert that reason attests to us, and that shining as evidently and clearly as the noon day sun, that it is impossible and thus false that two natures are discoverable in Christ.”

19 Christoph Ostorodt (d. 1611), a German Socinian polemicist, made precisely this claim in his 1604 work Unterrichtung von den vornemsten Hauptpunkten der Christlichen Religion that gained broader circulation and garnered even more concern in the Netherlands in 1689 as a new Dutch translation entitled, Onderwyzinge van de voornaamste hoofpunkten der Christelyk religie.20 Ostorodt’s usage of natural, human reason—as well as the affinity and similarity to a Cartesian criteria of clear and evident ideas—as the final arbiter of matters of revealed religion seemed to validate those suspicious of the radical Cartesian reasoning. Ostorodt’s work generated a storm of protest (as well as leering curiosity) throughout the first half of the seventeenth century from both Lutheran and Reformed quarters not simply for his Socinian Christology but also for what was deemed an atheistic use of reason.21 This in fact is the sum and substance of the outcry of the

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19 Christoph Ostorodt, Unterrichtung Von den Vornemsten Hauptpunkten der Christlichen Religion : in Welcher Begriffen ist Fast die Gantze Confession oder Bekentnis Der Gemeinen im Königreich Polen Großfürstenthumb Littauen/ und Anderen zu der Cron Polen gehörenden Landschafften welche... Arrianer und Ebioniten Genennet werden / Geschrieben: Durch Christoff Ostorodt von Goslar (Rackaw: Sebastian Sternatzki, 1604), 43, "...sondern wir sagen das uns unser verstand uberzeugt und das so hell un klar wie die Sonne im Mittage Scheinet das es unmüglich sey und der halben falsch das zwo naturen in Christo solten befunden werden."


21 See Mosheim, Institutes, 3:237n37 "Brandt in his History of the Reformation in the Netherlands, tells us that Ostorodt and Voidovius were banished, and that their books were condemned to be burned publicly by the hands of the common hangman. Accordingly, the pile was raised, the executioner approached, and the multitude was assembled, but the books did not appear. The magistrates, who were curious to peruse their contents, had quietly divided them among themselves and their friends."
orthodox theologians of the early Enlightenment era, the objection is not that Philosophy is a respectful partner or subsidiary source in the exposition of Theology. It is this: Philosophy has become the final arbiter of truth and in so doing has become the handmaiden of heretics and atheists. The handmaiden has become a tyrant, and the queen a slave.

Such figures as Baruch ben Spinoza, Lodewijk Meijer, and their circle for their radical approach to reason were extremely controversial in the Netherlands, both of which were influenced by Cartesian and even Socinian thinkers. Before the advent of the term "Spinozist" and "Spinozism" by the close of the seventeenth century, initially church authorities and synods frequently identified Spinoza's work as a threat associated with threats they knew: Socinianism.

In a called meeting on June 30, 1670 in response to gravamina from their classis and synod, the Amsterdamer Kirchenrates took up the question of their opinion regarding Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. According to its minutes, the meeting found that the older gravamina against publication of Roman Catholic material, Socinian works, and licentious publications applied here as well to this schaderlijke boek. At its

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23 Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 121.
ordinary meeting on July 28, 1670, having received its committee's report and "heard several enormously atrocious specimens in that book, [Classis] has ruled it to be blasphemous and dangerous." The Synod of the Cross of the Hague on July 7, 1670 found it to be similar to "a treatise of paganism and superstition" (tractaat van afgodery en superstitie). The Synod of South Holland, meeting at Schiedam from July 15-25 of 1670 condemned it as "a book so vile and blasphemous as the world had ever seen" and magistrates should be vigilant and take heed that "such books—especially that vile and blasphemous book Tractatus Theologico-politicus—must be suppressed and banned." The States Holland and West-Friesland, on April 24, 1671, took up the recommendation of the Court of Holland and their deputed committees through the churches regarding "several Socinian and other harmful books" and the States requested all the Synods to examine and search out the works more carefully and advise. The books listed included Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-politicus, and the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, that is, collected works of the Polish Socinians or Unitarians. By 1674, this list also included Philosophia Scripturae interpres. By 1676,

24 Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 123.
25 Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 122.
26 Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 122. "Art. X, art. 13 sprekkende van't licentieuse drucken en vercopen van allerlei vuyle en godslasterlycke schriften, die van tydt tot tydt seer veel en verscheeyden uytcomen, gelyck op nius aen dese E. Synodus door D. Deputatus Holbeek is notitie gegeven van een boek, geintituleert Tractatus Theologico-politicus, so vuyl ende godslasterlyck als men weet, dat oyt de werelt gesien heeft … Magistraten sullen vigileren en aenhouden, dat all sulke boeken besonderlyk dat vuyle en godslasterlycke boeck Tractatus Theologico-politicus, moghte werden gesupprimeert en geweert …"
27 Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 125-127. The searching out of the books was literally to discover who was printing the works and under what titles they were appearing, as they were printed with false title pages. Cf. Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 136-37. Some of these were printed right under the nose of the Leiden magistrates, see Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte, 136-138.
28 Lodewijk Meijer, Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture (1666), trans. Samuel Shirley, introduction and notes by Lee C. Rice & Francis Pastijn, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005); Jacqueline Lagrée, "Sens
this issue had made its way through the Synods of North Holland, South Holland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Dordrecht, and into the Synod of the Waalsekerk or Walloon churches. After Spinoza died in 1677, his Opera Posthuma began to be printed and disseminated as well, which initiated another flurry of synodical and magisterial correspondence and actions well into 1680.  

Given that Spinoza's philosophy was quite different from the Socinian theology, why would Dutch ministers and magistrates equate these? It was not because they were necessarily similar philosophically or theologically. The answer seems to be this: they shared a common approach to reason as a means to dethrone the supernatural or to lessen Scripture's authority. Spinoza’s 1670 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus not only was a bald assertion that philosophy, not religion, is the most conducive for the peace of the Dutch Republic, but also a direct frontal attack upon the status of theology as the queen of the sciences that could lead to humanity’s ultimate felicity and beatitude. The oft forgotten and lengthy subtitle of this work was “some dissertations in which the liberty of Philosophizing is not only demonstrated in a sound piety and can be allowed for the peace of the Republic, but the same cannot be destroyed without the loss of the peace of the Republic and piety itself.”  

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30 Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Continens Dissertations Aliquot, Quibus Ostenditur Libertatem Philosophandi non tantum Salva Pietate, & Reipublicae Pace Posse Concedi: sed Eandem Nisi cum Pace Reipublicae, Ipsaque Pietate Tollis Non Posse, (Hamburg, Henricus Künrath, 1670). There is also a translation of this with introduction by J. I. Israel, B. Spinoza, Spinoza: Theological-Political Treatise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), cf. J.I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Also, Israel's theses regarding Spinozism have not gone unchallenged, e.g. Russ Leo's review, "Caute: Jonathan Israel's Secular Modernity" in JCRT 9.2 (2008): 76-83. I am working off primarily the Latin with an occasional eye towards this translation.
interested in philosophical or academic freedom of speech, but his greater goal is to
demonstrate the inability of revealed religion to provide a common public morality. In
Reformed quarters this called into question the viability of a privileged—if not
established—Reformed church.

6.1.2.2 Philosophy, Spinoza’s Handmaiden-Queen

In the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, in continuity with other radical Cartesians,
Spinoza poignantly re-iterated the challenge. The ultimate question in the relationship
between Philosophy and Theology is whether Reason will submit to Scripture or
Scripture to Reason. Adding insult to injury, Spinoza also claims that those who maintain
that Philosophy and Reason are handmaidens to Theology do so on the basis of ancient,
crass prejudices alone. The very title of chapter fifteen displays one of the primary goals
of his project: “Whether or not theology is the handmaiden of Reason or Reason
theology’s; the reason is demonstrated by which we persuade ourselves of the authority
of Holy Scripture.”

In his preface, Spinoza launches his offensive upon the classic method of
theology by rejecting the Scriptures as sufficient as a basis for religion and piety. Spinoza
asserts that the theologians have taught "nothing beyond Aristotelian and Platonic
speculations" and have accommodated Scripture to the philosophers.

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32 Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, *(4).*
and Scripture. Spinoza demands that these presuppositions be fully demonstrated by rational proof.

It was not enough for them to rave with the Greeks, but they want the prophets to go mad with them: which shows quite clearly that even in their dreams they have not even caught a glimpse of the divinity of the Scriptures, and that these mysteries are so zealously admired demonstrates all the more that they do not so much believe Scripture as assent to it. This is consequently also evident because the majority [of theologians] lay as a foundation (for the purpose of understanding the [Scripture] of course, and bleeding out its true sense) that it is everywhere true and divine; of course at the very beginning they state this as a rule of interpretation. [On the contrary] this must be established from an understanding of [the Scriptures]; and out of this understanding, which would at the least be free from human figments, we would be by far much better informed.33

Elsewhere, Spinoza imbues his theological method with a decidedly rationalistic spirit: “I have carefully decided to examine Scripture from a whole new and free spirit, and to affirm nothing from the same and admit nothing as its doctrine which I might not teach in the clearest way possible.”34 This is a significant point of contention for the officially Protestant Netherlands in this sense: Spinoza does not believe that a supernatural light is necessary beyond the natural light of reason for the proper interpretation of spiritual truth contained in the Scriptures.35 Yet, after proceeding according to his method, Spinoza concludes, “After this, I have demonstrated that the Word of God is not revealed as a certain number of books, but a simple concept of the divine mind revealed to the

33 Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, *[4r].”Non satis his fuit, cum Graecis insanire, sed Prophetas, cum iisdem delieravisse voluerunt: quod sane clare ostendit eos Scripturae divinitatem nec persomnium videre; et quo impensius haec mysteria admirantur, eo magis ostendunt, se Scriptura non tam credere, quam assentari; quod hinc etiam patet, quod plerique tanquam fundamentum supponunt, (ad eandem scilicet intelligendum, ejusque verum sensum cruendum) ipsum ubique veracem, et divinam esse; id nempe ipsum, quod ex ejusdem intellectione, et severo examine indiget, longe melius edoceremur, in primo limine pro regula ipsius interpretationis statuunt.”

34 Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, *[4r].

35 Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, 98.
prophets, namely to obey God with our entire soul by nurturing righteousness and
certainty.”36 This is evident again in the very opening salvo of chapter one in regard to the
nature of revelation and prophecy. Spinoza maintains that revelation is a matter of faith
and not the clear and distinct knowledge of reason: “Prophecy or revelation is a certain
kind of knowledge of something revealed to human beings by God. Moreover, the
prophet is one who interprets the things revealed to them by God, one who cannot have a
certain knowledge of the things revealed by God, and they can only embrace the things
revealed by sheer faith.”37

The problem with theology, according to Spinoza, is that it is simply philosophy
done poorly on the basis of ignorance invoking faith as its justification in the face of
reasons to the contrary. Furthermore, argues Spinoza, if one makes faith the basis for a
common or universal morality, not everyone would attain it. Would it not be better to
base a common morality upon the tenets of a common and natural knowledge available to
anyone by the dictates of certain reason? Such a natural knowledge is neither dependent
upon prophets who stake their moral authority upon a so-called divine text, a divine
revelatory event, nor upon interpretations of that divine text that resort to explanations
contrary to reason. Spinoza expressly places Scripture under the bar of reason when he
states with regard to miracles:

We may, therefore, absolutely conclude that everything that has been truly
described in Scripture necessarily happened according to the laws of
nature; and if anything is recorded which can be apodictically
demonstrated to be repugnant to the laws of nature, or is not deducible
from them, we plainly must believe that it was added to the sacred
writings by sacrilegious hands; for anything that is contrary to nature is

36 Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, *[4v]*.
contrary to reason, and anything contrary to reason is absurd, and accordingly must also be rejected.  

In short, Spinoza has turned the theological method on its head, the divinity and inspiration of the Scriptures—and thus its authority and even necessity—are now conclusions of a rational, philosophical enterprise, not presuppositions of faith and the principle of knowing in a theological science. In Spinoza there is no category of something that is above reason. All that accords with reason accords with nature. Thus miracles, which are contrary to nature, are necessarily contrary to reason. Scriptures’ divinity and inspiration are now subject to the claim that one can come to clear and distinct ideas via the Scriptures apart from faith. True theology is at bottom moral philosophy founded upon philology and history. We have here in the seventeenth century a description of faith within the bounds of reason.

6.1.3 Prolegomenal Debates Among Dutch Professors

From the 1630s in the Dutch Republic, the debates regarding the nature of reason in theology began with the Socinians, ballooned to include the Cartesians in the 1640s, and continued in varying degrees over the next century, being compounded by broader debates over the works of Spinoza and Hobbes respectively, but also on a much more local scale. For example, some Reformed theologians and philosophers of a Cartesian or later Wolffian stripe, would speak with a great amount of confidence in the preparatory role of reason and the propaedeutic content of natural theology for revealed theology.

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38 Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, 77.

39 E.g. Spinoza also claims, contra the Reformed of his day, that one does not need faith in order to interpret scripture rightly, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, 85-87.

40 Muller, *PRRD*, 1:293-310.
At issue was whether reason and faith develop symmetrically in force and efficacy, despite a real distinction between a regenerate versus an unregenerate reason, and a real distinction between faith and reason as \textit{principia}. Some viewed the relationship as symmetrical, others as asymmetrical in favor of reason, still others as asymmetrical in favor of faith.

\textbf{6.1.3.1 The Relationship Between Theology and Philosophy}

As has been noted, among many Reformed thinkers of this period, the force and efficacy of reason is asymmetrically less in comparison to faith. The period surrounding Descartes and his reception in the Netherlands is well documented by historians of philosophy and theology.\footnote{Theo Verbeek, \textit{Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637-1650}, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992); Aza Goudriaan, \textit{Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625-1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen} (Leiden: Brill, 2006); on the controversies at Utrecht and Leiden, see A. J. Beck, \textit{Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 60-91; see "Philosophy" in \textit{Dutch Culture in a European Perspective: 1650, A Hard-Won Unity}, eds. W. Frijhoff and M. Spikes (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004 ), 281-348.} Where more work can be done is in understanding the role of this framework of theological prolegomena at Leiden throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century in these debates. One key for understanding the tension is the issue not only of the authority of Scripture but also the issue of piety or worship.

With respect to piety, religion, and worship the tension in the period for the Reformed is this, the \textit{theologia viatorum} posits that theology is a divine wisdom and thus has both theoretical and practical sides to it. Furthermore, true theology is divided broadly into revealed and natural categories. Since theology aims at worship of God, is it possible to speak of multiple kinds of true worship of God? Or, given the doctrine of original sin, is there only one kind of true worship which proceeds by faith? And while
the Reformed admitted the fall of humanity into sin, there were still quarters that cherished somewhat of an optimism regarding the certainty of unregenerate human reason.

Even at Leiden, as has been indicated previously, not all of the theologians and philosophers were satisfied with this prolegomenal framework of the archetypal/ectypal theology. Most, if not all, desired to preserve the close union between natural and revealed theology evidenced by the classical Christian metaphor that theology is the domina or regina of the sciences and philosophy is its ancilla. Some, who questioned the utility of the archetypal and ectypal distinction, were increasingly willing to juxtapose faith and reason.42 Others, while agreeing that all truth is ultimately God's truth, argued for philosophy's freedom to philosophize according to reason alone. At the same time, this last group maintained that philosophy should not encroach upon theology and, in cases of cognitive dissonance the philosopher should simply suspend judgment upon things that must be taken by faith. Yet, some Leiden philosophers, like Adriaan Heereboord (1614-1661), saw the task of philosophy as not so much a question of physics or principles of the natural order like many Cartesians and semi-Cartesians, but of an investigation of what can be known naturally of God, by reason alone in theoretical and practical terms for the purpose of worshipping God and living an ethical life.43

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42 Abraham Heidanus, *Corpus Theologiae Christianae in XV. Locos Digestum* (Leiden: Jordan Luchtmans, 1686), 2-3, "Naturalis [theologia], quae lumine rationis ex rebus factis de Deo agit, fabulosa aut vitiosa minime est, neque pari cum caeteris loco censeri potest. Licet enim aberratum hic sit ab iis qui eam tractarunt, non decet tamen errores eorum transcribere doctrinae ipsi."

43 See Adriaan Heereboord, *Adriani Heereboordi ... Meletemata Philosophica, in Quibus Pluraeque Res Metaphysicae Ventilantur, Tota Ethica ... Explicantur* (Amsterdam: Johannes Ravestein, 1664), passim.
A prime example of this view is found in Heereboord's two brief disputations "Problem: Whether true philosophy may be opposed to holy theology, and vice versa?" and "Philosophical Disputation: the use of human reason in theology and questions of faith." Among other things, the former disputation argues against double truth and seeks to assert that philosophy must simply suspend judgment and recognize the limits of human thought and opinion. The latter disputation is more precise than its title suggests as it is a discussion of how the philosophical sub-discipline of Logic should function in controversies on matters of faith. Heereboord is noteworthy for his attempt to maintain a *philosophia novantiqua*, or eclectic appropriation of both the older Christian philosophy and his critical appreciation at points of Descartes.

In the 1640s, for example, the Leiden philosophy professor, Adriaan Heereboord, maintained two seemingly non-controversial points: (1) philosophy proceeds by reason alone, theology proceeds by faith; (2) philosophy must employ its *principium cognoscendi*, reason within the bounds of its discipline. But it is the next steps in Heereboord's thinking that touch upon an array of sensitive issues of piety and worship: if all true theology is theoretical and practical, and natural theology as a subset proceeds by reason alone then it can and does lead to some kind of true knowledge of God and

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44 For a sample of one seventeenth-century Leiden professor of Philosophy, see Adriaan Heereboord's (1614-1661) "Problema: Num vera philosophia contrarietur S. Theologiae, et vicissim?" and "Disputatio Philosophica: De Usu rationis humanae in theologia ac quaestionibus fidei", in *Adriani Heereboordi ... Meletemata Philosophica, in Quibus Pleraque Res Metaphysicae Ventilantur, Tota Ethica ... Explicantur* (Amsterdam: Johannes Ravestein, 1665), 363-373. For insight into the early debates from Heerebord's perspective, see also the dedicatory epistle to the curators of Leiden University and "Sermo Academicvs, de recta philosophice disputandi ratione, habitus 13 Ianuar. 1648 in Acad. Lugd Batav." in Adrian Heereboord, *Collegium Ethicum* ([Leiden: Franciscus Moyaert,] 1649), 1-20, 29-38. Heereboord claims in his dedicatory epistle that he is emphasizing the same points as his predecessor and professor Francisco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), cf. F. Burgersdijk, *Franconis Burgersdici Institutionum Metaphysicarum* (Leiden: Hieronymus de Vogel, 1640), 1-10, where Burgersdijk speaks briefly of the nature and methodology of metaphysics with respect to its *theoria, praxis*, and *poesis* as well as distinguishes between *fides* and *scientia*: the former proceeds by testimony, the latter by demonstration.
worship. Heereboord believes that philosophy can proceed by reason alone, but is delimited by certain faith commitments and at those points philosophy must suspend judgment. In other words, what keeps Heereboord within the bounds of confessional orthodoxy in the overlap between religious epistemology and philosophical epistemology is that he posits an asymmetric relationship between revealed knowledge of God and natural knowledge of God. Reason is delimited at key points by faith. Faith on the other hand is not so delimited when it proceeds on the authority of Scripture.

Part of Heereboord's significance is that in De Moor's discussion some of his views regarding how reason should be deployed are recapitulated in De Moor's *Commentarius*.\(^\text{45}\) Compared to Heidanus, De Moor maintains a moderate and qualified position regarding the relationship between theology and philosophy as evidenced by his usage of Heereboord. De Moor’s clarification of the classic description of Philosophy as the handmaiden of Theology is a critical line of defense of faith in the dawning age of the Enlightenment's autonomous reason. Without seeking to discard the discipline of philosophy, De Moor asserts natural theology—and thus philosophy—fails to provide the highest felicity and beatitude. Having accomplished this, a pathway is opened for a discussion of the necessity of Scripture and Scripture’s role in the believer’s progress toward the *visio Dei*, that is, the viability of a *theologia viatorum*.

\(^\text{45}\) Cf. De Moor, *Commentarius*, 1:71-72 and Adriaan Heereboord, *Meletemata philosophica*, 213-225, for the disputations, "De usu philosophiae in theologia," "De abusu philosophiae in theologia," and "De usu metaphysicae in disciplinis aliis, ac praeertim theologica." Heereboord sets forth a moderate Cartesian understanding of methodological doubt when it is utilized to arrive at clear and distinct ideas with respect to matters perceived by the senses. That is, the proper role of doubt is in the perfecting of sense perception, not when applied to matters of divine authority. Otherwise, *annexum 5* applies, "Veritas revelata rationis examini non est subjecta," 221.
At Leiden University, there was also another proximate cause for more care in discussion. Well into the eighteenth century, theologians had to be on their guard when bordering on or crossing into matters of philosophy, and philosophers into theology, due to a declaration by the States Holland in 1656. In part, this is due to the previous tumults at the universities of Leiden, Utrecht, and Groningen and so forth that embroiled Voetius, Schook, Descartes, and a score of others.

To a certain extent it is not a question of whether one discipline proceeds by reason and the other by faith. The point is accepted in the period that reason is the principium cognoscendi of philosophy and faith of theology. The questions in the seventeenth century through the late eighteenth century tend to center on whether or not Scripture has anything profitable that would clarify and inform philosophy, and vice versa.

6.1.3.2 Christian Physics and the Limits of Scripture

Also in the 1650s there is another layer of debate among the Reformed. This is evidenced by the work of the professor of theology Christoph Wittich while a professor in Duisburg, Germany.46 One of his disputations displays the tensions and evidences a slightly different concern. While on one hand writing heavily against Spinoza in his later years at Leiden University, earlier in his career he defended aspects of Cartesianism and its appropriation into Reformed theology. For the last sixteen years of his life he was a professor of theology at Leiden. But during his first and short-lived tenure as a theology professor at Duisburg (1653-1654), Wittich defended the highly controversial proposition

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that Holy Scripture was inadequate as a basis for natural philosophy. Wittich directly denied that Scripture can be used as the basis for a *Mosaica physica*, or as he put it more pointedly in the title of his treatise "On the abuse of the Holy Scriptures in philosophical matters." Since Scripture described events generally and without sufficient detail, Wittich challenged Voetius and Schoock by asserting the insufficiency of Scripture to address matters of natural philosophy and instead insisted that the Scriptures were by and large silent on philosophical matters. Wittich's critique strikes at a line of thought that was widespread and cherished. Many theologians like the professor at Geneva, Lambert Daneau (1530-1595), or Johann Heinrich Alsted at Herborn (1588-1638), and their followers, sought to formulate and defend a *Mosaica physica* or *Physica Christiana* as a form of scripturally bounded natural philosophy and philosophy of science.

Many of the conservative theologians of various Protestant traditions responded most vociferously to philosophers like Spinoza and Hobbes on several subsequent points: the harmony of reason and revelation (*harmonia Rationis et Revelationis*), the relationship between natural and revealed theology, and whether natural theology was saving. This last point was a topic that would consume not only public tracts and treatises but student lectures and disputation. Additionally, several radical Cartesian philosophers


and theologians asserted that the handmaiden-queen adage should in fact be abandoned, precisely because Scripture, faith, and theology were inadequate to generate a metaphysic, physics, and ethics.⁴⁹

Even in 1719, almost seventy years beyond the philosophical fracas at Leiden, the semi-Cartesian, Reformed theologian at Leiden, Salomon van Til comments on the 1656 ordinance of the States Holland. The 1656 ordinance of the States Holland, according to his quotation, reads as follows:

Since all faculties—and hence even Theology and Philosophy—have their own boundaries and limits that are proper to themselves, within which those each must be contained in order to avoid confusion so that one does not leap over into the other, we therefore command that material and questions, which are proper to Theology and are known only by revelation from the Holy Word of God, just as they are plainly different from questions which can and must be inquired into and even known from nature, with reason mediating, these questions shall be left only to the theologians.⁵⁰

He takes pains in his dedicatory epistle of *Theologiae utriusque compendium: cum naturalis tum revelatae* to explain that "nowhere do I depart from the doctrine defined in the formulae of orthodoxy, but I would faithfully guard the dogmas of the Reformed Church against any of the heterodox."⁵¹ By heterodox, Van Til is referring to Socinus, Hobbes, and Spinoza, among others.⁵² He also notes that he is outlining questions of

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⁵⁰ Salomon van Til (1643-1713), *Theologiae Utriusque Compendium: cum Naturalis tum Revelatae* (Leiden: 1719), *4r.

⁵¹ Van Til, *Theologiae Utriusque Compendium*, *3v.

⁵² Van Til, *Theologiae Utriusque Compendium*, ***2r-v.*
natural theology in a textbook separately from revealed theology specifically because faith and reason (van Til: *scientia*) "do not sit in the same chair."\(^{53}\)

Another more proximate source of restraint for Van Til and other professors were certain strictures that had been enacted by the burgomasters of the city of Leiden and the curators of the university on what theses could be disputed at Leiden University. After the sustained scrutiny of the national authorities as well as the uproar over the years surrounding certain controversial theses and disputations, on January 16, 1676, the curators of the University and the burgomasters of Leiden, "heard with sadness and great displeasure that for some years from time to time" certain theses were defended that are not found in "God's Holy Word, which is summarized in the formulae of unity in the doctrine namely of the Confession, the Catechism of the Dutch Reformed Church … [and] the Canons in the last national Synod at Dordrecht."\(^{54}\) Therefore, they forbid twenty three theses to be "publicly or privately taught, disputed, written, or in any manner directly or indirectly handled."\(^{55}\) After consultation and comment from the prince of Orange, two theses were dropped.\(^{56}\) Of the remainder, the following stand out with

\(^{53}\) Van Til, *Theologiae Utriusque Compendium*, *3v*.


respect to the questions fostered by more radical followers of Descartes as well as Spinoza and his circles:

7. In matters of faith the norm and measure of truth is clear and distinct perception. 8. Scripture speaks according to the erroneous prejudices of the common man. 11. All philosophy is free from religion, and the highest good of humanity is a soul content with its lot. 18. We have a faculty by which we can take precautions that we would never err; but error only resides in the will. 19. We must doubt about all things, even about the existence of God and it must be doubted in such a way that they are held as false. 20. Human beings have an adequate idea of God. 21. Philosophy is the interpreter of Holy Scripture. 57

Such a drastic action indicates not only the curators and burgermasters concerns for the university, but also that the matters had risen to the point where the concerns had reached the ears of the house of Orange.

The prohibition of theses is mentioned by De Moor in the middle of the eighteenth century. 58 He references specifically this action by the curators of Leiden University in the context of his exposition on Cartesian methodological doubt. It is also worth noting that De Moor has in view the Leiden professor, Abraham Heidanus, who had taught and presided over disputations that utilized some of the theses that were ultimately prohibited. De Moor points to the nineteenth prohibited thesis that all things must be doubted even the existence of God and doubted in such a way that they are considered false" and ties it to Heidanus's complaints regarding the university's actions in Consideratien over eenige saecken onlanghs voorgevallen in de Universiteyt binnen Leyden. 59

57 Molhuysen, Bronnen, 3:319-20

58 De Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus, 1:49.

6.1.3.3 Natural Theology and Fallen Faculties

In the preface to the reader, Van Til states that in this work, "I treat natural theology from those pure principles of reason, and the discussion about God and his law contains nothing except what has been grasped from common notions." His stated goal in this is his optimistic claim that as much as possible he wants the reader to realize that Christianity accords with the light of nature more than other religions (excepting mysteries that are only known by revelation). As admirable a goal as this is, his language certainly alarmed many due to its optimism regarding the role of reason in natural theology and natural religion. For example, Van Til claimed "objective reason is the infallible norm of judgment, according to whose precepts in natural theology it must pronounce regarding divine matters."61

In order to properly appreciate Van Til's position, these comments must be placed alongside his account of the theologia viatorum, in his theology manual, Compendium theologiae (1703), "natural [theology] leads from reason alone to the knowledge and perception of God (τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ πρεπὸν τοῦ θεοῦ)."62 He argues that the immutable nature of truth founded on the character of God is such that a philosophical truth cannot in fact be truly contrary to theological truth. In addition, he defends the point that natural theology is insufficient for salvation, what are necessary are faith, knowledge of Christ, and true righteousness. And in this regard his views accord with theologians that utilize this prolegomenal framework. However, when Van Til moves to the question

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60 Van Til, Theologiae Utriusque Compendium, ***2r.

61 Van Til, Theologiae Utriusque Compendium, 8.

62 Salomon van Til, Ῥήτωρικας τῶν ὑπαιωντων λόγων sive Compendium Theologiae (Bern: Jacobus Anthonius Vulpes, 1703), 3.
of revealed or scriptural theology, he notes that revealed or scriptural theology does not admit a person to its discipline simply, but the person taught by the light of reason: (a) that there is a God from whom all things exist, (b) the mind is distinct from the body, (c) the law of justice and equity is naturally known, and (d) the person, out of consciousness of their contracted guilt, is concerned about their reconciliation with God.63

Van Til's optimism should be contrasted with, for example, Polanus's view about one hundred years earlier (1610), which was common among the Reformed, in his elaboration of the implications of the theologia viatorum in the differences between supernatural and natural theology. Polanus states that supernatural theology provides for us three things that natural theology cannot: (1) "to know God and what must be believed about God, which we cannot know through human investigation but only through revelation … in Holy Scripture"; (2) "to stir up our affections to desire and love God … for which reason in order to love God the knowledge of faith is required, which occurs through revelation and thus supernaturally"; and (3) "to avoid the danger of error."64 But for Polanus a key difference is in the adjuncts: "revealed theology is clear and perfect, but natural theology is obscure and imperfect on account of its common principles (principia communia), and [natural theology] necessarily has to receive its perfection from supernatural theology."65 And finally, according to Polanus, this difference existed even before the fall, "in the natura integra, [natural theology] was more excellent than it is [now] in the corrupted nature, but even still, from its common principles it was necessary

63 Van Til, Compendium Theologiae, 27.
64 Polanus, Syntagma, 1.10.6.
65 Polanus, Syntagma, 1.10.7.
to improve and augment it by reason and perfect it by grace."\textsuperscript{66} For Polanus, this is an extension of the principle that grace perfects nature, \textit{even before the fall}. That is, according to Polanus, even Adam must be informed by God's special revelation since Adam not only possessed unfallen faculties to perceive the books of nature and conscience in order to worship God, but God also specially delimited the relationship with special revelation regarding its terms. On the other hand, Van Til emphasizes that the knowledge of God available to the unregenerate is more than some think. And here we see in the comparison between Polanus and Van Til that by the early eighteenth century there is a more positive assessment of the work of unregenerate reason and a pivot towards a body of natural theology clearly and distinctly perceived by reason, as propaedeutic to the task of supernatural theology.

\textbf{6.1.3.4 The Role of Reason and Scripture}

Due to De Moor's appropriation of Witsius it is helpful to review one example in the 1680s of the intensity of the intramural debates and the range of opinions in the academies in the Dutch Republic. This is evidenced by the Franeker professor Ulrich Huber's brief treatment \textit{On the agreement of Reason and Holy Scripture} at Franeker, the \textit{exercitatio} of the Leiden professor of theology, Herman Witsius, "On the use and abuse of reason concerning mysteries of the faith," and the Utrecht philosophy professor (and occasional theology professor) Gerhardus de Vries's \textit{Descartes Vindicated}.\textsuperscript{67} Huber takes

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\textsuperscript{66} Polanus, \textit{Syntagma}, 1.10.7.

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pains to point out that Gisbertus Duker's dissertation has strayed far beyond the limits of Scripture, the views of the ancient and modern church, and even his patron Descartes. Witsius seeks to outline a justum medium on faith and right reason. De Vries intends to demonstrate that Cartesianism does not require one to claim that reason is the judge of theological matters, thus demonstrating that Duker passes radically beyond the boundaries of Cartesianism.

What is striking in Huber's work is first to realize that he is neither a philosopher nor a theologian, but served at Franeker variously as the "professor of eloquence and history" (1657-65) and law (1665-1679, 1683-1694). He joins the fray purely out of indignation. The impetus for Huber's work was a dissertation successfully defended by G. W. Duker at Franeker built on the thesis that "if reason would dictate something to us other than what Scripture does, the latter must not be believed more." Huber identifies this as the first principle of the Socinian error. In Ulrich Huber's work On the agreement of Reason and Holy Scripture, he notes that the debates about the authority of Scripture concern "the foundations of the Christian state," divide friend from friend, and erupt into public quarrels.
Huber takes special issue with Duker's claims regarding the status of reason operating off of implanted principles (insita principia, i.e. common notions). Duker had claimed, "by reasoning from the implanted principles, [the mind] achieves equal certainty of the intellect as there is in certain degrees of revelation and of the word of God." Specifically, it is the claim that reason has equal certainty as the Word of God without further clarification or qualification. Huber's primary assertions to the contrary touch upon the point that Scripture is a mediate form of revelation that provides greater certainty than the claim of an infallible, immediate form of knowledge that occurs in the intellect or in the conscience. Second, Huber argues, if Duker's claim is true, then the inward illumination of the Holy Spirit among the elect is not of much appreciable significance in handling Scripture, a point which Spinoza and others had made. Now, Huber claims that he can demonstrate Duker's erroneous use of reason "not only from the Holy Scriptures, the testimonies of the ancient fathers of the Church and more recent theologians, but also from the authority of Descartes himself, from which patron they have derived their sole principle of knowing the truth." Huber observes that Duker's friends received his assertion with "nothing except horror that he either received or presumed to have transferred [Descartes'] method to theological matters so that, full of indignation, they did not hesitate to call this an outrage and spiritual adultery." Huber explains further, "whoever states that the divinity of Holy Scripture, which is the

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72 Huber, *De Concursu Rationis*, †5v.

73 Huber, *De Concursu Rationis*, ††1r; "unicum veritatis cognoscendae principium."

74 Huber, *De Concursu Rationis*, ††1r.
undoubted principle of Christian truth, cannot be established from anywhere other than
Reason must not reject the dictum that Reason is the sole principle of all holy truth."75

Herman Witsius (1636-1708), who taught theology at Franeker (1675-1680), Utrecht (1680-1698), and finally at Leiden (1698-1708) concludes his treatment on the use and abuse of reason concerning mysteries of the faith with these words:

It is evident that much of human reason and those things that are so celebrated are useful in knowing, discerning, proving and guarding the truth and stability of the mysteries revealed by God, not only to the extent that reason denotes a faculty of our mind, but also to the extent that it denotes certain practical theories76 and axioms: yet, it must not be claimed as a norm and rule according to which all the mysteries of religion ought to be examined before they may be received by faith.77

How does Witsius reach such a conclusion? First, he notes that reason frequently is understood either as a faculty that judges between truth and falsehood either deduced from practical theories (scita), general judgments (placita), and axioms, or from evidence. Secondly, if speaking about right reason as a faculty there is a contrast between right reason (recta ratio) as it judges versus a corrupt, vicious, or blind reason. On the other hand if one speaks of right reason as axiomatic, then it denotes the most certain and evident principles and evident conclusions drawn from them, not "a wide-open, gaping conclusion." Third, "rightly judging itself, reason firmly believes, whenever concepts or ideas of things are observed clearly and distinctly. But in this regard, it very frequently

75 Huber, De Concursu Rationis, ††2v.
76 Cf. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistles: Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales [books 93-124], (Cambridge, Mass.: 1989). In Stoic philosophy, Seneca comments that in the liberal arts, most have decreta as well as praecepta (95.9) and that decreta, as well as placita and scita frequently translates the Greek dogmata (95.10). In Seneca, the force of the terms seems to be that these are not rules but practical theories with ethical import.
grasps that it is deceived that it thought it perceived something clearly and distinctly.”78 Fourth, to the extent that it denotes a faculty it is a proximate efficient cause of perception and judgment, but it is not a norm. Yet, "to the extent that it signifies evidences and certain axioms, to that extent it can function as a norm, so that it may reject something as false whatever is plainly repugnant to a manifest axiom of truth or what is not deduced by a legitimate conclusion."79 Fifth, faith is an assent offered to some truth on account of the testimony of God, "who is simultaneously supreme truth and in himself is autopistic (αὐτοπίστος)," not on account of the evidence of the matter.80 Sixth, the mysteries of the faith are whatever no mortal can find out by their own reasoning, but only by the revelation of God. Witsius specifically notes that the mysteries of the faith are opposed to "the knowledge of God" as employed in Romans 1:19, and are part of the mystery hidden by God 1 Corinthians 2:7, and the mystery made known by revelation in Ephesians 3:3. Finally, this revelation is contained in the Old and New Testament, which those who are conscious of its marks and innate divinity will approve since for them "it is a sin to ever interject any pretense whatsoever whenever there is something certainly taught there."81

Witsius also narrows the issue by noting that there are several questions that are not part of the current controversies, presumably in the Netherlands and among the Reformed, as a quote will show in a moment. It is not being debated whether there is any

78 Witsius, Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV, 585.
79 Witsius, Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV, 585-86.
80 Witsius, Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV, 586.
81 Witsius, Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV, 586.
mystery in Scripture that is contrary to right reason, as the answer is no. It is not being debated whether reason is permitted to ever oppose the teaching of Scripture under pretense of correctness (*rectitudo*), for it does not. Nor is there any question that reason is very useful (*magnus usus*) in searching out the sense of Scripture, because it is. The real question is principal in nature: must reason be consulted first when we inquire into the sense of the divine word? Is reason the arbiter of Scripture? And furthermore, is it appropriate to bend the words of Scripture to the axioms of reason? "At an earlier time the Socinians contended for these things, and approved of them in their practice—and oh that it were only these—for lately it is the Orthodox (i.e. the Reformed) that are dogmatically affirming them!"82

Before speaking of how right reason can be deployed positively in theology, Witsius clearly articulates the more traditional view of reason among the Reformed in his articulation of the extent of reason's depravity as he heaps up biblical adjectives. Due to its corruption, with respect to divine matters, reason is blind (2 Cor. 4:4), darkened (Eph. 4:18), darkness itself (Eph. 5:8), unable to know (1 Cor. 2:14), even senseless (Tit. 3:3) and foolish (Rom. 1:21). "Reason customarily fashions for itself axioms concerning divine matters that are as far as possible from the truth."83 And yet, as reason is the only proximate principle and cause of knowledge and judgment, "if divine matters, if mysteries of religion ought to be known, it cannot happen in any other way than through reason. Faith itself, as it ought to be a knowledge (*cognitio*), νόησις, and assent, is an

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operation of Reason or of the mind."\textsuperscript{84} So then, how can this possibly work? According to Witsius, notwithstanding the corruption of human reason, it is the mercy and forbearance of God who causes the residual sparks of light in the human mind, by which reason is even able to form some practical theories or axioms. "Thus it is not so much that these were formed by reason as they appear to be innate to reason: seeing that whenever a person thinks on them, one will always fall back on them in the same way. And so these are what they call common notions (\koin\acute{\epsilon}n\nu\omicron\acute{\i}o\omicron\alpha\varsigma)."\textsuperscript{85}

With respect to the positive role of reason, Witsius cautions his reader that there are two boulders that must be cautiously and carefully avoided: (1) "that we do not hastily hold something as certain or clear which is not" and (2) "we do not rashly pitch a battle where none is found."\textsuperscript{86} When these two things are held circumspectly, something cannot be opposed to right reason as revealed by God that is in fact repugnant to the axioms of evident truth. Something that is true according to right reason cannot ultimately be contrary to Scripture, and vice versa.

The result is that God never reveals by supernatural revelation something to human beings that is repugnant to self-evident truths (\textit{veritatibus per se notis}) or the dictates of right reason. And to this extent those axioms can have the force of a certain kind of norm, so that nothing may be received as revealed by God which is in fact contrary to the known principles of nature.\textsuperscript{87} In part, this is due to the fact that assent is a

\textsuperscript{84} Witsius, \textit{Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV}, 588.

\textsuperscript{85} Witsius, \textit{Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV}, 588.

\textsuperscript{86} Witsius, \textit{Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV}, 591.

\textsuperscript{87} Witsius, \textit{Miscellaneorum Sacrorum Libri IV}, 589.
cognitive function of reason in the recognition of faith. If faith is totally divorced from the function of reason, then in addition to not having certainty or conviction, one cannot also yield assent. Thus, reason does have a role to play in a person's faith.

Witsius insists that there is a disparity between the level of certainty between human reason and supernatural revelation. For example, a farmer may know the methods of plowing, tilling, sowing, threshing, and so forth, but "the precepts of agriculture are not oracles of equivalent certainty with articles of faith" given that they are admixed with human reasoning.88 Whereas Scripture's origin is from God and faith operates in a mediated way, in this respect "faith is rational because it does not assent to anything except truth clearly known, although it is not known in in the ordinary way of reasoning."89

And finally, another approach among some Reformed that denied Duker's claims and simultaneously demonstrated that Duker went beyond Descartes is evidenced in the 1687 anonymous twenty-page work, *Descartes vindicated: or the divine authority of revelation independent of reason*, which was published in Utrecht.90 Duker assumed and publicly claimed that this was the handiwork of the Utrecht professor of philosophy, Gerardus de Vries. De Vries was no friend of Cartesianism, however. This particular brief treatment is primarily a pastiche and aggregation of citations from Descartes's works collated to particular claims that Duker made. Rather than recapitulate the

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90 Anonymous, *Cartesius Vindicatus sive Divina Revelationis Auctoritas a Ratione Independens, Asserta ex Ratione pro Cartesio contra Propositionem Franequeranam de Divina Scripturarum Auctoritate, quae non Aliunde (non nisi) ex Ratione Adstrui Possit*, (Utrecht: Franciscus Halma, 1687). G. W. Duker in his *Dissertatio apologetica* believed that the Utrecht theologian Gerhardus de Vries was the author.
arguments here, it is sufficient to note that de Vries’s concern is to demonstrate how far
Duker is beyond even the Cartesians, and thus all the more intolerable.\footnote{See the entry “Gerardus De Vries” in Wiep van Bunge, Michiel Wielema, and Paul Schuurman in Dictionary of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Dutch philosophers, 2 vols. (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003).}

In comparison to de Vries approach to Descartes, the Utrecht theologian Petrus
warned that the previous generation understood that Arminianism was the "snake in the
grass" and the "basilisk in the egg" which the Orthodox sought to suffocate with a
national synod at Dordt.\footnote{Mastricht, Gangraena, **2r-v, "atque etiam basiliscum in ovo suffocare conati sunt."} Now, the national synod that met in Duisburg on July 13-14, 1656 has sought to address the new threat Cartesianism, whose principles it declared
"useless and noxious to Holy Theology" and its opinions "absurd."\footnote{Mastricht, Gangraena, **2v.} While Mastricht
does address the theoretical principles of Cartesianism, he does so with an eye to
demonstrate how they impinge upon the praxis and piety of the Church as well as the
practical theology of the academy.\footnote{Mastricht, Gangraena, **3r.}

One of Mastricht's express concerns for example, which regards its gangrenous
character, is that when Descartes's work was translated into Dutch, the word dubitatio
was not translated as twijffelen (doubt) its lexical equivalent, but rather it was translated
by the phrase opschortinge des oordeels (suspensio judicii, a suspension of judment), "as
if we would then state that this was any less impious: to suspend judgment on all things,
namely the existence of God and all those matters whose certain assent God prescribes in his Word."\textsuperscript{96} Besides the issues that Descartes raises, Mastricht is concerned to point out what Descartes truly says since some of his Dutch translators, as Ryssenius points out, have substituted "Allingaism" for genuine Cartesianism by "crossing out" (\textit{doot-stuypen}) or editing out certain words.\textsuperscript{97} For example, if Cartesianism is so benign, why does it pose such questions as these: could we arrive at the knowledge of God through the contemplation of creatures if the knowledge of God were not concreated with us, or if in our soul we did not have the idea of God? Is it heterodox if a philosopher proposes to a person that not all things were made only by God and some do not have any use? Could someone err who rightly employs their own judgment? Mastricht addresses each of these questions and more in order to demonstrate how Cartesianism undercuts true faith and belief. While Mastricht is genuinely concerned about "philosophy writ large" so to speak, his more proximate context is the reception of Descartes in "philosophy writ small," that is, how it is impacting the life and practice of the Church and Academy in the Netherlands. De Moor cites and endorses Mastricht's \textit{Gangraena} in his own engagements with methodological doubt, which we will have occasion to reference again.

\textbf{6.2 Responses of Marckius and De Moor}

It is in this milieu among the Reformed that De Moor, following Marckius, seeks to reiterate the \textit{theologia viatorum} or \textit{theologia stadii}, establish the proper boundary between philosophy and theology, and reinforce the necessity of Scripture for salvation.

\textsuperscript{96} Mastricht, \textit{Gangraena}, ***r.

and worship, all while delimiting the appropriate use of reason in the context of such debates. In his *Compendium Theologiae Christianae didactico-elenchiticum* on the topic of natural theology and its relationship to revealed theology, Marckius does not cite other sources besides his own corpus, primarily various collections of his *textuales exercitationes* or disputations based off of his course material which he presided over. In elaboration of Marckius, every one of the issues and debates among the Reformed theologians mentioned previously (§4.2), De Moor mentions either by direct citation, specific reference, or allusion.

### 6.2.1 Marckius on *Theologia Stadii* and Methodological Doubt

In the space of thirteen sections, Marckius deploys the division between natural and revealed theology as together comprising the *theologia stadii*. In standard scholastic fashion Marckius examines whether or not this theology exists, asserting that "There is a certain *theologia stadii*—indeed it is necessary—so that it may be proved *a priori*: from God's communicative goodness, His goal in the creation and conservation of things, in humanity's innate desire for blessedness, and first their dependence on God and their present misery."  

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99 For the thirteen sections, see Fig. 4.1 above or Marckius, *Compendium*, 5-11.

100 Marckius, *Compendium*, 5.
Theologia Stadii, when divided according to its principium is either natural or special, which is supernatural and revealed. "And in nature certainly there occurs a two-fold book from which [natural theology] can be learned: a book of one's own heart and of other creatures outside or near by a person."¹⁰¹ Thus natural theology is implanted or innate and is also subjective, "which of course proceeds with the use of reason from the innate faculty of the mind and instinct without the contemplation of any creatures."¹⁰² Having both theoretical and practical sides, in the former sense it is the knowledge of God according to Romans 1:19 in human beings but in the latter sense according to Romans 2:14-15 when Gentiles "do by nature the things required by the law." Also, it consists of a divine knowledge that extends to all that includes in the human mind knowledge of their own dependence and a fear due to their own hidden sins.

As regards objective natural theology, Marckius explains this in terms of proofs for the existence of God a posteriori by the via Causalitatis, via Negationis, and the via Eminentiae.¹⁰³ This objective natural theology is acquired and functions in a discursive way "from the observance of the best and constant order among creatures so that we ascend from the finite and dependent effects to the first cause by the via Causalitatis." From the exclusion of creaturely imperfections in the via Negationis and the supposition of all perfections to God in the via Eminentiae. This acquired knowledge helps and perfects the implanted knowledge and does not proceed from supernatural grace, but from the effects of Nature, "and not from the knowledge of God's existence only but also

¹⁰¹ Marckius, Compendium, 5.
¹⁰² Marckius, Compendium, 5.
of the divine perfections" which in turn practically function to urge that humans are subject to God.\footnote{Marckius, Compendium, 5.}

It is at this point that Marckius takes up the question of whether or not universal doubt about everything external to ourselves, our very selves, and the creator's perfections and existence can lead to greater certainty and perfection when deployed in theology. In short, Marckius denies the \textit{universalis dubitatio} of Pyrrhonian skepticism generally, and sees in Cartesian methodological doubt particularly skeptical tendencies. Furthermore, he argues that such methodological doubt does not have any place in theology, natural or otherwise, and calls it useless, impossible, unseemly, and dangerous, as it cannot prove the Deity from doubt and there is no certainty that one would emerge from the forest of doubt utilizing this path \textit{(via)} or method. And thus, practically the Cartesian method fails in the very goal of philosophy which is to lead to greater certainty regarding ourselves, the nature of things, and God.

Marckius utilizes Romans 1 and 2 repeatedly to emphasize that after the fall natural theology in this life is insufficient to save and it is only sufficient to render someone inexcusable. Viewed from this angle, Marckius's qualified defense of common notions is an attempt to defend the \textit{imago Dei}.

\section*{6.2.2 De Moor on Methodological Doubt}

When commenting on the portion of Marckius regarding methodological doubt, De Moor notes that Descartes even acknowledges that "if anyone sets their goal as: to doubt about God in order that one may persist in doubt, that person gravely sins while
one wants to keep a matter of such great importance in doubt." And yet while Descartes argues that one could use doubt to refine their beliefs, De Moor points out that Descartes is employing methodological doubt in his articulation of innate natural theology. The problem is that belief in or the realization of God's existence is a point of innate natural theology that can be sharpened discursively by acquired natural theology, but the ground of innate natural theology (i.e. that it is a noetic part of the image of God in humanity) cannot be established discursively. In other words, according to De Moor, in the *theologia stadii* the proposition *Deus existit* is part of the very *fundamenta* and thus must be immune to doubt. To support this argument, De Moor cites Witsius's *Twist des Heeren met zyn Wyngart*, or "The Lord's conflict with his vineyard." This work is tailored to the Dutch context in which Witsius is citing controversial disputations that occurred in the Dutch universities and demonstrating their importance on matters in the Dutch Reformed churches. On the question of the image of God in humanity and innate knowledge of God Witsius in turn cites Calvin's *Institutes*, in which the *sensus divinitatis* is "indelibly engraved on the human heart" and the belief "is naturally engendered in all and thoroughly fixed, as it were in our very bones" because it "is not a doctrine which is first learned at school, but one which every person possesses from the womb, one which nature herself allows no individual to forget."  

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105 Cited in De Moor, *Commentarius*, 1.47, "Si quis sibi pro scopo proponat dubitare de Deo, ut in hac dubitatione persistat, graviter peccat, dum vult in re tanti momenti pendere in dubio."


107 E.g. marginalia in Witsius, *Twist*, 262. Also note Witsius's citation of Samuel Desmaret's, *De Abusu Philosophiae Cartesianaee, Surrepente & Vitando in Rebus Theologicis & Fidei, Dissertatio Theologica* (Groningen, Tierck Everts, 1670), 11.

For De Moor, as has been mentioned the *theologia stadii* divides into revealed and natural theology. The difference with respect to their *principia* are that the common principium is the "total nature and universe of things" whereas the special principium is the revealed Word of God (both unwritten and written). ¹⁰⁹ "Nature has a double book from which it teaches theology: first the book of one's own heart and then one of other creatures, outside a human being or according to it." The natural theology present in the heart is generally called implanted (*insita*) or innate (*innata*), as well as subjective theology (*theologia in subjecto*). According to De Moor, "subjective natural theology is not drawn from the contemplation of several objects but naturally inheres in the knowing subject." This is also described as noetic theology whereas dianoetic theology is a form of discursive knowing through ratiocination. However, in De Moor's view, if one utilizes the term noetic as a synonym for subjective theology, it is not present as an actual content within an infant's mind as if "its actual concept and assent are present."¹¹⁰ On the other hand, it is not satisfactory to assert that innate theology is only a mere potency or faculty of thinking about God or assenting to proffered reasons to demonstrate God's existence. Instead, De Moor states that the *theologia insita* is a similar mode as with the rest of the common notions.

In play is whether there is an innate natural theology. De Moor asserts there is and so does Descartes in a sense given that both agree that there are common notions. However, the method for using innate or implanted natural theology is where the

¹⁰⁹ De Moor, *Commentarius*, 1.1.12.
¹¹⁰ De Moor, *Commentarius*, 1.1.12.
conversation centers. The next question is how much does innate natural theology include and how much must be perfected or improved by acquired natural theology. Or to use another pair of De Moor's distinctions, does dianoetic natural theology ground or take primacy over noetic theology? Without any noetic, implanted or innate knowledge in the knowing subject, in order for a discursive knowing to be the basis of all human knowing one must assume that all human knowledge is known either directly or indirectly, either in an immediate way or a mediated one. Or to pose it slightly differently, which is more certain, a noetic natural theology implanted by God in the imago Dei and immediately accessible in the human subject as a common gift of God to humanity or a dianoetic natural theology discursively attained by fallen human reason mediately accessible through methodological doubt? For De Moor, and many of the Reformed, the answer is the former.111

It is in this vein that one can understand De Moor's usage of Witsius and Calvin. And besides Calvin, Witsius deploys Ursinus's comments on the Heidelberg Catechism with respect to the knowledge of God and the manner in which both the Church and the Academy should search the Scriptures,

The vast misery of the nature of human beings cannot be known well enough, that, although it has been created according to the brilliant knowledge of God and thus according to the image of God, it is fallen so that not only is it ignorant of who God is and what sort of God He is, but also it disputes whether there is any God in heaven. And at least in the Church, if it should establish the question in view of doubt, it would seem hardly that it must be tolerated. Therefore we search the testimonies

111 For more on insita theologia or noetic theology, De Moor commends a contemporary Utrecht theologian, Gisbert Bonnet's disputation on this topic: "A metaphysical-pneumatological disputation on the knowledge of those things that the human mind cannot know directly or positively", see Gijsbertus Bonnet, Dissertatio Metaphysico-Pneumatologica, de Notitia Eorum, quae Mens Humana nec Directe nec Positive Cognoscere Potest ... Gisbertus Bonnet, Narda Batavus Auctor ad Diem 23 Aprilis ... (Utrecht: Joannes Broedelet, 1749).
concerning God, not as the ignorant, but to be sure, we will all the more build ourselves up regarding their reliability.\textsuperscript{112}

If Ursinus recommends this is what we should do in the Reformed Church, what of the Reformed University? Witsius asks how a minister would fare that embarked into ministry from a \textit{gereformeerde Academië} who was regularly taught to philosophize by doubting the existence of God\textsuperscript{113} How indeed when one must remain in doubt until the nature and existence of God would have to be clearly and distinctly perceived? How all the more could a doubting minister lead a congregant to certain faith in God through Scripture? As Witsius states, and by citation De Moor endorses, there is no guarantee—indeed it is highly unlikely—that once one begins with doubt one will end in certainty.\textsuperscript{114}

De Moor closes his parenthetical reference to Descartes by noting that Witsius specifically quotes Descartes's views, "the renowned Witsius displays [Descartes's views in these citations] and likewise gravely detests his thesis."\textsuperscript{115}

De Moor continues elaborating Marckius's list of adjectives regarding Cartesian methodological doubt. It is useless,

\textsuperscript{112} Cited in Witsius, \textit{Twist}, 266-267 both in Latin and Dutch, the former in the marginalia, the latter in the text. Witsius cites this passage as "De Dei cognitione. Operum, Tom. 1. pag. mihi 37." Cf. Zacharias Ursinus, \textit{Zachariae Vrsini Vratislaviensis, Theologi Svmmi ... Volumen Tractationum Theologicarum} (Neustad: Matthaeus Harnisch, 1587), 1:37. The Dutch is "De elende van de natuur des Menichen kan niet genoeg bedagt worden, dat, daar zy tot de Heerlyke kennis ende na haet beeld Gods geschapen is, daar toe is vervallen, dat zy niet alleen niet wete, wie en hoedanig God is, maar ook disputere of'er eenige God in den Hemel is. En in de Kerkewel. Indien zoodanige Vrage om der twyffelinge wille wierden v opgestelt, zoo zoude zy nauwelyks verdragelyk schynen. Wy zoeken getuigenissen van God op, niets als of wy hem niet kende, maar op day wy ons in een zekere zaake te meer bevestigen." I would like to thank Dr. Lyle Bierma for his assistance in locating Witsius's Latin citation from Ursinus's \textit{Volumen Tractationum Theologicarum}.

\textsuperscript{113} Witsius, \textit{Twist}, 267, "Hoe meent gy zoude die man uitvaren als hy in een Gereformeerde Academië hoorende disputeren, dat men om ordentelijst te Philosopheeren voor al aan de wezetheid Gods twijffelen moest?"

\textsuperscript{114} Cf. Witsius, \textit{Twist}, 263-264.

\textsuperscript{115} De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:46-47.
Because doubt does not provide such proof of deity and after a long period of doubt it does not supply higher and greater effective arguments for the existence of God to anyone than what one had known or could have known previously from the testimony of conscience, the senses, reason, and the agreement of all peoples, arguments whose greater or lesser force can be weighed while this innate principle always remains certain and undoubted: God exists.\footnote{De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:47-48.}

It is impossible, as this persuasion regarding God's existence is part of "the common notions (κοιναὶ ἐννοίαι) and innate truth, which, by the force of its own certainty excludes all doubt."\footnote{De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:48.} In order to utilize this doubt here, one must extinguish "the light of reason and conscience." It is impious, according to Descartes's reasoning, (a) one would have to become an atheist for a time in order to become pious and honest which is contrary to Psalm 10:4 and 14:1 (i.e. "the fool says in his heart there is not God"). A time of atheism that Descartes himself endured for nine years by his own admission.\footnote{De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:48, cited as "Diss. De Meth. Pag. 8-10, coll. Pag 18, 19."} (b) To call the existence of God into question is to live for a time without God in the world and thus to live without hope of salvation (Eph. 2:12). (c) "By our moral dependence these are demanded of us in every and any moment: love, honor, reverence, worship towards our Creator and faith about and towards God, without which it is impossible to please Him."\footnote{De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:48.} And finally, fourth, doubt of this sort is most dangerous, "for if one must doubt about God's existence, which is an innate truth, one will have to doubt also about other self-evident principles."\footnote{De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:48.} De Moor states the total impact grimly "but in this way the atheist and skeptic will have an unconquerable bulwark (\textit{inexpugnabile propugnaculum}),
which cannot be overturned without the assistance of certain immediate truths certainly supposed."\textsuperscript{121}

For the Reformed of this period who share De Moor's view, methodological doubt is an atheistic acid that will eat through the entire framework and system of Christian theology, piety, and religion. De Moor closes the point with two quotes, one an endorsement of how philosophy should be done from Clement of Alexandria's \textit{Stromata}, "But the most ancient philosophers did not conduct themselves for the sake of contending and doubting; still less do we, who embrace that which is truly philosophy."\textsuperscript{122} And finally, De Moor recapitulates a century old lament:

One is moved to astonishment today at a new plague sprouting up among those who induce a soul to doubt whether they may exist, see, hear, and so forth. O miserable mortals who reason contrary to their own sense so that they may doubt they exist, and so that they may dare to profess themselves as unbelievers and atheists, certainly [at first] while they are willing [to believe], they doubt; next they will begin to allow that they question all things, by which means they could put off their faith (which Scripture calls disputing (\textit{ratiocinationes}) and murmuring), and finally they withdraw from themselves the knowledge of God and his ways (\textit{eius viarum})!\textsuperscript{123}

This second comment is from Johannes Cocceius regarding the state of affairs in the seventeenth century which De Moor applies all the more in terms of the eighteenth.

\textsuperscript{121} De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:48.

\textsuperscript{122} Cited in De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:48 as Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Stromata}, book 7, "\textit{ἄλλος οἱ παλαιῶταὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητεῖν, καὶ ἀπορεῖν ἐφέροντο ἦποι γὰρ ἂν ἤμεῖς οἱ τὸς ἄντως ἀληθοῦς ἀντεχόμενοι φιλοσόφοι}" and "Sed neque antiquissimi philosophi ad contendendum ferebantur & ad dubitandum; nederum nos qui amplie tum eam, quae vere est philosophiam."

\textsuperscript{123} De Moor cites this from Johannes Cocceius in two passages, with the first cited here, "De Ultimis Mosis Considerationes ad Deuteronomii capita sex postrema: confirmandae atque illustrandae Religioni Christianae" in \textit{Opera Omnia theologica, exegetica, didactica, polemica, philologica}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} edition, (Amsterdam: 1701), vol. VII, p206 §74, which is similarly to his comments in "Summa Theologiae ex Scripturis repetita," \textit{Opera Omnia}, 7:160 §§24-25.
In a more analytical way, De Moor takes up some of the Cartesian and semi-Cartesian objections to his characterization thus far. First, he notes that the Cartesians equate the concepts of doubt and suspension of judgment. In response he asserts that "these differ among themselves like an antecedent and a consequent."\textsuperscript{124} Doubt is a result. Suspension of judgment is part of the beginning of the process. Furthermore, De Moor acknowledges one could utilize these phrases synonymously provided that one applies a peremptory suspension of judgment only on doubtful matters, not certain ones.\textsuperscript{125} But there is a larger problem, by doubt, Descartes intends something more than \textit{simplex assensus suspensio ac rationum examen}, and burns the entire house down to the foundations or as it were overturns the whole fruit basket because one piece may be rotten.\textsuperscript{126} Descartes's absolute methodology indicates that it lacks the ability to truly determine what is good and bad, what is worth keeping and what is not. From here De Moor lists specific phrases that indicate the radical nature of Descartes's method, such as doubt means "meticulously restraining assent as if something were patently false," "affirming none of the things that the mind (\textit{mens}) previously affirmed or denied," "casting them out of the heart" (\textit{ex animo}), "removing them entirely as if they were false," "considering them false," "accounting them as false," and so forth. And for these reasons, according to De Moor, "it is not permitted without impiety to suspend judgment,

\textsuperscript{124} De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:49.

\textsuperscript{125} De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:49

\textsuperscript{126} De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:49, "Quod … Cartesius aliquid amplius … per dubitationem intelleixerit, colligi potest: ex similitudinibus, quibus Dubitationis negotium illustrat Cartesius, veluti destructionis domus ad fundamenta usque, ut ejus loco melior aedificari possit; corbis pomis plenae, ex qua cuncta promiscue ejicuntur, ubi veremur ne aliqua ex iis putrida sint, ut deinceps ea, quae animadvertisimus non esse corrupta, resumamus reliquis relictis."
to restrain assent concerning the knowledge of the existence of God, and by not affirming or denying that God exists."\textsuperscript{127}

6.3 Conclusions

By the time De Moor published the first volume of the \textit{Commentarius Perpetuus} in 1761 conservative Reformed Orthodoxy had been engaged in a philosophical and theological battle for over one hundred and twenty years on the issues surrounding of Socinian reason and Cartesian doubt. And so when one works through the citations and sources for positing his arguments, De Moor was still fighting philosophical battles that had taken place from the 1640s onward. While his arguments are clearly exegetically based, faithful to the model of theology he is expositing from Marckius, by the time his \textit{Supplementum} was published in 1774, his supplemented and updated references were from works published in the 1740s. The currents of the philosophical world are rapidly shifting around him. And although it is true that the church, school, and national authorities sought to curb and hinder the progress of atheism and irreligion through strictures and bans, the results were not what could be called anything close to lasting success. It is in this sense, that De Moor's theology must be called late orthodoxy.

There are manifold, inter-related and complex issues in play, yet De Moor views the root issue as methodological doubt. The \textit{theologia in hac vita} is a commitment to epistemic humility and dependence upon the authority of the scriptures. For De Moor reason must give way to faith for true knowledge of God in submission to the Scriptures. While De Moor defends common notions inasmuch as they assist in establishing innate and implanted knowledge of God, yet human reason cannot acquire a saving knowledge

\textsuperscript{127} De Moor, \textit{Commentarius}, 1:49.
of God apart from grace. The classical text here is Romans 1:18-21. For attaining saving knowledge of God, creaturely reason is insufficient and fallen reason is incapable of it. For De Moor conflict with the Enlightenment currents both inside and outside of the church and academy spring from this cause.
CHAPTER 7: Summary of Findings

7.1. Institutional continuity as a matter of method

The primary thesis that has been prosecuted through the course of this dissertation is that in order to understand the process of confessionalization and deconfessionalization, it is necessary to root a historical inquiry—even one of intellectual history—in a discrete social context. In this case, an early modern university is located at the intersection of social and intellectual history. From that point, I have endeavored to situate the prolegomena of Bernhardinus De Moor, professor of theology at Leiden University from 1745 to 1779, and to evaluate his Commentarius Perpetuus in terms of institutional continuity and its relationship to Junius’s De Theologia Vera (1594). As was stated in the first chapter, institutional continuity views a particular professor's thought within the history of a theological faculty, in this case at Leiden University, and evaluates the rootedness of that paradigm or conceptual framework in the pedagogical artifacts and subsequent publications of a professor and its continuance over the life of an institution.

To say that a viewpoint, framework, or conceptual schema has some degree of institutional continuity is to make an a posteriori judgment based upon its recurrence, development, critique, and use over multiple generations of professors. A conceptual framework has no power, force, or ability on its own. In order to function in a historically meaningful way, a conceptual framework must be rooted in contexts and recur as an intellectual artifact of a person's career, and in this case, teaching career. Second, in order to function in a historically meaningful way, it must be transmitted and taken up by colleagues and students within discrete, evaluable environments. It must be tied to places, names, documents, and dates, and not to idealized and reified "-isms" that function
ahistorically. By requiring such transmission in terms of documents, a historian can evaluate more concretely its development and decay. Third, the continuity of a pedagogical framework at an academic institution can be explored in terms of its reception via simple, conceptual, and programmatic continuity or discontinuity among a faculty. Fourth, there are degrees of institutional continuity as evidenced by: (1) a strong form of institutional continuity in the official adoption of a particular schema, text, or curricula. The limits of a strong institutional continuity can even be measured in terms of what sort of debate or discourse is proscribed or censored on a particular topic. Additionally, an institution's position can be measured by how long a particular topic or issue is officially banned. (2) A moderate form of institutional continuity occurs when a viewpoint is not officially endorsed by the administration but is continuously deployed (whether by all, some, or even one professor of a faculty) over successive generations. (3) A weak form of institutional continuity occurs either (a) when a viewpoint enters upon a professor's arrival and lasts only the length of their tenure, or (b) when it is adopted by a professor upon their arrival at a new institution that was not deployed in the same way at their prior institution. Fifth, institutional continuity is best evidenced in works and publications executed in the course of a professor's duties such as: lectures, textbooks, students' notes, disputational cycles, academic orations, and works published in some measure at the university's expense or in the university's name.

As shown in chapter 2, in the case of Leiden University, this methodological thesis of institutional continuity is somewhat easier to demonstrate as Franciscus Junius published his prolegomenal framework in the *De Theologia Vera* (1594), which was subsequently deployed as part of a cycle of student disputations in 1597, and elements of
his schema were adopted, adapted, and taught to generations of students through at least the tenure of Bernhardinus De Moor, which ended in 1779. As professors arrived and doctoral graduates departed, this prolegomenal framework of theology was also transmitted and transplanted to other university contexts. In some cases, this framework spread to other contexts as it was perpetuated, adopted, and adapted in new institutions by some of Junius's colleagues (e.g. Gomarus) and students (e.g. Walaeus). In the case of Gomarus, the framework was utilized at the Academy of Saumur while he was there and then again at Groningen when he took a position there. By coordinating continuity and influence directly to professor-student transmission via pedagogical methods, both terms gain a greater degree of concrete significance.

This dissertation does not address the thornier questions of what the limits and degrees of author-reader(s) continuity and influence are, but evaluations in terms of institutional continuity can account for more direct degrees of influence that would play into accounts of confessional developments and regional identities in the early modern period. Such history writ small also allows for synchronic evaluations within a confessional consensus in different geopolitical regions. This in turn could open one pathway for understanding both confessionalization and deconfessionalization in a more nuanced and localized way. In the early modern period of Leiden University, as in other early modern universities, there was a much greater degree of connectivity between the church, the academy, and the state. By studying continuities, developments, and discontinuities within the content and method of instruction at a particular institution one can investigate broader controversies (e.g. Cartesianism, Spinozism, etc.) within the
context of particular institutional actions (e.g. the edict of Leiden University curators banning particular topics).

As argued in chapter 3, the importance of the disputational genre cannot be underestimated for its linkage both to a professor's lectures as well as it's subsequent incorporation into a published work. In student disputations we find a genre of academic publication that yields a sufficient and substantial degree of certainty with respect to a professor's view on a particular topic, even to the very day and hour of the disputation. In this dissertation, I have taken the stronger position that unless demonstrated explicitly to the contrary, student disputations should be viewed as primarily a professor's views, and secondarily as a student's. In this dissertation, authorship must mean more than copyist. And, as argued, the distinction between respondens and auctor et respondens is real and not simply semantic or haphazard. Exclusive student authorship (in a modern sense of originality) of disputations, while possible and even permitted at Leiden, was not the general rule and was not as frequent as some might suppose. Most often, disputations should be viewed as an exercise of student incorporation and public defense of portions of a professor's lecture. In some instances, disputations were written years in advance by the professor before ever delivering a series of ordinary or extraordinary lectures and disputations. In other cases disputations are even written conjointly among a theological faculty and published as a specimen of an institution's confessional commitment and pedagogical content. It is in this light that disputations represent but one small part of building a regional confessional identity.

Academic orations, as articulated in chapter 4, are also a genre that is not as frequently explored in relation to a theologian's views and their tenure. In the case of
Bernhardinus De Moor there are two disputations that deploy the prolegomenal framework. His inaugural disputation coordinates the issues of the *theologia viatorum*—the kinds of knowledge of God, kinds of revelation, the necessity of Scripture, methodological doubt, common notions, and so forth—with matters that affect the life of the Church and the life of the individual believer. In his valedictorian address as rector magnificus, De Moor deploys several of the themes, if not the distinctions proper, regarding the nature of theology as a way to critique certain abuses of theology within his own context. This in turn within the context of the *genus demonstrativum* as an oratorical method is applied to the life of the academic community, its confessional identity, and its piety. This too yields insight into, if not the actual state of affairs, at least the ideals of the faculty for the institution. Since Leiden University frequently published these orations in Latin for the educated public, we see that these ideas, events, and documents were intended to shape the social, national, and confessional identity. This is even more the case when we find Latin academic inaugural orations translated into the vernacular for the literate, but less educated public. This too informs an understanding of institutional continuity, albeit more indirectly than the original conceptual framework taught in a professor's lectures and defended in student disputations.

7.2 *Theologia viatorum* as a Matter of Content

The value of a conceptual framework, and what this dissertation demonstrates via its test case in Bernhardinus De Moor, is that when it has a significant trajectory of institutional continuity, it seeks to address particular concerns, problems, or ambiguities of an enduring and even contemporary nature. As has been demonstrated in chapters 2, 5, and 6, the framework metonymically referred to here as *theologia viatorum* serves to
protect certain constructions regarding the creator/creature distinction, the nature of
accommodated knowledge of God, the progressive and eschatological elements of
theology in Christian experience, the relationship between faith and reason, the
insufficiency of natural theology, the necessity of Scripture, and the nature of the
theological discipline and its ordering to matters of theory and practice. All of these
constructions are based in particular interpretations of classic scripture passages such as 1
Corinthians 13:9-12 and Romans 1:19-22, for example. The *theologia viatorum*
framework as expressed at Leiden was deepened, chastened, and challenged by theology
and philosophy professors in its faculty. At times the schema was simply recapitulated, at
others it was called into question, and by the eighteenth century in De Moor, coordinated
to the larger witness of the confessional Reformed world. Academic and even private
controversies sometimes resulted in public disputes for the churches and the nation as
recent graduates who became pastors brought disputes, questions, and new questions and
concepts into their local churches.

Chapter 4, with respect to content, illustrates how De Moor deployed thematic
elements of the *theologia viatorum* without utilizing technical terms in public oration
within the Leiden University community. Using the structure of classic oration, De Moor
musters classic scripture passages regarding the knowledge of God, the nature of the
church, the imperfect nature of human knowledge, the imperfection due to human
depravity, the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit and the eschatological hope of glory. All
of these together form a historical argument or *demonstratio* by which De Moor moves
through redemptive history and the continuity of theological instruction at Leiden
University to his own day to motivate his community for service to God in each person's
respective callings in the academic and national context of the University of Leiden and the United Provinces. The goal of such orations is to move his community from embracing a conceptual theory to engaging contextual practices. In short, the academic oration echoes and seeks to buttress the mission of the institution and its continuance.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that Mastricht and De Moor (and thus MArckius) have different approaches to where practical theology is placed and how it is arranged in a theological textbook. Yet, as both utilize the archetypal and ectypal framework, they believe that theology has a theoretical and a practical component. In other words, a scholastic method of discourse does not necessarily preclude the emphasis upon piety.

In chapter 6, the focus is on how De Moor engages the questions surrounding methodological doubt, faith and reason, and the role of natural theology from within the framework of the archetypal and ectypal theology. In tracing out the sources De Moor utilizes to exposit Marckius and engage the debates, the basic concern and commitment driving the engagements is a concern for the authority of Scripture, the reality of God's special revelation, the necessity of salvation, and the submission of human reason to divine faith.

Whether institutional continuity is a tenable and fruitful methodological tool for further investigations in other periods and contexts, only time will tell. The same can be said for the broader transconfessional value of a theologia viatorum and its place in the long arc of Christian theology.
APPENDIX: Theses

I. Theses in Dissertatione

1. In order to study the process of confessionalization and deconfessionalization, it is necessary to bound a descriptive term (e.g. an "-ism") with clear parameters, whether historical, confessional, regional national, or otherwise.

2. The transmission of the schema known as theologia vera or simply theologia viatorum in Dutch Universities can be traced in the main back to the University of Leiden, its professors, and its graduates.

3. Among the majority of Dutch Reformed in the seventeenth century and (although shifting) in the eighteenth century, methodological doubt represented a step towards atheism and irreligion.

4. Academic disputations in the early modern theology faculty at Leiden University should be interpreted as representing the presiding professor's view unless explicitly stated or proven otherwise.

5. Theology, being a mixed discipline of theory and practice, is best described as a wisdom (sapientia).

II. Theses in Curriculo

6. Ramist and Aristotelian methods of exegesis do not determine doctrinal conclusions but frame practical applications.

7. There is only one sense of Scripture from which doctrine can be derived, all other so-called senses are properly understood as applications or uses.

8. The literal sense of a typological passage among the early modern Reformed was a composite sense, and thus it is an error to stop with the Old Testament context if the New Testament directs the passage to Christ. As a corollary, it is equally an error in this period to hasten to the New Testament fulfilment if there is a clear contextual referrent in the Old Testament.


10. In order for a doctrine to be necessary for salvation it must be clearly taught in the Scriptures. A doctrine that is not clearly taught in the Scriptures cannot be a test of orthodoxy.
III. Quodlibetal Theses

11. Reformation and Post-Reformation Protestants frequently utilized *allegoria* in order to draw parallels between the caput-corpus-membrum relationship between God and Israel to Christ and his Church, in order to apply Old Testament narrative to the New Testament Church.

12. The fundamental unity of the Heidelberg Catechism and the Westminster Shorter Catechism is illustrated in this: in order for Christ to be your deepest comfort He must also be your chief good. In order for Christ to be your chief good, he must also be your deepest comfort through knowledge, assent, and trust.

13. It is never appropriate to put off a footnote.
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