The Pactum Salutis in the theologies of Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius.

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The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* (covenant of redemption) offers the idea of a covenant between the very persons of the Trinity for the redemption of humanity. The doctrine received most of its attention in seventeenth-century Reformed theology, but has been criticized and almost totally forgotten in dogmatics since the eighteenth century. Most of recent Reformed dogmatics, with very few exceptions, tend to ignore the doctrine or disparage it from biblical, trinitarian, christological, pneumatological, and soteriological perspectives—namely, the doctrine lacks scriptural basis; it is tritheistic; it leads to subordination of the Son; it omits the role of the Holy Spirit; and it applies a deterministic idea for the Christian life. The present study was designed not only to demonstrate the invalidity of these criticisms of the doctrine but also to point to its practical implications for theology and the church. The theologies of Herman Witsius, John Owen, David Dickson, Thomas Goodwin, and Johannes Cocceius portray a very robust form of the doctrine. In his description of the doctrine, Witsius argues that the doctrine is firmly based on biblical exegesis that was passed on from the patristic era. His peculiar methodology of cross-referencing and collation of related scriptural texts for the doctrine can be very useful for modern interpretation of the Scriptures. The doctrine formulated by Owen endorses the doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis* so as to give a deep insight into the Trinity. Owen’s doctrine of the *pactum*, in particular, provides a useful tool for the understanding of the relationship of the three Persons of the Trinity both in the *ad intra* and *ad extra* works. In Dickson’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, the Son’s voluntary consent and obedience of the will of the Father
are highly emphasized. This indicates that the doctrine does not lead to any subordination on the part of the Son; rather, it confirms the divinity of the Son in mediatorship and suretyship which display his full divinity. Likewise, Goodwin’s depiction of the Holy Spirit in the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* secures the divinity of the Spirit as well as his indispensable role for the transaction and accomplishment of the *pactum*. In Goodwin’s *pactum* doctrine, both Christology and Pneumatology are beautifully knit together for a more biblical soteriology. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in the theology of Cocceius sheds much light on the vibrant dynamic of the Christian life. He appropriates Reformed thought on freedom for the *pactum* doctrine and makes it very clear that the doctrine never leads to determinism. Christians regain true freedom in the fulfillment of the *pactum*, and the freedom increases in accordance with the *ordo salutis*. The triune God concurs with Christians in the way of their sanctification. This concurrence not only provides a foundation for the contingency of human freedom but also protects the assurance of salvation. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* of the five Reformed theologians clearly shows that the doctrine is both promised and promising for theology and the life of faith.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Thesis Statement and Introduction to the Problem

The Reformed church and theology acknowledge more clearly than other Christian traditions that the doctrine of the covenant is enormously important, both for theology and for the practice of the Christian life. Following the traditional interpretive patterns of patristic and medieval biblical interpretation, the early modern Reformed theologians assumed continuity between the Old and New Testaments. They argued this continuity with reference both to temporal covenants and with reference to the eternal foundation of these covenants in the covenant of redemption (i.e., the pactum salutis). The doctrine of the pactum salutis, however, has been harshly criticized in various ways since the eighteenth century. It is still criticized and, as I will argue, misunderstood by many modern theologians and has become almost forgotten in modern dogmatics.

In this study, I will demonstrate that the doctrine formulated by Herman Witsius, John Owen, David Dickson, Thomas Goodwin, and Johannes Cocceius can not only overcome modern criticisms, but it can also provide highly practical applications from trinitarian, 

1 Richard A. Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis: Locating the Origins of a Concept,” _Mid-America Journal of Theology_ 18 (2007): 11–12; Bert Loonstra, _Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond: Beschrijving en beoordeling van de leer van het pactum salutis in de gereformeerde theologie_ (Hague: Boekencentrum, 1990), 80–104; Andrew Alexander Woolsey, “Unity and Continuity in Covenantal Thought: A Study in the Reformed Tradition to the Westminster Assembly” (Ph.D. diss., University of Glasgow, 1988), I:262. Woolsey’s dissertation was published with minor corrections. Andrew Alexander Woolsey, _Unity and Continuity in Covenantal Thought: a Study in the Reformed Tradition to the Westminster Assembly_ (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012). In this study, I will use “the covenant of redemption” and “the pactum salutis” interchangeably. The reason this doctrine was developed particularly in the Reformed tradition, not in other traditions such as Roman Catholic and Lutheran, can be attributed to the Arminian and Antinomian debate that occurred in the Reformed circle.
christological, pneumatological, and soteriological perspectives. According to Witsius, the doctrine is based on a sound biblical exegesis that was passed on from the patristic era. His exegesis of the two key texts (i.e., Zechariah 6:13 and Galatians 3:16-20) can still find similar voices among modern biblical scholars and theologians. The doctrine formulated by Owen gives us a deep understanding of the Trinity, particularly regarding the oneness and threeness dimensions in the ad intra and ad extra works of the Trinity. In the doctrine of the pactum salutis Dickson clearly distinguishes between the Son’s natural consubstantiality with the Father and his voluntary subordination to him for the fulfillment of the pactum salutis. One can find a meaningful implication for the voluntary obedience of Christ in Dickson’s pactum formulation. The Spirit plays a very significant role in the transaction and application of the pactum in Goodwin’s theology. The pactum doctrine of Goodwin shows that the redemption of Christ cannot be fully understood without due consideration of the pneumatological dimension. Cocceius’s adumbration of the doctrine sheds new light on salvation history and soteriology. His abrogation theory offers a very creative idea for the understanding of freedom in the doctrine of the pactum salutis. The doctrine of the pactum salutis provides a pretemporal, inviolable foundation of the temporal covenant of grace in Reformed federal theology.² The purpose of the present study is to salvage this forgotten doctrine and to present it as a contribution to the modern theological discussion.

² In Reformed orthodoxy, “pretemporal” (or “praetemporal”) does not mean “time before time” but means “prior to all things created” and thus “prior to time.” In this regard, “eternity” is a “pretemporal” or “praetemporal” conception, in which a logical and ontological connotation is contained. If “eternal” means “time before time,” then eternity temporally precedes created time, which leads to deterministic thinking. In this discussion, I do not differentiate between “pretemporal” or “praetemporal” as some other scholars do, such as Gijsbert van den Brink and Mark Jones. Joel R. Beeke and Mark Jones, A Puritan Theology: Doctrine for Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012), 237n1.
1.2. Place of the Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis in Reformed Covenant Theology

The doctrine of the pactum salutis has a peculiar history in the early modern Reformed theology. Its conception is usually associated with Johannes Cocceius. Wilhelm Gass, for example, suggested that Cocceius had invented the idea of the pactum salutis. Cocceius himself, however, acknowledged that Cloppenburg influenced him on this thought. The doctrine of the pactum salutis occupied a firm place in sixteenth and seventeenth Reformed covenant theology, even though the locus was implicit sometimes and explicit in other times. One can find foreshadowing of the doctrine of the pactum salutis when Oecolampadius, in 1525, spoke of God’s covenant with his people in Christ as based on a “pactum cum filio suo domino nostro Ihesu Christo.” According to his

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5 Van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669), 228.

6 Oecolampadius, In Iesaiam prophetam Hypomnematon, hoc est, Commentariorum, Ioannis Oecolampadii Libri VI (Basel: Apud Andream Cratandrum, 1525), 265b (Isa 54:9–10). Cited from Woolsey, Unity and Continuity in Covenantal Thought, 211; David VanDrunen and R. Scott Clark, “The
larger promises (ampliores promissiones) which were made with his Son, there will be an everlasting covenant (foedus sempiternum) which will be made with his people.⁷

Zwingli also argued a strong implication of the later idea of an eternal pactum salutis based on the authority of divine election, since salvation was a covenantal salvation.⁸ The covenant of grace had its origin in the elective love of God, according to his predetermined purpose.⁹

The doctrine of the pactum salutis had already been brought to full and clear expression in Olevianus’s De substantia foederis (1585).¹⁰ When human beings sinned, argued Olevianus, they corrupted themselves and destroyed the work of God. In order to save the fallen human being, the Son of God was constituted as a mediator of the covenant (Filius Dei mediator foederis à Patre constitutus spondet) for two reasons. First, the Son of God became the satisfaction for the sins (satisfacturum pro peccatis) of all

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people to whom the Father had given him (John 17). They are those whom God decreed
to adopt as sons through Christ from eternity (Eph 1). Second, the Son of God executed it
so that they may enjoy the peace of conscience and renew the image of God. Olevianus
was quite conscious of the trinitarian and covenantal link. R. Scott Clark pointedly argues
that “Olevian was as much a theologian of the Trinity as he was a federal or covenant
theologian.” Olevianus related the doctrine of the Trinity with that of the covenant in
his idea of the *pactum salutis*. It is also notable that Olevianus presents the Son as a
 guarantor. The guarantee of the Son is the root of the application and operation of the
*pactum salutis*. As a result of his guarantee, the mediator forms an ideal unity with the
 elect. Heppe draws the following conclusion from Olevianus’s doctrine of the *pactum
salutis*: “From this it appears that the doctrine of redemption in Olevianus has its actual
center of gravity in the doctrine of the *pactum* and *consilium salutis* between Father and
Son, and in the doctrine which rests upon it, namely, the planting of the elect in Christ, or
in the mystical body of Christ. This relationship is one already established in eternity, and
of such a nature that from eternity the Father looks upon the Son in no other way than as

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11 Caspar Olevianus, *De substantia foederis gratuitti inter Deum et electos, itemque de mediis
quibus ea ipsa substantia nobis communicatur. Libri duo è praelectionibus Gasparis Oleviani excepti*
(Geneva: Eustache Vignon, 1585), 23, 63, 106. Olevianus writes at p. 23, “Prout autem homo duplex
malum commiserat: nam & inobedientia Deum offenderat, & peccando semetipsum corruerat siue opus
Dei destruxerat: ita & *Filius Dei mediator foederis à Patre constitutus spondet* pro duabus rebus, primò
se satisfacturũ pro peccatis omnium quos Pater ei dedit Ioã. 17:& ab æterno per Christum in filios adoptare
decreuit Ephes. 1. Secundò se etiam effecturum vt sibi insiti pace conscientiae fruantur atque indices
renouentur ad Dei imaginem, quò Deus scopum prime creationis in ipsis consequatur, & in æternum pro
infinita sua bonitate & in Christo exhibita misericordia celebrentur: atque sic ipsis fore perfectum Iesum, id
est salutarem, qui merito & efficacia saluet populum suum à peccatis ipsorum Matth. I” (bolds mine).


14 Olevianus, *De substantia foederis gratuitti inter Deum et electos, itemque de mediis quibus ea
ipsa substantia nobis communicatur. Libri duo è praelectionibus Gasparis Oleviani excepti*, 2.
the Word to be made flesh, and then in union with the elect, believers, who form his mystical body.”

According to Witsius’ comment, Jacob Arminius (1560-1609) “does not carelessly discourse on this covenant, in his oration for the degree of doctor.” Arminius’s doctoral oration of July 1603 deals with the relationship between the Father and the Son.

William Ames (1576-1633), mentioned also by Witsius, formulated the doctrine of the covenant of redemption to refute the Remonstrants. He rejected the Remonstrant distinction between the accomplishment and the application of redemption (distinctio inter impetrationem et applicationem). For him the distinction made powerless and weak the decree of God in which he ordained Christ as a Savior of human beings (Consilium & decretum Dei, quo Christum posuit in Salvatorem hominum, frustrabile facit & plane infirmum). The conception of the pactum salutis served here as a higher unity between

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16 Herman Witsius, De oeconomia foederum Dei cum hominibus, libri quatuor (Leeuwarden: J. Hagenaar, 1677), II.2.16. Loonstra places the first mention of a covenant between the Father and Son concerning the Son’s priesthood in Arminius’s writing, with three particular developments later by Cloppenburg, Cocceius and Dickson. Loonstra, Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond, 381.

17 Jacob Arminius, Oratio de Sacerdotio Christi, in Opera theologica (Leiden, 1629), 9-26; translated as The Priesthood of Christ, in The Works of James Arminius, trans. James Nichols and William Nichols, 3 vols. (London, 1825, 1828, 1875; repr. with an intro. by Carl Bangs. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1986), I:416-17. The theme of a covenant between the Father and the Son also appears in Arminius’s oration De obiecto theologiae (Opera; Works, I:334-335, 343-344). Cited from Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 12-13n14. It seems that Arminius does not explicitly argue the doctrine of the pactum salutis any longer in his later theology. As far as I can determine, the doctrine is not found in the later works of Arminius such as Epistola Ad Hypolytum A Collibus . . . Nec Non Articuli Diligenti Examine Perpendendi (1608); Disputationes Publicae & Privatae (1610); Orationes Itemque Tractatus Aliquot Insigniores (1611); De Vero & Genuino Sensu Cap. VII. Epistolae Ad Romanos (1612); Examen Libelli Perkinsiani De Praedestinationis Ordine & Modo (1612); and Amica cum D. Francisco Iunio De Praedestinatone Collatio (1613).

18 Vos, Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation, 250; Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 13.

19 William Ames, Anti-synodalia scripta, vel animadversiones in dogmatica illa, quae
the accomplishment and the application of salvation.

David Dickson (1583-1662) also developed a Trinitarian doctrine of the *pactum salutis* and made explicit use of the doctrine for the refutation of Arminianism.\(^{20}\) He clearly mentioned “the Covenant of redemption betwixt God and Christ”\(^{21}\) so as to refute Arminianism in his speech at the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland in 1638. Later, in *The Summe of Saving Knowledge* (1649), Dickson claimed that the Father, Son, and Spirit decree all that comes to pass in time, and then he proceeds to expound that decree through the covenants. As human beings broke the covenant of works, God in his grace had ordained a way of salvation which was made “by vertue of and according to, the tenor of the Covenant of Redemption, made and agreed upon between God the Father and God the Son, in the counsel of the Trinity before the World began.”\(^{22}\)

Peter Bulkeley (1583-1659) published a book which addresses the doctrine of the covenant of redemption in 1646, two years prior to the publication of Cocceius’s *Summa doctrina de foedere et testamento Dei*.\(^{23}\) His doctrine of *pactum salutis* between the

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\(^{20}\) Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 16. Loonstra argues that the *pactum salutis* was developed as a response to Arminian universalism. Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond*, 28–31. Trueman also maintains that “Owen’s discussion of the covenant structure is understood against the background of debates with Arminianism,” and that “Owen . . . regards the covenant of redemption also as the ultimate basis for the rejection of universal ransom theories.” Carl R. Trueman, *The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology* (Carlisle, Cumbria: Paternoster Press, 1998), 134–35, 138.

\(^{21}\) David Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland, Session 11, December 3, 1638,” in *In Records of the kirk of Scotland, containing the acts and proceedings of the general assemblies, from the year 1638 downwards, as authenticated by the clerks of assembly; with notes and historical illustrations by Alexander Peterkin*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: John Sutherland, 1838), 158 (italics mine).  

\(^{22}\) David Dickson, *The summe of saving knowledge: with the practical use thereof* (Edinburgh: George Swintoun and Thomas Brown, 1671), 15r. See chapter 4 of this study.

\(^{23}\) Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 19.
Father and the Son not only removes the Arminian problem but also stands against an
Antinomian position. He carefully delineates the respective commitments between
Father and Son in the arrangement of the *pactum salutis*. The Father appoints the Son as
mediator for the redemption of human beings. He commands his Son to offer himself as a
sacrifice. He makes the Son a fivefold promise: he will give the Holy Spirit abundantly to
him; he will provide full assistance in his work; he will guarantee ultimate success in
bringing the elect to faith; he will grant rule and dominion; he will lift him to final glory.
The Son promises to accept the office. He will depend upon the Father and submit
himself to the Father’s will. He can expect the final glory for himself.

Johann Cloppenburg (1592-1652), Dutch Reformed theologian, worked out very
precisely the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. He chose the doctrine as a starting point for
his polemic against the Remonstrants. In his comment on Luke 22:29, Cloppenburg
argues that there is a twofold *diatheke* or dispensation of the new covenant of Christ: 1)
the one which the Father covenantally ordains the guarantor; 2) the one in which the Son
as the Father’s guarantor ordains the promise of life and heavenly glory for our sake.
Claims Cloppenburg, “As for the first arrangement, the covenant is said to be previously
ratified by God in Him, Gal 3:17. Here the full covenant concept remains, namely a two-
sided agreement of mutual trust. As for the second arrangement, the covenant is called a

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25 Bulkeley, *The Gospel-Covenant; or The Covenant of Grace Opened*, 29–31; Carl R. Trueman,
“The Harvest of Reformation Mythology?: Patrick Gillespie and the Covenant of Redemption,” in
*Scholasticism Reformed: Essays in Honour of Willem J. Van Asselt*, ed. Maarten Wisse, Marcel Sarot, and
Willemien Otten (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 200.
testament established for us by the dying Testator, Heb 9:14-17.\textsuperscript{26} Cloppenburg dealt with the covenant arrangement between God the Father and the Son as guarantor in detail.

Thomas Blake (c.1596-1657) acknowledges the existence of the covenant of redemption. He admits that federal transactions took place between the Father and the Son, and that this happened for our sake.\textsuperscript{27} He writes, “there is such a covenant . . . which was entered between God and Christ, containing the transactions which passe between the Father and the Sonne, the tenor of which covenant we find laid down by the Prophet, Esay 53.10, & c. and commented upon by the Apostle, Phil. 2.6.”\textsuperscript{28} For Blake, the economy of the covenant of grace and our being in it is founded on the covenant of redemption.

Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661) wrote a work on the covenant entitled The Covenant of Life Opened. He distinguished between the covenant of grace and the covenant of redemption according to the parties of the covenant. He called the covenant of redemption the “covenant of suretyship.”\textsuperscript{29} Rutherford wrote, “In this covenant of

\textsuperscript{26} Johannes Cloppenburg, Theologica opera omnia, ed. Johannes Marckius (Amsterdam: apud Johannem Gyselaar, 1684), 1:503.

\textsuperscript{27} Thomas Blake, Samuel Shaw, and Anthony Burgess, Vindiciae Foederis; Or, A Treatise of the Covenant of God Entered with Man-kinde: In the Several Kindes and Degrees of It, in which the Agreement and Respective Differences of the Covenant of Works and the Covenant of Grace, of the Old and New Covenant are Discust. The Conditions of the Covenant of Grace on Mans Part, are Assigned and Asserted. The Just Latitude and Extent Clearly Held Forth, and Fully Vindicated. Several Corollaries Containing Many Heads of Divinity, Now Controverted, and Practical Points Singularly Useful, Inferred. In Particular the Necessity of a Constant Settled Ministry (to Bring Men Into Covenant, and to Bring Them Up to the Termes of It,) and of Schooles, and Nurseries of Learning, and an Orderly Call in Tendency to It. Infant Baptisme in that Latitude, as Now in Use in Reformed Churches Maintained. Newly Corrected and Much Enlarged, & in Many Places Cleared by Its Author. Thomas Blake, Late Minister of the Gospel, at Tamworth in the Counties of Stafford and Warwick. Whereunto is Annexed, a Sermon Preached at His Funeral by Mr. Anthony Burgessse, and a Funeral Oration Made at His Death by Mr. Samuel Shaw (Abel Roper, at the Sun against St. Dunstans Church in Fleet street, 1658), 14–15.

\textsuperscript{28} Thomas Blake, Samuel Shaw, and Anthony Burgess, Vindiciae Foederis, 14.

\textsuperscript{29} The term of suretyship has its origin in the Latin word “spondere” (to give surety) as is seen in
suretyship, the parties are Jehovah God as common to all the three on the one part, and on the other the only Son of God the second person undertaking the work of redemption. In the covenant of reconciliation, the parties are God the Father, Son and Spirit, out of free love pitying us, and lost sinners who had broken the covenant of works. Hence the covenant of suretyship is the cause of the stability and firmness of the covenant of grace.”

Thus, for Rutherford, the covenant of redemption was a trinitarian covenant.

Thomas Goodwin (1600-1680) developed a nuanced doctrine of the pactum salutis in his christological and pneumatological works. He explained particularly the role of the Holy Spirit from various viewpoints. The Holy Spirit is identified as a legal partner who equally participated in the agreement of the pactum. The Spirit is portrayed as essential in the execution of the pactum in time, since he concurred with every redemptive work of Christ and effectually applied the result of the work to the believer.

Richard Baxter (1615-1691) acknowledges, “Divines use to mention a Covenanting between the Father and the Son about the work of Redemption.” He prefers the language of “decree” over “covenant,” but he definitely thinks that there is a pre-temporal agreement between the Father and the Son, “concerning Christs Incarnation, his work, and his sufferings, and the successe of these, and what God will further do thereupon.”

Olevianus’ work. See note 11 of this study.


31 See chapter 5 of this study.

32 Richard Baxter, Aphorismes of Justification, With their explication annexed. Wherein also is opened the nature of the Covenants, Satisfaction, Righteousnesse, Faith, Works, &c. (London: Francis Tyton, 1649), 8.

John Owen’s (1616-1683) formulation of the *pactum salutis* is deeply trinitarian at its center. It clearly grants the reality that the three persons of the Trinity work distinguishably but inseparably. For Owen, the doctrine of the *pactum* is in basic continuity with the Augustinian-Thomistic doctrine of the Trinity. Owen appropriates theological conceptions such as inseparable operations, *terminus operationis*, voluntariness of the will, habitue, and in-being. In his trinitarian theology the *pactum salutis* imputes the *ad extra* relations back into pretemporal *ad intra* transaction, in which the Father promises to make the provision, the Son undertakes the redemptive work, and the Holy Spirit cooperates with the Son and perfects the redemption.34

Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669) appealed to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* as artillery against the Socinians, the Remonstrants, the Jesuits, and the Tridentine theologians. He repudiated the (Semi-)Pelagian notion of free will in those theologies as well as any hint of universalism in them. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was useful to Cocceius in that it could teach the limitedness of the elect and the sovereign act of the Godhead. Through the accomplishment of the *pactum*, humans regained true freedom to do good works.35

In his 1675 article “Paradise Opened,” Thomas Brooks (1608-1680) differentiated the

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34 See chapter 3 of this study.

35 See chapter 6 of this study.
covenant of grace from the covenant of redemption. He included an extended exposition of the covenant of redemption in this treatise in a trinitarian way. He explicitly explained the role of the Holy Spirit in the *pactum salutis*. In the end of the exposition, he mentioned that the Spirit of God is involved in the covenant as a “legal witness.” He argued that God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, do all agree to the articles of the covenant, and are all witnesses to the same covenant.

The most extensive work on the *pactum salutis* was Patrick Gillespie’s *The Ark of the Covenant Opened* (1677). Gillespie suggested the covenant of redemption as the foundation of the covenant of grace. He declared the biblical validity of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* on the first page of the book, saying that “there is a Covenant betwixt God and Christ; though the name of this mysterious transactions, which we call the Covenant of Redemption and Suretiship, be not found in Scripture, in so many words (which may be among the reason why most Writers have been silent about the thing); yet the thing it self being so evidently held forth in the Scripture.” Gillespie argued that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was fully biblical.

Herman Witsius (1636-1708) repudiated Antinomianism and used the doctrine of the

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38 For the authorship of this work, see Trueman, “The Harvest of Reformation Mythology?”

39 Patrick Gillespie, *The ark of the covenant opened, or, A treatise of the covenant of redemption between God and Christ, as the foundation of the covenant of grace. : The second part. Wherein is proved, that there is such a covenant. The necessity of it. The nature, properties, parties thereof. The tenor, articles, subject-matter of redemption. The commands, conditions, and promises annexed. The harmony of the covenant of suretiship made with Christ, and the covenant of reconciliation made with sinners wherein they agree, wherein they differ. Grounds of comfort from the covenant of suretiship* (London: Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and three Crowns in Cheapside, near Mercers Chappel, 1677), 1.
pactum salutis in defense of his view. Some of Witsius’ works played an important role in the English Antinomian Controversy of the 1690s.40

The doctrine of the pactum salutis was included in a Reformed confession as well. It is true that the doctrine of the pactum salutis is not explicitly mentioned in the Westminster Confession or Catechisms. However, the Savoy Declaration 8.1, which was formulated according to the Westminster Confession 8.1, added eight words (bold in the citation) to the article to explicitly indicate the doctrine of the pactum salutis.

It pleased God, in his eternal purpose, to choose and ordain the Lord Jesus his only begotten Son, according to a covenant made between them both, to be the Mediator between God and man; the Prophet, Priest, and King; the Head and Saviour of his Church, the Heir of all things and Judge of the world; unto whom he did from all eternity give a people to be his seed, and to be by him in time redeemed, called, justified, sanctified, and glorified.41

To recapitulate briefly, the doctrine of the pactum salutis was present in the Reformed theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in continental Europe, England, and Scotland.42 It also took its place in a Reformed confession. The doctrine was developed in the Reformed covenant theology by four routes: (1) debate with Arminians, Socinians, and the Tridentine theologians (e.g., Dickson, Ames, Owen, and Cocceius); (2) refutation of Antinomians (e.g., Bulkeley and Witsius); (3) doctrinal expansion (e.g., Olevianus, 40 For a good study of the historiography, see Gijsbert van den Brink, Herman Witsius en het Antinomianisme (Apeldoorn: PIRef, 2008). See chapter 2 of this study.


42 For other theologians’ doctrine of the pactum salutis, who are not mentioned in this study, see F. Junius, Theses theologicae, in Opuscula theologica selecta, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: Muller, 1882), c. 25, th. 21; F. Gomarus, Opera theologica omnia (Amsterdam: J. Jansson, 1664), on Matt. 3:13; Luke 2:21; 19:1; G. Voetius, Selectae disputationes theologicae, 5 vols. (Utrecht, 1648–69), II, 266; A. Essenius, Dissertations de subjectione Christi ad legem divinam (Utrecht: Antonii Smytegelt, 1666), X, 2. Cited from Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3:212n39.
Patrick Gillespie, and Goodwin); and exegetical development (e.g., Oecolampadius, Dickson, Cocceius, Goodwin, Owen, and Witsius).

1.3. Present Status of the Problem

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, which occupied a fixed locus in many Reformed dogmatics of the high orthodoxy era (ca. 1640-1725), has been harshly opposed in various ways by eighteenth-century theologians such as Deurhof and Wesselius, and has gradually lost its previously solid position. In many modern Reformed dogmatics the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is simply ignored, very briefly touched upon, or harshly criticized. For example, Hendrikus Berkhof never mentions the doctrine in his *Christian Faith*. In more recent dogmatics, Gijsbert van den Brink and Cornelis van der Kooi allow only seven lines for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Based on Ephesians 1:4 and 1 Peter 1:20, they argue that this covenant was concluded between the Father and the Son and aimed to redeem the elect, and that since the covenant of grace necessarily has the same scope as that of redemption, the covenant of grace is limited to the elect. They do not give more explanation about the implications of the *pactum salutis*. By contrast, Michael Horton points to the doctrine in many places of *The Christian Faith* in relation to the divine decree, union with Christ, covenant and conditionality, the covenant of grace,

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the priesthood of Christ, and the certainty of the salvation of the elect. Horton underscores the importance of the covenant of redemption. It is the basis for all of God’s purpose in nature and history and the foundation of the covenant of grace. Horton argues that the covenant of redemption is at least assumed in chapter 8 of the Westminster Confession. He, however, neither discusses the doctrine of \textit{pactum salutis} as a separate locus nor gives specific biblical evidence of the doctrine.

Although there are some exceptions in which the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} is favorably explained, the doctrine has been criticized by many theologians since the eighteenth century. Johannes Wesselius (1671-1745), a professor of Leiden University, criticized the doctrine in his preface to a Dutch translation of the French theologian

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49 Horton simply relates the doctrine with John 16:14-15 and 17 but does not offer an exegesis of the text. Horton, \textit{The Christian Faith}, 558, 644. For Horton’s positive development of the doctrine, see 7.2 of this study.

Bénédict Pictet’s (1655-1724) *De Christelyke God-geleertheid, en kennis der zaligheid*.  

Wessselius draws four points of criticism: first, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* lacks biblical evidence. The texts which the proponents of the doctrine offer do not point to the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son but are related to the promise or representation of the eternal will of God in time.  

Second, the doctrine involves tritheism inasmuch as it presupposes two or more substantially different wills in the Godhead. Third, the doctrine also comprises a form of subordinationism. The divine pact between the Father and Christ was concluded as an unequal alliance between master and servant. The will of the Father is a commandment which he compulsorily imposes upon the Son. Lastly, Wessselius tries to change the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* into a counsel of peace in which the will of the Father and the human will of the incarnate Son coincide. In so doing, he regards the pertinent biblical texts to the doctrine as prophesying or describing the relationship between the Father and the incarnate Christ in time.  

In these similar lines, Thomas Boston (1676-1732) and Alexander Comrie (1706-1774) assumed a critical attitude toward the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Comrie translated  

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54 Thomas Boston, *A view of the covenant of grace from the sacred records: wherein the parties in that covenant, the making of it, its parts conditionary and promissory, and the administration thereof, are distinctly considered: together with the trial of a personal inbeing in it, and the way of enstating sinners therein unto their eternal salvation: to which is subjoin’d, a memorial concerning personal and family fasting and humiliation, presented to saints and sinners* (Edinburgh: R. Fleming and Co., 1734); Alexander Comrie, *Stellige en praktikale verklaaringe van den Heidelbergschen Catechismus, Volgens de*
and introduced Boston’s *View of the Covenant of Grace* in the Netherlands. Instead of assigning the *pactum* as a separate covenant, Boston preferred to count it as the same covenant as the covenant of grace.\(^{55}\)

Modern scholarly criticisms of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* have similarly followed the lines of old critiques and can be classified in five points. The first point of criticism is a lack of biblical evidence of the doctrine (O. P. Robertson, G. H. Kersten, and Proponents of the “New Covenant Theology”).\(^{56}\) Second, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* incurs suspicion of tritheism (Robert Letham, Kersten, and Karl Barth).\(^{57}\) Third, some critics argue that this divine covenant between the Father and Christ emerges as subordinationism since it seems to presuppose an unequal alliance between master and servant (Letham, Kersten, and Herman Hoeksema).\(^{58}\) Fourth, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is criticized from a pneumatological perspective for allegedly omitting a role for the Holy Spirit (Letham, Hoeksema, and R. A. Smith).\(^{59}\) Fifth and lastly, some scholars argued that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* brings about a perverted view of human

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55 The assertion of VanDrunen and Clark that “the leader of the so-called Marrow men, Thomas Boston, taught the *pactum salutis*” is not quite right because Boston identified the *pactum salutis* with the covenant of grace. VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 170. It seems that Boston absorbs the covenant of grace into the *pactum* so that although he calls it the covenant of grace, he has actually removed the temporal covenant and identified the eternal covenant as the covenant of grace.

56 See 2.1 of this study.

57 See 3.1 of this study.

58 See 4.1 of this study.

59 See 5.1 of this study.
freedom (Klaas Schilder, K. J. Popma, Matthias Schneckenburger, and T. F. Torrance).60 The above criticisms are unanimous in their denials of the validity and theological usefulness of the *pactum salutis*, albeit from different perspectives. Recently, by contrast, many historical studies regarding the doctrine attempt to correct previous misunderstandings of the doctrine. Richard Muller, Lyle Bierma, Willem van Asselt, Carl Trueman, Mark Jones, Joel Beeke, Mark Beach, and Carol Williams dealt, respectively, with the doctrine of John Gill, Caspar Olevian, Johannes Cocceius, John Owen, Thomas Goodwin, Herman Witsius, Francis Turretin, and David Dickson.61 They demonstrated that theologians like Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius certainly did not see things the way that the above criticisms were offered, and their expositions of the *pactum salutis* were reflective of their deep concerns regarding the Trinity, Christology, Pneumatology, and soteriology. The main interest of these studies, however, does not consist in the above criticisms, and they do not give satisfying answers to them.

Dutch theologian B. Loonstra dealt with the doctrine in his dissertation.62 His work should be noted because of its comprehensiveness, and is worthy to be treated here

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60 See 6.1 of this study.


62 Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond.*
separately from other scholarly works. Although Loonstra’s work covers various points of view regarding the *pactum salutis*, his conclusions seem to be flawed in many ways.\(^{63}\)

In this study, I will supplement and correct previous studies on the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. I will argue that the Reformed doctrine of the *pactum salutis* formulated by Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius can give satisfactory answers to the above five modern criticisms. In so doing I will use the result of recent historical scholarship and will correct Loonstra’s historical and systematic descriptions in many

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\(^{63}\) I will point out some weaknesses of Loonstra’s dissertation in each chapter of this study. In sum, they are as follows. (The numbers of parentheses indicate the pagination of Loonstra’s *Verkiezing - Versoening – Verbond*.) (1) Loonstra argues that the seventeenth-century formulations of the doctrine lacked biblical basis (pp. 187–90). However, he does not examine seventeenth-century commentaries, but only a series of modern works that do not support the doctrine. The doctrine was amply supported in the older, pre-critical commentary tradition, and has been argued in several recent exegetical studies. See chapter 2 of this study. (2) He believes wrongly that Olevian or Cocceius was the first codifier of the doctrine. Yet there are other precursors of the doctrine. See 1.2 of this study. (3) His classification of the seventeenth-century formulations of the doctrine is too simplified (pp. 80–104). (4) Some of the patristic and medieval texts he uses for the proof of the doctrine are not related to the doctrine—for example, in the cases of Irenaeus (pp. 33–35) and Lombard (pp. 40–41). (5) Relying on the approach of Cornelis Graafland, Loonstra tends to distinguish between the development of the doctrine of predestination and that of the *pactum salutis* (pp. 99–101). These two doctrines, however, developed in relation with each other. (6) He opines that the notion of the covenant of works should be rejected (p. 385). The older proponents of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* supported the notion. (7) Loonstra contends that the title “surety of the covenant” must be safeguarded against contract associations, whereas the title “head of the covenant” is not suitable to express Christ’s position in the covenant (p. 385). (8) He argues that the use of the idea of the pact in order to explain the voluntary submission of the Son to the Father is not convincing because it leads to the obscure construction of a covenant between two parties that are equal when the covenant is established, but unequal when it is performed (p. 387). His notion of humiliation, however, is very close to the thought of the voluntary submission of the Son to the Father. (9) Loonstra’s assertion that the *pactum salutis* dominates the decree of election and reprobation has problems (p. 388). For a short discussion about the problem, see van Genderen and Velem, *Concise Reformed Dogmatics*, 207. (10) He argues that one of God’s essential properties is his ability to humiliate himself in the Son, and one of the accidental properties is God’s actual humiliation in the Son, which is settled in the *pactum salutis* (pp. 343–45). This formulation raises many questions. It is not at all like anything in traditional formulations of the *pactum*. (11) Loonstra refers to the charge of Nestorianism in connection with those who make a distinction between Christ as the eternal God who predestines and Christ as the man who is predestined to be mediator (pp. 67, 334). However, those who make the distinction between Christ as the electing God and as the elect mediator (i.e., proponents of the extra Calvinisticum) do not separate his divinity from his humanity. The unity of the two natures in the one mediator is not denied in the theory to which Loonstra refers. Hans Boersma pointed out (10) and (11). Hans Boersma, “Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond: Beschrijving en beoordeling van de leer van het pactum salutis in de gereformeerde theologie,” *Calvin Theological Journal* 26, no. 1 (1991): 241–44. (12) His analysis of Herman Bavinck’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is not exactly correct (pp. 148–50). For a detailed analysis, see Laurence R. O’Donnell III, “Not Subtle Enough: An Assessment of Modern Scholarship on Herman Bavinck’s Reformulation of the Pactum Salutis Contra ‘Scholastic Subtlety’,” *Mid-America Journal of Theology* 22 (2011): 89–106.
ways. I am convinced that the doctrine includes very highly useful implications in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, Pneumatology, and soteriology.

1.4. Proposed Method

In each chapter I will summarize modern criticisms of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* and defend the doctrine with the adumbrations of the theologians of the high orthodoxy era (ca. 1640-1725). Although I will endorse some of the high orthodoxy theologians, the main interlocutors will be Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius. Many modern researchers of the doctrine and the covenant theology have a consensus that Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius were the great codifiers of the Reformed federal theology. Charles Greig McCrie argues that the greatest elaboration of federalism came after the Westminster Assembly from the Dutch, English, and Scottish, naming Dutch theologians Cocceius and Witsius, and English theologians

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Stephen Charnock and Owen. Donald MacLeod describes Cocceius and Witsius as representatives of covenant theology in its fully developed form. Joel Beeke and Mark Jones claim that the expositions of the *pactum salutis* of Owen, Goodwin, Cocceius, and Witsius were reflective of their deep trinitarian concerns. Willem van Asselt maintains that Cocceius and Owen “appear as the great codifiers of the important federal movement within Reformed theology.” Richard A. Muller proposes Dickson, Cloppenburg, Bulkeley, Cocceius, and Witsius as exemplar codifiers of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Jones asserts that the emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit of Goodwin and Owen made a great contribution to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* that is not vulnerable to the accusation of a sub-Trinitarianism.

Therefore, it is a reasonable choice to choose the federal theologies of Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius to respond to modern criticisms of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Additionally in the latter part of each chapter and the concluding chapter, I will demonstrate the promising implications of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* for modern theological discussions. In dealing with the five theologians, I will not follow the chronological order (e.g., Dickson, Cocceius, Goodwin, Owen, and Witsius) but will

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68 Van Asselt, “Covenant Theology as Relational Theology,” 65.

69 Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 15.

70 Jones, *Why Heaven Kissed Earth*, 139–44.
follow a logical order for the convenience of discussion.

1.5. Outline

Chapter 2 will deal with the assertion that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* lacks biblical evidence. I will summarize criticisms of modern scholarship and present biblical exegeses to support the doctrine. First, I will describe the exegeses of Herman Witsius regarding the doctrine. It is notable that Witsius here appropriates Jerome’s commentary on Zechariah. Second, I will offer modern exegeses of key scriptural texts (i.e., Zechariah 6:13 and Galatians 3:17), which support the doctrine.

Chapter 3 will prove that the doctrine does not necessarily lead to tritheism. I will present some modern criticisms of the doctrine from a Trinitarian perspective. I will answer them with the version of John Owen. In order to show that the thought which the doctrine suggests is not inconsistent with the tradition, I will introduce the two doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis* and explain how they are related to Owen’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. In conclusion, I will offer some practical implications of the study.

In chapter 4, I will ask whether the doctrine implies subordinationism on the part of the Son. I will demonstrate that the voluntariness of the Son is underlined in David Dickson’s formulation of the doctrine. In his *pactum* doctrine, Christ is acting as God both in the transaction and fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. The Son who made the *pactum* with the Father is the consubstantial Word of God. Dickson divides between Christ’s natural consubstantiality with the Father and his voluntary subordination to him for the fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. He argues that the incarnate Son of God willingly
obeyed unto death because he voluntarily accepted the stipulations of the *pactum salutis*.

Some modern critics of the doctrine regard it as binitarianism or sub-trinitarianism because it allegedly omits the role of the Holy Spirit. In chapter 5, I will elaborate on the role of the Holy Spirit both in the transaction and in the execution of the *pactum salutis*. In so doing, I will demonstrate that the doctrine presented by Thomas Goodwin gives a strong certainty of salvation.

Chapter 6 will present modern criticism of the doctrine in that it offers a perverted view of freedom. I will deal with the problem of determinism regarding the issue. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* described by Johannes Cocceius never leads to determinism; rather, it guarantees the freedom of the people of God. I will demonstrate the relationship between Cocceius’ abrogation theory and his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.

In the concluding chapter, I will summarize the above five points and offer the promises of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. The Reformed doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was criticized in various ways by twentieth-century theologians. However, the doctrine formulated by Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius can not only overcome modern criticisms of the doctrine, but it can also offer a highly practical application of the doctrine from trinitarian, christological, pneumatological, and soteriological perspectives.
CHAPTER 2

BIBLICAL SUPPORT OF THE PACTUM SALUTIS: HERMAN WITSIUS

2.1. Exegetical Critique of the Pactum Salutis

This chapter examines the biblical foundation of the pactum salutis in Witsius’ theology. It will address the following questions. What is the basic structure of Witsius’ doctrine of the pactum salutis? What scriptural evidences does he present? What is his hermeneutical strategy to formulate the doctrine? How does he interpret the two key texts (i.e., Zechariah 6:13 and Galatians 3:16-20)? What are the ancient and modern interpretations of these texts? This chapter will demonstrate that the biblical foundation of Witsius’ doctrine of the pactum salutis can be most fully understood from the perspective of his hermeneutical methodology.

The sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Reformed theologians formulated and revised their doctrinal points by recourse to biblical exegesis.¹ Although the doctrine of the pactum salutis was concerned with a complex of doctrinal issues from the very beginning

of its formulation, the doctrine did not lack exegetical discussion. Many theologians from the eighteenth century until now, however, have cast doubt on the biblical basis of the doctrine. For example, Johannes Wesselius regarded the doctrine as unbiblical in his preface of a Dutch translation of the French theologian Bénédict Pictet’s *De Christelyke God-geleertheid, en kennis der zaligheid*. He argues that the scriptural texts—such as Heb 9:15, 13:20; Gal 3:17; Luke 22:29—offered by the proponents of the doctrine do not point to the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son but are related to the promise or representation of the eternal will of God in time. The Scripture gives no reason to consider this representation as a covenant. Other texts—such as Pss 2, 16:2, 40:7-9, 110:4; Isa 42:1, 6, 49:5-6, 12, 53:10-11; Zech 6:12-13—do not indicate an eternal covenant relationship between the divine persons. Rather, they are only prophecies of a covenant that is established between the Father and the Son in time. For Wesselius the reasoning of the proponents of the doctrine of *pactum salutis* is not founded on a biblical basis and therefore would produce dangerous consequences from a doctrinal point of view.

Thomas Boston assumes a critical attitude toward the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* that is known as a different covenant from the covenant of grace. In various places of his works, he argues that “the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace are not two

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2 For recent studies of the *pactum salutis*, see notes 3 and 86 of chapter 1 of this study.

3 Bénédict Pictet, *De Christelyke God-geleertheid, en kennis der zaligheid* (’s-Gravenhage, 1728).


distinct covenants, but one and the same covenant.” Thus, “covenant of redemption” and “covenant of grace” are two names of one covenant, under different considerations. “In respect of Christ, it is called the covenant of redemption, forasmuch as in it he engaged to pay the price of our redemption,” asserts Boston, “but in respect of us, the covenant of grace, forasmuch as the whole of it is of free grace to us.” In order to support his view, Boston cites from the Westminster Larger Catechism, which reads “That the covenant of grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed.” He offers his own exegesis on the scriptural texts such as Gal 3:16 and Isa 53:10-11 that were used to formulate the doctrine of the covenant of redemption. According to Gal 4:24, there are only “two covenants”—one is the old covenant and the other is the new covenant. Boston relates these two covenants to the covenant of works and the covenant of grace respectively and identifies the latter with the covenant of redemption. In so doing he demonstrates that one can find no biblical reason in the doctrine of the covenant of redemption that differs from the covenant of grace.


9 Boston, The Whole Works of Thomas Boston, 8:396.

10 Boston, The Whole Works of Thomas Boston, 8:397.
Modern exegetical criticisms of the *pactum salutis* have similarly followed the lines of old critiques. They point to the lack of biblical evidence of the doctrine. O.P. Robertson argues that Scripture simply does not say much on the pre-creation shape of the decrees of God. He considers the effort to structure the intertrinitarian covenant between the Father and the Son before the foundation of the world as flavoring “a sense of artificiality.” “To speak concretely of an intertrinitarian ‘covenant’ with terms and conditions between Father and Son mutually endorsed before the foundation of the world,” asserts Robertson, “is to extend the bounds of scriptural evidence beyond propriety.”\(^{11}\) For him a covenant is to be defined as a mutual contract, not as a sovereignly administered bond. He maintains that the feasibility of a “covenant” among members of the Trinity appears even less likely based on more recent light on the character of the biblical covenants. In addition, he asserts that the doctrine of *pactum salutis* “finds no specific development in the classic creeds of the Reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\) Robertson, *The Christ of the Covenants*, 54.

\(^{12}\) Robertson, *The Christ of the Covenants*, 54. Although Mark Beach agrees with Palmer Robertson’s assertion, one can find, as Carl Trueman, John Fesko, Joel Beeke, and Mark Jones rightly pointed out, at least one explicit confessional expression of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*—the Savoy Declaration 8.1. Beach, “The Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis in the Covenant Theology of Herman Witsius,” 114. Based on their analysis of the Savoy Declaration 8.1, Beeke and Jones argue that “the basic teaching of the covenant of redemption can be located in several places in the Westminster Confession though not in explicit terms. Indeed, the Scottish divine David Dickson, in his commentary on the Westminster Confession [i.e., David Dickson, *The Summe of Saving Knowledge: With the Practical Use Thereof* (Edinburgh: George Swintoun and Thomas Brown, 1671)], ‘had no difficulty finding the doctrine there.’” Beeke and Jones, *A Puritan Theology*, 238. John Fesko asserts that an explicit confessional expression of the *pactum salutis* can be found in the Helvetic Consensus Formula (1675), canon IV, and that similar statements are also found in the Canons of Dordt (1618-1619), I.7. John V. Fesko, *Beyond Calvin: Union with Christ and Justification in Early Modern Reformed Theology (1517-1700)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 322n11. It should be noted, however, that the Westminster Confession chose not to explicitly reference the *pactum*. Dickson’s analysis does not count for much in this regard, inasmuch as Dickson was himself a major proponent of the *pactum*—and his insertion of it into an explanation of the Confession does not really say much about the Confession itself. Confessions and catechisms often purposely refrain from mentioning doctrinal points that even their authors would argue elsewhere. For
Herman Bavinck evaluates the development of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* among the Reformed as being not free of “scholastic subtlety.” For him the *locus classicus* of the *pactum salutis*, Zechariah 6:13, has nothing to do with a covenant relationship between the Persons of the Trinity. Bavinck stands with Carl Friedrich Keil in asserting that Zechariah 6:13 only states that “the Messiah, who unites in his person both the kingship and the priesthood, will consider and promote the peace of his people.” He also casts doubt on other texts cited by the proponents of the doctrine. “From Job 17:3; Isaiah 38:14; and Psalm 119:122 (none of which refer to the Messiah), and from Hebrews 7:22 (where we are told only that Christ, because he lives forever, is the guarantee that the new covenant will continue forever),” maintains Bavinck, “it was inferred that in the pact of salvation Christ had from all eternity become the guarantor, not of God to us, as Crell and Limborch claimed (for God, being trustworthy, needed no guarantor), but of us before God, as Cocceius, Witsius, and others tried to argue.”

Nevertheless, Bavinck claims that “this doctrine of the pact of salvation, despite its defective form, is rooted in a scriptural idea.” Then he offers his own exegetical basis

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to support the doctrine.

In his *Reformed Dogmatics*, G. H. Kersten deals with the covenant of redemption in two places—“The Covenant of Redemption” and “The Covenant of Grace.” He argues against Heyns, Jongeleen, Woelderink, and Schilder, who make an essential (*wezenlijk*) difference between the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace. For him the covenant of grace was established in eternity between the Father and the Son, and the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace are one in essence. “God’s Word speaks of only two covenants,” argues Kersten, “and in Art. 17 the Belgic Confession of Faith says *likewise*.” To him the Westminster Catechism does not speak of “an essential difference between the Counsel of Peace and the Covenant of Grace,” but it teaches that “the covenant of grace is made with Christ as the second Adam, and in Him, with all the elect as His seed (Gal 3:16, Rom 5:15, Isa 53:10-11).” Kersten depicts Arminius as the first theologian who separated the covenant of redemption from that of grace as two essentially different covenants. “By ascribing another nature to the Covenant of Redemption than to the Covenant of Grace,” claims Kersten, “Arminius

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17 Kersten, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 145, 237; Gerrit Hendrik Kersten, *De Gereformeerde door het verbond der genade van eeuwigheid tusschen den Vader en den Zoon gesloten is, blijkt o.a. duidelijk uit de volgende Schriftuurplaatsen* (p. 199). “Het Verbond der Verlossing en het Genadeverbond zijn in wezen één; zijn niet twee wezenlijk van elkander verschillende verbonden” (pp. 313-14; author’s emphasis).


served very well his wrong views that Christ died for all men.” Failing to discern the historical fact that the doctrine of the pactum salutis was endorsed in many cases to refute Arminianism, Kersten argues that Heyns, Jongeleen, Woelderink, Schilder and others, who differentiated the doctrine of the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace, opened “the door for a practical Remonstrantism which credits faith and obedience with power to keep one in the covenant” and declined to “full Pelagianism.” The key point that Kersten attempts to make is that the covenant of grace is established only with the elect. He opposes Schilder’s claim, which goes “In the Covenant of Grace are those who are Christ’s as well as those who are not purchased by Him. Hence, haters of God are in it

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21 For example, David Dickson regarded the doctrine as crucial to the refutation of Arminianism. Dickson’s anti-Arminian speech can be found in Alexander Peterkin, *Records of the Kirk of Scotland, containing the Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, from the Year 1638 Downwards*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: John Sutherland, 1838), 158–59. Peter Bulkeley also appropriated the doctrine to oppose Arminianism. Bulkeley, *The Gospel-Covenant: or The Covenant of Grace Opened*, 275. Johann Heinrich Heidegger (1633-1698) considers it as a crude paradox of the Remonstrants with their effort toward free choice to assert that the Father was able to renounce his promise after he affirmed the sponsorship (vel Patri sponsionem, admisso Sponsore, admittere, vel rejicere. quod Remonstrantium, libero arbitrio velificiantium, crudum nimis paradoxum est). Generally speaking, the proponents of the pactum salutis argue that both the Father and the Son were not able to cancel the pact once they voluntarily accepted it. Maastricht also refutes Remonstrants with the same argument. Stephen Charnock calls this a “voluntary necessity.” Petrus van Mastricht, *Theoretico-practica theologia*, vol. 1, Editio nova. (Utrecht: Apud W. van de Water, 1724), V, Pars dogmatica xxxv (p. 503); Johann Heinrich Heidegger, *Corpus theologiae christianae* (Zürich: Typis Joh. Henrici Bodmeri, 1697), XI.15 (p. 377); Stephen Charnock, *Discourses on Christ Crucified* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1841), 118; Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources*, 379. In a similar vein, Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) maintained that although Christ willingly chose to die for the salvation of human beings, he died in the steadfast pursuance of that same will, and nothing could change that will. “non significatur in illo ulla impotentia servandi aut volendi servare vitam suam immortalem, sed immutabilitas voluntatis eius, qua se sponte facit hominem ad hoc ut in eadem voluntate perseverans moreretur, et quia nulla res potuit illam voluntatem mutare. Plus enim esset impotentia quam potentia, si posset velle mentiri aut fallere aut mutare voluntatem, quam prius immutabilem esse voluit” (Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, II.17; bolds mine). For the English translation, see Anselm, *The Major Works*, ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 345. Witsius’ view on this point will be treated below.

as well as lovers of God. Yea, those loved by God are in the covenant in the same way as those who are hated by Him (Jacob and Esau).”

Thus Kersten interprets the scriptural texts used by Heyns, Jongeleen, Woelderink, and Schilder to support their doctrine of the *pactum salutis* differently from them. His interpretation of the texts is very dubious, however.

On the one hand, in his discussion of “The Covenant of Redemption,” Kersten acknowledges that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* can be supported by biblical texts such as Ps 2:7-8, Isa 42:6, 53:10-12, Luke 22:29, Heb 8:10, 10:16, Gal 3:17, John 6:38, 17:4, 6, 9, 11-12, 15, 21, 24, and I Pet 1:20. The Reformers realized the great importance of doctrine of the *pactum salutis* “in contrast with the Romanists, and, in contrast with the Lutherans.” The doctrine was accepted by Olevianus, Gomarus, Cloppenburg, Cocceius, Burman, Witsius, Vitringa, Leydekker, Mastricht, A Marck, De Moor, Brakel and others, and as a result the covenant of grace could have a firm foundation in their covenant theologies.

On the other hand, in his discussion of “The Covenant of Grace,” Kersten claims that in nature and in essence there is no difference between the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace. Kersten does not give any specific exegetical explanation about

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26 Kersten, *Reformed Dogmatics*, 147; Kersten, *De Gereformeerde dogmatiek*, 201.

the reason that one should understand the covenant of redemption as essentially the same with the covenant of grace. It is noteworthy that he does not mention the above old Reformed theologians in this chapter inasmuch as most of them, unlike Kersten, clearly distinguished between the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace. At the end of the day, for Kersten, the above scriptural verses do not prove the eternal covenant between the Persons of the Trinity, which is essentially different from the covenant of grace.

Proponents of the “New Covenant Theology” asserted that the Bible does not teach a covenant of redemption. New Covenant Theology attempts to combine strengths of

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wezen is echter geen onderscheid tusschen het Verbond der Verlossing en het Verbond der Genade.” John Brown of Haddington, Edmund Calamy, and the Antinomian theologians did not distinguish between the covenants of redemption and grace. Beeke and Jones argue that “the distinction between the two covenants may reflect not only exegetical advances by Reformed theologians, but also a desire to distance themselves from the rising Antinomian influence in the seventeenth century.” Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology, 238, 238n11. John von Rohr claims, “This collapsing of the covenant of grace into the covenant of redemption tended, however, to be more characteristic of the Antinomian wing of Puritanism where there was inclination to see as much as possible in the divine act and to keep the covenant as far away as possible from human contracting.” Von Rohr, The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought, 44. A similar line of thought can be found in William Adams Brown, “Covenant Theology,” in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908), 4:216–17.

The most important criteria by which one can judge whether a theologian identifies the pactum salutis to the covenant of grace is who they say the parties are in the covenant. For example John Owen distinguishes between the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace by arguing that the covenant of grace is “the covenant that God made with men concerning Christ” whereas the covenant of redemption is “the covenant that he made with his Son concerning men.” John Owen, The Works of John Owen, D.D. (Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850), 19:78 (Exposition of Hebrews).

dispensationalism and Reformed covenant theology and to eliminate the weak points of the two. Its founders, who have come from Reformed Baptist circles, reacted against key tenets of covenant theology in rejecting such doctrines as the covenant of redemption, the covenant of works, and the covenant of grace. The movement has a strong emphasis on study of the Scripture in attempting to derive a biblically based theology. Its leaders include John Zens, John G. Reisinger, Fred G. Zaspel, Tom Wells, and Steve Lehrer. The most notable peculiarities of the group include a rejection of covenant theology’s superstructure. For example, Jon Zens argues that Scripture nowhere calls the pre-creation commitments in the Godhead for the salvation of humanity a “covenant.” Steve Lehrer also states, “We do not believe that it is wise to refer to God’s plan to save a people in eternity past as a ‘covenant.”’

Although New Covenant theologians also believe that the Persons of the Trinity did have a plan for salvation before time, they see no specific biblical evidence of the covenant of redemption.

From a different perspective, Gordon R. Lewis and Bruce A. Demarest argue that Jesus’ obedience to the Father’s will is explained on the basis of his filial relation rather than on the basis of the covenant of redemption. “Jesus . . . completed the work entrusted to him,” they maintain, “not necessarily by virtue of a formal pretemporal covenant but as the obedient Son.”


Taken together, the above analysis suggests that there are two groups that point out the lack of biblical evidence of the doctrine of the pactum salutis. One group sees the pactum salutis as the same covenant with the covenant of grace (Wesselius, Boston, and Kersten). The other group argues that there is just no scriptural evidence to support the existence of the pactum salutis (Robertson, New Covenant Theology). One of the limitations with the assertions of these two groups is that they did not pay attention to the biblical exegesis of the older Reformed theology to formulate the doctrine. Their arguments do not seriously take account of the exegetical process of the older Reformed proponents of the pactum salutis nor do they closely examine the individual text apparently related to the doctrine. The doctrine of the pactum salutis of Herman Witsius, however, demonstrates not only that the doctrine is distinguished from the covenant of grace, but also that it has a firm biblical basis. The result of Witsius’ exegesis can be supported by modern exegesis as well as by Jerome, which will be shown in the following analysis.

2.2. The Biblical Exegesis of Herman Witsius to Support the Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis

2.2.1. The Distinction between the Pactum Salutis and the Covenant of Grace

In his masterpiece, De oeconomia foederum Dei cum hominibus (The Oeconomy of the Covenants between God and Man), Witsius argues three points with the Scriptures: (1) that the pactum salutis differs from the covenant of grace; (2) that the pactum salutis is a covenant; (3) and that it has enough biblical evidences.

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33 This is also true of Loonstra. See 2.3 of this study.

34 For the Latin text, see Witsius, De oeconomia foederum. For the English translation, see
Witsius argues that the distinction between the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace is important to understand more thoroughly the nature of the covenant of grace. The former is “a pact that stands between God the Father and Christ the Mediator” (PACTUM, quod inter DEUM PATREM & MEDIATOREM CHRISTUM intercedit) whereas the latter is “that testamentary disposition by which God assigns by an immutable covenant, eternal salvation and every thing relative thereto, upon the elect” (TESTAMENTARIA illa DISPOSITIO, qua DEUS ELECTIS SALUTEM ÆTERNAM, & omina eo pertinientia, immutabili foedere addicit). The former is an agreement (conventio) between God and the mediator, and the latter is an agreement between God and the elect. Thus Witsius clearly distinguishes between the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace.

2.2.2. The Qualification as a Covenant of the Pactum Salutis

When he defines the meaning of covenant, Witsius begins the article with works of ancient authors and develops his argument with the biblical exegesis. He defines the
concept of the covenant as follows: “a covenant of God with man is an agreement between God and man, about the method of obtaining consummate happiness, with the additoin of a threatening of eternal destruction, with which the despiser of the happiness offered in that way is to be punished.” Thus, the covenant is a “mutual agreement between parties” and is composed of stipulations—commandment, promise, and reward.

Witsius endorses this definition of covenant when he proves the covenantal character of the pactum salutis. The nature of a compact and agreement consists in the pactum between the Father and the Son. Witsius discusses all the elements of the covenant, which are mentioned in De oeconomia foederum, I.1.10. The contracting parties are the Father, whom Christ calls my Lord (Ps 16:2), and the Son, whom the Father calls his servant (Isa 53:11). The law of the covenant is proposed by the Father and can be found in John 10:18 and John 12:49. A promise is added to that law by the Father (Isa 53:10-12, 49:6-8). On performing that law, the Son acquires a right to ask for the reward (Ps 2:8). Thus far the proposal of the covenant is on the part of the Father. The acceptance on the part of the Son consists in that he willingly submitted himself to the law of the covenant (Ps 40:7-9, John 14:31). Nor did the Son only undertake this, but actually performed it (Gal 4:4; John 15:10, 8:29, 19:30). In the course of this obedience, the Son comforted himself in the faithfulness of the Father, to accomplish his promises (Isa 49:4). When the

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37 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, I.1.9. “FOEDUS DEI CUM HOMINE EST CONVENTIO INTER DEUM ET HOMINEM, DE RATIONE CONSEQUENDÆ CONSUMMATÆ EXITII, QUO MULCTANDUS EST BEATITUDINIS, EA RATIONE OBLATÆ, CONTEMPTOR.”

38 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, I.1.3.

39 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.2.
Son drew near the end of his course, Witsius claimed, with great confidence of mind, the promised reward (John 17:4-5).40

The Scriptural verses that Witsius cites do not directly point to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. He, however, clearly demonstrates that one can find a *mutual agreement* between the Father and the Son over the salvation of the elect and the basic *stipulations* thereof. The rhetorical question that he asks in the concluding part of the section shows that he quite surely regards the *pactum* as a covenant—“What then can be supposed wanting to complete the form of a covenant, which we have not here?”41

2.2.3. Scriptural Evidences of the *Pactum Salutis*

Witsius is convinced that the doctrine of the covenant of redemption rests upon Scriptural texts. Although he cites a variety of scriptural verses, the main texts are Luke 22:29, Heb 7:22, Gal 3:17, some Old Testament passages regarding the suretyship (i.e., Ps 119:122, Isa 38:14, and Jer 30:21), and Zech 6:13. In Luke 22:29, Jesus says, “And I engage by covenant unto you a kingdom, just as my Father has engaged by covenant unto me” (Κἀγὼ διατίθεμαι ύμῖν, καθώς διέθετό μοι ὁ πατήρ μου βασιλείαν).42 Witsius literally renders the word “διατίθεμαι” as “testamentaria dispositione addico.” With this rendering, Witsius argues that “by virtue of some covenant or disposition Jesus obtains a kingdom, as we also obtain it by virtue of the same.”43 Most modern English translations

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40 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.10.

41 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.10.

42 Turretin also relates this verse to the *pactum salutis* (*Institutes*, XII.ii.14, 2:177).

43 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.3. “Et ego testamentaria dispositione addico vobis Regnum, sicut dispositione testamentaria addixit mihi illud Pater.” Mark Beach comments, “Just as the
do not give the nuanced meaning of the word “διατίθεμαι.”\(^{44}\) The word is a stereotypical rendition of “حرف” (cut, conclude, establish) in the expression “διατίθημι διαφήκην” (to establish a covenant, to conclude an agreement) for the Hebrew “حرف חק” (cf. Gen 9:17; Ps 83:6; Hos 2:18, 12:1 in the Septuagint).\(^{45}\) Witsius assumes the covenant connotation of the word “διατίθεμαι” and appropriates it for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.

After this exegesis, Witsius cites and comments Heb 7:22, where Christ is said to “have become a surety of a better covenant or testament” (κρείττονος διαθήκης γέγονεν ἔγγυος). Christ is called the surety of a testament not principally because he engages to us for God and his promises, or because he engages for us in that we shall obey. Rather, the suretyship (*sponsio*) of Christ consists in:

that he himself undertook to perform that condition, without which, consistently with the justice of God, the grace and promises of God could not reach unto us; but being once performed, they were infallibly to come to the children of the covenant. Unless then we would make void the suretyship of Christ, and gratify the Socinians, the very worst perverters of Scripture, it is necessary we conceive of some covenant (*Foedus*), the conditions of which Christ took upon himself; by giving surety (*spondendo*) [to us] before the Father (*apud Patrem*), to perform them in behalf of us (*pro nobis*); and that having performed them, he might give surety (*spondere*) to us in behalf of the Father (*nobis pro Patre*), that we should certainly have grace and glory bestowed upon us.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{44}\) For example, the word is rendered as “confer” (NIV, 1982), “assign” (RSV, 1952; ESV 2001), and “appoint” (ASV 1901). Witsius, however, renders it as “to make a covenant.”


\(^{46}\) Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.4. I changed the English translation a little bit to make it closer to the Latin text. “quod in sese receperit praestare conditionem illam, citra quam salva justitia Dei, gratia Dei et promissiones ipsius ad nos non poterant pervenire: et qua praestita omnia illae ad filios
Witsius argues that in the suretyship, Christ took upon himself the conditions of covenant in behalf of us and performed them for us. The suretyship of Christ is described to imply the mediatorship in behalf of us and of the Father. For Witsius the notion of suretyship of Christ and the *pactum* between Christ and the Father clearly opposes the Socinians, who deny the eternal divinity of Christ and his substitutionary mediatorship. In Hebrews 7:21, God declares that Christ is a priest forever. Witsius seems to relate the eternal priesthood of Christ of this verse to his suretyship of a better covenant (v. 22), which is for Witsius the eternal *pactum*.

Next Witsius turns to Gal 3:17, where Paul mentions a certain “διαθήκη” (*covenant*, or *testament*), “which was confirmed before of God in Christ.” The covenant of this verse seems to indicate the Abrahamic covenant. It should be noted, however, that Witsius takes the new translation that was accepted by virtually all of the Reformers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Following Erasmus, the early modern Reformed theologians re-translated Gal 3:17 from the Greek and added the phrase “toward Christ” (*erga Christum*) or “in respect of Christ” (*respectu Christum*) after the “διαθήκη” of Gal 3:17. This gives the reason why Witsius regards the contracting parties of the covenant as God and Christ. Thus the verse is rendered as “the covenant, that was confirmed to

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48 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.5.

49 Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 41. Witsius is using the “Textus Receptus.”
Abraham before of God in Christ” (testamentum illud - quod Abrahae deus confirmavit in Christo).  

That being said, it is not unnatural that Witsius argues that “the word διαθήκη does here denote some covenant or testament, by which something is promised by God to Christ.” He points out that “lest any should think that Christ is here only considered as the executor of the testament bequeathed to us by God, the apostle twice repeats, that Christ was not promised to us, or that salvation was not promised to us through Christ, though that be also true; but that the promises were made to Christ himself, verse 16.” Christ was “the seed, ὥ ἐπαγγήλται,” to which the promise was made concerning the inheritance of the world and the kingdom of grace and glory. Although the promises were made to the mystical body of Christ, argues Witsius, it also should be admitted “that Christ, who is the head, and eminently the seed of Abraham, be on no account excluded from these promises.” The core of Witsius’ argument is that the covenant of Gal 3:17 is the pactum salutis between Christ and the Father, and that in the covenant Christ received promises from God as the head of his mystical body. Although Witsius’ argument depends on the phrase “εἰς Χριστόν” in Gal 3:17, modern exegesis, which uses the text omitting the phrase “εἰς Χριστόν,” also supports his argument as will be explained in the following section.

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50 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.5.
51 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.5.
52 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.5 (italics are mine).
53 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.5.
54 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.5.
55 See section 2.3.2.3. Cf. Baugh, “Galatians 3:20 and the Covenant of Redemption.”
Witsius tries to explain the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* with various Old Testament passages such as Ps 119:122, Isa 38:14, and Jer 30:21. In Ps 119:122 and Isa 38:14 one can find the meaning of suretyship. Witsius renders Ps 119:122 as “fidejube pro serve tuo in bonum” (be *surety* for thy servant for good; כִּי יְתָן מִלֶּךְ לְשֵׁם). In Isa 38:14, he uses the fideiussor language: “fide-jube pro me” (go surety for me; כִּי יְתָן מִלֶּךְ לְשֵׁם). He assumes that the suretyship mentioned in these passages can defend the notion of *pactum salutis*. “None but Christ alone” could undertake the suretyship of these texts.56 In Jer 30:21, for Witsius, the one who “appeased his heart by his suretiship, or sweetened his heart by a voluntary and fiducial engagement, or, in fine, pledged his very heart, giving his soul as both the matter and price of suretyship” means Christ who will expiate sin. The above passages show “what that suretyship or guarantee (*sponsio sive fidejussio*) was which David and Hezekiah sought for, namely, a declaration of will to approach unto God, in order to procure the expiation of sins.”57 Christ is the suretyship or guarantee (*sponsio sive fidejussio*) for the salvation of the elect. Even though Witsius regards Christ as *fideiusser*, he, unlike Cocceius, does not distinguish between *fideiusso* and *expromissio*.58

For Cocceius the concept of “ἐγγυὸς” was a link between the Reformed doctrine of the *pactum salutis* and the doctrine of the atonement. He made a clear difference between the

56 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.6.

57 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.6. “Quibus quoque verbis indicator, quid sponsio sive fidejussio illa, a Davide & Hiskia petita, contineat: scilicet declarationem voluntatis accedendi ad intra Deum, ad procurandum expitionem peccatorum.”

58 Van Asselt, “Expromissio or Fideiusso?,” 50. It is notable that for Cocceius the *pactum* is a *fideiusso*, but for Voetius and Witsius it is *expromissio*. This is the major difference on the *pactum* between the two theologians, and it underlies Cocceius’ abrogation theory (ibid, 37–57).
concepts of “ἔγγυος” (sponsor) and “μεσίτης” (mediator). The mediator refers to a person who bridges the gulf between God and humanity, while the sponsor, the surety, refers to someone who offers himself, his very person and life, as a guarantee of something. Christ is the mediator of this covenant of grace. He made satisfaction for sins and paid the “bail or surety for sinners” (vadimonium pro peccatoribus). Thus the suretyship of the mediator is linked to the notion of a redemption price in the doctrine of the atonement. The Cocceians asked the characteristic of the suretyship using a distinction derived from Roman law: is it a conditional suretyship (fideiussio) or an absolute suretyship (expromissio)? This question evoked a big debate among the followers of Cocceius and Voetius in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Nederlands. They distinguished the different forms of forgiveness. The Cocceians supported the notion of the conception of a conditional suretyship in which the creditor can still take action against the debtor. They argued that if the notion of expromissio were right, there were no need for the incarnation and the cross of Christ. By contrast, the Voetians promoted the notion of an absolute suretyship in which the debtor no longer has any obligation. If the conception of fideiussio were right, asserted the Voetians, one cannot believe in the doctrine of predestination and cannot have a full assurance of salvation.

The case of Witsius is rather different. He rejected the Cocceian distinction between a conditional suretyship and an absolute suretyship, and advocated the full pledge of Christ’s satisfaction. He, however, characterized Christ as fideiussor. Convinced that

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60 For a detailed explanation, see Van Asselt, “Expromissio or Fideiussio?,” 45–55.

61 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, IV.12.43. “Expiatio peccati est, qua reatus a delinquente
Christ bears all sins (*ferente omnem poenam*), Witsius still denotes him as *fideiussor* in accordance with the language of the Old Testament.

Finally, Witsius refers to Zech 6:13, “The counsel of peace shall be between them both.” He argues that the counsel of peace will be concluded “between the man whose name is *The Branch* and *Jehovah*, for no other two occur here.” He throws some light on this place by a close analysis. In this and the preceding verse, says Witsius, there is a “remarkable prophecy concerning the Messiah.” The Messiah (or the Branch) comes from God (Isa 4:2; Zech 1:12) and will build the temple of the Lord, which is the church of the elect and the mystical body of Christ (1 Tim 3:15; Heb 3:4; Matt 16:18; John 2:19, 21). He will receive majesty, a name above every name, and sit on the throne of God, to execute his kingly and priestly office in glory (Heb 10:11, 1:3, 9:12, 14; Revelation 3:21). Based on the right given to him, the Messiah makes intercession for his people (Rom 8:34).

At this point, Witsius raises the key question regarding the counsel of Zech 6:13: “what else can this counsel be, but the mutual will of the Father and the Son, which, we said, is the nature of the covenant?” He argues:

> It is called a “counsel,” both on account of the free and liberal good pleasure of

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62 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.7.

63 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.7.

64 Witsius refers to James Altingius, Hept. iii. Dissert. 6. § 49, who ingeniously observed this point. Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.6.

65 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.7.
both, and of the display of the greatest wisdom manifested therein. And a counsel of “peace,” not between God and Christ, between whom there never was any enmity; but of peace to be procured to sinful man with God, and to sinners with themselves.66

In the counsel of peace (*pactum salutis*), the mutual will of the Father and the Son is unified, and the free and liberal good pleasure and the greatest wisdom of both were manifested. It is called a counsel of “peace,” because peace will be procured between God and sinners in the counsel.

Witsius offers his own answers to objections in accordance with the scholastic method. He is aware that his appeal to Zech 6:13 in support of the *pactum salutis* is contested, but he argues that the proposed alternative understanding of the text is unacceptable. First, there are those who maintain that the counsel will be between the Jews and the Gentiles, not between the Father and the Son. Second, there are those who argue that “it is not the counsel, which is the original and cause of all these things, and which ought to have been expressed in the preterperfect or present tense; but the counsel, which is the fruit of Christ’s intercession, of which the prophet speaks in the future tense.”67

To the first, Witsius asserts that there is no distinct mention made of Jews and Gentiles in the preceding verses of this chapter. He also argues that it is quite forced that other commentators allege concerning a priest and king, or the office of priest and king, or about the Jews of Jerusalem and Babylon. He is convinced that it is not lawful to add anything to the text. He cites from “the very learned De Dieu” to argue the same opinion

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66 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.7.

67 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.8.
which is “appears simple and plain.” In fact, his exegesis is not new, “since Jerome tells us that this verse was understood of the Father and the Son.”

To the second, Witsius maintains that his analysis and explanation yield a very just and profitable sense. With respect to the difference of tenses, he explains that the tenses in Hebrew are often put one for the other, and the future for the present in an example, such as Ps 17:3. If anyone insists on the future tense, argues Witsius, the counsel will indicate the peace advanced by Christ at his ascension into heaven and the execution manifested in this counsel. The reason why the prophet, Zechariah, ought to speak of it in the future tense is that in accordance with the counsel, Christ will assume human nature and will appear as the surety. Christ—God-man—shall build the spiritual temple of the Lord, for which he shall receive as a reward glorious majesty, and shall sit on the throne of God. Christ will promise to the Father that he will do all this. The Father, on the other hand, will promise thus to reward that service. In short, the content of the pactum salutis is about the future event so it is expressed in the future tense.

2.2.4. The First Period of the Pactum Salutis in the Eternal Counsel of the Trinity

Witsius recommends readers to see De oeconomia foederum, II.3.2-4 for more exegetical materials, in which Witsius considers three periods of the pactum salutis. The first period is the commencement of the pactum salutis in the eternal counsel of the Trinity. In the period, “the Son of God was constituted by the Father, with the

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68 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.8. De Dieu’s comment on this verse will be discussed below.

69 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.8. Jerome’s comment on this verse will be discussed below.
approbation of the Holy Spirit, the Savior of mankind.” The Apostle Peter has a view to this, when he says in 1 Pet 1:20 that “Christ was foreordained before the foundation of the world.” The supreme wisdom testifies concerning itself in Prov 8:23: “I was set up (anointed) from everlasting.” Paul likewise declares that “we were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world” (Eph 1:4). Christ himself was constituted, from everlasting, the head of those that were to be saved, and they were given unto him (John 17:6). He was to merit salvation for the elect in whom he was to be glorified and admired. From this constitution, the Son, from everlasting, bore a peculiar relation to those that were to be saved. The book of life is especially appropriated to the Lamb (Revelation 13:8), as containing a description of the peculiar people assigned to the Lamb from all eternity. The New Testament passages that Witsius cites above are all related with the preexistence of Christ and the divine decree for the salvation of human beings. The doctrine of the pactum salutis goes together with the doctrine of the divine decree in Witsius’ federal theology.

2.2.5. The Second Period of the Pactum Salutis and the Threefold Office of Christ

The second period of the covenant of redemption is its constitution in the intercession of Christ, by which immediately after the fall of humanity, he offered himself to God in order actually to perform those things to which he had engaged himself from eternity. Christ made way for the word of grace to be declared to, and the covenant of grace to be

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70 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.2. Notably, Witsius points out that the Holy Spirit also engaged the pactum salutis. For the role of the Holy Spirit in the pactum, see chapter 5 of this study.

71 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.2.

72 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.3.
made with the elect. In this period, Christ was actually constituted mediator and was
revealed as such immediately after the fall, having undertaken the suretyship.

Witsius explains the suretyship and mediatorship with the threefold office of Christ.
From the beginning of church history, Christ was viewed not only as prophet but also as
king and priest.73 These three offices were sometimes expressly listed side by side.
Eusebius speaks of Christ as being “of the world the only High Priest, of all creation the
only king, of the prophets the only archprophet of the Father.”74 Similar statements
occurred also in Lactantius, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, and others.75 Calvin already
spoke of this threefold office in his 1539 Institutes, included it in the Genevan Catechism
(French 1542; Latin 1545), and elaborated it in the 1559 Institutes. The doctrine of the
threefold office of Christ appeared in time in numerous works by Reformed, Lutheran,
and Roman Catholic theologians.76 In the development of the Reformed orthodox
theology, as Richard Muller puts it, “new structures, like the threefold office and the two
states of Christ, were integrated into systems of doctrine as formal principles, indeed, as

73 For a systematic study of the doctrine, see Robert J. Sherman, King, Priest, and Prophet: A

74 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, Fathers of the Church; v. 19, 29 (Washington: Catholic
University of America Press, 1965), I.3. In a note of his article, J. Boehmer (“Zum Verständnis des Reiches
Gottes,” Die Studierstube [1905]: 661ff.) states that Philo in his Life of Moses already describes the latter as
high priest, king, and lawgiver; that Josephus repeatedly praised his hero Hyrcanus as king, high priest, and
prophet; and that the Testament of Levi (chs. 8 and 18) bears witness to the future Messiah, saying that he
will simultaneously be king, priest, and prophet. Cited from Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3:341n34.

75 For Augustine, see the following works: The City of God, X, 6; The Handbook on Faith, Hope,
and Love (=Enchiridion), 108; Confessions, 10.43. A thorough discussion can be found in Krauss, “Über
das Mittlerwerk nach dem Schema des munus triplex,” Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie (1872): 595–655;
are cited from Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 3:341n36.

new doctrinal contexts elicited from scripture.” Many of the early modern Reformed theologians developed the doctrine of the threefold office of Christ in relation to his mediatorship, as evidenced by Calvin, Lambert Daneau (c.1530-1595), and Amandus Polanus (1561-1610). Calvin is the forerunner in this development. In Calvin’s thought, there is a unity of thought among “the clear delineation of Christ’s threefold office, the powerful emphasis on Christ as God manifest in the flesh, the doctrine of the election of the mediator, the well-constructed trinitarian ground, and the concept which came to be known as the extra calvinisticum.” In the Christology of Daneau, the name Jesus indicates the human nature assumed by the Son of God, whereas the name Christ denotes the anointing of the savior and servant to the threefold office of king, priest, and prophet. Polanus accepted the doctrine of the two states as a guiding principle of his Christology. Thus he treated the threefold office at the end of his Christology. For him


79 See his 1559 edition of *Institutes*, II.xv-xvi. Hereafter Calvin’s 1559 edition of *Institutes* will be abbreviated as *Institutes*.

80 Muller, *Christ and the Decree*, 72; Muller, “Predestination and Christology in Sixteenth Century Reformed Theology,” 182.

the threefold office demonstrates the unity of Christ’s work, which derives from the unity of Christ’s person.  

Witsius explicates the doctrine of the threefold office of Christ in the order of prophet, king, and priest. As a prophet and the interpreter of the divine will, Christ, by his Spirit, revealed those things relating to the salvation of the elect (Isa 48:15; 1 Pet 1:11, 3:19).

For Witsius, Christ himself sometimes appeared in the character of an angel, instructing his people in the counsel of God. As a king, Christ gathered his church and formed to himself a people, in whom he might reign by his word and Spirit. Based on Acts 7:38, Witsius boldly argues that it was the Son of God who said to Israel in Exod 19:6, “And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests,” and who published his law on Mount Sinai. In accordance with the christological interpretation of the Gospel of John 12:41, Witsius is convinced that Christ was the one whom Isaiah saw sitting as king upon a throne (Isa 6).

As a priest, Christ took upon himself the sins of the elect, that he might expiate them by the sacrifice of his body, which was to be prepared for him in the fullness of time. In virtue of this office, Christ interceded for the elect, by declaring his will, that they might be taken into favor. Witsius relates Christ with the ransom mentioned in Job 33:24. He also regards Christ the king as captain of the host of angels, who guards each believer (Song 5:10; Dan 10:13, 12:1). It is Christ “who declares to man his righteousness, both the righteousness of God and of man.” It is Christ “who is כפר the ‘propitiation’ (Rom 82 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 140–41; Muller, “Predestination and Christology in Sixteenth Century Reformed Theology,” 338, 351. Amandus Polanus, The Substance of Christian Religion, trans. Elijahu Wilcocks (London: R. Field for Iohn Oxenbridge, 1595), 64–94.

83 Acts 7:38, “οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ γενόμενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ μετὰ τοῦ ἀγγέλου τοῦ λαλοῦντος αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ὄρει Σινᾶ καὶ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν, ὃς ἐδέξατο λόγια ζῶντα δοῦναι ἡμῖν” (This is he, that was in the church in the wilderness with the angel which spake to him in the mount Sina, and with our fathers: who received the lively oracles to give unto us; King James Version).
3:25; Zech 1:12-13). In short, Witsius adumbrates the mediatorship and suretyship of Christ in relation with the threefold office of Christ, and it comprises the substantial content of the intercession of Christ, which immediately became effective after the fall of human beings.

Notably, Witsius’ adumbration of the threefold office of Christ, though succinct, is very biblical and well organized. The doctrine of the threefold office of Christ is worthy to be considered more in relation to the doctrine of the pactum salutis since the two doctrines are closely connected in many Reformed dogmatics. Two major criticisms of the Reformed doctrine of the threefold office of Christ can be found in Albrecht Ritschl and Karl Barth. Ritschl argues that the Christian notion of reconciliation does not fit a juridical order of reward and punishment. Christ has come to reveal to us the love of God, and his work cannot be described with the notion of “office.” According to Ritschl, the word “office” belongs only in a juridical community. He contends:

to remove the occasion . . . for the hierarchical pretensions . . . it is well to withhold from the work of Christ the title of “office” (Amt), since this title may lead the holders of office in the Church, because of their formal ecclesiastical distinction and prerogative as compared with the ordinary member.

The title of office makes the Christian community hierarchical. Thus, for Ritschl, in a

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84 In Witsius’ own context, it was granted that the angel in many Old Testament passages was interpreted as the epiphany of the Son of God. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, I.xiii.10 (Hos 12:5; Gen 32:29-30; 1 Cor 10:4; Zech 2:3, 9; Isa 25:9, Mal 3:1).


moral community of love, it is better to speak of a “calling” than an office. By the
kingdom of God, Christ meant a community of loving conduct, not of legal rights. In the
Old Testament, to Ritschl, prophecy never was an “Amt” since it was always a free
religious vocation. According to the Epistle to the Hebrews, Ritschl maintains, “the
priesthood of Christ is subject to other conditions than the official (amtlich) priesthood of
the Old Testament.”88 In the case of Christ, moreover, the three offices cannot be kept
distinct; they blend into one another.89

Ritschl’s criticism and adumbration of the doctrine of the threefold office of Christ are
flawed in many ways: (1) The notion of “office” cannot be restricted in a juridical context.
In the Old Testament, the three offices were appropriated in various circumstances.90
Witsius himself applies it in different settings—a revelational, a reigning or ruling, and a
sacrificial context; (2) The hierarchical structural cannot be attributed to the use of the
conception of “office.” In Witsius’ doctrine, the threefold office of Christ constitutes his
actual mediatorship or suretyship for the salvation of sinners. It is a ministry of
servanthood. Witsius argues that Christ behaved as “a Servant of rulers” (Isa 49:7), even
though he was equal to God as a king.91 There is no antithesis between the institutional

90 Günter Kehrer argues, “Over the course of history, the word office has been used for a wide
variety of functions. In every case, however, what is peculiar to the term is that it refers to an activity
independent of the unique personal characteristics of the officeholder.” Günter Kehrer, “Office. I. Religious
Studies,” in Religion Past & Present: Encyclopedia of Theology and Religion, ed. Hans Dieter Betz et al.,
4th ed., English ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 281. A more complete study of office can be found in Günter
91 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.9.
office and the personal calling in the doctrine.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, the mere use of the title of office does not cause the hierarchism of the Christian church; (3) Although the “prophets” of the New Testament prophesies did not occupy an office in the local churches, it goes without doubt that the prophet in the Old Testament was an office in the nation of Israel. That the “house of Israel” was constituted in the sequence of kings - \textit{šarîm} (ministers) - priests - prophets in Jer 2:26\textsuperscript{93} strongly suggests that the prophetic work was also regarded as an “office” in the kingdom of Israelite; (4) The Epistle to the Hebrews, the priesthood of Christ is compared with the official priesthood of the Old Testament in both similar and dissimilar points. The differences between them does not efface that fact that the high priesthood of Christ is an office;\textsuperscript{94} (5) Finally, it is noteworthy that although

\textsuperscript{92} According to Udo Rüterswörden, “Office. II. Old Testament,” in \textit{Religion Past & Present: Encyclopedia of Theology and Religion}, ed. Hans Dieter Betz et al., 4th ed., English ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 282., the Old Testament officials were divided into ‘\textit{ābādîm} (subordinates) and \textit{šarîm} (ministers), as listed in 2 Sam 8:15-18, 20:23-26; 1 Kgs 4:1-6. The office of the ‘\textit{ābādîm} may be regarded as service in dependency on the king. Thus there was an office of servanthood in the Old Testament. For a detailed analysis, see Udo Rüterswörden, \textit{Von der politischen Gemeinschaft zur Gemeinde: Studien zu Dt 16, 18-18, 22}, Bonner biblische Beiträge; Bd. 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1987). The notion of “\textit{diakonia}” of the New Testament teaches this very well. See Ernst Käsemann, “Amt und Gemeinde im Neuen Testament,” in \textit{Exegetische Versuche und Bestimmungen} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 109-34. Hermann von Lips challenges the conclusion of older scholarship regarding the issue and argues: “The phenomenon of ‘office’ in the NT can be approached from two directions: from the present reality that we read of positions, functions, and ministries within the primitive Christian communities, or from the observation that authority in such positions was exercised in part by people who had been called and appointed, so that basic elements of an office emerge... The sharp antithesis drawn by earlier scholars between a pneumatic and charismatic structure and an official, institutional organization (Sohm-Harnack) does not hold up, however. A grasp of the situation in the primitive church requires appropriate correlation of both aspects.” Hermann von Lips, “Office. IV. New Testament,” in \textit{Religion Past & Present: Encyclopedia of Theology and Religion}, ed. Hans Dieter Betz et al., 4th ed., English ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 283.


\textsuperscript{94} Paul Ellingworth, \textit{The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text}, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993), 279. F. F. Bruce writes, “Aaron, the first of Israel’s high priests, occupied his office by divine appointment (Ex. 28:1ff.; Lev. 8:1ff.; Num. 16:5; 17:5; 18:1ff.; Ps. 105:26), and so did his heirs and successors (Num. 20:23ff.; 25:10ff.). And others who were not of Aaronic descent, but in a time of emergency exercised an intercessory and sacrificial ministry like that of the Aaronic priests, did so by a direct and special call from God, as did Samuel (1 Sam. 7:3-17). If our author is to sustain his thesis that Jesus is his people’s great high priest, he must produce comparable evidence of a divine call in his case.” Bruce argues that the intent of Heb 5:5-10 is to demonstrate Christ’s qualifications for high priesthood. F. F. Bruce, \textit{The Epistle to the Hebrews}, Rev.,
Ritschl criticizes the notion of the threefold office of Christ, he endorses it very positively in relation to the kingship of Christ. In the context of religious studies of the office, as Günter Kehrer puts it, “what first comes to mind is the office of priest, as found in many religions.” Ritschl’s attitude of the threefold office of Christ is, therefore, very selective. In many places of his work, he seems to bring in through the backdoor what he had discarded at the front door.

In a discussion with his student, Karl Barth argues that the order of the threefold office of Christ matters. He writes, “The ordinary order for Calvin and Reformed theologians is prophet, king, priest, for Schleiermacher and Lutheran theologians: prophet, priest, king.” By contrast, he deliberately deals with the issue in the order of priest, king, and prophet. He argues that the priestly and kingly offices in the narrower sense are the doings of Christ whereas the office of prophet is revealing Christ as king and priest. Barth writes, “To make clear what happens when He reveals Himself, I have to know what He is and does. . . . Christ’s priestly and kingly offices are the subject matter, the content of His prophetic office, because He reveals Himself.” That is why he uses this order. For him, in the order of Calvin and other theologians, it is never clear what the prophetic office means. Barth begins with the priestly, not the kingly office. He could have begun with the kingly office. There are two reasons why he chose the order: first, he thought it wiser to begin with God’s act for humans and then continue with the humanity of Christ.

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96 Karl Barth and John D. Godsey, Karl Barth’s Table Talk (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1963), 17 (emphasis mine).

97 Barth and Godsey, Karl Barth’s Table Talk, 17.
and what became of humanity in the sanctified Christ; second, by beginning with the priestly work, one can make clear the meaning and reason for the second element, because God did this for humans.\textsuperscript{98} Barth’s criticism of the Reformers regarding the issue is not quite right. Three points are important: (1) Although Barth willfully distinguishes between the doings of Christ and the revealing act of Christ, Witsius does not differentiate between them. Christ’s ministry as prophet, king, and priest is both the doing and the revealing act at the same time. Regarding the prophetic office, for instance, Witsius points out that Christ himself appeared in the character of an angel to reveal the salvation of God. In the work of the threefold office of Christ, the doing and the revealing act of Christ are firmly connected and inseparable;\textsuperscript{99} (2) Barth argues that it is wiser to begin with God’s act for humans by starting with the priesthood of Christ, and that it can make clear the meaning and reason for the kingship of Christ because God did this for humans. One can ask, however, why the kingly office of Christ is not God’s act for humans. Witsius would argue that all the threefold office of Christ is God’s act for humans. Barth cannot fully explain how the priestly office of Christ can make clear the meaning and reason for the kingship of Christ. By contrast, Witsius sees the threefold office of Christ as inseparable and working together in the redemptive history of Christ. It is another distinctiveness that Witsius deals with the threefold office of Christ from a trinitarian perspective. In Witsius’ Trinitarian scheme, the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} does not require a disparity among the divine Persons. He points to the cooperation of the

\textsuperscript{98} Barth and Godsey, \textit{Karl Barth’s Table Talk}, 18.

\textsuperscript{99} It is noteworthy that generally in Barth’s actualistic doctrine of the revelation, God’s revelation is not separate from God’s being. George Hunsinger, \textit{How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 76–79. From this perspective, Barth’s remark regarding the order of the threefold office seems to contradict with his view of revelation.
Holy Spirit in the prophetic and kingly work of Christ. In other passage, he links the priestly work of Christ, the satisfaction, with the work of the Holy Spirit, arguing that the Spirit, who fits for a holy and happy life, should flow from Christ who gives satisfaction for the sin of his members.\textsuperscript{100} It should be noted, therefore, that the content is more important than the order when the threefold office of Christ is dealt with in Reformed theology.\textsuperscript{101}

2.2.6. The Third Period of the \textit{Pactum Salutis} and the Voluntariness of Christ

In the third period of the \textit{pactum salutis}, Christ assumed human nature and suffered his ears to be bored (Ps 40:7; Heb 10:5). This means that Christ “engaged himself as a voluntary servant to God, from love to his Lord the Father, and to his spouse the church, and his spiritual children.”\textsuperscript{102} Witsius points out that the ears of such voluntary servants were bored (Exod 21:5, 6). Witsius stresses the voluntariness of Christ’s suretyship, by which he stands in the lines of the Anselmian tradition.\textsuperscript{103} In his work, \textit{Cur Deus Homo}, Anselm accents three aspects of Christ’s work of atonement—in his suffering, in the possibility of sinning, and in his death and its repayment. Firstly, Anselm argues that God

\textsuperscript{100} Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.4.7.

\textsuperscript{101} Some modern Reformed theologians formulated the doctrine of the threefold office of Christ in different order from Calvin or Witsius. For example, the order for Charles Hodge is prophet, king, priest. Charles Hodge, \textit{Systematic Theology} (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc., 1997), 2:459–609. Louis Berkhof also offers it in the order of prophet, priest, and king, which is probably the most frequently used order in the era of orthodoxy. Berkhof, \textit{Systematic Theology}, 356–412. Bavinck deals with it in a mixed way because he believes that “no single active of Christ can be exclusively restricted to one office.” At the same time, he argues, “While it is not possible to separate them [offices], the distinction between them is most certainly there.” Bavinck, \textit{Reformed Dogmatics}, 3:366, 367.

\textsuperscript{102} Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.3.4.

\textsuperscript{103} For a detailed discussion, see chapter 4 of this study.
the Father wished the death of the Son because he wanted the world to be saved by a man who could perform the saving work (I.9).\textsuperscript{104} He emphasizes that, for the Son, this was not coercion since he embodied the desire not under compulsion but \textit{voluntarily} (I.10).\textsuperscript{105} Regarding the possibility of the sinning of Christ, secondly, Anselm also underscores the voluntary character of Christ. Christ is capable of sinning according to his power but is not capable of sinning according to his will (I.10).\textsuperscript{106} Thirdly, Christ did not die by necessity because he was omnipotent; neither did he die out of obligation, because he was not a sinner. Thus he died of his own free will (I.11).\textsuperscript{107} God does not demand from him repayment of a debt (I.11).\textsuperscript{108} Christ \textit{voluntarily} offered himself to the Father, to the honor of the Father (I.18).\textsuperscript{109} Thus it is necessary that the Father should compensate the Son. Christ did not need the recompense, however, because all things which belonged to the Father belonged to him, and he had no debt to pay to the Father. Christ bestows the reward and recompense to those who are the imitators of him. This is God’s grace for us to share (I.19).\textsuperscript{110} Witsius appears to endorse the first and third points above along the lines of the Anselmian tradition. He also develops the place of the law in the mediatorship of Christ in the third period.

\textsuperscript{104} Anselm, \textit{The Major Works}, 279.

\textsuperscript{105} Anselm, \textit{The Major Works}, 280, 281.


\textsuperscript{107} Anselm, \textit{The Major Works}, 331.

\textsuperscript{108} Anselm, \textit{The Major Works}, 330.

\textsuperscript{109} Anselm, \textit{The Major Works}, 351.

\textsuperscript{110} Anselm, \textit{The Major Works}, 352–53.
2.2.7. The Third Period of the *Pactum Salutis* and the Relationship of the Law and Christ

Witsius’ explication of the law and the mediatorship of Christ is like a well woven texture of biblical theology and doctrinal theology. He argues that Christ came “under the law” (Gal 4:4), by subjecting himself to the law.\textsuperscript{111} Christ solemnly testified by his circumcision on the eighth day after his birth, whereby he made himself “a debtor to do the whole law” (Gal 5:3).\textsuperscript{112} Witsius, according to a scholastic method, parses the law proposed to the mediator into a twofold view: first, as the directory of his nature and office; second, as the condition of the covenant. And again, Witsius tries to distinctly compare the three aspects of the mediator: first, as God; second, as man; and third, as mediator, God-man.\textsuperscript{113} Firstly, Witsius maintains, “The Son, as God, neither was, nor could be subject to any law, to any superior; that being contrary to the nature of Godhead, which we now suppose the Son to have in common with the Father.”\textsuperscript{114} “No subjection,” argues Witsius endorsing a christological interpretation of 1 Tim 6:15, “can be conceived of the deity of the Son.”\textsuperscript{115} Since that engagement was nothing but the most glorious act

\textsuperscript{111} By contrast, N. T. Wright refuses the idea that Christ fulfilled the law, because it cannot but result in a kind of legalism. He also denies the notion of imputation and the active obedience of Christ. N. T. Wright, *Justification: God’s Plan & Paul’s Vision* (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009), 135. His assertion, however, cannot seem to explain Gal 4:4 and 5:3, which Witsius cites.

\textsuperscript{112} Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.3.4.

\textsuperscript{113} Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.3.5. “Mediator ipse considerari potest tripliciter. I. Qua Deus. II. Qua Homo. III. Qua Mediator θεάνθρωπος” (author’s emphasis).

\textsuperscript{114} Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.3.6.

\textsuperscript{115} Witsius also adds, “The emperors Gratian, Valentine, and Theodosius said, long ago, that ‘he is a true Christian, who believes that the Deity of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is one in equal power; that, under the same majesty, there is one Deity; and he who teaches the contrary is a heretic’ (Cod. lib. i. tit. 1)”. Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.3.6.
of the divine will of the Son, doing what none but God could do, it implies no manner of subjection. In the third period, the divine person, on assuming flesh, would appear in the form of a servant.\footnote{Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.3.7.} This servant form, however, does not indicate subordinationism because “by undertaking to perform this obedience, in the human nature, in its proper time, the Son, as God, did no more subject himself to the Father, than the Father with respect to the Son, to the owing that reward of debt, which he promised him a right to claim.”\footnote{Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.3.7. That the Son, even before his incarnation, was called παρθένος (the Angel), (Gen 48:16; Exod 23:20), argues Witsius, “signifies no inferiority of the Son.” The expressions only mean a form resembling the appearances of angels, and prefiguring his future mission into the world. Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.3.8. For the issue of subordinationism in relation to the \textit{pactum salutis}, see chapter 4.} Witsius stresses that Christ was fully God even when incarnated.

Secondly, as man, Christ was subject to the moral law, asserts Witsius, as it is the rule both of the nature and actions of man. It is a “contradiction” to suppose a rational creature, such as is the human nature of Christ, to be without the law. Christ, as a man, was really bound by the law. Witsius argues:

\begin{quote}
First, to preserve the holiness implanted into his nature from his first conception, unspotted and pure. Second, to express it in the most perfect manner in his life and actions, from all his heart, all his soul, and all his strength. Third, constantly to persevere therein, without yielding to any temptations, to the end of his course.\footnote{Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.3.9.}
\end{quote}

Christ, as a man, was not only subject to the moral law, but he, as an Israelite, is also subject to the ceremonial and political laws, “which were then still in force, according to the divine institution.”\footnote{Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.3.10.} He observed the festivals, repaired the temple, and behaved as
an obedient subject under a lawful magistracy. Witsius considers some objections to this view. Some might say that as to the ceremonial laws, Christ declared himself “greater than the temple” (Matt 12:6), and “Lord of the sabbath” (Matt 12:8). As to the political laws, some might point out that, being the Son of God, Christ was exempted from paying tribute (Matt 17:26-27). Modern biblical scholars, such as E. P. Sanders, try to explain this with the “autonomous” characteristic of Jesus regarding the Jewish Law. They, however, do not explain why Jesus was able to be autonomous. Witsius approaches the issue with the scheme of the divinity and humanity of Christ. As God, Jesus Christ was Lord of the law, the lawgiver himself. On account of his divine nature, he had authority to dispense with precepts of a mutable and positive institution. Even when he became man, he was still the Son of God, and for that reason had acted as equal to God.

Thirdly, as mediator and surety, Christ is under the law in another manner and in two ways—first, as enjoining the condition of perfect obedience, upon which he and his were to partake of happiness; second, as binding to the penalty, due to the sins of the elect, which he had taken upon himself. The first is active obedience, and the second is passive obedience. As to the former, the Son of God appeared in our nature, but not in the

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120 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.11. Sanders writes, “Perhaps Jesus did not, then, directly oppose any aspect of the sacred Law. He probably did, however, have legal disputes, in which he defended himself by quoting scriptural precedent, which would mean that he had not set himself against the Law (e.g., Mark 2:23–28). However, Jesus was autonomous; he made his own rules with regard to how to observe the Law, and he decided how to defend himself when criticized.” E. P. Sanders, “Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism, ed. John J. Collins and Daniel C. Harlow (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 806. Here Sanders, retaining the main argument, slightly changed his previous article, “Jesus Christ,” published in Encyclopaedia Britannica (Academic Edition). Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, s. v. “Jesus Christ,” accessed October 30, 2013, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/303091/Jesus-Christ. In both articles, Sanders does not explain why Jesus was able to be autonomous.

121 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.11.

122 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.12. For Witsius, the term, “active obedience” is used,
quality of a surety. Every human being should be subject to God, as described in the 
divine law, and this is eternally to continue without end. However, “there is another 
obligation to subjection, limited to a certain period of time.” The apostle calls the 
period “the days of his flesh” (Heb 5:7). In the time, argues Witsius, “Christ, when 
obeying the law, was meriting that happiness which he was not in possession of;
considering this law, not only as a rule of life, but also as prescribing the condition of 
acquiring happiness.” The active obedience of Christ is imputed to us.

Witsius relates Christ’s submission to the law with the voluntary character of Christ’s 
mediatorship of the third period. Christ is rich as the heir of all things and “might have 
acted as equal to God, from the very beginning of his incarnation.” In his voluntary 
covenant-engagement (voluntariae confoederationis), however, Christ became poor for 
our sakes (2 Cor 8:9). His subjecting to the law is “wholly from his voluntary

“not so properly.” De oeconomia foederum, II.3.14.

123 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.13.

124 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.13.

125 N. T. Wright denies the notion of imputation and the active obedience of Christ. He argues 
that “in Romans 5, the ‘obedience’ of Jesus (Romans 5:19, with cross-reference to Philippians 2:8) refers 
back, in line with the ‘obedience’ of the Isaiahic servant, to the achievement of his death.” Wright, 
Justification, 231. Wright’s interpretation of Rom 5:19 seems to be flawed because he forcibly tries to see 
the text through the lens of Phil 2:8, which refers to the passive obedience of Christ. The scriptural passages 
such as Rom 4:5, 5:17, 19; 10:4; 1 Cor 1:30; 6:11; 2 Cor 5:21; Phil 3:9 teach or imply the doctrine of 
imputation. For a defense of the doctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, see John Piper, 
Counted Righteous in Christ: Should We Abandon the Imputation of Christ’s Righteousness? (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway Books, 2002). VanDrunen and Clark rightly argue that “the pactum salutis provides an essential 
part of the biblical and theological context for the doctrine of active obedience and hence the doctrine of 
justification. When Jesus Christ earned the righteousness to be imputed to his people, he was fulfilling not 
only the historical covenant of works as the Second Adam (Rom 5:12-21; 1 Cor 15:45) but also the 
covenant he made with his Father.” VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 169.

126 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.13.
covenant-engagement, which he entered into on our account.” The Son of God was, in virtue of the covenant-engagement, subject to “the curse of the law, being made a curse for us” (Gal 3:16). Christ bound himself, by his engagement, to fulfill the whole law.

Witsius argues:

Now Christ, considered simply as a righteous person, might have been exempted from these miseries, and from such a death; but after having once, by a voluntary engagement, submitted himself to the law for us, he became bound to satisfy also this sanction of the law, which threatened death to sinners; for all these things arise from the mediatorial covenant, and belong to Christ as Mediator. . . . Since the divine nature, as subsisting in the Son, could not truly and really be subject; therefore, by virtue of the covenant, it did not exert or display all its majesty, in the assumed form of a servant; nor hinder that nature, to which it was united by the hypostatical union, from being truly subject to the law, both as to the condition of the reward, and as to the penal sanction; which, indeed, was neither a real renunciation nor degradation of the divine superiority, but only a certain economical veiling of it for a time.

Christ obeyed the law, submitted himself to the curse of the law, and died at the cross for sinners. He did not exert all his majesty because of the pactum salutis. Here, Witsius stresses that the obedience and sufferings “are not only to be appropriated to the human nature, but to be considered as truly performed and suffered by the God-man.” Christ, who is “in the form of God,” argues Witsius, is said to have “made himself of no reputation, and became obedient unto death” (Phil 2:6, 7, 8; 1 Cor 2:8).

Witsius maintains that Christ fulfilled the work of redemption as “the person, God-

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128 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.15.
129 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.15, 17 (italics mine).
130 This notion will be related to the kenotic Christology in 4.3 of this study.
131 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.3.19.
man.” The very God-man emptied himself by virtue of the *pactum salutis*. Notably, both the Scriptures and the early ecumenical creeds such as the Nicene Creed (325; “one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God”), the Nicene-Constantinople Creed (381; “one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God”) and the Creed of Chalcedon (451; “the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ”) teach that it was not a *nature* of Christ but the *person* (i.e., the Son of God) who suffered and died for the salvation of sinners. Witsius follows this tradition in his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.

2.2.8. Witsius’ Use of the Scriptures for the Doctrine of the *Pactum Salutis*

Witsius offers biblical evidences of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in two ways—by presenting directly related verses and indirectly related verses. He interweaves these two sets of scriptural verses in four phases: first, he presents directly relevant texts and their exegesis; second, he extracts doctrinal themes from them; third, he presents other scriptural verses which are related to the doctrinal themes; and fourth, he correlates these indirectly related verses to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Witsius extends the exegetical discussion for the doctrine in this gradual progressive interweaving of correlated biblical texts.

The scriptural verses directly related to the doctrine are Luke 22:29, Gal 3:17, Heb 7:22, some Old Testament passages regarding suretyship (such as Ps 119:122, Isa 38:14, Jer 30:21), and Zech 6:13. In Luke 22:29, argues Witsius, Christ is said to engage by covenant unto his believers a kingdom, just as the Father has engaged by covenant unto him. Christ obtains a kingdom by virtue of some covenant or disposition, which is, for
Witsius, the *pactum salutis*. For Witsius, Gal 3:17 attests to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, where a certain “διαθήκη” (covenant, or testament) was confirmed before God in Christ. Witsius extracts the theme of suretyship in Heb 7:22, in which Christ is said to have become a surety of a better covenant or testament. The suretyship (sponsio) of Christ, who is the eternal priest (Heb 7:21), consists in the *pactum salutis*. Witsius presents other scriptural verses which are related to the theme of suretyship. He suggests in his exegesis of Ps 119:122 that the suretyship in the verse can defend the notion of *pactum salutis* since Christ alone could undertake the suretyship of the text. Witsius argues that Isa 38:14 and Jer 30:21 also elucidate the meaning of Christ’s suretyship.

The counsel of peace in Zech 6:13, among other Old Testament passages Witsius cites, clearly indicates the covenant between the Father (Jehovah) and the Son (the Branch). Permitting three pages Witsius deals with the text in detail to verify its validity for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Witsius notes that “the very learned De Dieu” supports his interpretation. Also, he argues that his exegesis sides with Jerome (c. 347-420). The Zechariah passage takes an important position in Witsius’ doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in his other work. 

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132 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.3. For a succinct explanation of the verse, see VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 190.

133 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.5.

134 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.4.

135 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.6.

136 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.7.

137 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.8.

138 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.8.
Apostles’ Creed, for example, Witsius deals with the pactum salutis in his explanation of Zech 6:13. The Son of God was sent into the world, clothed with human flesh, “according to the counsel of peace which takes place between God and the Man whose name is the BRANCH” (Zech 6:12, 13). Mary’s birthing of Jesus Christ “took place according to an agreement between the Father and the Son, or, as it is expressed by Zechariah [6:12, 13], according to ‘the counsel of peace,’ which was between ‘the LORD of Hosts,’ the Father, and ‘the man,’ the Son, who was to become man, ‘whose name is the BRANCH.’”

Besides those texts directly related to the pactum, for Witsius, a variety of scriptural verses offer a probative force to prove the validity of the doctrine of the pactum salutis. Witsius extracts the themes which are connected to the doctrine—the threefold office of Christ, the voluntary character of Christ’s salvation, and the relationship of the law and Christ. Correlated scriptural texts to the themes are such as Pss 2:8, 16:2, 40:7-9, Isa 38:14, 49:4, 49:6-8, 53:10-12, John 8:29, 10:18, 12:49, 14:31, 15:10, 19:30, 17:4-5, Gal 4:4, and Revelation 13:8. Among these texts, John 17 is noteworthy because Witsius depends on the text to explain the doctrine of the pactum salutis in Sacred Dissertations on What Is Commonly Called the Apostles’ Creed. In the work, Witsius argues that Christ’s redemptive work expiated our sin “by virtue of the suretiship engagements.”

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140 Witsius, Sacred Dissertations, 1:323–24.

141 Witsius, Sacred Dissertations, 2:14.

142 Witsius, Sacred Dissertations, 1:273–74.
Christ prayed for his people in John 17 as “the Son of God and the Surety of excellent a
 covenant.”  

He voluntarily obeyed the will of the Father in the intercession. It is a work
 of the God-Man, in which there is a joint concurrence of “the human will of Christ” and
 “of his Divine will.” Thus, Witsius argues that in the intercessory prayer of John 17,
 the will of the Father concurs with the human and divine will of Jesus Christ.

The doctrine of the _pactum salutis_ did not just depend on a few scriptural verses but, as
 Muller well documented, was based on “cross-referencing and collation” of many
texts. Witsius also uses the strategy and synthesizes a series of biblical passages. The
evidence from Scripture overwhelmingly points to the conclusion that this relationship of
Father and Son ought to be referred to in an eternal covenantal term. It is true, however,
that among numerous scriptural texts he offers for the doctrine of the _pactum salutis_,
some texts are more importantly treated than others. Particularly, Gal 3:17 and Zech 6:13
are the most important evidences for the doctrine. For Witsius, Gal 3:17 is “a primary
proof,” and Zech 6:13 is identified “as a major foundation of the doctrine.” The
following discussion will address these two passages as a test case for showing the
validity of Witsius’ use of the Scriptures for the doctrine. I will treat the Zechariah
passage from patristic, medieval, and early modern exegetical backgrounds because
Witsius himself writes that his interpretation of the passage sides with Jerome and De

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143 Witsius, _Sacred Dissertations_, 1:274.
144 Witsius, _Sacred Dissertations_, 1:274–75.
145 The concurrence of the will of the Father and the will of the Son is the kernel point in
understanding the Trinitarian theology of the _pactum salutis_. See chapter 3 of this study.
146 Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 25–48, cited from 47.
147 Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 44, 39.
Dieu (1590-1642). I will also argue that this exegetical tradition of Zech 6:13 can be supported by modern biblical scholarship. I will deal with Gal 3:17 from early modern and modern exegetical perspectives to elucidate their relevance for the *pactum salutis*. I will demonstrate that Witsius’ use of the passages for the doctrine can be validated both by older tradition and by modern exegesis.

2.3. Analysis of Witsius’ Exegesis of Two Primary Proofs of the *Pactum Salutis*

In his dissertation of the *pactum salutis*, B. Loonstra argues that the most important scriptural evidences of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* are Ps 40:7-9, Heb 10:5-7, Isa 53:10-12, Zech 6:13, Luke 22:29, and Gal 3:16ff. For him, however, these texts are irrelevant to the doctrine as will be shown as follows. The context of Ps 40:7-9 is the anointing (J. Ridderbos) or accession (N. H. Ridderbos) of David, in which David submits to the special mission God gives him.\(^{148}\) Although Heb 10:5-7 clearly mentions the willingness of the Son, it does not present the temporal issue. Thus, the Son in God’s eternal decision is not at issue here. The text refers to the Old Testament prophecy of the Messiah.\(^{149}\) Isaiah 53:10 gives no room for the idea of an agreement between YHWH and his servant because the temporal meaning of the verse, which denotes the future reality.\(^{150}\) In Zech 6:13 “the agreement that brings peace” (*vredebrengend overleg*),

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\(^{149}\) Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond*, 188. Loonstra refers to O. Michel, *Der Brief an die Hebräer*, K.E.K. 13 (Göttingen, 1975), 337.

argues Loonstra, “does not refer the relationship between the YHWH and his anointed, as was mostly adopted in the seventeenth century, but the counsel between the ruler and the high priest after the construction of the temple.”¹⁵¹ Luke 22:29f bears witness to Jesus’ special position in the kingdom of God. The Father has therefore appointed him as the ruler of his kingdom. The time of the “diatithemai” is not addressed. The decision of the Father for the kingdom will be made in the future. Thus an eternal established testament is not spoken here.¹⁵² Galatians 3:16 addresses the promises to Abraham and to his seed. These promises have the legal force of a will (testament). They cannot be invalidated or be impaired by the law that came 430 years later. The promise is made to Abraham and to his “seed,” not to “seeds.” It was not the people who would be subject to the law. If it were the case, the promise would be still under the control of the law. The promise was given to the seed of Abraham, who is Christ. Given that, the promise is not under the control of the law. One can participate in the blessing of the promise not by works of the law but through faith in Christ. To Loonstra, the text is not about “the idea of an above-historical promise of the Father to the Son” (gedachte van een boven-historische belofte van de Vader aan de Zoon), but about “the promise to Abraham that also applies to Christ and those who are really in him” (de belofte aan Abraham die ook voor Christus geldt en die in Hem werkelijkheid wordt).¹⁵³ In sum, Loonstra concludes that a direct reference to

¹⁵¹ Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond*, 188–89. Loonstra offers “an obvious rendering” of A.S. van der Woude, Zacharia, P.O.T. (Nijkerk, 1984), 117, who translates the text not as “he shall be a priest upon his throne,” but as “there will be a priest upon his throne.”


the *pactum salutis* cannot be found in these texts. He, however, does not argue that the Scriptures do not support the doctrine. Rather, he is convinced that “the doctrine of eternal *pact* is nevertheless to be considered a legitimate justification for the relationship between covenant, reconciliation and election.”  

Therefore, he takes a roundabout way to verify the biblical evidence of the doctrine.

Loonstra’s analysis and conclusion have some defects. First, he fails to locate the exegetical context in which the doctrine was formulated. Witsius, for example, argued that his interpretation of Zechariah 6:13 sided with that of Jerome and De Dieu. Considering the widely concerted exegesis of the text in the seventeenth century, Witsius had enough reason to present the Zechariah text as a proof of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Second, Loonstra selectively offers the modern biblical scholars who would refute the notion of the *pactum salutis* in those texts. Some modern biblical scholars, however, do agree with the scriptural exegesis of Witsius regarding the doctrine. To Witsius the most important texts are, among others, Zech 6: 13 and Gal 3:16ff, which are also interpreted to support the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in modern exegesis.

2.3.1. Analysis of Witsius’ Exegesis of Zechariah 6:13

2.3.1.1. Jerome’s Comment on Zechariah 6:13

Modern biblical studies have demonstrated that interpretation and scriptural proof are

154 Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond*, 190. “Met deze conclusie kunnen wij niet volstaan. Want de belangrijkste bewijsplaatsen zijn dan wel niet overtuigend gebleken, maar dat sluit niet bij voorbaat uit, dat de leer van het eeuwige pact in systematisch-theologisch opzicht desondanks als een legitieme verantwoording van de verhouding tussen verbond, verzoening en verkiezing aan te merken is” (bold is mine).

155 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.8. De Dieu’s comment on this verse will be discussed below.
determined to a great degree by the interpretive conventions of particular interpretive communities.\textsuperscript{156} In Witsius’ mind, the most important principle for proper interpretation of the Scriptures was “the Spirit speaking in the Scriptures.”\textsuperscript{157} The second most important principle was the interpretation of “the very learned interpreter,” to whom he professes himself greatly indebted. These interpreters could be the church fathers and his contemporary theologians. For the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis}, Witsius refers to the comments of Jerome and Lodewijk de Dieu on Zech 6:13.\textsuperscript{158}

Jerome deals with Zech 6:13 in his Zechariah commentary, which he finished in 406 with commentaries of Hosea, Joel, and Amos.\textsuperscript{159} His interpretation of the text appears ambivalent. On the one hand, he contends that Jesus Christ will be both king and priest and will sit in kingly throne as well as in priestly throne. “The counsel of peace,” argues Jerome, “will be between the two offices so that the royal majesty would not suppress the sacerdotal dignity, nor would the sacerdotal dignity suppress the royal majesty.”\textsuperscript{160}


\textsuperscript{157} Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.2.15.

\textsuperscript{158} Witsius, \textit{De oeconomia foederum}, II.2.8.

\textsuperscript{159} Neil Adkin, “Sallust, Hist. frg. II, 64 and Jerome’s ‘Commentary on Zechariah,’” \textit{Latomus} 58, no. 3 (1999): 635.

Rather, the two would consent in the one glory of the Lord Jesus. On the other hand, Jerome argues that “the counsel of peace will be between the two, which is referred to Father and Son. For the Son will come to do the will of Father, and the Father will be in the Son, and the Son in the Father.” Jerome does not try to harmonize these two seemingly contradictory interpretations. He seems to apply the text to two themes—one application from a christological perspective and the other from a trinitarian perspective. He does not say which interpretation he prefers.

2.3.1.2. Medieval Understanding of Zechariah 6:13, the “Counsel of Peace,” and the “Covenant of Salvation”

In the Middle Ages, some commentators followed Jerome’s interpretation. For example, Haymo Halberstatensis (Haymo of Halberstadt, 778-853), who was a German Benedictine monk and served as bishop of Halberstadt, took the first interpretation. Citing almost literally the work of Jerome, he argues that the counsel of peace will be between the two offices so that “the royal majesty would not suppress the sacerdotal dignity, nor would the sacerdotal dignity suppress the royal majesty, but would agree in the glory of Jesus the only Lord.” Other exegetes did not follow Jerome’s

161 Hieronimus, PL, 25:1458B–C.


interpretation and offered different exegesis. When dealing with the numbers of the Scriptures in *De universo* (c. 844), Rabanus Maurus (c. 780-856), who was a Frankish Benedictine monk and the archbishop of Mainz in Germany, regarded the two of Zech 6:13 as indicating Jews and Gentiles.  

In the twelfth century, some theologians expanded the exegesis of the Zechariah text and linked it with various New Testament texts. For example, Rupertus Tuitiensis (Rupert of Deutz, died c. 1135) argues that Christ came to fulfill God’s promise, given to the Israelites. Christ, who is the victor of the salvation of all people, suffered the passion, rose again, ascended into heaven, and will return, crowned with glory and honor (Heb 2). Christ will be glorified in bringing many sons unto glory (Heb 1). The believers will be glory to each other owing to the redemptive work of Christ (2 Cor 1). Then how much more the Lord Jesus Christ will be glory to the saved? Christ decided all things to be reconciled through him, making peace by the blood shed at the cross, whether they are things in earth, or things in heaven (Col 1:20). All things will hold together in him (Col 1:17). The cause of this glory is “the one and the very same God-

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165 Rupert, who praised and followed Jerome in many ways, is described as “a giant at the threshold of the twelfth century” in Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis*, 3:163–77.

man, Jesus Christ” (*unus idemque Deus et homo Jesus Christus*). Christ will be the high priest who sits on a throne and will reign all things. He will be “the priest for eternity” (*sacerdos in aeternum*), and through his blood, there will be universal peace.

When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, he will sit on the throne of his majesty (Matt 25:31). In one person, king and priest come together (*in unam personam convenient regnum et sacerdotium*). That there will be the counsel of peace, argues Rupertus, should be understood as denoting the two offices of lordship and priesthood (*dominantem et sacerdotem*). In Christ the two offices are not divided.

Rupertus claims, “The two teachings were disjoined thus far—one was kingly person and the other was priestly person, but, now in Christ, they are now united.”

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167 Rupertus Tuitiensis, “In Zachariam Prophetam Commentariorum,” 168:748C–749A. “[748C]…Et tunc *ipse portabit gloriam*, scilicet quam coronae istae significant, quia videlicet magna illi ert gloria, tam multos *filios adduxisse in gloriam* (Hebr. I). Si enim cujuslibet gloria sunt hi qui per ejus ministerium crediderunt, quemadmodum [748D] et Apostolus dicit: *Quia gloria vestra nos sumus, sicut et vos nostra in die Domini nostri Jesu Christi* (II Cor. I), quanto magis ipsius Domini nostri Jesu Christi gloria est et gloria ert, quod est ipse salus omnium, quemadmodum idem Apostolus ait, *qua cum placuit per eum reconciliari omnia in ipso, pacificans per sanguinem crucis ejus, sive quae in terris, sive quae in coelis sunt?* (Coloss. I.) Tacito quod primum est, quia *in ipso condita sunt universa in coelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, et omnia per ipsum, et in ipso creata sunt, et ipse est ante omnes, et omnia in ipso constant* (ibid.); quae causae si, cum jam dictis congregentur, quot [749A] putas coronarum gloriae est, unus idemque Deus et homo Jesus Christus?”


counsel is called the counsel of peace because “peace can be ours through the conjunction [of the two offices in Christ]” (*per illam conjunctionem pax est nobis*). Rupertus explains that this is what the Apostle meant when he says, “to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross” (Col 1:20). Rupertus extends the exegesis toward Pneumatology. He argues that “the Holy Spirit glorified Jesus Christ with these words, and the glory will not cease even to the end of the world.” He claims that “we know that the Lord has sent the prophet to us in truth,” and that “the Holy Spirit said truth through his prophets” (Act 28). Although Rupertus does not interpret the counsel of peace of Zech 6:13 as a *pactum* between the Father and the Son, he demonstrates that in the counsel, God’s promise to the Israelites was revealed, and that Christ’s work of reconciliation was fulfilled through the counsel of peace. In addition, Rupertus introduces the work of the Holy Spirit in the interpretation of the verse, and by so doing he undergirds a trinitarian perspective for understanding it. One can easily find that these motifs recur in early modern exegesis of Zechariah 6:13.

The term of “covenant of salvation” (*pactum salutis*), in the Middle Ages, was used to

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171 Rupertus Tuitiensis, “In Zachariam Prophetam Commentariorm,” 168:749C. “[749C]... Inter illos igitur subauditur principatus cum in uno fuerint inseparabiliter consociati, consilium, inquit, pacis erit, quia videlicet per illam conjunctionem pax est nobis. . .”

172 Rupertus Tuitiensis, “In Zachariam Prophetam Commentariorm,” 168:749C. “[749C]... et sicut jam ante ex Apostolo commemoratum est, per eum complacuit reconciliari omnia in ipso, et pacificari per sanguinem crucis ejus, sive quae in terris sunt, sive quae in coelis.” Rupertus’s exegesis of Zech 6:13 is very similar to that of William Pemble in many ways (see 2.3.3 below).


denote the fulfillment of God’s promise for the salvation of his people. For example, Gerhohus Reicherspergensis (Gerhoh of Reichersberg, ca. 1093-1169) uses the term in relation to the Genesis narrative of Joseph in his exegesis of Psalm 119:159. He tells the narrative as an illustration of his exegesis. When Jacob realized that his son Joseph, whom he loved, was still alive, his spirit revived (Gen 45:27). Gerhohus comments that for Jacob “the covenant of salvation and peace” (pactum salutis et pacis) previously had been dissolved by transgressions but now was recovered. He argues that Jacob was able to meet his son Joseph again “by loving God’s commandments.” In so doing, the story of Jacob and Joseph, contends Gerhohus, warned the Israelites not to dare to transgress against the commandment of God. Thomas Cisterciensis (Thomas of Perseigne, died c.1190), who was a Cistercian monk of Perseigne Abbey, wrote a very famous commentary on the Song of Songs. In his interpretation of Song 4:6, he relates the notion of the pactum salutis to the salvation of Rahab of Jericho. He maintains that hope is useless when it is found in an erroneous faith or in an offensive love. “Faith is fortified,” argues Thomas Cisterciensis, “by the practice of good works, the hope of longing eternity,  

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175 Gerhohus Reicherspergensis links the love of God’s precepts with the story of Jacob. Ps 119:159 See how I love your precepts; preserve my life, O LORD, according to your love.


177 In the commentary, Thomas Cisterciensis cites Bernard of Clairvaux, calling him “a certain wise man.” Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis*, 3:32.
and the love of displaying obedience.” In Joshua 2, according to Thomas Cisterciensis, “the harlot Rahab hid the spies of Jericho because of this faith; her “covenant of salvation” (pactum salutis) was concluded with them because of this love; she tied the scarlet cord in the window because of this hope.”¹⁷⁸ In the exegetical works of Gerhohus Reicherspergensis and Thomas Cisterciensis, the term of “covenant of salvation” (pactum salutis), means a covenant which gives salvation to God’s people who faithfully keep his precepts.

Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) does not use the term, “pactum salutis.” He, however, uses the term, “foedus salutis,” which actually has the same meaning with “pactum salutis.” In the commentary on Isaiah, Aquinas argues that Christ was given to us “in order to keep the covenant of salvation” (in foedus conservandae salutis).¹⁷⁹ He also claims that the blood of the sacrificial calf in the Mosaic Law (Exod 24:8) signified “the blood of the covenant of the Lord.” For Aquinas, it is the meaning of Hebrew 9:7, in which the blood that the Old Testament high priest offered to God is connected to the blood of Christ.¹⁸⁰ Aquinas stresses that the redemptive work of Christ was based on


¹⁷⁹ In his running comment on Isa 42, Aquinas writes, “Datur Christus in foedus conservandae salutis (Gen. 9)” (bolds mine). Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria cursoria: Super Isaiam, Capitulus 42. All citations of Aquinas’ works are from Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1989-).

¹⁸⁰ Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria Biblica: Super Evangeliun Matthaei, Capitulus 26, Lectio 4,
covenant. In his commentary on Hebrews, he contends that Christ is the mediator and sponsor of the better covenant. He writes, “It should be noted that a priest is in the middle between God and human beings (Deut 5:5): I am the middle-person and the go-between” (Sciendum est autem quod sacerdos est medius inter deum et populum. Deut. V, 5: ego medius et sequester fui). The priest is obliged to restore God and human beings because the go-between is the middle-person. If it was so in the temporal covenant of the Old Testament, the priest of the better covenant also should be like that. Jesus is the sponsor and guarantor of the better testament and the better covenant, so he should restore God and human beings as the go-between.181

To summarize, in the medieval exegesis of Haymo Halberstatensis and Rupertus Tuitiensis, the “two” (שְׁנֵיהֶֽם) of Zachariah 6:13 were interpreted as denoting the two offices of Christ. There will be the counsel of peace between the kingly and priestly office of Christ—Jerome’s first suggestion. Rupertus Tuitiensis, however, extended the interpretation toward the christological fulfillment of God’s salvation. Christ will be glorified in bringing many sons unto glory. All things will be reconciled through him who will make peace by his blood. Although Rupertus does not mention the eternal pactum between the Father and the Son in his comment of Zech 6:13, he does point to the

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“Sciendum est autem quod sacerdos est medius inter deum et populum. Deut. V, 5: ego medius et sequester fui. Et ideo, quia sequester est mediator, sacerdos debet deum et populum ad concordiam reducere. Et hoc fit, quasi per pactum de bonis temporalibus, in quibus non conquiescebat affectus nisi carnalium, secundum illud Ps. XV: quid enim mihi est in caelo, etc.. Et ideo oportuit, ut superveniret alius sacerdos, qui esset sponsor, id est promissor melioris testamenti, et melioris pacti, quia de bonis spiritualibus et stabilibus. Et hic est iesus. Ier. XXXI, 31: feriam domui Iuda foedus novum, non secundum pactum quod pepigi, etc.. Matth. IV, V. 17: poenitentiam agite, appropinquabit enim regnum caelorum” (bolds mine).
reconciliation of Christ, which is fulfilled through the counsel of peace between the two offices of Christ. It is also noteworthy that Rupertus presents a trinitarian understanding of the text by describing the work of the Holy Spirit in the fulfillment of the counsel of peace. The medieval notion of the pactum salutis comprises the conception of salvation given to God’s people who faithfully keep his precepts, as evidenced by the biblical interpretations of Gerhohus Reicherspergensis and Thomas Cisterciensis. Although Thomas Aquinas does not use the term, pactum salutis, he argues that Christ was given to us in order to keep the “covenant of salvation” (foedus salutis). He, like Rupertus, furthers the notion toward the new covenant, which God made with the house of Judah, not like the covenant made with their ancestors. Although this analysis does not confirm that the medieval thinkers thought the pactum salutis or consilium pacis as the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son, it does partially substantiate that medieval exegesis of Zech 6:13 and other related passages could offer a background for the notion of the eternal pactum. Thus, it was not an exaggeration when Witsius argued that the notion was “not new”—Jerome clearly offered the same conception, and various medieval theologians interpreted the text as comprising the christological implication.

2.3.1.3. Early Modern Exegesis of Zechariah 6:13 in Support of the Pactum Salutis

In the early modern biblical exegesis, the various interpretations that Jerome and

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182 Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria Biblica: Super ad Hebraeos, Capitulus 7, Lectio 4. “Ier. XXXI, 31: feriam domui Iuda foedus novum, non secundum pactum quod pepigi, etc. . .”

183 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.8.
medieval theologians offered coexisted. In earlier exegeses the first interpretation of Jerome dominated as evidenced by Luther and Calvin. Luther wrote two commentaries on the book of Zechariah—one in Latin (1526) and one in German (1527). In both commentaries he argued that the “two” of Zech 6:13 did not denote the Jews and the Gentiles but indicated “the offices of priest and prince” of Christ. \(^\text{184}\) Calvin argued in his commentary on the Minor Prophets that the prophet here did not refer to different persons who were to be at peace together, and that the prophet spoke of the two offices. “There shall then be the counsel of peace,” according to Calvin’s interpretation, “between the kingly office and the priesthood.” \(^\text{185}\) Calvin’s exegesis tended to carry over into the next several generations of Reformed commentators. For example, the text and annotations of the Geneva Bible and the Tremellius-Junius Bible offer no significant adumbration of the covenant between the Father and the Son at Zechariah 6:13. \(^\text{186}\) Similarly, Lambert Daneau (c.1530-1595) did not relate the verse with the pactum salutis. For him the two men in Zech 6:13 indicated Joshua, who is the type of Messiah, and Christ, who is the true fountain of prophecy. In Christ, argued Daneau, the two offices of the church were


\(^{185}\) John Owen, the editor of John Calvin’s commentary of Zechariah, opines, “There are especially two interpretations of this sentence; the one adopted by Calvin, and also by Jerome, Marckius, Drusius, Dathius, Scott, and Henderson; and the other is, that the ‘two’ are Jehovah, and the Branch or Messiah, and that the ‘throne’ mentioned is the throne of Jehovah. This is the interpretation of Vitringa, Cocceius, Henry, M’Caul, and Adam Clarke.” He, like Calvin, prefers the first interpretation as the most appropriate understanding—the concord and agreement between the kingly office and the priesthood. Although the editor of Calvin’s commentary classifies Jerome’s comment to the first interpretation, Jerome himself did offer the two interpretations as above. Jean Calvin, *Commentaries on the Twelve Minor Prophets*, trans. John Owen (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1950), 5:160n1 (editor’s emphasis).

harmonized. The ministers of the church could expect the glory of Christ in his office, and the glory of God was promoted in the office of Christ. 187 Although Daneau did not appropriate the *pactum salutis* in his comment, it is notable that he regarded the office of Christ as a presentation of the glory of Christ and the glory of God.

William Pemble (c.1591-1623) developed the exposition further. He claimed, against the Jewish exegete David Kimchi, 188 that the counsel of peace refers to a conjoining of the priestly and kingly offices. He expanded the discussion focusing on the “peace.” He argues that Christ purchased all peace for his church according to his priestly office and his maintaining and defending the peace in his kingly office. The peace of the verse, to Pemble, indicated the reconciliation of the church with God accomplished in the offices of Christ. 189 Pemble further spoke of the reconciliation between Christ and God as the active parties in the counsel. In so doing, he opened a door to the possibility of using the text for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. 190 As Muller points out, Burgess probably has endorsed Pemble’s interpretation, and Gillespie cites him directly. 191

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189 Pemble’s exegesis of the verse is very similar to that of Rupertus Tuitiensis (see 2.3.1.2 of this study). Witsius also argues that the peace of the counsel of peace indicates the reconciliation between God and sinners.


191 Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 38. Anthony Burgess, *The True Doctrine of Justification Asserted, and Vindicated, from the Errors of Papists, Arminians, Socinians, and More*
In 1648, both Lodewijk de Dieu and Johannes Cocceius clearly mentioned the Zechariah text as a proof of the **pactum salutis**. Cocceius repeated in his *Summa Theologiae* that the **consilium pacis** was made between Jehovah and the priest, Christ. From then on, the text became relatively prominent in the doctrinal discussions of the **pactum salutis**. However, the significance of Zech 6:13 to the formulation of the **pactum salutis** was not uniformly accepted. For instance, Thomas Goodwin, Francis Turretin, David Dickson, Peter Bulkeley, or Edward Fisher omitted consideration of the text in their discussions of the **pactum**. Many more writers, such as Lodewijk De Dieu, William Pemble, Abraham Heidanus, Johannes Cocceius, Anthony Burgess, John Owen, Patrick Gillespie, Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Wilhelms à Brakel, Herman Witsius, Johannes Marckius, and Campegius Vitringa, Sr., identified it as a major foundation of Especially Antinomians, in XXX Lectures (London: Thomas Underhill, 1654), 376; Gillespie, *The ark of the covenant opened*, i (pp. 6–7).

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194 Zech 6:13 is not cited at all by Goodwin, Dickson, Bulkeley, or Fisher. Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 24, 37, 39. Cf. Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra*, i.iv.47-51; Bulkeley, *Gospel Covenant*, 28-31; Godwin, *Of Christ the Mediator*, i.ix (pp. 27-30); Turretin, *Institutio theologiae elencticae* (Geneva: S. de Tournes, 1679), XII.i.14-15. Turretin suggests that the “two” of Zech 16:13 refers to the kingship and priesthood of Christ the Branch (*Institutes*, XII.v.6, 2:393). Dickson pointed toward an initial formulation of the pactum salutis in his commentary on Hebrews of 1635, but he did not use a specific terminology to denote the doctrine. It seems that Dickson did not use definite terms, such as “foedus redemptionis,” “pactum inter Patrem & Filium,” “the covenant of redemption,” and “the covenant past between the Father and Christ,” until his 1638 “Speech to the General Assembly.” Following the “Speech to the General Assembly,” clear statements of the doctrine are found in his commentaries of Paul’s Epistles of 1645 and at greater length in Matthew commentary of 1647. Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 161.
the doctrine. Witsius dismissed the former interpretation as a forced reading, in which the two offices of Christ were harmonized in the counsel of peace; rather, he took the latter interpretation, in which the counsel of peace would be between the Father and the Son.

John Gill (1697-1771) stands between these two interpretations. In his commentary on Zechariah, Gill argues that the “two” of Zech 6:13 are the kingly and priestly offices of Christ. Later, in his formulation of the doctrine of the pactum salutis, he recognized the dispute over its exegesis and offered two interpretations of the text. He writes:

What would put this matter out of all doubt, is the sense of a passage in Zech. vi. 13. as given by some learned men, if it can be established; “And the counsel of peace shall be between them both”: some, indeed, interpret it of the Kingly and Priestly offices meeting in Christ, and of the unanimity of them in him . . . but there is another sense of them embraced by learned men, to whose judgment I pay a great deference; such as Heidegger, De Dieu, Cocceius, Witsius, Dr. Owen, and others, that this respects the council concerning the peace and reconciliation in eternity, between Jehovah and the Branch, between the Father and the Son, who in time was to become man.

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196 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.8.

197 John Gill, A Complete Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity (London: W. Wintereotham,
Formerly Gill objected to this latter interpretation because “this council in eternity was between the three Persons, and not two only; and that is what is past; whereas this is spoken of as future.” Gill, like Goodwin and Owen, stressed that the three Persons of the Trinity engaged with the *pactum salutis*. That is why he regarded the Zechariah passages as irrelevant to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* since the passage mentioned only “two.” He, however, changes his mind and acknowledges the validity of the interpretation:

> . . . when I consider that Jehovah and the Branch are the only Persons mentioned in the text, and so could only, with propriety, be spoken of, though the council was between the three; and that, in the Hebrew language, tenses are frequently put for one another . . . the sense may be, that when the Man, the Branch, should grow out of his place, and build the temple, and bear the glory, and sit a priest on his throne, *then it should clearly appear, that there had been a council of peace between them both, which was the ground and foundation of all: and in this light, this sense of the passage may be admitted*, and so be a proof of the point under consideration.

Although only two Persons of the Trinity were mentioned in the Zechariah text, one should believe that the *pactum salutis* was between the three Persons of the Trinity. That the text mentions two Persons, argues Gill, was attributed to the context. Yet, it does indicate the *pactum salutis* between the Trinity. Thus, at the end of the day, Gill admits that the passage could be used to uphold the doctrine. In another passage of his book, he

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1796), 1:309. Gill’s system first appeared in two volumes (London, 1769). In the following year Gill added a volume on practical theology. The whole system was reissued under the title, *Complete Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity: or A System of Evangelical Truths Deduced from the Sacred Scriptures*, with Gill’s Dissertation *Of the various sorts of Jewish Proselytes* (London, 1796) in three volumes and has been followed in the present work.

198 For the Spirit’s role in the formulation of the doctrine in Gill, Goodwin, and Owen, see Muller, “The Spirit and the Covenant”; Jones, *Why Heaven Kissed Earth*, 139–44; O’Donnell III, “The Holy Spirit’s Role in John Owen’s ‘Covenant of the Mediator’ Formulation.” Chapter 5 of this study will discuss the topic.

explicitly claims that the counsel of peace of Zech 6:13 was “between the Father and the
Son.”

Among the above early modern theologians who argued for the use of the Zechariah
text for the doctrine of the pactum salutis, Lodewijk de Dieu is noteworthy because
Witsius identified him with Jerome as a major influence on his exegesis of the text. De
Dieu is convinced that although there are various interpretations of the text, it is the
simple and clear exegesis to regard the “two” as the sprout and Jehovah. He argues:

CAP. VI. . . . VERS. 13. And he shall build the temple of Jehovah, and he
himself shall bear majesty, and shall sit and rule in turn, on his
(Jehovah’s) throne & there shall be a Priest by his throne & there shall be the
counsel of peace between the two—certainly the sprout & Jehovah
(nempe Germen & Jehovam). Interpreters tend to render as on his own
throne. They were troubled with the issue who the two would be, between whom
the peace will be. Some will regard them as the Jews and the Gentiles; another
will regard them as king and priest; the other will regard them as the royal
dignity and the priestly dignity. These phrases, between the two, turn to neither
side. Our explication seems simple and clear (simplex . . . & perspicua).

De Dieu admits that many interpreters had difficulty in the exegesis of the text. He offers
the other three options for the exegesis of the “two”: (1) the Jews and the Gentiles; (2)
king and priest; and (3) the royal dignity and the priestly dignity. These three
interpretations, argues de Dieu, cannot get the true meaning of the text. For him, the pair
of the sprout and Jehovah meets the text most satisfactorily inasmuch as it fit the text

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200 Gill, A Complete Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity, 1:95 (cf. 1:328).

simply and clearly.

In conclusion, Witsius’ use of Zechariah 6:13 in his argumentation of the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} did not lack reason. The examination of the history of the exegesis of Zechariah 6:13 helps to understand his identifying it as a proof for the \textit{pactum}. The early modern Reformed theologians based the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} on no single primary scriptural ground such as Zech 6:13. They formulated the doctrine by the collation and mutual interpretation of relevant texts in their argumentation of the doctrine of \textit{pactum salutis}. Yet, the Zechariah text, among other scriptural evidences, played a very important role in the exegetical history of the doctrine since the time of De Dieu and Cocceius. The Zechariah text appeared relatively late as a proof of the \textit{pactum salutis}. It became prominent, however, in the doctrinal discussions of the \textit{pactum salutis} in the works of many seventeenth century Reformed theologians, not only because it had a definite patristic support and medieval background, but because it offered a very clear evidence of the doctrine.\footnote{A more recent scholar who follows the interpretation can be found in Arthur W. Pink, \textit{The Doctrine of Reconciliation} (Mulberry, IN: Sovereign Grace Publishers, 2006), 40.} “Even the use of Zechariah 6:13 is qualified,” as Muller puts it, “given the varied readings of the text in the exegesis of the era.”\footnote{Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 48.} Witsius followed this tradition and tried to expand the discussion more deeply in his exegesis of the text.

\subsection*{2.3.1.4. Modern Exegesis of Zechariah 6:13 in Support of the \textit{Pactum Salutis}}

Marko Jauhiainen argues that the pronominal suffix in Zech 6:13 refers to Branch (\textit{Zemah}) and Yahweh.\footnote{Marko Jauhiainen, “Turban and Crown Lost and Regained: Ezekiel 21:29-32 and Zechariah’s} According to Wolter Rose, there are two most common
interpretations of the text: (1) that this passage envisions a diarchic leadership of the high priest and the Davidic governor/king in Judah; and (2) that the coming ruler Zemah will also function as a priest, and there is “the counsel of peace” between the two offices of ruler and priest. Jauhiainen maintains that the biggest lexical and syntactical problem with the latter proposal is the “two” of the text and the context seem to suggest “two persons rather than offices.” The former view, on the other hand, suffers from a number of other problems. Rose argues above all that the “two” of the text “clearly suggests the presence of two persons.” Rose himself maintains that the priest of the text is merely to offer counsel to the king (rather than co-rule with him), but Jauhiainen repudiates his view in that the view is merely another variant or the “two persons” view. Then, who does the “two” of Zech 6:13 refer to, if not to two offices or to the priest and the Branch? One of them should be the Branch (Zemah). The two verses 12 and 13 mention the Branch and then describe what he will do. The Branch is the subject


209 Rose, *Zemah and Zerubbabel*, 60.

of a total of five imperfective verbs. Thus it is natural to take the first party of the “two” to be the Branch. Regarding the second party, argues Jauhiainen, the “simplest solution” is to “take the other person to be Yahweh, who is not only mentioned twice in the list of things that the Branch will do, but also is the only other person mentioned in vv. 12b-13.” For Jauhiainen, the nearest possible candidate for the second party of the “two” of Zech 6:13 is Yahweh. The context also stands by this interpretation. The counsel of peace between Yahweh and the Branch, as Jauhiainen puts it, is set “in stark contrast to the relationship between Yahweh and the wicked king, who brought about the exile.”

The wicked king lost the turban and the crown, and they will be restored to the coming king, the Branch. According to Al Wolters, Jauhiainen’s exegesis was also defended, but without reference to the pactum salutis, by earlier interpreters such as Charles Wright, William Lowe, Edward Pusey, and David Baron. Wolters prefers the “two offices of

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211 Zechariah 6:12-13 [12] And say to him, “Thus says the LORD of hosts, ‘Behold, the man whose name is the Branch: for he shall branch out from his place, and he shall build the temple of the LORD. [13] It is he who shall build the temple of the LORD and shall bear royal honor, and shall sit and rule on his throne. And there shall be a priest on his throne, and the counsel of peace shall be between them both.’” (Cited from English Standard Version. The bolds are the verbs whose subject is the Branch.)

212 Jauhiainen, “Turban and crown lost and regained,” 509–10. John Owen also writes, “Zech. 6:13. The counsel about peace-making between God and man was ‘between them both;’ that is, the two persons spoken of,—namely, the Lord Jehovah, and he who was to be ‘מָצֵאשׁ שָׁלָוֶם וַתִּהְיֶ֖ה בֵּ֥ין שְׁנֵיהֶֽם, מָצֵ֖אשׁ שָלָוֶם וַתִּהְיֶ֑ה בֵּ֣ין שְׁנֵי֑ם.’” John Owen, An Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews, ed. W. H. Goold, vol. 19, Works of John Owen (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1862), 85.


Christ” view to Jauhiainen’s view, but he also seems sympathetic to the latter interpretation so that he does not offer any objection to it.\textsuperscript{215} Meredith Kline defended the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} from an exegetical perspective, as part of his research into the historical administration of the covenants of works and grace.\textsuperscript{216} He argues that the covenant of Zech 6:13 is a covenant between Yahweh and the messianic Branch. What Zech 6:9-15 prophesies, argues Kline, is “the Father’s fulfillment of the eternal covenant by bestowing the promised kingdom grant on the Son who came to earth as Jesus, the Christ of God, the son of David, the son of Abraham (Matt 1:1), and obediently carried out the stipulated task.”\textsuperscript{217} Two figures mentioned at the beginning of the verse are the Branch and Yahweh. There shall be a priest on Yahweh’s throne. The emphasis of the verse lies upon the work that the Branch will build Yahweh’s temple. The Branch does a great work for Yahweh, and Yahweh bestows honor upon the Branch. The main focus of this verse does not lie on abstract notions of \textit{kingship} or \textit{priesthood}, but on the

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  \item[\textsuperscript{216}] Meredith G. Kline, \textit{Kingdom Prologue: Genesis Foundations for a Covenantal Worldview} (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006), 145. According to this book (section 2.1), the major divisions of the administration of God’s kingdom are twofold: the Covenant of Creation and the Covenant of Redemption. Within the Covenant of Creation (traditionally called the Covenant of Works) there is the Covenant with Adam and the subsequent Covenant of Confirmation. For there to be divine favor for humankind after Adam’s fall there is another covenant, the Covenant of Redemption (traditionally called the Covenant of Grace). Here again, Kline distinguishes between two separate covenants: first, the Covenant with Christ in eternity (the Counsel of Peace or the \textit{pactum salutis}) and, second, the Covenant of Conferment. Some modern scholars (such as Kline, Beale, Gunton, and Karlberg) tend to use the term, “the covenant of redemption,” to denote the traditional notion of the covenant of grace. Gregory K. Beale and James Bibza, “The New Testament: The Covenant of Redemption in Jesus Christ,” in \textit{Building a Christian World View} (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub Co, 1986), 49–70; Colin E. Gunton, \textit{Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Essays Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology} (London: T & T Clark, 2003), 136; Mark W. Karlberg, \textit{Covenant Theology in Reformed Perspective: Collected Essays and Book Reviews in Historical, Biblical, and Systematic Theology} (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2000), 47, 50, 61, and passim.
  \item[\textsuperscript{217}] Kline, \textit{Glory in Our Midst}, 222.
\end{itemize}
concrete *persons* of Father and Son. Many modern biblical scholars are convinced that the compelling interpretation of Zach 6:13 remains that a counsel of peace exists between Yahweh and the Branch. It can be argued, therefore, that Witsius’ exegesis of Zech 6:13 could still find the same or similar voices among modern biblical scholarship.

2.3.2. Analysis of Witsius’ Exegesis of Galatians 3:16-20

2.3.2.1. Early Modern Exegesis of Galatians 3:16-20 in Support of the *Pactum Salutis*

Galatians 3:17, to Witsius, is a primary evidence for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. From the perspective of early modern exegetical history, Witsius’ interpretation of Galatians 3:16-17 is, as Muller puts it, another example of “the creation of significant doctrinal associations by a revision and re-translation of the text.” The covenant of this verse, as Loonstra argues, seems to indicate the Abrahamic covenant. For Witsius, however, the contracting parties of the covenant are God and Christ. It should be noted that following Erasmus and almost all of the early modern Reformed theologians, Witsius reads Gal 3:17 as a certain “διαθήκη” (*covenant*, or *testament*) was confirmed “before of God in Christ.” Thus the verse is rendered as “the covenant,

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218 Cf. VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 188.

219 Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 44.


221 Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond*, 189–90.

222 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.5; Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 41.
that was confirmed to Abraham before of God in Christ” (testamentum illud - quod Abrahae deus confirmavit in Christo), as in the Authorized Version.223

The crucial phrase, “in Christ,” was not in the Vulgate, but Reformed theologians of the sixteenth century added it because they found the phrase “εἰς Χριστοῦ” in the codices that they viewed to be the best Greek codices. Owen, Goodwin, and Cocceius also read that the covenant was made “before of God in Christ.”224 The Greek text which Witsius read included “εἰς Χριστοῦ” after “θεοῦ” as the Textus Receptus, following the later uncials and most minuscules (Dgr Cgr Ivid K 0176 88 614 2127 2495 Byz Lect arm al).225

In this revision and re-translation of the text, Witsius’ interpretation is not unnatural or forced. Muller points out that early modern Reformed theologians such as Calvin, Perkins, Rollock, Diodati, and Dickson stood along a similar line with Witsius in their exegesis of the Galatians text.226 Calvin also renders the verse as “However, I say this: The law, introduced 430 years later, does not set aside the covenant (pactum) previously established by God toward Christ (erga Christum) and thus do away with the promise

223 Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, II.2.5.

224 Goodwin, The Works of Thomas Goodwin, 6:54, 282, 9:423; Owen, The Works of John Owen (1862), 11:227, 12:361; Cocceius, Summa Doctrinae, 89, 230. Owen calls the covenant promises in Gal 3:17 “gospel promises, not as though they were only contained in the books of the New Testament, or given only by Christ after his coming in the flesh — for they were given from the beginning of the world, or first entrance of sin.” Owen, The Works of John Owen (1862), 11:227. Owen, however, does not relate the covenant of Gal 3:17 to the pactum.

225 Bruce Metzger writes, “Apparently the interpretative gloss was added in order to introduce into the argument a reference to Χριστοῦ of the preceding verse. The shorter text is strongly supported by Ψ46 Ψ56 A B C P 33 81 1739 Old Latin vg cop Aeth.” Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (New York, NY: Deutsche Biblegesellschaft, 2002), 525. For the abbreviations, refer to the abbreviations and textual apparatus of Metzger’s book.

226 Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 41–44.
Calvin notes that the singular “seed” indicates Christ, and that Christ is “the foundation of the agreement” between God and Abraham. Perkins extended the exegesis and saw the singular seed as “first and principally the Mediatour.” This mediatorship is grounded in an eternal counsel: “The Sonne of God takes not to himselfe the office of a Mediatour, but he is called and sent forth of his Father: whereby two things are signified; one, that the office of a Mediatour was appointed of the Father; the other, that the Sonne was designed to this office in the eternall counsel of the blessed Trinitie.” Rollock comments on Gal 3:16 that the covenant is made with respect to Christ. He argues that “the promise is therefore both made by Christ and made in Christ as he is mediator, for unless he had interceded as mediator between God and man from the beginning, truly, that covenant of grace would never have been concluded with humanity.” Although the term pactum salutis is not found here, it is clear that the covenant promise was made with respect to Christ as mediator and its eternal foundation. In his Annotations, Diodati does offer a formulation

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227 “hoc autem dico, pactum ante comprobatum a Deo erga Christum, lex quae post annos quadringentos et triginta coepit, non facit irritum, ut abroget promissionem.” Calvin, Commentaries on Galatians, 3:16-17, in loc. (Calvin Translation Society, Galatians, 94-96).

228 Calvin, Commentaries on Galatians, 3:16-17, in loc.

229 William Perkins, A Commentarie, or Exposition upon the five first Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians (London: John Legatt, 1617), 3:16 (p. 183).

230 Perkins, A Commentarie, or Exposition upon the five first Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians, 4:6 (p. 247).

of the eternal *pactum*. He claims, “[In Christ] That is, of which covenant Christ already appointed and promised for a Mediatour, was the onely foundation, known and apprehended by the fathers.”

Dickson’s exegesis of the Galatians passage is not so illustrative. He argues, however, that the *pactum* between God and Abraham is concluded “with respect to Christ,” and it has been confirmed “by a testamentary sacrifice” (*per sacrificium testamentario*). The promise of the *pactum* represents a covenant not subject to the mutation of the law because it is the *Dei absoluta promissio*. Therefore, Witsius’ exegesis of Galatians 3:16-20 stands along the lines of the interpretative tradition to which he belonged. The argument depends on the phrase “εἰς Χριστόν” in Gal 3:17. In more recent exegesis, however, the text is used to argue the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* with the text which omits the phrase “εἰς Χριστόν” as will be explained in the next section.

2.3.2.2. Modern Exegesis of Galatians 3:16-20 in Support of the *Pactum Salutis*

Roger T. Beckwith declares the attempt to carry the idea of a covenant between God the Father and Son as a doubtful interpretations of Galatians 3:16f. New Testament scholar, Steven M. Baugh, however, argues that Gal 3:20 points to the “eternal,

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233 Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 176.


intratrinitarian covenant.” He agrees with Hoeksema that statements like Isa 49:8 “do not directly identify a covenant between the Father, the pre-incarnate Son, and the Holy Spirit, but are really directed to Christ in his incarnate existence as covenant mediator.” He maintains that Ps 110:4 and Gal 3:20 are two scriptural passages which have not traditionally been connected with the pactum salutis doctrine that present interesting possibilities. He attempts to show that “the pactum salutis is the capstone for Paul’s argument in Gal 3:15-22, specifically in v. 20.”

Modern scholars have consensus in that the three verses of Gal 3:19-20 are “among the most difficult in Paul.” Richard Longenecker says that there are 430 different interpretations of this one verse. One majority view is that in vv. 19-20 Paul offers an

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236 Baugh, “Galatians 3:20 and the Covenant of Redemption,” 49–70. Geoffrey Bromiley’s translation chose the term “intertrinitarian” to render Barth’s “inner-trinitarisch” and “innergöttlich.” Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, IV/l (Zurich: EVZ, 1953), 66-70; ET, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, vol. IV/l (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 63-66. Baugh, however, prefers the term “intratrinitarian” to “intertrinitarian” because the term “intertrinitarian” can denote something among various trinities. I use both terms interchangeably, believing nobody would misunderstand the meaning of “intratrinitarian.” Hereafter, Barth’s Kirchliche Dogmatik and Church Dogmatics are abbreviated as KD and CD. Sometimes I will correct the English translations of CD to make the meaning of the original German text clearer.


241 Richard Longenecker, Galatians, Word Biblical Commentary 41 (Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1990), 141. Longenecker derived the number from the 430 years in Gal 3:17.
argument for the “inferiority” of the Torah to the Abrahamic promises. Baugh, however, argues that this is not the point of the text. Rather, he is convinced that Paul asserts here the Mosaic law’s “inability” to mediate the promises of God’s covenant. Baugh writes, “These promises are based upon an *eternal, intratrinitarian covenant* which cannot be mediated.” To argue the point, he maintains that v. 20 should be read in connection with the whole passage of vv. 15-22 to take the trinitarian implications presented in this passage seriously. Baugh summarizes his argument:

> In a nutshell, when Paul says, “Now a mediator is not [mediator] for one party, whereas God is one,” he is arguing that the law, represented by its mediator, Moses, *cannot* mediate the promise made to Abraham and to his seed, because the promisor, God the Father, and the promisee, God the Son who would come as Messianic Seed, are one in the divine Being. The Father made his promissory oath to the covenant Head in whom all his promises are refracted (2 Cor 1:19-20). And until that One should come into the world, no third party could intervene, because the first two parties to this transaction—the *pactum salutis*—are actually one in inseparable divinity.

The promise made to Abraham and to his seed represents the content of the *pactum salutis* in which God the Father is the promisor, and God the Son is the promisee, who would come as the promised messianic seed. Baugh offers his exegesis of vv. 15-20 to support his view.

In Gal 3:15, argues Baugh, the “no one” refers to someone other than the testator in

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242 Riesenfeld, “The misinterpreted mediator in Gal 3,” 409; Callan, Jr., “The Law and the Mediator,” 2. N. T. Wright does not follow this view but acknowledges that it is the predominant opinion. Wright, “The Seed and the Mediator: Galatians 3.15-20,” 159.


245 Baugh, “Galatians 3:20 and the Covenant of Redemption,” 54 (author’s emphasis).
Paul’s analogy.\textsuperscript{246} Just as no one can set aside or add to a human covenant (\textit{diatheke}) that has been duly established, so it is in the case of the Abrahamic promises. The singular “seed” of Gal 3:16 means the “Messianic Seed.” Baugh rejects to apply the idea of “corporate solidarity” to interpret the verse.\textsuperscript{247} For example, Longenecker claims, “The apostle is not just forcing a generic singular into a specific mold [in Gal 3:16]. . . . Rather, he is invoking a corporate solidarity understanding of the promise to Abraham and the true representative of his people, and the Messiah’s elect ones, as sharers in his experiences and his benefits, are seen as the legitimate inheritors of God’s promises.”\textsuperscript{248} N. T. Wright also takes Χριστός of Gal 3:16 as referring both to Jesus of Nazareth and to the unified people of God at the same time. He calls the second of these the “incorporative” meaning of Christ.\textsuperscript{249} Baugh contends, however, that this suggestion has “serious linguistic problems vis-à-vis James Barr’s ‘illegitimate totality transfer’ not to mention the theological pitfalls.”\textsuperscript{250} He suggests that the solidarity between Christ and his people is a “covenant solidarity” between the federal surety, mediator, or head with his people which is so fundamental to covenant theology (Rom 5:12-21; Heb 7:22). Baugh contends that “Christ is for Paul the center of all of God’s promises, who, in the

\textsuperscript{246} Baugh, “Galatians 3:20 and the Covenant of Redemption,” 57.


\textsuperscript{248} Richard Longenecker, \textit{Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period} (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 124.

\textsuperscript{249} Wright, “The Seed and the Mediator: Galatians 3.15-20,” 170n54.

\textsuperscript{250} Baugh, “Galatians 3:20 and the Covenant of Redemption,” 53n17.
eternal counsel of God was foreknown to be the Seed to come.”

He sees the “seed” in Gal 3:16 as “referring ultimately to Christ as the fundamental Promisee of the Abrahamic covenant.” In Gal 3:17-18, argues Baugh, Paul contrasts faith and law as two mutually exclusive options for receiving the inheritance. The fundamental purpose of the law cannot be the basis for reception of the eternal inheritance because the law is said to be added for the sake of transgressions (Gal 3:19). Paul does not disparage the law because it was given by mediation of angelic authentication; rather, he just points to the inability of the Mosaic law to give the eternal inheritance. The Mosaic law was looking forward to “the time of fulfillment in the Seed, until the faith in that Seed should be revealed (3:19c and 23).” In Gal 3:20 Paul writes, “A mediator, however, does not represent just one party; but God is one.” Baugh takes a “mediator” in v. 20 as a generic noun and regards the referent of “mediator” is Moses. He contends that Moses could be a mediator when a covenant is concluded between two parties, but that a mediator is not employed when there is only one party in the transaction, which is the intratrinitarian covenant. For Baugh, Paul’s clinching argument is:

Moses, as mediator, has to be viewed as a kind of third party to the disposition between the Father and the Seed-to-come. . . . The law of Moses did not mediate the promised inheritance because the promise to Abraham ultimately originates

in a divine promissory agreement between the Father and the Son who was to come (v. 19). No one can mediate between these two parties to the covenantal agreement, for they are both members of the one, triune God. They are not, in fact, two separate parties, but represent the one God originating and effecting our redemption.\(^\text{257}\)

The intratrinitarian arrangement cannot be nullified or even mediated by a human agency because it was made between the members of the Triune God, and God is one. Baugh does not here deny the mediation of the new covenant by Christ (e.g., 2 Cor 1:20). The incarnate Son of God is the one mediator between God and man (1 Tim 2:5), argues Baugh, but the *pactum salutis* has no such mediation.\(^\text{258}\) He distinguishes between the *pactum salutis* and the new covenant. He agrees with Louis Berkhof that the *pactum salutis* was a “covenant of works” for the Second Adam, because the Son came with the obligation to personally and perfectly fulfill the work specified in the intratrinitarian compact (John 17:4-5).\(^\text{259}\) This formulation, to Baugh, provides the theological basis for the imputation of the active obedience of Christ to the believer.\(^\text{260}\)

To recapitulate briefly, Galatians 3:16-20 can be used to uphold the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. As Baugh convincingly argues, the passage presupposes the notion of


\(^{259}\) Baugh, “Galatians 3:20 and the Covenant of Redemption,” 68. Louis Berkhof, *Systematic Theology*, 268 reads “Though the covenant of redemption is the eternal basis of the covenant of grace, and as far as sinners are concerned, also its eternal prototype, it was for Christ a covenant of works rather than a covenant of grace. For Him the law of the original covenant applied, namely, that eternal life could only be obtained by meeting the demands of the law. As the last Adam Christ obtains eternal life for sinners in reward for faithful obedience, and not at all as an unmerited gift of grace. And what He has done as the Representative and Surety of all His people, they are no more in duty bound to do. The work has been done, the reward is merited, and believers are made partakers of the fruits of Christ’s accomplished work through grace” (bolds mine).

\(^{260}\) Baugh, “Galatians 3:20 and the Covenant of Redemption,” 68–69. VanDrunen and Clark argue along these lines that “the *pactum salutis* provides an essential part of the biblical and theological context for the doctrine of active obedience and hence the doctrine of justification.” VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 169.
*pactum* between the Father and the Son. Moses cannot mediate the promise made to Abraham and to his seed because both the promisor and the promisee are one in this eternal intratrinitarian transaction (Gal 3:20). Those who do not assume the idea of *pactum* cannot fully interpret the passage. Thus, Witsius’ argument for the *pactum salutis* based on Galatians 3:16ff does not lack exegetical propriety among modern biblical scholarship.

2.4. Conclusion: The Hermeneutical Strategy for the Doctrine of the *Pactum Salutis*

Besides the two key texts (i.e., Zechariah 6:13 and Galatians 3:16-20), the Johannine texts that Witsius considers as significant for the *pactum* doctrine are interpreted by modern interpreters as indicating the *pactum salutis*. For example, Andreas J. Köstenberger and Scott R. Swain argue that the elements of the *pactum salutis*, properly understood, are “present both implicitly and explicitly in Jesus’ high-priestly prayer and elsewhere in John’s Gospel.”

They elaborate further on this idea with John’s Gospel: “the Son comes into the world on a mission he received from the Father before he came into the world (3:19; 6:38; 10:36; 17:2, 4 etc.); the Son acts representatively on behalf of the people given him by the Father (10:11; 15:1-17; 17:1-26 etc.); the Son has received from the Father the promise of eschatological glory and vindication upon the completion of his mission (1:33; 12:28; 17:2-5, 24-26 etc.).” The doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, for Köstenberger and Swain, assumes that the one who makes petitions to the Father in the high-priestly prayer (John 17) is none other than the Son of God incarnate, and that

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261 Köstenberger and Swain, *Father, Son and Spirit*, 169.

262 Köstenberger and Swain, *Father, Son and Spirit*, 170.
everything he does is a true revelation of the life of love, promise, and fidelity he eternally shares with the Father in the Spirit. Köstenberger and Swain conclude:

In other words, the *pactum salutis* teaches us that the story which unfolds on the stage of history is the story of an intra-trinitarian fellowship of salvation, a fellowship that reaches back ‘before the world began’ (17:5) and that continues even to the hour’ of Jesus’ cross, resurrection and ascension (17:1). In this regard, the claim that the *pactum salutis* is eternal is not so much a claim about ‘eternity past’ as about eternal persons, persons whose fellowship remains unbroken throughout the course of redemption and thus guarantees that redemption. . .

The interpretation of Köstenberger and Swain is very consistent with Witsius’ understanding of John 17 in relation to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Witsius also considers that John 17 comprises the substantial content of the *pactum salutis* between the Father and the Son. Thus, in their trinitarian reading of the Fourth Gospel, Köstenberger and Swain fully champion Witsius’ exegesis in support of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.

The exegetical development of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was based on the method of cross-referencing and collation of various scriptural texts, which was a common pattern of the Reformed Orthodox era. The exegetical development of the

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265 Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.2.10, II.3.2, and II.3.29.

doctrine was also attributed to the creation of significant doctrinal associations by a revision and re-translation of the texts such as Luke 22:29 and Gal 3:17. In Witsius’ covenant theology, many scriptural texts are read as a reference to the doctrine of the pactum salutis and are arranged in an ordered exegetical strategy. To support the doctrine, Witsius starts from key scriptural verses (i.e., Luke 22:29, Gal 3:17, Heb 7:22, Ps 119:122, Isa 38:14, Jer 30:21, and Zech 6:13) and then, like a skillful weaver, interweaves referencing verses. He extracts main doctrinal themes—the pactum salutis and surety of Christ—from directly relevant texts and offers reference texts which are connected to the doctrinal themes. From these indirectly related verses he also supports the doctrine of the pactum salutis. Witsius does not ignore the increased emphasis placed on various texts in the era of early orthodoxy, and he also refers to patristic exegesis and medieval conceptions. The exegetical discussion of the doctrine is extended along this gradual progressive interweaving of correlated biblical texts. Given the careful marshalling of such a careful exegetical arguments to establish the doctrine, it is quite clear that to characterize Witsius’ exegesis as dogmatically driven or as proof-texting would be to do him a profound injustice. Although the current study is based on a small sample of scriptural texts such as Gal 3:17, Zech 6:13, and John 17, the findings clearly show that modern exegesis stands by the exegetical conclusion of Witsius. Taken together, it should be concluded that the doctrine of the pactum salutis does have biblical evidences.
CHAPTER 3
THE PACTUM SALUTIS AND THE TRINITY: JOHN OWEN

3.1. Modern Critique of the Pactum Salutis as Tritheism

This chapter deals with the relationship between the doctrines of the pactum salutis and the Trinity in the theology of John Owen. It will answer these questions. What is the basic structure of Owen’s doctrine of the Trinity? What are the doctrines of inseparable operations and terminus operationis? What are Owen’s terminology and formulation of the pactum salutis? How are the two doctrines of inseparable operations and terminus operationis appropriated in Owen’s doctrine of the pactum salutis? How does Owen endorse the two notions of habitude and mutual in-being in his pactum doctrine? This chapter will show that the doctrine of the pactum salutis in Owen’s theology is not only consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity, but it is an excellent model for the understanding of the Trinity.

The doctrine of the pactum salutis has been harshly criticized as tritheism.1 Those who argue for the doctrine have also pointed out the danger. Abraham Kuyper, for

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1 “Tritheism” means that God is three persons, with no unity of essence. According to tritheism, there are three consciousnesses and hence three intellects and three wills, in God. “Sabellianism (or modalism)” means that there is only one person in God who represents himself in the roles of three persons. According to Sabellianism, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are three modes in which the one God acts in history, but there is no real distinction among them. Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 2004), 132–36. See also Peter Phan’s definition in Peter C. Phan, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 20 (tritheism), 6 (Sabellianism). On the two errors of tritheism and Sabellianism in relation to trinitarian orthodoxy, see Muller, PRD, 4:190–91. For recent studies of the pactum salutis, see notes 3 and 86 of chapter 1 of this study.
example, has asked an important question with respect to the criticism: “Now we are faced with the question how—if from eternity there was indeed a *constitutio mediatoris*—that could have happened without ending up in tritheism. If that *pactum salutis* existed in eternity, would not then the equality be a fiction, and is it then still possible to speak of the equality of being between Father and Son? Does that not compel us—willy-nilly—to give up the idea of the Trinity?”² Kuyper answers these questions and contends that we “are fully justified to carry the concept of the *foedus*, the *pactum*, into the intra-divine life.”³ Although he anticipates that the doctrine might be construed as tritheistic, Kuyper argues that it does not require an uncertainty and disparity among the divine persons. Rather, the *pactum salutis* belongs “to the necessary manifestations of God’s essence” and is “directly and absolutely based in the essence and the attributes of God.”⁴ Klaas Schilder warns against the easy ascription to God of forms of human agreements. In that case one can fall into the danger of tritheism. The transaction of the Trinity in the *pactum salutis* is totally different from a human agreement or contract because “it is without beginning and therefore at the same time a being together from and for eternity.”⁵ G. C. Berkouwer also opines that the danger of the tritheistic formulation is not at all imaginary, and that many scholars deal with the issue in their discussion of

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² Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*, 3:89. The translation was cited from Berkouwer, *Divine Election*, 163.

³ Kuyper, *Dictaten dogmatiek*, 3:90. The translation was cited from Beach, “The Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis in the Covenant Theology of Herman Witsius,” 116.


the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.⁶

Some modern theologians tend to repudiate the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* inasmuch as it leads to tritheism. Robert Letham avers that the doctrine introduces elements of subordinationism with respect to the Son and contains tendencies to tritheism.⁷ In his other book, he has problems with the *pactum salutis* because tritheistic tendencies have been noticed in the doctrine.⁸ “For all the good intentions of those who proposed it [the covenant of redemption],” argues Letham, “the construal of the relations of the three persons of the Trinity in covenantal terms is a departure from classic Trinitarian orthodoxy.”⁹ G. H. Kersten also argues that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* could make a separation between the persons of the Godhead to form two parties.¹⁰ Kersten argues that “between the Persons of the Godhead, considered in themselves, no

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⁶ Berkouwer, *Divine Election*, 164. David VanDrunen and R. Scott Clark write, “Berkouwer also criticizes the doctrine as tending to tritheism by confusing the economic and ontological distinction.” They contend that Berkouwer detracts and rejects the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. VanDrunen and Clark, *The Covenant Before the Covenants*, 194–95. Their charges, however, miss the point of Berkouwer’s discussions of the doctrine. Berkouwer just offers some dogmatic difficulties in defending the doctrine. In conclusion, Berkouwer argues that the *pactum salutis* does not yield an abstract doctrine of election and must be guarded against such abstraction. Berkouwer, *Divine Election*, 170–71. By contrast, Geerhardus Vos points out that those who repudiate the *pactum* doctrine because of its tritheistic tendency could lead to Sabellianism. “To push unity [of the Trinity] so strongly that the persons can no longer be related to one another judicially,” maintains Vos, “would lead to Sabellianism and would undermine the reality of the entire economy of redemption with its person to person relationships.” Vos, *The Doctrine of the Covenant in Reformed Theology,* 246. On the same page, Vos writes, “One should consider what Owen brings to bear in removing this objection in his work on the epistle to the Hebrews (*Exercitation XXVIII*, 1, 13; cf. Brakel, *Redelijke Godsdienst*, VII, 3).” Thus it is permissible for Vos to juxtapose the undivided will of God with entering into judicial relations in the *pactum salutis*.⁶


⁹ Letham, *The Westminster Assembly*, 236. Letham also writes, “My point is that the covenant of redemption opened the door to Trinitarian heresy.” He, however, argues that Owen “recognized the dangers” and “wrote of the will of God in its particular manifestation in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit” (Owen, *Works*, 19:87-90). He does not elaborate on Owen’s formulation of the covenant of redemption.

covenant can be established.” Most notoriously, Karl Barth rejects the doctrine as mythology. In an influential excursus on federal theology he asks provocatively: “Can we really think of the first and second persons of the triune Godhead as two divine subjects and therefore as two legal subjects who can have dealings and enter into obligations with one another?” He argues that one should “not regard the divine persons of the Father and the Son as partners in question, but only the one God—Father, Son and Holy Spirit—as the one partner, and the reality of human beings as distinct from God as the other.” For Barth, “a wider dualism” (eine weitere Dualismus) would be introduced into the Godhead if the covenant of grace were based on a pact between two divine persons. Thus, argues Barth regarding the doctrine of the pactum salutis, “This

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11 Kersten, De Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 197–98; Kersten, Reformed Dogmatics, 144. “Ten andere dient men wel te verstaan, dat tusschen de Personen Gods, op Zichzelf aangemerkt, geen verbondssluiting kan plaats hebben” (Kersten’s emphasis). It is not clear why Loonstra on the one hand rejects the idea of immanent trinitarian covenantal life (suggested by Herman Bavinck and Klaas Schilder) without much ado and on the other hand still wants to speak of a covenant of redemption. Loonstra, Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond, 336, 342.

12 Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, IV/1:69–70; Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1:65–66. Hereafter, Barth’s Kirchliche Dogmatik and Church Dogmatics are abbreviated as KD and CD. Sometimes I will correct the English translations of CD to make the meaning of the original German text clearer.

13 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65.

14 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65. “. . . so kommen als dessen Partner jedenfalls nicht die göttlichen Personen des Vaters auf der einen und des Sohnes auf der anderen Seite in Frage, sondern nur der eine Gott--Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist--auf der einen und die von Gott verschiedene Wirklichkeit des Menschen auf der andern Seite.”

15 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65. VanDrunen and Clark sharply point out that Barth “did not seem to see the irony of claiming to uphold the Reformed tradition concerning ‘modes of being’ (a groundless assertion) and his rejection of one of the principal expressions of the Reformed doctrine of the Trinity, the pactum salutis.” VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 177. Mark Beach also criticizes Barth and writes, “Perhaps the question is indicative of Barth’s own modalistic predilections regarding the Trinity. In any case, for Barth, the one God as single subject—Father, Son and Holy Spirit—is the one partner in a covenantal relationship, with man as the other partner.” Beach, “The Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis in the Covenant Theology of Herman Witsius,” 105. It is probable that Barth has problems with the doctrine of the pactum salutis because of the monotheistic and actualistic tendency of his theology. For a criticism of Barth’s “trinitarian monarchy,” see Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: the Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 139–44.
is mythology, for which there is no place in a right understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity as the doctrine of the three modes of being of the one God, which is how it was understood and presented in Reformed orthodoxy itself.” He is convinced that in the doctrine the question is necessarily raised of the will of the Father, which originally and basically is different from the will of the Son. In so doing, Barth points out that the doctrine of the pactum salutis produces the danger of tritheism.

The greatest fault of the above critiques is that they do not really interact with the best from Reformed tradition on the issue. Many of the formulators of the doctrine were deeply conscious of the tritheism problem, and they offered their own biblical and traditionary solution for the problem. A historical case can be made, as Michael Horton puts it, that the doctrine of the pactum salutis remained firmly in place when a robust Trinitarian faith flourished in Reformed circles. Horton suggests that “in Reformed circles at least, the pactum salutis and Trinitarian dogma were inextricably connected,” and that “where this rubric was lost, ignored, or rejected, rigor mortis set in, and eventually the Trinity itself was either marginalized or rejected in the faith and practice of

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10 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65. “Das ist Mythologie, für die es in einem richtigen Verständnis der Trinitätslehre als der Lehre von den drei Seinsweisen Gottes, wie sie auch von der reformierten Orthodoxie verstanden und vorgetragen wurde, keinen Rückhalt gibt.”

17 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65. “Vor allem ein vom Willen des Sohnes eigentlich und im Grunde verschiedener Wille Gottes des Vaters mußte ernstlich da in Frage kommen. . .”

18 A detailed study of the issue can be found in Rinse Reeling Brouwer, “Karl Barth’s Encounter with the Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius: Prejudices, Criticisms, Outcomes and Open Questions,” Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 4 (2010): 160–208. For meaningful defenses against Barth’s critique of the pactum salutis, see Köstenberger and Swain, Father, Son and Spirit, 170; Trueman, “From Calvin to Gillespie on Covenant”; Trueman, “The Harvest of Reformation Mythology?” Horton argues that “the dominance of the one Lord over the three persons is the principal reason for his [Barth’s] objection to the notion of an intratrinitarian covenant of redemption.” Horton, The Christian Faith, 321..

19 Horton, Covenant and Salvation, 132.
the churches.”\textsuperscript{20} Although many modern scholars have tritheistic problems with the doctrine, theologians like Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius certainly did not see things that way, and their expositions of the doctrine were reflective of their deep trinitarian concerns.\textsuperscript{21} John Owen among others makes it very clear that the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} does not tend to tritheism. For Owen the doctrine is clearly consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity.

3.2. Owen’s Doctrines of the Trinity and the \textit{Pactum Salutis}

3.2.1. Owen, the Theologian of the Trinity

John Owen suffered no shortage of renown then or now. Even his foes thought highly of him. In \textit{The Presbyterian Pater Noster} (1681) it reads: “I Believe in John Calvin, the Father of our Religion. . . . and in Owen, Baxter, and Jenkins &c. his dear Sons our Lords, who were Conceived by the \textit{Spirit of Fanaticism}, born of \textit{Schism} and \textit{Faction}.”\textsuperscript{22} This spoof on the Creed signals paradoxically the height of esteem of Owen in his time. The strength of the theology of Owen lies in its biblical preciseness, doctrinal thoroughness, and pastoral usefulness.\textsuperscript{23} One of the most fascinating elements of Owen’s theology is its trinitarian character. Many modern scholars, such as Sinclair B. Ferguson, Carl Trueman, Kelly Kapic, Brian Kay, and Peter de Vries, argue that the doctrine of the Trinity was

\textsuperscript{20} Horton, \textit{Covenant and Salvation}, 132.

\textsuperscript{21} Beeke and Jones, \textit{A Puritan Theology}, 256–57n154.


crucial in Owen’s theology. Ferguson calls Owen “a deeply Trinitarian theologian.”

Trueman argues, “Throughout his works—whether those dealing with God, redemption, or justification—the doctrine of the Trinity is always foundational.” Owen himself writes, “Take away, then, the doctrine of the Trinity, and both these are gone; there can be no purpose of grace by the Father in the Son—no covenant for the putting of that purpose in execution: and so the foundation of all fruits of love and goodness is lost to the soul.”

The doctrine of the Trinity is pervasive in the entire works of Owen. One of his major works, *The Death of Death in the Death of Christ* (1647), explains the doctrine of limited atonement based on the doctrine of the Trinity. In the *Vindiciae Evangelicae*, or the *Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated and Socinianism Examined* (1655), Owen repudiates John Biddle, the early English Unitarian, and defends the doctrine of the Trinity with

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27 Owen, *Works*, 16:341. In this work, when Owen’s *Works* is cited, Goold’s 24-volume numbering of the 1682 edition is basically used, in which volume 17 is Owen’s Latin works.

various scriptural verses. Editing his sermons that are preached to the Coggeshall congregation for six years, he produced another book on the Trinity, *On Communion with God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, each Person Distinctly* (1657). In his massive *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (1668-84), Owen deals with the doctrine of the Trinity in many places. Owen’s trinitarian ideas are also distilled in his mature and short work, *A Brief Declaration and Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity* (1669). There are other works which are devoted to the doctrine of the Trinity: *On the Person of Christ, Meditations and Discourses on the Glory of Christ, Discourse on the Holy Spirit, On the Work of the Holy Spirit in Prayer, On the Holy Spirit and His Work*. In his *The Doctrine of Justification by Faith* he relates the Trinity with the imputation of Christ’s righteousness in the doctrine of justification.

### 3.2.2. Owen’s Doctrines of the Trinity and the Doctrine of Inseparable Operations

#### 3.2.2.1. A Recent Discussion of Owen’s Doctrine of the Trinity and the Doctrine of Inseparable Operations

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30 Owen, *Works*, 2:3-274. For a good discussion of the issue, see Chapter 6, “John Owen on Communion with the Triune God” (co-authored by Paul Smalley), in Beeke and Jones, *A Puritan Theology*, 101–16. In his lesser catechism, Owen defines “person” as “a distinct manner of subsistence or being, distinguished from the other persons by its own properties.” These distinguishing properties are as follows: The Father is the “only fountain of the Godhead” (John 5:26, 27; Eph. 1:3); the Son is “begotten of his Father from eternity” (Ps. 2:7; John 1:14; 3:16); the Spirit is said “to proceed from the Father and the Son” (John 14:17; 16:14; 15:26; 20:22). Owen, *Works*, 1:472.


Recent discussion of Owen’s doctrine of the Trinity tends to center around the issue of whether his formulation of the doctrine deviated from the Augustinian-Thomistic tradition—especially from the doctrine of inseparable operations (Opus Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa). Following Augustine and Aquinas, the Western theological tradition in the medieval and reformation eras held the view that the external works of the Trinity are undivided. It would be impossible in any external work for one of the divine persons to will and to do one thing and another of the divine persons to will and do another, because the Godhead is one in essence, one in knowledge, and one in will. Some scholars, for example Alan Spence and Brian Kay, argue that there is a significant tension between Owen’s trinitarian theology and the Augustinian-Thomistic doctrine of inseparable operations. Kay is convinced that there “definitely exists some tension between Owen and this aspect of the Western tradition.” In his influential study of John Owen’s Christology, Spence illustrates the development of the doctrine of the indivisibility of the activity of the divine persons in the thought of Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine. Basil understood the Gospel

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35 Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2006), 213.

36 Kay, Trinitarian Spirituality, 36. The following discussion will mainly treat the argument of Spence because Kay’s discussion heavily depends on him. Kay criticizes particularly the Thomistic doctrine of the Trinity in this vein. From a different perspective, Karl Rahner also criticizes Aquinas that the first tractatus of Aquinas’ doctrine of the Trinity in Summa Theologicae is subjected to the consideration of the unity of the nature of God and thus constitutes a “natural theology,” which prejudices all subsequent reflection upon the Trinity. Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (London: Burns & Oates, 2001), 16. For a defense of Aquinas’ doctrine of the Trinity, see William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 62–78.
account of the Holy Spirit’s works in the life of Christ as demonstrating the conjunction of their activity. In the work of Gregory of Nazianzus, the doctrine of the indivisibility was also to be formulated, which made the action of the three persons totally indistinguishable. Gregory of Nyssa, argues Spence, led the thought toward a critical next step. To Spence, the wording of Basil summarizes the Cappadocian discussion of the doctrine as follows: “Suppose we observe the operations of the Father, of the Son, of the Holy Ghost, to be different from one another, we shall then conjecture, from the diversity of the operations, that the operating natures are also different.”

Spence contends that the idea became a part of Western orthodoxy primarily through the work of Augustine. Augustine endorsed the idea in his understanding of the incarnation when he writes, “just as the Trinity wrought that human form from the Virgin Mary, yet it is the person of the Son alone; for the invisible Trinity wrought the visible person of the Son alone.” Spence maintains that “Augustine thus held the divine action that led to the incarnation as indivisible. The trinitarian persons, then, never act distinctly on the world of our experience.” Augustine was unwilling to grant, argues Spence, the reality of the ad extra acts of the divine persons toward one another. Thus, for Spence,

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37 Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 133–35.
38 Spence, however, does not cite the work of Gregory of Nyssa to demonstrate his assertion. Instead, he quotes Basil’s Letter, 189.6.
40 Augustine, De Trinitate, 2.10.18 (NPNF, First Series, 3:61).
41 Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 135.
Augustine and those within his trinitarian tradition ruled out any dealing of one divine person with another which has respect to the economy of salvation.\textsuperscript{42} Augustine’s development of the doctrine of inseparable operations rendered him unable to see the trinitarian persons acting distinctly on the world.\textsuperscript{43} It is quite interesting to notice that Spence points out that Karl Barth speaks for that tradition when he regards the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} as mythology.\textsuperscript{44} Spence asserts that Barth’s opinion of the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} is one outcome of the doctrine of inseparable operations. In it, argues Spence, the biblical witness to the reality of the relations between the Father, Son, and Spirit in the economy of salvation is ignored as myth.\textsuperscript{45}

The theology of Owen, according to Spence, was no longer wholly committed to the theory of the indivisibility of the divine operations.\textsuperscript{46} Although Owen accepted the doctrine, his epistemology was clearly at odds with the presuppositions of the doctrine.\textsuperscript{47} In Owen’s theology, “the Triune nature of God’s being could only be known through his action among us.”\textsuperscript{48} Thus, the economy reveals the nature of God, and “Karl Rahner stresses the same point.”\textsuperscript{49} The strength of Owen’s trinitarian theology is that, while

\textsuperscript{42} Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 135.
\textsuperscript{43} Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 133–35.
\textsuperscript{44} See the quotes from Barth’s \textit{Church Dogmatics} in the introduction of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{45} Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 135.
\textsuperscript{46} Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 135–37.
\textsuperscript{47} Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 135.
\textsuperscript{48} Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 135.
\textsuperscript{49} Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 135. Spence cites Rahner: “What we have said above shows that the doctrine of the ‘mission’ is from its very nature the starting point of the doctrine of the Trinity. No theology can in principle deny this, because it is a fact of salvation history that we know about
affirming the essential unity of God, it recognized a “real distinction” in the action of the Trinity “not only internally and reciprocally in the inner being of the Godhead as orthodoxy allowed, but also outwardly as they condescend to their particular roles in the economy of salvation.” Spence offers two significant passages for his claim. He presents the first passage to show that for Owen a particular action may be appropriated to one person. As the Son assumes human nature and the Spirit condescends to his office, writes Owen, “Where there is a peculiar condescension of any person unto a work, wherein the others have no concurrence but by approbation and consent.” Spence argues that Owen employed the phrase, “no concurrence but by approbation and consent” from John of Damascus to undermine significantly the doctrine of inseparable operations. In so doing, for Spence, Owen tried to make room for “a real distinction in divine activity, maintaining only the common approval of the persons,” treating the incarnate Son and the sent Spirit as “distinct agents of their own activity.” Spence presents the second passage to argue that Owen makes a distinction in the Trinity’s ad

the Trinity because the Father’s Word has entered our history and has given us his Spirit.” Rahner, The Trinity, 48. Rahner argues that “the economic Trinity is also already the immanent Trinity” (p. 48). Rahner’s Rule—that the economic Trinity is the eternal Trinity—was mainly formulated to protest against the scholastic doctrine of the Trinity whereby the eternal Trinity was expounded in a seemingly rationalistic fashion and the economic Trinity was not considered until many other doctrines had been discussed. For a succinct discussion, see Samuel M. Powell, The Trinity in German Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 207; Phan, The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, 17–18.

50 Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 137. It should be noted that orthodoxy also allowed ad extra distinctions in terms of opera appropriata and the person on whom the act terminates. Muller, PRRD, 4:267–68. See 3.2.3 of this study.

51 Owen, Works, 3:94.

52 Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 131. Part of the problem with Spence’s argument is that John of Damascus’ De fide orthodoxa was used already by Peter Lombard and is embedded in the Western formulation of doctrine since that time. It is so much a part of the Western formulation that it is rather incongruous to claim that it was used to undermine a standard point in doctrine. See 3.3.3.2 of this study.

53 Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 131.
extra works while affirming the indivisibility of the divine activity. He cites Owen’s work:

we must consider a twofold operation of God as three in one. The first hereof is absolute in all divine works whatever; the other respects the economy of the operations of God in our salvation. In those of the first sort, both the working and the work do in common and undividedly belong unto and proceed from each person.⁵⁴

Owen points to the doctrine of inseparable operations in his passage. In the following passages, he deals with the economic work of God. In Spence’s belief, Owen argues that in “those operations which, with respect unto our salvation, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do graciously condescend unto,”⁵⁵ a distinction is apparent in the activity of the trinitarian persons. Advancing his interpretation of Owen, Spence maintains that Christ acts absolutely as God in the asarkos work, but his activity in his office as mediator is that of an agent distinct from the Father.⁵⁶ As a conclusion, he presents that the indivisibility of the external divine works applies to the trinitarian persons only when they are considered as divine persons absolutely and not when they condescend to their particular offices in the work for our salvation.⁵⁷

3.2.2.2. The Doctrines of Inseparable Operations of Augustine and Owen

Spence’s description of Owen is flawed at least on three counts. First, his interpretation of Owen’s text is not quite accurate. Spence develops his opinion with an illustration

⁵⁴ Owen, Works, 3:198.
⁵⁵ Owen, Works, 3:198.
⁵⁶ Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 132.
⁵⁷ Spence, Incarnation and Inspiration, 133.
which is not found in Owen’s text. It should be noted that Owen did not say that in the 
asarkos\ the Son’s work is not distinguished from that of the Father, but that his work as 
mediator is distinguished from that of the Father. Owen did not use at all the term of 
asarkos in his text. For him the distinction between asarkos and ensarkos does not 
match the distinction between the indivisible work of God and the divisible work of God. 
Moreover, Owen’s passage cited by Spence not only articulates the oneness of all divine 
works when it is absolute work but it also emphasizes that the economic work of a person 
is related to that of the other persons. Although it is true that Owen distinguishes the 
economic work of the three persons, it is also noteworthy that he tried to bind and relate 
their work with each other. Owen distinguishes the economic work of the Trinity but 
does not separate the economic work, considering it as a result of only one person’s 
working.

Second, Spence’s understanding of Augustine is not quite right. Augustine endorsed 
both the doctrine of inseparable operations and the doctrine of the divine unity of the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, he clearly asserted that each person does 
things the others do not do. The thought that the Father was born of the Virgin Mary and 
suffered under Pontius Pilate would entail the heresy of Patripassianism. Augustine

58 Spence uses the term “asarkos” but does not use the term “ensarkos.” Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 132.

59 Both Spence and Brian Kay explain this distinction with the terminology of “asarkos.” Spence, \textit{Incarnation and Inspiration}, 132; Kay, \textit{Trinitarian Spirituality}, 103–4. As far as I know, however, Owen 
did not use the term “asarkos” in his entire works.

60 Augustine, \textit{Sermo}, 52.6. Augustine elucidates it in \textit{De Trinitate}, 1.4.7: “It was not however this 
same three . . . that was born of the virgin Mary, crucified and buried under Pontius Pilate, rose again on the 
third day and ascended into heaven, but the Son alone. Nor was it this same three that came down upon 
Jesus in the form of a dove at his baptism, or came down on the day of Pentecost after the Lord’s 
ascension . . . but the Holy Spirit alone. Nor was it this same three that spoke from heaven . . . but it was the 
Father’s voice alone addressing the Son; although just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are inseparable, so
acknowledges that there are distinctions in the external work of the three persons. The external work of the Trinity, however, is distinguishable but not separable. Augustine points out that the work of Christ on the earth is also of the Father. The three persons of the Trinity are distinct and irreducible, but they work inseparably in their opera ad extra. On the one hand, Augustine contends that “the working of the Father and of the Son is indivisible.” This indivisibility of the ad extra work is based on the unity of the three persons. The nature of one person is incorporeal, unchangeable, consubstantial, and co-eternal with that of the other persons. On the other hand, Augustine argues that “the Son is not the Father, and the Father is not the Son, and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.”

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61 Augustine writes, “the Son indeed, and not the Father, was born of the Virgin Mary; but this birth of the Son, not the Father, from the Virgin Mary was the work of both the Father and the Son. It was not indeed the Father, but the Son who suffered; yet the suffering of the Son was the work of both Father and Son. It wasn’t the Father who rose again, but the Son; yet the resurrection of the Son was the work of both Father and Son.” Augustine, Sermo, 52.8.


63 Augustine, De Trinitate, 1.8.15 (NPNF, First Series, 3:24). For the equality of the three Persons, see De Trinitate, 1.6.9.

64 Augustine, Sermo, 52.2. Augustine said this when he delivered a sermon on the baptism of Jesus (Matt. 3:13); cf. Epistulae, 120.3.17. Arie Baars wrongly argues that Augustine’s doctrine of inseparable operations ad extra left no room for distinct personal appropriations ad extra. It seems, however, that both Spence and Baars do not give attention to the distinction between “separation” and “distinction” in opera Dei ad extra in the trinitarian theology of Augustine. Arie Baars, “‘Opera Trinitatis Ad Extra Sunt Indivisa’ in the Theology of John Calvin,” in Calvinus Sacrarum Literarum Interpres: Papers of the International Congress on Calvin Research, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 133–34. For a persuasive objection of Baars’s thesis, see Claunch, “What God Hath Done Together: Defending the Historic Doctrine of the Inseparable Operations of the Trinity,”
persons are distinguished not only by eternal relations of origin but also in their external works. In the baptism of Jesus, the distinct works of the Trinity were clearly demonstrated.

To explain consistently Augustine’s idea, one can endorse his differentiation between Christ as a servant and Christ as the Son. When Augustine answers the question, “In what manner the Son is less than the Father,” he argues that Christ is equal to the Father in the form of God and is less than the Father in the form of a servant or the mediator between God and human beings. Augustine cites Philippians 2:6-7, where the Apostle Paul says, “Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but emptied Himself, and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and was found in fashion (habitu) as a man.” Augustine argues that “the Son of God is equal to God the Father in nature, but less in ‘fashion’ (habitu).” In the form of God, Jesus Christ is the Word, “by whom all things are made” (John 1:3), argues Augustine, but in the form of a servant Jesus was “made of a woman, made under the law, made in the likeness of men.”

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65 Stephen Holmes argues that according to the patristic consensus “[t]he three divine hypostases are distinguished by eternal relations of origin–begetting and proceeding–and not otherwise.” He writes, “The relationships of origin express/establish relational distinctions between the three existent hypostases; no other distinctions are permissible.” Stephen R. Holmes, The Quest for the Trinity: The Doctrine of God in Scripture, History and Modernity (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012), 146. These assertions of Holmes, however, are too rigid to explain the distinct external works of the Trinity.

66 Augustine, De Trinitate, 1.7.14 (NPNF, First Series, 3:24). The subtitle of the passage of PL expresses the idea, “The Son in the form of servant is less than the Father or himself” (Filius in forma servi minor Patre ac se ipso; PL, 42:828).

67 Augustine, De Trinitate, 1.7.14 (NPNF, First Series, 3:24). “Ait enim: Qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo, sed semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens, in similitudine hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo. Est ergo Dei Filius Deo Patri natura aequalis, habitu minor. In forma enim servi quam accepit minor est Patre; in forma autem Dei in qua erat etiam antequam hanc accipisset aequalis est Patri. In forma Dei Verbum per quod facta sunt omnia 91; in forma autem servi factus ex muliere, factus sub lege ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret. Proinde in forma Dei fecit hominem; in forma servi factus est homo” (PL, 42:829).
to redeem them that were under the law” (Gal 4:4-5). Augustine adds:

In like manner, in the form of God He made man; in the form of a servant He was made man. For if the Father alone had made man without the Son, it would not have been written, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness” (Gen 1:26). . . . The Divinity is not changed into the creature, so as to cease to be Divinity; nor the creature into Divinity, so as to cease to be creature.  

Augustine’s differentiation between Christ as God and Christ as mediator is useful for explaining his thought on the external works of the Trinity. The work of Christ as God is not divisible from the work of God the Father; the work of Christ as mediator is distinct from the work of God the Father. The early modern Reformed theology articulated this idea more deeply.

Finally, Spence lacks a fuller understanding of the seventeenth-century Reformed theology in this regard. Many of the early modern Reformed theologians, Zanchi, Polanus, Maresius, Edward Leigh, Francis Turretin, and Witsius among others, endorsed the notion of *terminus operationis*, where the doctrine of inseparable operations and the distinction of external works of the three persons are harmonized. The notion of *terminus operationis* is worthy to be treated in more detail.

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69 This idea does not mean that there are two distinct agents or actors. Rather, it is related to the distinction between Christ’s humanity and his divinity. The distinction between Christ as God and Christ as mediator is also seen in the so-called “extra Calvinisticum” (i.e., the divinity of Christ exists beyond his flesh). For the early modern Reformed theologians such as Calvin and Ursinus, this doctrine functions as a way of preserving the deity of the Son. Christ remained as God, even though he united himself to human nature. See Andrew M. McGinnis, *The Son of God Beyond the Flesh: A Historical and Theological Study of the extra Calvinisticum* (T&T Clark, 2014), 93–123.
3.2.3. Owen’s Doctrines of the Trinity and the Doctrine of *Terminus Operationis*

3.2.3.1. The Doctrine of *Terminus Operationis* of Aquinas and Early Modern Reformed Theologians

The conception of *terminus operationis* became a basic solution to the question of how the work of the three persons of the Trinity is distinct but inseparable. In the incarnation of the Son, for example, one person alone became incarnate without dividing the work of the Trinity.\(^{70}\) Polanus asks in this regard, “If the incarnation of Christ is the common work of the whole sacred Trinity, why is the entire sacred Trinity not incarnate?”\(^{71}\) To solve the problem, early modern Reformed theologians spoke of the *opera ad extra* as personal works after a certain manner (*opera certo modo personalia*). The undivided works *ad extra* do manifest one or another of the persons as their end or limit of operation (*terminus operationis*). The Son alone can become incarnate without dividing the work of the Trinity because the incarnation and work of mediation terminate in the Son, although they are willed and effected by Father, Son, and Spirit.\(^ {72}\)

The pattern of *terminus operationis* is evident in Thomas Aquinas, who articulates the thought in his Christology.\(^ {73}\) In *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas asks whether the union of

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\(^ {71}\) Cited from Muller, *PRRD*, 4:272.

\(^ {72}\) Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 213.

the divine nature and the human nature is the same as assumption. In Objection 3, he cites Damascene, who argues that “Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation determine the end of copulation.” Based on Damascene, objection 3 concludes that union is the same as assumption because assumption does not determine the end of copulation. Aquinas, however, argues that union is different from assumption.

Union implies a certain relation of the divine nature and the human nature, according to as they come together in one person. There are three differences between assumption and union. First, union implies the relation, whereas assumption implies the action. Second, assumption implies “becoming,” whereas union implies “having become.” The human nature is taken to be in “the terminus of assumption” (terminus assumptionis) unto the divine hypostasis. Third, assumption determines “the term whence and the term whither” (terminum et a quo et ad quem); for assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things. Thus, the human nature is united with the divine, or conversely.

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74 Aquinas, *Summa Theologicae*, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8. All translations of *Summa Theologicae* are taken from the second and revised edition of Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920).

75 Aquinas, *Summa Theologicae*, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8; John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, 3.11. The Greek text reads: “Ἄλλο μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἕνωσις, καὶ ἕτερον σάρκωσις· ἡ δὲ σάρκωσις ἐνανθρώπησις, τὴν πρὸς τὸ πῦρ ἑνωσιν.” The English translation of this text reads: “Union, then, is one thing, and incarnation is something quite different. For union signifies only the conjunction, but not at all that with which union is effected. But incarnation (which is just the same as if one said ‘the putting on of man’s nature’) signifies that the conjunction is with flesh, that is to say, with man, just as the heating of iron implies its union with fire” (NPNF, Second Series, 9b:55).

76 Aquinas, *Summa Theologicae*, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8, co. “Et ideo assumptio determinat terminum et a quo et ad quem, dicitur enim assumptio quasi ab alio ad se summptio, unio autem nihil horum determinat.”

77 This is *communicatio idiomatum*. 
conversely, because the human nature is joined to the divine personality, so that the
divine person subsists in the human nature.78 Therefore, Aquinas argues that union and
assumption have not the same relation “to the term” (ad terminum), but a different
relation.79 The person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to
himself. Likewise the united and the assumed are not identical, for the divine nature is
said to be united, but not assumed.80 Agreeing with Damascene, Aquinas argues that
assumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one assuming;
whereas, incarnation and humanation determine with whom the union is made on the part
of the thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. Therefore, argues Aquinas,
assumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.81

In the following Question, Aquinas maintains that with the word assumption two
things are signified—“the principle of the action and the term of the action” (principium
actionis, et terminus eius). As for the principle, the assumption belongs to the divine
nature in itself, because the assumption took place by its power. As for the term, however,
the assumption does not belong to the divine nature in itself, but by the reason of the
person in whom it is considered to be. A person is primarily and more properly said to
assume, argues Aquinas, but it may be said secondarily that the nature assumed a nature
to its person. The nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it is changed to flesh, but
that it assumed the nature of flesh. In this regard, Aquinas quotes Damascene, “Following

78 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8, co.

79 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8, ad 1. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unio et
assumptio non eodem modo se habent ad terminum, sed diversimode, sicut dictum est.”

80 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8, ad 2.

81 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3.
the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the nature of God is incarnate.”

Aquinas argues that although the Father takes human nature to the person of the Word, he did not thereby take it to himself, for the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one, and hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes human nature. In sum, what is befitting to the divine nature in itself is befitting to the three persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like. But to assume belongs to it by reason of the person of the Word, and hence it is befitting to that person alone. Therefore, for Aquinas, assumption is the work of the Trinity in principle, but it is the work of the Son in term.

In dealing with the Son’s assumption of flesh, Aquinas reconciles the doctrine of

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Spence cites this passage of Damascene to argue that Owen’s doctrine of the Trinity is deviated from Aquinas’ doctrine of inseparable operations. The related text reads (*NPNF*, Second Series, 9b:50): “Thus, therefore, we confess that the nature of the Godhead is wholly and perfectly in each of its subsistences, wholly in the Father, wholly in the Son, and wholly in the Holy Spirit. Wherefore also the Father is perfect God, the Son is perfect God, and the Holy Spirit is perfect God. In like manner, too, in the Incarnation of the Trinity of the One God the Word of the Holy Trinity, we hold that in one of its subsistences the nature of the Godhead is wholly and perfectly united with the whole nature of humanity, and not part united to part” (Οὕτω τοίνυν ὁμολογοῦμεν τὴν τῆς θεότητος φύσιν πᾶσαν τελείως εἶναι ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν αὐτῆς ὑποστάσεων, πᾶσαν ἐν πατρί, πᾶσαν ἐν υἱῷ, πᾶσαν ἐν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι. Οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνανθρωπήσει τοῦ ἑνὸς τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος θεοῦ λόγου φαμέν πᾶσαν καὶ τελείαν τὴν φύσιν τῆς θεότητος ἐν μιᾷ τῶν αὐτῆς ὑποστάσεων ἑνωθῆναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσι ἑνωθῆναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσι καὶ οὐ μέρος μέρει).

83 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1. “Et ideo, inquantum natura divina sumit naturam humanam ad personam verbi, dicitur eam ad se sumere. Sed quamvis pater assumat naturam humanam ad personam verbi, non tamen propter hoc sumit eam ad se, quia non est idem suppositum patris et verbi. Et ideo non potest dici propric quod pater assumat naturam humanam.”

84 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2. “Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod convenit divinae naturae secundum se, convenit tribus personis, sicut bonitas, sapientia et huiusmodi. Sed assumere convenit ei ratione personae verbi, sicut dictum est. Et ideo soli illi personae convenit.” It seems that the last two sentences allude to the *pactum salutis*. 
inseparable operations and the doctrine of *terminus operationis*. First, Aquinas agrees
with Augustine that “the works of the Trinity are inseparable” (*Enchiridion*, xxxviii). He also agrees with Damascene that “the whole divine Nature became incarnate in one of
its hypostases” (*De Fide Orth.* iii, 6). Aquinas argues that the act of assumption
proceeds from the divine power, which is common to the three persons, but that the term
of the assumption is a person. Thus, Aquinas argues:

> what has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three Persons; but
what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not
to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united
to the one Person of the Son. . . . The nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume
by reason of the Person in whom the union is terminated and not as it is common
to the three Persons.

The cause of the assumption is divine power, which is common to all three persons. In
this regard, the assumption is the work of the Trinity. The term of the assumption,
however, is one person; the assumption terminated in the Son alone. In this vein, the
assumption is the work of the Son. When Damascene says, “the whole divine nature
became incarnate,” argues Aquinas, it does not mean that it is incarnate in all the persons

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85 For Aquinas’ view of the Trinity, trinitarian agency, and his doctrine of inseparable operations,
see Gilles Emery, *Trinity in Aquinas* (Ypsilanti, MI: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria College, 2003); Gilles
Emery, *Trinity, Church, and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays* (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave

86 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 4, ad 1. Aquinas cites Augustine’s *Enchiridion*,
xxxviii, as if Augustine himself said, “the works of the Trinity are inseparable.” However, Augustine writes
there, “Or is it that, when one of the Three is mentioned as the author of any work, the whole Trinity is to
be understood as working? That is true, and can be proved by examples.” It is true that Augustine’s passage
supports the doctrine of inseparable operations.

87 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2.

88 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 4, co. It is already stated above (IIIa, q. 3, a. 2).

89 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 4, co and r. 1.
but signifies that nothing is wanting in the perfection of the divine nature of the person incarnate. Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of assumptions. First, the assumption which takes place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the divine nature, by an assimilation to its goodness, and hence this assumption is common to the three persons, in regard to the principle and the term. Second, the assumption which is by the grace of union “is common on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term” (est communis ex parte principii, non autem ex parte termini).

Many early modern Reformed theologians such as Zanchi, Polanus, Maresius, Leigh, Turretin, and Witsius inherited the lines of thought of Aquinas, which differentiated between the “principle or beginning” (principium) and the “term or end” (terminus) in the work of the Trinity. Zanchi adopted the idea of terminus operationis from Aquinas. Polanus also mirrors the idea. Zanchi and Polanus distinguish between considering a work inchoative (from the beginning) and terminative (from its end or completion).

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90 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2.

91 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 3, a. 4, ad 3. “Ad tertium dicendum quod assumptio quae fit per gratiam adoptionis, terminatur ad quandam participationem divinae naturae secundum assimilationem ad bonitatem illius, secundum illud II Pet. I, ut divinae consortes naturae, etc.. Et ideo huiusmodi assumptio communis est tribus personis et ex parte principii et ex parte termini. Sed assumptio quae est per gratiam unionis, est communis ex parte principii, non autem ex parte termini, ut dictum est” (emphasis mine).

92 Aquinas also uses the terminology of “terminus assumptionis” in angelology but in different issues. For this terminology in Aquinas’ angelology, see *In Libros Sententiarum*, Sent II, Dist 8, Q 1, Art 3; Sent III, Dist 2, Q 1, Art 1A. For this issue in his Christology, see *Summa Theologiae*, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8; IIIa, q. 3, aa. 2, 4, and 5. On Thomism in Zanchi’s theology, see John Patrick Donnelly, “Calvinist Thomism,” *Viator* 7 (1976): 441–55; Harm J. M. J. Goris, “Thomism in Zanchi’s Doctrine of God,” in *Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise*, ed. Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 121–39.

93 “Assumptionem voco illam perfectam in suscipienda carne actionem: que inchoata a tota Trinitate, ita terminata est in filio, ut ipse solus factus sit caro.” Girolamo Zanchi, *De Incarnatione Filii Dei: Libri duo, Quibus Universum Hoc Mysterium Solide Explicatur, verias carnis Christi ex S. literis & Orthodoxae vetustatis consensu liquido demonstratur* (Heidelberg: Harnisch, 1593), II.ii (pp. 75–76).
Polanus contends that the incarnation, considered from the perspective of its inception, must be an undivided or common work (*opus commune*) of all three persons of the Trinity.\footnote{Amandus Polanus, *Syntagma theologiae christianae, juxta leges ordinis methodici conformatum, atque in libros decem tributum* (Hannoviae, 1615), IV.ii (p. 237), VI.xiii (p. 364).} It belongs to one of the works of the Godhead *ad extra*. Considered from the perspective of its completion, however, it is a divine work that terminates in the person of the Son.\footnote{Polanus, *Syntagma theologiae christianae*, IV.ii (p. 237). Translation is mine.} Maresius, who is cited in Leigh’s *Systeme*, presents the same view: “The incarnation is inchoatively and effectively of all the Trinity, but appropriately and terminatively of the Son alone, just like the three sew together a garment, nevertheless only one of them is to be clothed.”\footnote{“Est enim incarnatio inchoative & effective totius Trinitatis, sed appropriative & terminative solius Filii, ut tres simul consuant vestem, ab uno tamen ex illis induendam.” Samuel Maresius, *Collegium theologicum, sive Breve systema universae theologiae, comprehensum octodecim disputationibus privatim habitis in Academia provinciali* (Geneva: Iohannis Antonii et Samuælius de Tournæ, 1662), IV.xiii (p. 177); Edward Leigh, *A Systeme or Body of Divinity* (London: Printed by A.M. for William Lee, 1662), V.iv (p. 566).}

Turretin’s formulation is an excellent example in this vein. Firstly, he explains how the divine essence differs from the three persons of the Trinity. The persons are manifestly distinct from the essence because the essence is one only, while the persons are three. The essence is absolute, the persons are relative; the former is communicable (not indeed as to multiplication, but as to identity), and the latter are incommunicable. The essence is adequate to the three persons taken together, but it is broader than each one of them because each person has indeed the whole divinity, but not adequately and totally (i.e., not to the exclusion of the others), because it is still communicable to more. The essence is the common principle of external operations, which are undivided and common to the three persons. The persons are the principle of internal operations, which belong to the
single persons mutually related to each other.\textsuperscript{97} Turretin acknowledges that theologians do not agree about the nature of this distinction. It seems to him, however, that “the Person may be said to differ from the essence not really (\textit{realiter}), i.e., essentially (\textit{essentialiter}) as thing and thing, but modally (\textit{modaliter})—as a mode from the thing (\textit{modus a re}).”\textsuperscript{98} There is no composition in God because composition arises only from diverse things. In the Trinity, “we do not have a thing and a thing, but a thing and the modes of the thing by which it is not compounded but distinguished.”\textsuperscript{99} Whatever is in God essential and absolute is God himself (such are the divine attributes, power, wisdom, justice, etc.). But whatever is in God personal, relative and modal may not immediately in every way be identified with the divine essence.\textsuperscript{100}

Secondly, Turretin explains the meaning of the distinction in the Godhead. Against Sabellius, argues Turretin, the orthodox deny that the distinction of reason alone has a place here. Against the Tritheists, the orthodox reject the real (\textit{realem}) or essential distinction because although there are more persons than one mutually distinct, yet there is only one essence. The orthodox, however, hold to a modal (\textit{modalem}) distinction.


\textsuperscript{98} Turretin, \textit{Institutes of Elenctic Theology}, 3.27.3.

\textsuperscript{99} Turretin, \textit{Institutes of Elenctic Theology}, 3.27.4.

because as the persons are constituted by personal properties as incommunicable modes of subsisting, so they may properly be said to be distinguished by them. For Turretin, those orthodox theologians who say that the three persons differ really are nevertheless unwilling to express it as “a real major distinction” (*distinctionem realem majorem*), which exists between things and things (as if there was in the Trinity a difference of things or one and another essence, which would be opposed to the unity and simplicity of the divine essence). But they say it is only “a real minor distinction” (*distinctionem realem minorem*), which exists between a thing and the mode of the thing or between the modes themselves, and which coincides with the modal distinction held by others. Although in God there is not one and another thing (i.e., different essences), still there is one and another subject (a difference of persons). Turretin articulates the concept of subsisting with the help of the Cappadocian notion of modes of subsisting. The persons of the Trinity are distinguished by the mode of subsisting. With respect to that

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101 Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.10.

102 Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.11.

103 Turretin writes, “These modes of subsisting (*tropoi hyparxeos*) by which the persons are distinguished from each other may well be called real (*reales*) because they are not a work of reason, but imply something positive on the part of the thing (by which the persons are constituted and distinguished from each other). Yet they cannot well be called either substantial (*substantiales*) or accidental (*accidentales*) since this division applies only to a finite being and indeed to things, not to modes. If at any time, they are said to be substantial, this is done improperly with respect to the subject modified (*subjecti modificati*) (if we may so speak) and not with respect to the form or quiddity of the modes themselves.” Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.4. Basil the Great argues that each person of the Trinity exists in a mode of relation (*tropos hyparxeos*), and thus the paternity, the sonship, and the sanctifying power can be discerned only when one observes the internal relationship of the Trinity. One cannot divide the external work of the Trinity according to the person, since each person always works together in external economy. Basil emphasizes frequently that the attributes and works of the Holy Spirit are not different from those of the Father and Son. In this way he attempts to avoid the danger of monotheism and tritheism. For the term “tropos hyparxeos” in the Cappadocian fathers, see Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 43, 44, 46 (*Patrologia Graeca* [hereafter, *PG*], 32; Basil, *Ep. 189.7* (PG, 32); Basil, *Contra Sabellium*, 6 (PG, 31); Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium*, 1 (PG, 45). John of Damascus also uses the term in his *De fide orthodoxa*, 1.8 (PG, 94).

104 The mode of subsisting is used in trinitarian language as a synonym for *subsistentia* and as a
order a certain preeminence (*hyperoche*) is attributed to the Father, not indeed as to essence and deity but as to mode. The persons are consubstantial (*homoousios*) with each other, and the highest equality exists among them, but they differ from each other both in subsisting and in working—in subsisting, because both as to order and as to origin, he precedes the Son and the Holy Spirit; in working, because the order of operating follows the mode of subsisting. The Father has no principle either of order or of origin, but exists from himself. In this sense, he is called by the church fathers “the fountain of deity” (*pegaia theototos*), not absolutely as to existence, but respectively as to the communication of it.  

Thirdly, Turretin explains the distinction in the external operations of the Trinity. Although the external works are undivided and equally common to the single persons, yet they are distinguished “by order and by terms” (*ordine et terminis*). The order of operating follows the order of subsisting. As therefore the Father is from himself, so he works from himself; as the Son is from the Father, so he works from the Father.  

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Latin equivalent for *hypostasis*. The terminology is more precise than *persona*. The early modern Reformed theologians prefer to say that the three persons of the Trinity are distinguished, not merely *rationaliter* or *formaliter*, but *modaliter*, according to their distinct modes of subsistence. See Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 195. Muller writes, “The term can be used generally to indicate the mode or manner of the individual existence of any thing and, in this general sense, plays a role in Lutheran and Reformed christological debate over the manner of Christ’s presence in the Lord’s Supper and the mode or modes of the subsistence of Christ’s body in its union with the divine person of the Word.” The early modern Reformed theologians also applied the conception to describe the *ad extra* works of the three persons of the Trinity, as exemplified by Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.16.

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105 Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.16.

106 Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.20. “Nam licet opera ad extra indivisa sint, & communia ex aequo singulis Personis, tum ex parte principii, tum ex parte apotelesmatis; *ordine* tamen, & *terminis* distinguuntur” (author’s emphasis).

107 Here Turretin cites the words of Christ, “the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do” (John 5:19). Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.20.
the Holy Spirit is from both, so he works from both.\footnote{Turretin concludes, \textit{"They [the persons] also differ in terms as often as any divine operation is terminated on any person. So the voice heard from heaven is terminated on the Father, incarnation on the Son and the appearance in the form of a dove on the Holy Spirit."} Turretin, \textit{Institutes of Elenctic Theology}, 3.27.20. \textit{"Terminis etiam differunt, quoties operatio aliqua divina ad aliquam Personam terminatur. Sic vox de caelo audita terminatur ad Patrem, Incarnation terminatur ad Filium, & apparitio sub specie columbae ad Spiritum Sanctum"} (author’s emphasis).} The three persons of the Trinity are distinguished by their external works, which are undivided yet admit of distinction “by order and terms.” Like Augustine, Aquinas, Zanchi and Polanus, Turretin affirms the \textit{terminus operationis} principle, which is that a divine operation may especially terminate in one person, but this does not abrogate the indivisibility of the operation. Though the incarnation is an undivided triune operation, it has its subjective and appropriative terminus in the Son.\footnote{Turretin, \textit{Institutes of Elenctic Theology}, 13.4.2; 14.2.14.} Turretin upholds the doctrine of inseparable operations in the external works of the Trinity by appealing to the distinction between an act’s \textit{principium} and its \textit{terminus}. In so doing, Turretin thoroughly demonstrates that the doctrine of inseparable operations is perfectly consonant with the doctrine of \textit{terminus operationis}.

Taking the same lines of thought, Witsius contends that “the subject of the incarnation, or he who became man, is not the Father, nor the Holy Spirit, but the Son alone.”\footnote{Witsius, \textit{Sacred Dissertations}, XIV.iv (vol. 2, p. 4). The Latin work is Witsius, \textit{Exercitationes}, XIV.iv (p. 235).} When Scripture teaches that “the Word was made flesh” (John 1:14), argues Witsius, it means that “although the essence and operation of the three Persons in the Godhead are the same, the flesh was not assumed by the divine \textit{essence}, but by a certain \textit{Person}.”\footnote{Witsius, \textit{Sacred Dissertations}, XIV.iv (vol. 2, p. 4); Witsius, \textit{Exercitationes}, XIV.iv (p. 235).} Thus the incarnation is a \textit{personal} work belonging to the economy of the Godhead \textit{ad}
Neither the Father, nor the Holy Spirit was unconcerned in the incarnation of the Son. The glory of the whole Trinity is displayed in the human nature of Christ. However, though the Father is in the Son, he is not therefore incarnate with the Son; he is only in his incarnate Son. Witsius argues:

A body was formed to be the future residence of the Deity, by the will which is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. But whilst it was determined by the will of the Father and the Holy Spirit that the body should belong to the Son, the Son, by the same will, determined that it should be his own; and thus by the united consent of all the Three, it could be the body of none but the Son (Heb 5:5).

This passage strongly alludes to the pactum salutis. The three persons of the Trinity have the same will regarding the incarnation, but only the Son is determined to take the flesh in the incarnation. As to the question, “Why the Son, not the Father or the Holy Spirit, assumed the human nature,” writes Witsius, “it cannot be answered in a more satisfactory manner than by resolving it into the good pleasure of the Divine counsel, which is always distinguished by the most consummate wisdom.” The incarnation, considered “inchoatively” as the ad extra work, is a common work (opus commune) of all three

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112 Witsius also argues that the flesh was at least assumed by the divine essence, only as it was characterized and restricted (restricta est) in the person of the Son. Witsius, Sacred Dissertations, XIV.iv (vol. 2, p. 4); Witsius, Exercitationes, XIV.iv (p. 235). “essentia saltem non aliter, nisi quatenus characterisata, & quasi restricta est in persona Filii.” This means, as Muller puts it, “although the entire undivided divine essence is incarnate, the divine essence in union with Christ’s humanity is not to be understood simpliciter, but as the ‘natura divina determinata in Filio, id est, hypostasis sua persona Filii’” (Polanus, Syntagma, VI.xiii [p. 364, col. 1]). Muller, PRRD, 4:272.

113 Witsius, Sacred Dissertations, XIV.iv (vol. 2, pp. 4–5); Witsius, Exercitationes, XIV.iv (p. 236). “Attamen non quia Pater in Filio est, ideo Pater quoque cum Filio est incarnatus, sed est in incarnato” (author’s emphasis).

114 Witsius, Sacred Dissertations, XIV.iv (vol. 2, p. 5); Witsius, Exercitationes, XIV.iv (p. 236). “Eadem certe Patris, Filii, ac Spiritus Sancti voluntate corpus, Deitatis futura sedes, factum est. sed qua voluntate Pater & Spiritus Sanctus corpus illud voluerunt esse Filii, eadem voluntate Filii id voluit esse suum, ideoque ex communi consensu non nisi Filii esse potuit. Heb: x: 5.”

115 Witsius, Sacred Dissertations, XIV.v (vol. 2, p. 5); Witsius, Exercitationes, XIV.v (p. 236).
persons. Considered “terminatively,” however, it is the special work (opus proprium) of the Son from the perspective of its completion. The special work of a person is inseparably related to all three persons of the Godhead, but the work is to be attributed to one of the divine persons.116

3.2.3.2. The Doctrine of Terminus Operationis of Owen

John Owen, like Augustine, Aquinas, and other early modern Reformed theologians, endorses the idea of terminus operationis. He opposes the Socinians who argue that in the incarnation, the human nature of Christ “was immediately, inseparably, and undividedly united unto the person of the Son of God, there doth not seem to be any need, nor indeed room, for any such operations of the Spirit.”117 In reply, Owen claims:

The only singular immediate act of the person of the Son on the human nature was the assumption of it into subsistence with himself. Herein the Father and the Spirit had no interest nor concurrence, εἰ μὴ κατ’ εὐδοκίαν καὶ βούλησιν, “but by approbation and consent,” as Damascen speaks: for the Father did not assume the human nature, he was not incarnate; neither did the Holy Spirit do so; but this was the peculiar act and work of the Son. . . . That the only necessary consequent of this assumption of the human nature, or the incarnation of the Son of God, is the personal union of Christ, or the inseparable subsistence of the assumed nature in the person of the Son.118

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116 Muller, PRRD, 4:273. Muller summarizes Witsius’ Exercitationes, XIV. x that “Hebrews 10:5 teaches that incarnation is the work of the Father, Philippians 2:7 that it is the work of the Son, and Luke 1:35 and Matthew 1:18, 20 that it is the work of the Spirit.”

117 Owen, Works, 3:160. This work is titled, “ΠΙΕΥΜΑΤΟΑΟΓΙΑ OR, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT.”

118 Owen, Works, 3:160 (author’s emphasis). Owen cites Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa, 3. 11, which deals with the difference between union and incarnation. Aquinas cites the same text of Damascene in Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 2, a. 8. The Greek text of Damascene reads: “Ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ιστέον, ὡς ὁ πατὴρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον κατὰ σαρκώσει τοῦ λόγου κεκοινώνηκεν εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὰς θεοσημίας καὶ κατ’ εὐδοκίαν καὶ βούλησιν” (bolds mine). The English translation reads: “Besides all this, notice that the Father and the Holy Spirit take no part at all in the incarnation of the Word except in connection with the miracles, and in respect of good will and purpose” (NPNF, Second Series, 9b:55).
Owen argues that the Son alone became incarnate without dividing the work of the Trinity. He agrees with John of Damascus that the Son alone becomes incarnate by the order of subsistence. Spence and Kay argue that Owen, citing Damascene, deliberately deviated from the Augustinian and Thomistic tradition regarding the doctrine of inseparable operations. It should be noted, however, that Aquinas also cited the same passage of Damascene (De fide orthodoxa, 3.11) and tried to reconcile it with Augustine’s doctrine of inseparable operations. The mere citation of Damascene cannot demonstrate that Owen distances himself from the Augustinian and Thomistic tradition regarding the issue. Rather, Owen, like Augustine and Aquinas, harmonizes the doctrine of inseparable operations and the doctrine of terminus operationis. He admits that “Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa” (the external works of the Trinity are undivided). He explains this Latin phrase:

There is no such division in the external operations of God that any one of them should be the act of one person, without the concurrence of the others; and the reason of it is, because the nature of God, which is the principle of all divine operations, is one and the same, undivided in them all. Whereas, therefore, they are the effects of divine power, and that power is essentially the same in each

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119 See the discussion in 3.2.3.2 above. In Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 3, a. 4, Aquinas cites Augustine’s Enchiridion, xxxviii, where Augustine argues, “the works of the Trinity are inseparable,” and he also quotes Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa, 3.6, in which Damascene claims, “the whole divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases.”


121 Owen, Works, 3:162. Owen mentions the Latin phrase.
person, the works themselves belong equally unto them.\textsuperscript{122}

The Holy Spirit is the immediate, peculiar, efficient cause of all external divine operations. In the incarnation, the Son works by the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit in him immediately applies the power and efficacy of the divine excellencies unto the operation. Thus, the same work is equally the work of each person.\textsuperscript{123} Owen, in the following passage, however, admits also the doctrine of \textit{terminus operationis}. He asserts that “there is such a distinction in their operations, that one divine act may produce a peculiar respect and relation unto one person, and not unto another; as the assumption of the human nature did to the Son, for he only was incarnate.”\textsuperscript{124}

In his later text, \textit{ΧΡΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ},\textsuperscript{125} Owen clarifies what he means with the reference to John Damascene by using the reference in his explicitly trinitarian account of the assumption. He argues:

As unto \textit{original efficiency}, it was the act of the divine nature, and so, consequently, of the \textit{Father, Son, and Spirit}. For so are all outward acts of God—the divine nature being the immediate principle of all such operations. The wisdom, power, grace, and goodness exerted therein, are essential properties of the divine nature. Wherefore the acting of them originally belongs equally unto each person, equally participant of that nature. (1.) As unto \textit{authoritative designation}, it was the act of the Father. Hence is he said to send “his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh,” Rom. 8:3; Gal. 4:4. (2.) As unto the \textit{formation of the human nature}, it was the peculiar act of the Spirit, Luke 1:35. (3.) As unto the \textit{term of the assumption}, or the taking of our nature unto himself, it was the peculiar act of the person of the Son. Herein, as Damascen observes, the other persons had no concurrence, but only κατὰ βούλησιν καὶ ἐυδοκίαν—“by

\textsuperscript{122} Owen, \textit{Works}, 3:162.


\textsuperscript{124} Owen, \textit{Works}, 3:162.

\textsuperscript{125} Owen, \textit{Works} 1. The title of the work is “\textit{ΧΡΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ: OR, A DECLARATION OF THE GLORIOUS MYSTERY OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST—GOD AND MAN.”
In this passage, Owen definitely affirms the doctrine of terminus operationis. The divine nature of the Trinity is said to have worked in the assumption from the perspective of the “original efficiency,” but the assumption was the peculiar act of the person of the Son from the perspective of the “term of the assumption.” Owen, like other early modern Reformed theologians, uses “term of the assumption,” which recalls Aquinas’ language (terminus assumptionis). He argues that the Son’s assumption of human nature is the end (terminus) of the undivided trinitarian act of the incarnation. Likewise, certain triune works ad extra terminate on one person alone. Owen endorses Damascene to support the doctrine of terminus operationis while not undermining the doctrine of inseparable operations.

The early modern Reformed theologians made the doctrine of inseparable operations consistent with the doctrine of terminus operationis by appealing to the distinction between the principium (principle or beginning) and its terminus (term or end) of the works of the Trinity. Rather than weakening the received Augustinian-Thomistic trinitarian theology, Owen stood along the lines of the tradition like other early modern Reformed theologians. He was not only wholly committed to the indivisibility of

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126 Owen, Works, 1:225 (author’s emphasis). The quotation of Damascene is taken from De fide orthodoxa, 3.11.


128 Owen’s friend Thomas Goodwin also endorsed the distinction. See Jones, Why Heaven Kissed Earth, 108–10, 129.

129 Letham argues that “John Calvin followed Lombard rather than Aquinas, in making his doctrine of the Trinity his doctrine of God,” but, citing Richard Muller, that “the bulk of the Reformed Orthodox follow the traditional Western line of thought seen in Aquinas.” For Letham, Owen “avoids the dangers of Aquinas’ doctrine of the divine simplicity.” Letham, “John Owen’s Doctrine of the Trinity in Its Catholic Context,” 190, 193. Letham also argues that with the strong priority of the essence in Aquinas’
God’s external operations but also employed this doctrine to great effect with the help of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.

3.2.4. The Place of the *Pactum Salutis* in Owen’s Doctrine of the Trinity

Owen’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is closely related to the doctrines of inseparable operations and of *terminus operationis* in his trinitarian theology. The *pactum salutis* shows that the three persons of the Trinity are the common cause of the redemptive work. It also explains the distinctive work of the persons of the Trinity in its stipulations. The beginning of the redemptive work belongs to the Father, the establishing and upholding of all works to the Son, and the finishing and perfecting of these works to the Holy Spirit. Thus, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* not only guarantees the doctrines of inseparable operations and of *terminus operationis*, but it also becomes the nexus of the two doctrines. Along these lines, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* offers the principal agreement between the persons of the Trinity regarding the *terminus* of the redemptive work. Owen’s formulation of the *pactum salutis* illustrates the unity of the persons in the eternal stipulations on the redemptive work. His doctrine of the *pactum salutis* does not undermine his doctrine of the Trinity; rather, the former is completely consistent with the latter.

Owen’s formulation of the *pactum salutis* can be briefly summarized as follows. He
describes the *pactum salutis* as “that compact, covenant, convention, or agreement, that was between the Father and the Son, for the accomplishment of the work of our redemption by the mediation of Christ, to the praise of the glorious grace of God.”

Owen believes the agreement between the Father and the Son over the redemption of humanity was covenantal in nature. For him there are five characteristics of the *pactum salutis*: 1. the Father and the Son mutually agree regarding the salvation of the elect; 2. the Father requires the Son to accomplish all that is necessary to secure the redemption of the elect—to do the Father’s will; 3. the Father promises that the Holy Spirit would be given to the Son and be poured out on the elect; 4. the Father promises to reward Christ for accomplishing his will; 5. the Holy Spirit promises to be the dispenser of Christ’s benefits and builder of his church; 6. the Son voluntarily accepts the work given to him by the Father; and 7. the Father agrees to accept the Son’s work upon its completion. What is important here is that Owen formulates the doctrine of the

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133 Fesko, “John Owen on Union with Christ and Justification,” 10. Fesko entirely omits the Holy Spirit’s role in Owen’s formulation of the *pactum salutis*. Ralph Smith briefly summarizes Owen’s formulation of the *pactum salutis* in his *Exercitations on Hebrews* and claims that lacking the Spirit’s role, Owen’s “discussion of the covenant itself is not explicitly trinitarian.” Smith, *The Eternal Covenant: How the Trinity Reshapes Covenant Theology*, 20. Smith, however, does not study other passages of Owen’s works, which are related with the Holy Spirit’s role in the *pactum*. By contrast, Trueman argues that Owen makes a significant contribution in his attention to the role of the Holy Spirit with reference to the *pactum*. For the engagement of the Holy Spirit in Owen’s *pactum salutis*, see Trueman, *The Claims of Truth*, 145–48; Trueman, *John Owen*, 86–87, 92–93; O’Donnell III, “The Holy Spirit’s Role in John Owen’s ‘Covenant of the Mediator’ Formulation,” esp. 109–15. O’Donnell III succinctly writes, “Applying Trueman’s ‘basic axiom’ rule mentioned earlier wherein trinitarian ‘acts ad extra’ mirror the internal intratrinitarian relationships” [Trueman, *The Claims of Truth*, 132], we could argue by inference that the Spirit’s role in the *historia revelationis* mirrors His prior role in the *opera Dei ad intra* (i.e., specifically in the *pactum salutis*). In this light it may be possible to interpret Owen’s remarks about the Spirit’s role in the
pactum salutis in a trinitarian formula. He does not think that the pactum salutis is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, he interweaves the doctrine of the pactum salutis with the trinitarian theology so as to evade the danger of both Unitarianism and tritheism. Before the examination of the compatibility of the doctrines of the pactum salutis and the Trinity, one needs to survey Owen’s terminology and formulation of the pactum salutis in order to get a general understanding of the notion in his theology.

3.3. Owen’s Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis

3.3.1. Owen’s Terminology and Formulation of the Pactum Salutis

The doctrine of the pactum salutis was developed in a later phase of Owen’s career. His early work Display of Arminianism (1643), which opposed both Arminian and Socinian theologians, did not explicitly articulate the doctrine.\textsuperscript{134} It seems that he subsumed the pactum salutis under the covenant of grace.\textsuperscript{135} Four years later, however, in The Death of Death in the Death of Christ (1647), Owen wrote at some length about the arrangement between Father, Son and, significantly, Holy Spirit, using covenantal terminology.\textsuperscript{136} From 1647 onwards, Owen explicitly endorsed the notion of the intra-

\textsuperscript{134} Owen, Works, 10:87-99.


\textsuperscript{136} Trueman, John Owen, 86.
Trinitarian covenant to emphasize the fact that Christ’s priesthood was rooted in the arrangement within the Trinity.137

Owen used various terms to denote the *pactum salutis*.138 He refers to it as “covenant of the Mediator,”139 “covenant of the Redeemer,”140 “covenant of redemption,”141 and “eternal compact.”142 Explicit and implicit references to the *pactum salutis* in terms of eternal transactions and federal relations “between the Father and Son” are found in many places throughout Owen’s works143 and throughout his commentary on Hebrews.144 Furthermore, the *pactum salutis* is implied in his *Greater Catechism*, Ch. 12, Q/A 145 and in his explication of Christ’s love for the church in terms of the Canticles’ conjugal imagery.146 The Savoy Declaration (1658), which reflects the theology of Owen, one of

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137 Van Asselt, “Covenant Theology as Relational Theology,” 79.


142 Owen, *Works*, 1:88 (“the eternal compact between the Father and him [Christ]”); 5:179 (“eternal compact that was between the Father and the Son concerning the recovery and salvation of fallen mankind”); 22:510 (“the especial eternal compact which was between the Father and him”); 22:577 (“the eternal compact between the Father and the Son”); 23:56-57 (“his [Christ’s] own voluntary consent . . . was the ground of the eternal compact that was between the Father and the Son); 23:300 (“the eternal compact between the Father and him concerning the redemption of the church”).


its architects, states, “It pleased God, in his eternal purpose, to choose and ordain the Lord Jesus his only begotten Son, according to a covenant made between them both, to be the Mediator between God and man; the Prophet, Priest, and King, the Head and Savior of his church, the Heir of all things and Judge of the world; unto whom he did from all eternity give a people to be his seed, and to be by him in time redeemed, called, justified, sanctified, and glorified.”

Owen differentiates between the pactum salutis and the covenant of grace, and considers the former as the foundation of the latter. Since Christ is its surety, argues Owen, the covenant of grace “as the grace and glory of it were prepared in the counsel of God, as the terms of it were fixed in the covenant of the mediator, and as it was declared in the promise, was confirmed, ratified, and made irrevocable thereby.” Some of his contemporary theologians did not distinguish between the covenant of the mediator and the covenant of grace, “because the promises of the covenant absolutely are said to be made to Christ, Gal. 3:16; and he is the πρῶτον δεκτικός, or first subject of all the grace of it.” Owen, however, distinguishes between them. He argues:

In the covenant of the mediator, Christ stands alone for himself, and undertakes for himself alone, and not as the representative of the church; but this he is in the covenant of grace. . . . Wherefore the covenant of grace could not be procured by any means or cause but that which was the cause of this covenant of the mediator,

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147 Savoy Declaration, 8:1 in Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie R. Hotchkiss, eds., Creeds & Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 3:112. The Savoy Declaration was the Congregational revision of the Westminster Confession of Faith. It was revised by 120 representatives from congregational churches in England at London’s Savoy Palace in 1658. The Congregationalist theologians agreed with the doctrine of the Westminster Confession but revised its Presbyterian polity (Pelikan and Hotchkiss, Creeds and Confessions, 3:104-5). See also Trueman, John Owen, 105-6.

148 Owen, Works, 5:193 (author’s emphasis).

149 Owen, Works, 5:191.
or of God the Father with the Son, as undertaking the work of mediation.\textsuperscript{150} The covenant of grace was provided and declared in the covenant of the mediator.\textsuperscript{151} Thus, the \textit{pactum salutis} and the covenant of grace are distinguished in Owen’s theology.\textsuperscript{152}

The covenant of redemption is a transcript and effect of the covenant of grace.\textsuperscript{152} Owen articulates the relationship between the \textit{pactum salutis} and the covenant of grace in terms of deliverance of heavenly places and actual personal deliverance. The elect people were “acquitted in the covenant of the Mediator.”\textsuperscript{153} Thus, they are said “to be circumcised with him, to die with him, to be buried with him, to rise with him, to sit with him in heavenly places,—namely, in the covenant of the Mediator.”\textsuperscript{154} For this reason, they should be “acquitted personally in the covenant of grace.”\textsuperscript{155} Owen argues that “it was determined by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that the way of their actual personal deliverance from the sentence and curse of the law should be in and by such a way and dispensation as might lead to the praise of the glorious grace of God (Eph. 1:5-7).”\textsuperscript{156} In another place, Owen also contends that sin was imputed to Christ “in the covenant of the Mediator, through his voluntary susception.”\textsuperscript{157} It is true that sin was imputed to Christ when he was made to be sin (2 Cor 5:12), but this happened based on the covenant of the

\textsuperscript{150} Owen, \textit{Works}, 5:191.

\textsuperscript{151} Owen, \textit{Works}, 5:192.


\textsuperscript{153} Owen, \textit{Works}, 2:179.

\textsuperscript{154} Owen, \textit{Works}, 2:179.

\textsuperscript{155} Owen, \textit{Works}, 2:179.

\textsuperscript{156} Owen, \textit{Works}, 2:179.

\textsuperscript{157} Owen, \textit{Works}, 2:65.
mediator. Likewise, the promise of redemption was given to Christ and “actually received by him in the covenant of the mediator, when he undertook the great work of the restoration of all things, to the glory of God.”

Christ is “in his own faithfulness and righteousness, with respect to the covenant of the Mediator, engaged to do that which is needful to the bringing of them [sinners] to himself.” Therefore, Owen regards the pactum salutis as a foundation of redemption and the covenant of grace. Spiritual grace and mercy of sanctification and justification flow from the covenant of the Redeemer. It should be noted, however, that Owen does not support the doctrine of eternal justification. In his *Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews*, Owen argues that although “the whole work for which God of old promised the Messiah might have been

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160 Owen, *Works*, 21:148. “All these promises have respect unto the obedience of the Lord Christ in the work of mediation; which, being performed by him rightly and to the utmost, gives him a peculiar right unto them, and makes that just and righteous in the performance which was mere sovereign grace in the promise. The condition being absolutely performed on the part of Christ, the promise shall be certainly accomplished on the part of the Father. By this is the covenant of the Redeemer completed, ratified, and established. The condition of it on his part being performed unto the uttermost, there shall be no failure in the promises, Isa. 53:10–12” (author’s emphasis).


effected and fully accomplished . . . these promises belong not directly and immediately to the covenant of the Redeemer, but are declarations only of the sovereign will and wisdom of God, as to what he would do, in the dispensation of his providence, at such and such a season.163 The promises of redemption are declared in the pactum salutis and fully accomplished in and through the works of Messiah.

A distinction also lies between the counsel of God and the pactum salutis in Owen’s federal theology. Owen uses synonymously the eternal constitution of God, the eternal decree, and the counsel of the divine will.164 The counsel of God about Christ’s suffering and obedience is the cause and means of the eternal glory of God and the salvation of the church.165 In the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son, argues Owen, these things were transacted and agreed.166 Thus, Owen distinguishes between the counsel of God, the pactum salutis, and the covenant of grace.

In Owen’s case, the pactum salutis is closely related with soteriology, Christology, and the doctrine of the Trinity. Election and redemption are coordinated with the pactum salutis. Owen argues that the whole redemptive work is predicated upon the work of Christ, which is agreed upon in the pactum salutis, but is not effectual until its actual execution in history.167 Owen writes, “This, I say, was the covenant or compact between

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164 Owen, Works, 24:240 (comment on Heb 12:2).

165 Owen, Works, 24:240. For Owen, the doctrine of election is never considered abstractly but is always coordinated with Christology, pneumatology, and soteriology. See Muller, Christ and the Decree, 175–82.

166 Owen, Works, 24:240.

167 Owen, Works, 12:507; 11:336–43
the Father and the Son, which is the great foundation of what has been said and shall
farther be spoken of about the merit and satisfaction of Christ. Here lies the ground of the
righteousness of the dispensation treated of, that Christ should undergo the punishment
due to us.”\textsuperscript{168} Owen has set in sharp relief an important role of the pactum salutis in
regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. He adumbrated the doctrine of the pactum salutis in
a trinitarian form.\textsuperscript{169} Each person of the Trinity had a substantial role in the pactum. The
oneness and threeness of the Trinity are well demonstrated in Owen’s doctrine of the
pactum salutis.

3.3.2. The Relationship of the Two Doctrines of the Trinity and
the Pactum Salutis in Owen’s Major Works

3.3.2.1. The Death of Death in the Death of Christ

For an understanding of the relationship between Owen’s doctrine of the pactum
salutis and his doctrine of the Trinity, one should scrutinize related texts which
particularly treat those two doctrines. Among Owen’s works on the Trinity, the following
three works are most important in relation to the pactum salutis: The Death of Death in
the Death of Christ (1647), Vindiciae Evangelicae (1655), and Commentary on the
Epistle to the Hebrews (1668-84). The Death of Death offers Owen’s basic ideas of the
pactum salutis; Vindiciae Evangelicae articulates the doctrine in a trinitarian scheme; and
the Exercitation XXVIII of Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews expounds the

\textsuperscript{168} Owen, Works, 12:507.

\textsuperscript{169} Owen, Works, 12:497.
federal relations between the Father and the Son in more detail.\footnote{170} 

In his masterpiece on the atonement, \textit{The Death of Death in the Death of Christ}, Owen rooted the priestly work of Christ on a Trinitarian basis.\footnote{171} He describes the \textit{pactum salutis} as “the \textit{compact} and \textit{agreement} . . . between the Father and the Son, upon his voluntary engaging of himself unto this great work of redemption.”\footnote{172} Although the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} is dispersed in the entire work, Owen deals with the \textit{pactum salutis} very closely in one specific passage.\footnote{173} He expresses the Father’s sending of the Son as the Father’s “entering into covenant and compact with his Son” concerning the work of redemption.\footnote{174} There are two promises for the part of the Father in this transaction. First, the Father promises “to protect and assist him [the Son] in the accomplishment and perfect fulfilling of the whole business and dispensation about which he was employed, or which he was to undertake.”\footnote{175} Second, the Father promises the Son’s “success, or a good issue out of all his sufferings, and a happy accomplishment and attainment of the end of his great undertaking.”\footnote{176} God put these stipulations on his part, upon the death of Christ, because he himself knows it to be impossible for sinners to


\footnote{171} For the theological background of the work, see Owen, \textit{Works}, 10:140–41.  

\footnote{172} Owen, \textit{Works}, 10:185 (author’s emphasis).  


\footnote{175} Owen, \textit{Works}, 10:168.  

\footnote{176} Owen, \textit{Works}, 10:170.
perform the redemptive work for themselves. The two promises of the Father are the ground of the redemptive work of the Son. The Father engaged in his part upon his Son’s undertaking the work of redemption, argues Owen, so he would not be wanting in any assistance for his Son. The confidence of Christ in his greatest and utmost trials arose “by virtue of his Father’s engagement in this covenant, upon a treaty with him about the redemption of man.” “The ground of our Saviour’s confidence and assurance in this great undertaking, and a strong motive to exercise his graces received in the utmost endurings,” writes Owen, “was this engagement of his Father upon this compact of assistance and protection.” Thus, the pactum salutis provides the firm assurance of successful accomplishment of the redemptive work of the Son.

Owen emphasizes the Father’s promises in the pactum salutis. These promises are the basis of the cooperation of the Father and the Son in the redemption. Owen claims:

> the promises of God made unto him [the Son] in their agreement, and so, consequently, his own aim and intention, may be seen in nothing more manifestly than in the request that our Saviour makes upon the accomplishment of the work about which he was sent; which certainly was neither for more nor less than God had engaged himself to him for.

The pactum salutis was agreed upon between the Father and the Son, in which the former gives promises, and the latter undertakes the redemptive work. Once the promises of the pactum salutis were made, the two parties of the pactum would be completely engaged in the fulfillment of the work of redemption. In this regard, Owen writes, “we must

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remember that which we delivered before concerning the compact and agreement that was between the Father and the Son, upon his voluntary engaging of himself unto this great work of redemption; for upon that engagement, the Lord proposed unto him as the end of his sufferings, and promised unto him as the reward of his labours, the fruit of his deserveings, every thing which he afterward intercedeth for.”

The peculiar actions of the Holy Spirit in this transaction are also particularly stressed in Owen’s pactum salutis. Owen contends that the Spirit “is the immediate, peculiar, efficient cause of all external divine operations.” Whereas the order of operation among the distinct persons depends on the order of their subsistence in the blessed Trinity, argues Owen, in every great work of God, “the concluding, completing, perfecting acts are ascribed unto the Holy Ghost.” For this reason, the role of the Holy Spirit is substantial in the pactum salutis. The Holy Spirit engages the pactum salutis both ad intra and thus ad extra. In terms of the ad intra work, the Father promises the Holy Spirit to the Son for the fulfillment of the redemptive work. He gives the Spirit to the Son without measure (John 3:34). In terms of the ad extra work, because of the Father’s promise, the Holy Spirit takes on three works in the redemptive work of the Son. First,

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181 Owen, Works, 10:185 (author’s emphasis).

182 Owen, Works, 3:161 (author’s emphasis). In this regard, Owen ascribes Christ’s miracles to the Holy Spirit rather than the Son (Works, 3:174).

183 Owen, Works, 3:94 (author’s emphasis). The following patristic texts are cited in this passage (bolts mine): “Hoc non est inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae; non quod alter esset prior altero, sed quod alter esset ex altero.”—Augustine, Lib. iii. contra Maxentium, cap. 14; “Πᾶσα ἐνέργεια ἡ θεότης ἐπὶ τὴν κτίσιν διήκουσα, καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολυτρόπους ἐννοιας ὀνομαζομένη ἐκ πατρὸς ἀφορμᾶται, καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρόεισι, καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τὸ ἀγίῳ τελειοῦται.”—Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium; “Ἐν δὲ τῇ τούτων (ἁγγελῶν) κτίσει, ἐννοηθέν μοι τὴν προκαταρκτικὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γενομένων τοῦ πατέρα, τὴν δημιουργικὴν τῶν υἱῶν, τὴν τελειωτικὴν τὸ πνεῦμα.”—Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, cap. xvi.

184 Owen, Works, 10:168.
the Holy Spirit works in the incarnation of the Son. The conception in the nativity was done by the sole power of the Spirit (Matt 1:18, Luke 1:35). \(^{185}\) Second, the working of the Spirit was required as well in the oblation or passion of the Son. By the eternal Spirit, Christ offered himself without spot to God (Heb 9:14). \(^{186}\) The willing offering himself was done through the Holy Spirit. Third, the Holy Spirit raised up Jesus from the dead (Rom 8:11). \(^{187}\) To sum up, in terms of \textit{ad intra}, the Holy Spirit is the one who makes the \textit{pactum salutis} possible. In terms of \textit{ad extra}, the promises and stipulations of the Father and the Son in the \textit{pactum} is the causal ground for the Spirit’s \textit{ad extra} saving activity in applying the benefits they entail to the elect. \(^{188}\) The Holy Spirit, considering the significant works of the Holy Spirit in the transaction and fulfillment of the \textit{pactum}, takes on a crucial part in Owen’s discussion of the \textit{pactum}.

After depicting the \textit{opus Dei ad intra} and \textit{opus Dei ad extra} in the \textit{pactum salutis} and its fulfillment, Owen stresses the principle of inseparable operations. In the \textit{pactum salutis}, the Father promises assistance and success, the Son undertakes the redemptive work, and the Holy Spirit cooperates with the Son and perfects the redemption. Their works concur toward the same purpose. Owen describes it as follows:

\begin{quote}
And thus have we discovered the blessed agents and undertakers in this work, their several actions and orderly concurrence unto the whole; which, though they may be thus distinguished, yet they are not so divided but that every one must be ascribed to the whole nature, whereof each person is “in solidum” partaker. And as they begin it, so they will jointly carry along the application of it unto its
\end{quote}


\(^{188}\) Trueman, \textit{The Claims of Truth}, 146.
Owen offers three reasons to demonstrate that the principle of inseparable operations is observed in the *pactum salutis*. First, the actions of the three persons of the Trinity concur “unto the whole.” Second, each *ad extra* action is ascribed to the nature of the Trinity, since it originated from God’s essence. Third, the three persons “jointly carry along the application” of the *pactum salutis* “unto its ultimate issue and accomplishment.” Thus, the same aim, the same origin, and the same joint action secure the inseparable operations principle. Thus, Owen’s discussion of the *pactum salutis* does not fall into the danger of tritheism; rather, it guarantees the inseparable operations of the Trinity. At the same time, Owen underscores the doctrine of *terminus operationis* in his adumbration of the *pactum*. He argues:

Now, because the several actions of Father and Spirit were all exercised towards Christ, and terminated in him, as God and man, he only and his performances are to be considered as the means in this work, the several concurrences of both the other persons before mentioned being presupposed as necessarily antecedent or concomitant.

The *pactum salutis* is fulfilled through the means of Christ’s work. Although the promise and cooperation of the Father and the Holy Spirit concur with the redemptive work of the Son, the several actions of the *pactum salutis* terminate in the Son alone. The several concurrences of the Father and the Holy Spirit are presupposed as necessarily antecedent or concomitant of this means. For Owen, the means was ordained by the trinitarian agents for the end proposed in the *pactum salutis*, and the whole economy or dispensation will

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be carried along to the end. Owen argues that for this reason the Son is called a mediator and that the means is distinguished into two parts—Christ’s oblation and his intercession.\textsuperscript{191} The effect and actual product of Christ’s redemptive work is clearly manifested in four ways: first, \textit{Reconciliation} with God, by removing and slaying the enmity that was between him and us” (Rom 5:10); second, \textit{Justification}, by taking away the guilt of sins, procuring remission and pardon of them, redeeming us from their power, with the curse and wrath due unto us for them” (Heb 9:12, Gal 3:13, 1 Pet 2:24); third, \textit{Sanctification}, by the purging away of the uncleanness and pollution of our sins, renewing in us the image of God, and supplying us with the graces of the Spirit of holiness” (Heb 9:14, 1 John 1:7); fourth, \textit{Adoption}, with that evangelical liberty and all those glorious privileges which appertain to the sons of God” (Gal 4:4-5); and fifth, \textit{Glorification}, in which “we are settled in heaven, in glory and immortality for ever.”\textsuperscript{192}

To summarize, in \textit{The Death of Death in the Death of Christ}, Owen fully harmonizes the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} with his doctrine of the Trinity. The three persons of the Trinity have their own work in the \textit{pactum}. The Father promises to protect and assist the Son in the accomplishment and perfect fulfilling of the whole work of redemption. The Son voluntarily undertakes the work of suffering, oblation, and intercession. The Holy Spirit is concluding, completing, and perfecting the redemptive work of the Son in the incarnation, oblation or passion, and resurrection. In love and grace, God the Trinity takes these stipulations in the \textit{pactum salutis} because of humanity’s inability to save

\textsuperscript{191} Owen, \textit{Works}, 10:179.

\textsuperscript{192} Owen, \textit{Works}, 10:158-59.
themselves. Both the principles of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis* are observed in this transaction. The inseparable operations principles are secured based on the unity of the aim, origin, and cooperation of the operations of the three persons in the *pactum salutis*. The *terminus operationis* principle in the *pactum salutis* is justified by the termination of the Son’s work, which concurs with the works of the Father and the Holy Spirit as necessary antecedents or concomitants. The *pactum salutis* in Owen’s soteriology plays the role of link between the *ad intra opus Dei* and the *ad extra opus Dei*. It is completely compatible with his doctrine of the Trinity, which is expressed in the harmony of the two principles of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis*.

3.3.2.2. *Vindiciae Evangelicae*

In his 1655 work against the Socinians, *Vindiciae Evangelicae*, Owen develops the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in a fine and detailed account. The *pactum salutis* is considered as “the covenant between the Father and the Son, the ground and foundation of this dispensation of Christ’s being punished for us and in our stead.” Its definition is a “compact, covenant, convention, or agreement, that was between the Father and the Son, for the accomplishment of the work of our redemption by the mediation of Christ, to the praise of the glorious grace of God.” There are five requirements for the complete establishment and accomplishment of the compact or agreement. First, there should “be

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sundry persons, two at least, namely, a promiser and undertaker, agreeing voluntarily together in counsel and design for the accomplishment and bringing about some common end acceptable to them both.”

Owen argues that there are the Father and the Son as distinct persons agreeing together in counsel for the accomplishment of the common end—the glory of God and the salvation of the elect (Heb 2:9, 10, 12:2). He comments on Zech 6:13 that the “two” of the text signify not the two offices but the two persons who make the counsel of peace.

Second, there should be “the person promising, who is the principal engager in the covenant, do require something at the hand of the other, to be done or undergone, wherein he is concerned.” Owen contends that for the accomplishment of this compact, the Father, who is principal in the covenant, the promiser, whose love “sets all on work,” requires of “the Lord Jesus Christ, his Son, that he shall do that which, upon consideration of his justice, glory, and honour, was necessary to be done for the bringing about the end proposed, prescribing to him a law for the performance thereof.” The Son also made the atonement not according to his own method (suo more) but as the law requested. He fulfilled his office of priest, prophet, and king.

Third, the nature of the agreement requires that one person make to the other person

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197 Owen, Works, 12:498 (author’s emphasis).


199 Owen, Works, 12:499 (author’s emphasis).


“who doth undertake such promises as are necessary for his supportment and encouragement, and which may fully balance, in his judgment and esteem, all that is required of him or prescribed to him.”203 Owen claims that in the pactum salutis, “promises are made, upon the supposition of undertaking that which was required, and these of all sorts that might either concern the person that did undertake, or the accomplishment of the work that he did undertake.”204 The Father promises to give assistance to his Son for the redemptive work. He who prescribes the conditions of incarnation, obedience, and death, does also make the promises of preservation, protection, and success for the Son.205 Thus, if the Son did what was required of him, not only would he be preserved in it, but also the work itself would thrive and prosper in his hand.206

Fourth, the nature of the pact requires that “upon the weighing and consideration of the condition and promise, the duty and reward prescribed and engaged for, as formerly mentioned, the undertaker do voluntarily address himself to the one, and expect the accomplishment of the other.”207 Owen maintains that in the pactum salutis, “the Lord Jesus Christ accepts of the condition and the promise, and voluntarily undertakes the work (Ps. 40:7, 8).”208 The Son freely, willingly, cheerfully, undertakes to do and suffer

203 Owen, Works, 12:499 (author’s emphasis).
205 Owen, Works, 12:505.
206 Owen, Works, 12:504.
207 Owen, Works, 12:499 (author’s emphasis).
208 Owen, Works, 12:505.
whatever it is that the will of his Father would have him do or suffer for the bringing about of the common end. He undertakes it to be the Father’s servant in this work. 209

Fifth, there should be “the accomplishment of the condition being pleaded by the undertaker and approved by the promiser, the common end originally designed be brought about and established.” 210 Owen asserts that in the accomplishment of the pactum salutis, “on the one side the promiser do approve and accept of the performance of the condition prescribed, and the undertaker demand and lay claim to the promises made, and thereupon the common end designed be accomplished and fulfilled.” 211 All this is fully manifest in the pact or convention between the Father and the Son. God the Father accepts the performance of what was to the Son prescribed, and Christ, accordingly, makes his demand solemnly on earth and in heaven (John 17:1, 4-6, 9, 12-16). 212 To conclude, for Owen, these five things are required to the entering into and complete accomplishment of such a covenant, convention, or agreement. They are all eminently expressed in Scripture, and found in the pact between the Father and the Son. Thus, this agreement of the Father and Son can be called a “covenant”—not with respect to the Latin word “fœdus,” but to the Hebrew “בְּרִית” and the Greek “διαθήκη.” 213

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209 Owen, Works, 12:505.


211 Owen, Works, 12:505.


213 Owen, Works, 12:499. Owen differentiates here between the biblical conception of “בְּרִית” or “διαθήκη” and the Latin word “fœdus,” whose origin he regards as “paganish and superstitious” (Works, 12:499). Sometimes, however, he uses the term, fœdus, to denote God’s covenant of the Scriptures.
The above evidence suggests that Owen developed the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in this 1655 work far more than in the 1647 work (*The Death of Death*). There are two significant clues which demonstrate that Owen’s formulation of the *pactum salutis* is consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity—the unity of the will of the Trinity and a new habitude of will in the Father and the Son. First, Owen makes it clear that the will of the Father and that of the Son are one in the *pactum salutis*. The will of the Father is that he will appoint the Son “to be the head, husband, deliverer, and redeemer of his elect, his church, his people, whom he did foreknow.” The will of the Son is his “voluntarily, freely undertaking that work and all that was required thereunto.” These two wills are unified in the eternal pact between the Father and the Son. Does Owen assume that the will of the Father and that of the Son were different but became unified in the *pactum salutis*? If this is so, his idea would imply tritheism. Owen, however, believes that it is not the case and explains the logic as follows:

It is true, the will of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is but one. It is a natural property, and where there is but one nature there is but one will: but in respect of their distinct personal acting, this will is appropriated to them respectively, so that the will of the Father and the will of the Son may be considered [distinctly] in this business; which though essentially one and the same, yet in their distinct personality it is distinctly considered, as the will of the Father and the will of the Son. Notwithstanding the unity of essence that is between the Father and the Son, yet is the work distinctly carried on by them; so that the same God judges and becomes surety, satisfieth and is satisfied, in these distinct persons.

Owen first underscores the oneness of the Trinity. The three persons of the Godhead have

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one nature, so their will is only one.\textsuperscript{216} The *pactum salutis*, however, is an *ad intra* agreement regarding an *ad extra* work of God. It points to the distinct acting of each person, and thus, the will of the Trinity is appropriated to the three persons respectively. The Father has the will regarding his promises; the Son has the will regarding his undertaking; and the Holy Spirit has the will regarding his work. In their distinct personalities the will of the persons is distinctly considered. What is here intended is never tritheism. Rather, Owen claims that the will of the Father and the will of the Son, though being considered distinctly in respect to their distinct personal actings, concur in the *pactum salutis*.\textsuperscript{217} The will of the three persons is one in God’s nature, but is respectively appropriated to each person of the Godhead in *ad extra* transaction.

Although the *pactum salutis* is an *ad intra* agreement between the persons, it is related to the *ad extra opus Dei* of redemption and thus the will of the persons is distinctly considered in this transaction.

\textsuperscript{216} Owen here sees that the will of God is tied to nature. In his later writing, he argues more clearly, “The will is a natural property, and therefore in the divine essence it is but one” (*Works*, 19:87). I agree with Wittman that Owen would likely be opposed to the so-called “social Trinitarianism.” Generally social Trinitarians envision three distinct wills and centers of consciousness in the Godhead, often tying will to person rather than nature. For example, Scott Horrell’s definition of the social model of the Trinity is that “the one divine Being eternally exists as three distinct centers of consciousness, wholly equal in nature, genuinely personal in relationships, and each mutually indwelling the other” (author’s emphasis). J Scott Horrell, “Toward a Biblical Model of the Social Trinity: Avoiding Equivocation of Nature and Order,” *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 47, no. 3 (2004): 399. In that case, the social Trinitarianism cannot secure the necessity of the unity of the three wills of the Godhead. For an overview of modern forms of social Trinitarianism, see Thomas H. McCall, *Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?*: *Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 11–55; Stephen R. Holmes, “Three Versus One? Some Problems of Social Trinitarianism,” *Journal of Reformed Theology* 3 (2009): 77–89; Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in *The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity*, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 203–49; Stephen R. Holmes et al., *Two Views on the Doctrine of the Trinity*, ed. Jason S. Sexton (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2014). The incompatibility of such views with Owen’s theology should be evident from the above passage. Cf. Wittman, “The End of the Incarnation,” 291. On this issue, see 7.1.2 of this study.

\textsuperscript{217} Owen offers a more nuanced explanation in his commentary on Hebrews (*Works*, 19:87-88).
Second, Owen also articulates the mode of the agreement of the will in the *pactum salutis*. If the will belongs to the nature of God, does the agreement of the two wills of the Father and the Son entail a *change* in the nature of God? Owen thinks that this is not the case. He argues:

Thus, though this covenant be eternal, and the object of it be that which might not have been, and so it hath the nature of the residue of God’s decrees in these regards, yet because of this distinct acting of the will of the Father and the will of the Son with regard to each other, it is more than a decree, and hath the proper nature of a *covenant* or compact. *Hence, from the moment of it (I speak not of time), there is a new habitude of will in the Father and Son towards each other that is not in them essentially; I call it new, as being in God freely, not naturally.*

The emphasis consists in the freedom of God’s will. In terms of the divine essence, the will of God is only one. In terms of the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son, there is "a new habitude of will in the Father and Son towards each other." This new

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219 Owen, *Works*, 12:497. For Owen’s idea of *habitude*, see the following texts. 2:88 (“a new habitude or relation”), 2:426 (“And as they [God’s attributes] are all essentially the same in him, and considered only under a different habitude or respect, as they are exerted by acts of his will.”), 10:206 (“There is such a habitude and relation between merit and the thing obtained by it, whether it be absolute or arising on contract, that there ariseth a real right to the thing procured by it in them by whom or for whom it is procured.”), 10:454 (“the habitude of God towards man”), 10:463 (“That the will of God should, by the death of Christ, be changed into any other habitude than what it was in before, was before disproved.”), 10:499 (“Hence, that rectitude, which in itself is an absolute property of the divine nature, is considered as a relative and hypothetical attribute, and has a certain habitude to its proper objects.”), 10:504 (“But this excellence, or habitude for action, in no wise differs from universal justice, unless in respect of its relation to another being.”), 10:553 (“The representation or description of God, and of the divine nature in respect of its habitude to sin”), 10:601 (“habitude of the divine will”), 11:141-42 (“God himself being an infinite pure act, those acts of his will and wisdom which are eternal and immanent are not distinguished from his nature and being but only in respect of the reference and habitude which they bear unto some things to be produced outwardly from him. The objects of them all are such things as might not be.”), 12:93 (“Indeed, the ubiquity of God is the habitude of his immensity to the creation.”), 12:497 (“a new habitude of will in the Father and Son towards each other”), 13:44 (“though in their [believers’] fruits also they have a relation and habitude to others”), 19:99-100 (“And this virtue of the divine nature, considered absolutely, is not πρὸς ἕτερον, or doth not consist in a habitude of mind with respect into others, as all justice in men doth, but is the infinite, essential rectitude of God in his being.”), 20:252 (“This is renewed by grace, or brought into another habitude and frame, by the implantation of a ruling, guiding, spiritual light in it.”), 20:288 (“the variety of the objects which he acteth towards, and so denote a different habitude of the divine nature, not diverse things in God.”), 20:406-7 (“for although sometimes the effects of anger and wrath in
habitude is not of the essence of the Father and the Son. If it is essentially in them, the redemption of the fallen humanity is a necessary event for the Godhead. It is, however, a new habitue which freely arises in God. The notion of the *pactum salutis* describes this moment in which the new habitue arises in God.\(^{220}\) The moment does not belong to time. The revelation of the Scriptures describes the moment in a covenantal term because in its transactions *ad intra* and *ad extra*, the will of the Father and the will of the Son with regard to each other is distinguished.\(^{221}\) It is more than a decree, and has the proper nature of a *covenant* or pact.\(^{222}\) For Owen the covenantal character of this transaction is well expressed in Isaiah 53 and Psalm 40:7-8.\(^{223}\) In addition to these scriptural passages, numerous scriptural evidences satisfy the above mentioned five requirements for the complete establishment and accomplishment of a covenant.

To recapitulate briefly, Owen’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in *Vindiciae Evangelicae*

\(^{220}\) Duns Scotus, unlike Owen, argues that “in spite of the crucial role of the divine will, [in God] there is no particular moment at which a particular decision has been made.” Antonie Vos writes, “[For Scotus] it is not a decision at a certain moment which matters, but, as it were, an ‘eternal decision’: a voluntary determinateness of an open proposition, being determinate by the will of God (Lectura I 39.64).” Antonie Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 502.


\(^{222}\) For the relationship between decree and the *pactum*, Trueman writes, “with regard to Owen, the Reformed commitment to acts *ad extra* being acts of the whole Trinity necessitated that Orthodox theologians spent considerable time reflecting upon the implications of salvation for inner life of the Trinity. Combined with their adherence to the order of procession delineated in the catholic Creeds, this inevitably meant that the Orthodox had to work out the decree of predestination in Trinitarian terms, and the focal point of this discussion became the appointment of Christ as Mediator and the relation in which this stood to the predestination of the elect.” Trueman, *The Claims of Truth*, 131. Horton properly writes, “The doctrines of the Trinity and predestination (or God’s decree) converge at the point of the eternal covenant of redemption (*pactum salutis*) between the persons of the Godhead.” Horton, *The Christian Faith*, 309.

\(^{223}\) Particularly, Psalm 40:7-8 is recited in a form of a dialogue between the Father and the Son (Owen, *Works*, 12:498). Owen, like Witsius, formulates the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* based on cross-referencing and collation of innumerable biblical texts. See 2.2.8 of this study.
does not entail the danger of tritheism. Although there is the unity of will between the Father and the Son, the will of each person may be considered distinctly in respect to the distinct personal works. The will of the Trinity is one in its origin, but it terminates differently on distinct works of the three persons of the Trinity. The incarnation, for example, was of an undivided will of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but it had its appropriative terminus in the Son alone. Only the Son became incarnate in the flesh. Owen does not try to discern an essential distinction of sundry wills of the Trinity in the transaction of the pactum, but attempts to depict the distinct appropriation of the unified will of the persons in the accomplishment of the pactum. In Owen’s theology, the doctrine of the pactum salutis is not only consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity, but is very useful for describing and understanding it.

3.3.2.3. Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews

In his Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews (1668-84), Owen is more keenly aware of the danger of tritheism in the doctrine of the pactum salutis. He fully explains the doctrine in Exercitation XXVIII in Part IV of Exercitations on Hebrews. A comprehensive formulation of the eternal personal transactions which correspond with the pactum salutis is also found in Exercitation XXVII of the Hebrews commentary. Section 2 of Exercitation XXVII deals with “personal transactions in the holy Trinity”

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225 According to van Asselt, it seems that Owen studied Cocceius’s writings very carefully. In his Exposition of Hebrews, Owen used several of Cocceius’s commentaries and followed his formative work on the double covenant idea including his teaching on the arbor vitae in the Garden of Eden as one of the sacraments of the foedus operum. Van Asselt, “Covenant Theology as Relational Theology,” 67.

226 Owen, Works, 19:42-76.
concerning human beings. In section 8 of Exercitation XXVII, Owen proves the personal internal transactions in the holy Trinity with respect to humanity. He argues that “there were peculiar, internal, personal transactions between the Father, Son, and Spirit.”

The mutual distinct actings and concurrence of the several persons in the Trinity are expressed “by way of deliberation” (in genere deliberativo). “An anthropopathy must be allowed” in the formulation, writes Owen, “because we can no otherwise determine or act.” In section 18 of Exercitation XXVII, Owen confirms the eternal transactions between the Father and Son about the redemption of humanity. He contends that various scriptural texts, such as Ps 110:1, Rom 1:4, and Heb 5:5, show that “there were eternal transactions between the Father and Son concerning the redemption of mankind by his interposition or mediation.” Owen himself writes that he treats the pactum salutis at large in his Hebrews Exercitations XXVIII, Vol. II. There Owen claims that “personal transactions between the Father and Son about the redemption of mankind, [are] federal.” The transactions were carried on “‘per modum fœderis,’ ‘by way of covenant,’ compact, and mutual agreement, between the Father and the Son.” Owen suggests four requirements for a transaction to be a covenant: (1) there should be “distinct persons” in the agreement; (2) the agreement “must be voluntary”; (3) the agreement

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228 Owen, Works, 19:58.
230 Owen, Works, 19:76.
232 Owen, Works, 19:77.
233 Owen, Works, 19:77.
“must be of things in the power of them who convent and agree about them, otherwise it would be vain and ineffectual; and (4) the end of a covenant is “the disposal of the things about which the covenant is made to the mutual content and satisfaction of all persons concerned.” Within this general category of covenant, there is a more specific subset which involves three elements—(1) A proposal of service; (2) A promise of reward; and (3) An acceptance of the proposal. Continues Owen, the divine transaction between the Father and Son about the redemption of humankind is of this nature. He offers many scriptural evidences to argue his point. Everywhere in Scripture the “expression of being a God to anyone” is “declarative of a covenant.” In this vein Owen discusses several passages in which God the Father is called by Christ “his” God (for instance, Pss 2:8, 16:2, 22:1, 40:8, 45:7; John 20:17; Revelation 3:12). All these references point to a divine covenant between the Father and the Son. Owen also comments on some biblical passages which, to him, are directly related to the pactum salutis.

After demonstrating the covenant character of the eternal transactions between the Father and the Son both in doctrinal and biblical points of view, Owen tries to prove that the doctrine of the pactum salutis is compatible with the doctrine of the Trinity. He offers a nuanced account of the unity of the will of the persons more comprehensively in this work than in previous works. The argument is composed of three major themes of which

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234 Owen, Works, 19:82-83.

235 Owen, Works, 19:84.

236 Owen, Works, 19:84.

237 Owen writes, “Zech. 6:13, וַﬠֲצַת שָׁל֔וֹם תִּהְיֶ֖ה בֵּ֥ין שְׁנֵיהֶֽם. The counsel about peace-making between God and man was ‘between them both;’ that is, the two persons spoken of,—namely, the Lord Jehovah, and he who was to be חַמֶצ, ‘The Branch.’” Owen, Works, 19:85.
key words are voluntariness, mutual in-being, and habitude.

First, Owen developed the notion of the “voluntariness” of the will of the Father and the Son in the *pactum* doctrine in his commentary on Hebrews. He already articulated the doctrine of the unity of the will of the Trinity in his *pactum* formulation in *Vindiciae Evangelicae*. In his commentary on Hebrews, he offers more nuanced adumbration. Owen writes on the eternal transactions, “although it should seem that because they are single acts of the same divine understanding and will, they cannot be properly federal, yet because those properties of the divine nature are acted distinctly in the distinct persons, they have in them the nature of a covenant.” Here, Owen does not surmise a distinction of various wills in the Godhead, but depicts the distinct application of the same will of the three persons toward the *pactum salutis*. The will of the Father and Son concurred in this covenant. The will of the Father is in the highest liberty. The Father was at liberty to leave all the fallen human beings under sin and the curse. By grace, however, he decreed to save them. His will proceeds “from love acting by choice.”

Owen writes:

> Let none, then, once imagine that this work of entering into covenant about the salvation of mankind was any way necessary unto God, or that it was required by virtue of any of the essential properties of his nature, so that he must have done against them in doing otherwise. God was herein absolutely free, as he was also in his making of all things out of nothing. He could have left it undone without the least disadvantage unto his essential glory or contrariety unto his holy nature. Whatever, therefore, we may afterwards assert concerning the necessity of satisfaction to be given unto his justice, upon the supposition of this covenant, yet the entering into this covenant, and consequently all that ensued thereon, is

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absolutely resolved into the mere will and grace of God.\textsuperscript{241}

In his own choice and liberty, the Father sent the Son and gave him promises of the \textit{pactum salutis}. None exercised authority over the will of God. If God did not make the \textit{pactum} freely, it would not be grace. The \textit{pactum salutis} over the salvation of humanity proceeded from the love and freedom of God. The will of the Son was distinct in the \textit{pactum}. In his divine nature and will the Son undertook voluntarily for the work of his person. He voluntarily determined to assume the human nature.\textsuperscript{242} Continues Owen:

\begin{quote}
To manifest that those very acts which he had in command from his Father were no less the acts of his own will. Wherefore, as it is said that the Father loved us, and gave his Son to die for us; so also it is said that the Son loved us, and gave himself for us, and washed us in his own blood. These things proceeded from and were founded in the will of the Son of God; and it was an act of perfect liberty in him to engage into his peculiar concernments in this covenant. What he did, he did by choice, in a way of condescension and love. And this his voluntary susception of the discharge of what he was to perform, according to the nature and terms of this covenant, was the ground of the \textit{authoritative mission}, sealing, and commanding, of the Father towards him.\textsuperscript{243}
\end{quote}

The will of the Father and the will of the Son are distinct but not different in the \textit{pactum}. The Son of God voluntarily obeys the will of the Father and serves his purposes in the establishment and realization of the \textit{pactum}. The will of Christ expressed in the Scriptures is a representation of the will of the Son of God. He freely undertook to do and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{241} Owen, \textit{Works}, 19:86.

\footnote{242} Owen, \textit{Works}, 19:86.

\footnote{243} Owen, \textit{Works}, 19:87 (author’s emphasis). For the idea of the Father’s mission (or sending) of the Son, see Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, 4.19-20; Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologiae}, Ia, q. 43. Both Augustine (\textit{De Trinitate}, 4.20.28) and Aquinas (\textit{Summa Theologiae}, Ia, q. 43, a.2) distinguish the mission of the Word in the incarnation and in the preaching. Aquinas calls the former “His [the Son’s] visible mission, by becoming man” and the latter “His invisible mission, by dwelling in man” (\textit{Summa Theologiae}, Ia, q. 43, a.2, co).
\end{footnotes}
suffer whatever on his part was required. Although he was in the form of God, he
humbled himself unto this work (Phil 2:5-8), and by his own voluntary consent was
engaged therein.244 “Whereas, therefore, he had a sovereign and absolute power over his
own human nature when assumed,” writes Owen, “whatever he submitted unto, it was no
injury unto him, nor injustice in God to lay it on him.”245 The voluntariness and unity of
the will of the Father and the will of the Son secure the harmonization between the
doctrine of the pactum salutis and the doctrine of the Trinity. In the pactum, the will of
the Father appoints the Son as mediator and promises that he would protect, strengthen,
and help him in the accomplishment of his work, and that his mission would be
successful and achieve its purpose. The will of the Son voluntarily accepts the role of
mediator. Thus, Owen’s doctrine of the pactum involves no necessary tritheism.

Second, Owen furthers his thought with the notion of the “mutual in-being” of the
three persons of the Trinity. In the pactum salutis, a distinction of will for Father and Son
is proposed. This could be (mis)understood as the Father and the Son began to have one
will only after the pactum. Then, is Owen not surreptitiously moving towards a kind of
tritheism of the two persons having two separate wills?246 Keenly aware of the problem,

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244 Owen, Works, 19:87.

245 Owen, Works, 19:87. This last sentence can be a basis to oppose the so-called “Divine Child Abuse theory,” as found in the work of Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker. Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, “For God So Loved the World?,” in Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique, ed. Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (New York, NY: Pilgrim Press, 1989), 1–30; Joanne Carlson Brown, “Divine Child Abuse?,” Daughters of Sarah 18 (1992): 24–28. Against the theory, Garry Williams rightly argues: “when the Lord Jesus Christ died he was a child in the sense that he was a son, but not in the sense that he was a minor. As an adult, he had a mature will and could choose whether or not to cooperate with his Father. So we are in fact looking at a father and an adult son who will together for the father to inflict suffering on the son, as we have seen in our Trinitarian exposition.” Garry J. Williams, “Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 50, no. 1 (2007): 83.

246 Trueman poses a similar question but does not substantiate Owen’s theory of “habitude.”
Owen formulates the issue in a syllogistic form.247

A. The will is a natural or essential property, and therefore in the divine essence it is but one.

B. The Father, Son, and Spirit, have no distinct wills because they are one God, and God’s will is one, as being an essential property of his nature.248

C. How, then, can it be said that the will of the Father and the will of the Son did concur distinctly in the making of this covenant?

If two different wills are proposed in the pactum salutis, such a position would clearly endanger the oneness of the Trinity. This is a point of which Owen himself felt the force. To solve the difficulty, he enunciates what he treated in Vindiciae Evangelicae. He acknowledges that the will of God belongs to the divine nature, so that there is only one will in the Godhead. There are, however, distinct actings in the Trinity. Owen argues:

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248 Owen does not consider here the relation between Christ’s two wills and the unity of will of the Trinity. As far as I can determine, there is no place in Owen’s works which directly deals with the issue. In a relevant passage, he writes, “There is a threefold communication of the divine nature unto the human in this hypostatical union. (1.) Immediate in the person of the Son. This is subsistence. In itself it is ἀνυπόστατος,—that which hath not a subsistence of its own, which should give it individuation and distinction from the same nature in any other person. But it hath its subsistence in the person of the Son, which thereby is its own. The divine nature, as in that person, is its suppositum. (2.) By the Holy Spirit he filled that nature with an all-fullness of habitual grace; which I have at large explained elsewhere. (3.) In all the acts of his office, by the divine nature, he communicated worth and dignity unto what was acted in and by the human nature. . . . Wherefore, concerning the communion of the natures in this personal union, three things are to be observed, which the Scripture, reason, and the ancient church, do all concur in. (1.) Each nature doth preserve its own natural, essential properties, entirely unto and in itself; without mixture, without composition or confusion, without such a real communication of the one unto the other, as that the one should become the subject of the properties of the other. The Deity, in the abstract, is not made the humanity, nor on the contrary. The divine nature is not made temporary, finite, limited, subject to passion or alteration by this union; nor is the human nature rendered immense, infinite, omnipotent. Unless this be granted, there will not be two natures in Christ, a divine and a human; nor indeed either of them, but somewhat else, composed of both. (2.) Each nature operates in him according unto its essential properties. The divine nature knows all things,-upholds all things, rules all things, acts by its presence everywhere; the human nature was born, yielded obedience, died, and rose again. But it is the same person, the same Christ, that acts all these things,—the one nature being his no less than the other. Wherefore,—(3.) The perfect, complete work of Christ, in every act of his mediatory office,—in all that he did as the King, Priest, and Prophet of the church.” Owen, Works, 1:233-34.
for such is the distinction of the persons in the unity of the divine essence, as that they act in natural and essential acts *reciprocally* one towards another,—namely, in understanding, love, and the like; they know and mutually love each other. And as they subsist distinctly, so they also act distinctly in those works which are of external operation. And whereas all these acts and operations, whether reciprocal or external, are either with a will or from a freedom of will and choice, the will of God in each person, as to the peculiar acts ascribed unto him, is his will therein peculiarly and eminently, though not exclusively to the other persons, by reason of their mutual *in-being*.249

There are two kinds of distinct actings in the Godhead—one is reciprocal, and the other is external. First, the three persons of the Trinity know and mutually love each other. In this reciprocal knowing and loving, the acting of the three persons can be differentiated. Second, the three persons also act distinctly in external operations. Although the external operations of the Trinity cannot be separable, they would terminate in one distinct person. These two kinds of distinct actings are from a freedom of will of each person, but the will of the three persons always concurs with the others. The will of God in each person does not act “exclusively to the other persons, by reason of their mutual *in-being*.”250 Owen appropriates here the notion of the mutual in-being of the three persons of the Trinity. The notion is expressed not only in the classic patristic teaching of *perichoresis* but also endorsed in Aquinas’ theology.251 The doctrine of the mutual in-being of the three persons enables Owen to distinguish the one will in each person. The will of the persons is distinguished in the mode of their subsistence. “The will of God as to the peculiar actings of the Father in this matter is the will of the Father, and the will of God with regard unto the peculiar actings of the Son is the will of the Son,” argues Owen, “not by a


251 For a detailed discussion, see the discussion of 3.3.3.2.
distinction of sundry wills, but by the distinct application of the same will unto its *distinct acts* in the persons of the Father and the Son.”²⁵² The Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as subsisting principles of operation, demonstrate the one will of the divine nature in accordance with their mode and order of subsistence.²⁵³

Third, Owen relates his doctrines of voluntariness and mutual in-being with the idea of habitude. He argues that the *pactum salutis* differs from “a pure decree” because “from these distinct actings of the will of God in the Father and the Son there doth arise a new *habitude* or relation, which is not natural or necessary unto them, but freely taken on them.”²⁵⁴ All believers have been saved since the foundation of the world by virtue of this new habitude. It is the foundation of “the account of the interposition of the Son of God antecedently unto his exhibition in the flesh.”²⁵⁵ Owing to the new habitude, the Son was “esteemed to have done and suffered what he had undertaken so to do, and which, through faith, was imputed unto them that did believe.”²⁵⁶ Owen’s idea of habitude was already presented in his work, *Vindiciae Evangelicae*, which was published more than ten years before his commentary on Hebrews appeared. In *Vindiciae Evangelicae*, Owen enunciated that the moment, in which the new habitude arises, does not belong to time. It seems that he regarded it as belonging to logical succession. This


²⁵³ Owen, *Works*, 12:201-3. For “the mode of subsisting,” see note 107. The term was used generally to indicate the mode or manner of the individual existence of any thing and, in this general sense, the early modern Reformed theologians also applied the conception to describe the *ad extra* works of the three persons of the Trinity. Cf. Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 3.27.16.


new habitude is not natural or necessary to the three persons of the Trinity, but freely taken on by them. Thus, the salvation of the fallen humanity comes from the freedom of God. The will of the Trinity concurs in this new habitude.

3.3.3. Aquinas’ Theory of Habitude and Mutual In-Being

3.3.3.1. Aquinas’ Theory of Habitude

When Owen offers the ideas of mutual in-being and habitude, he cites no source. It is very clear, however, that his argument represents an application of the Thomistic formulation of trinitarian logic to the problems of tritheism.257 According to Christopher Cleveland who studied Thomism in Owen, there are four categories into which Thomistic influence on Owen falls.258 First, there is direct quotation of Thomas. Second, there is the use of a Thomistic theological concept, with identical or similar terminology to Thomas or Thomist authors. This is the most common type of Thomistic influence in Owen. Third, there is the use of similar but not identical principles. Fourth, there are times at which Owen and Thomas merely coincide in their thoughts, usually because they are borrowing from a common source such as Augustine. In Cleveland’s analysis, this type is somewhat rare. Owen’s endorsement of the ideas of mutual in-being and habitude falls into the second category. Although Owen does not cite directly the work of Aquinas, his conceptions of these theological terms are almost identical with those of Aquinas, as

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257 Trueman notes that Owen’s idea of mutual in-being was “a fruitful application of the Boethian tradition of Trinitarian logic to the problems raised by Reformed Orthodox formulations of predestination.” Trueman suggests as evidences the documents of Boethius, De Trinitate and Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 28, but he does not deal with those documents. Trueman, The Claims of Truth, 136n106.

258 Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen, 3.
the below evidences show.

The notion of habitude, most of all, can be traced in Aristotle’s work. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle dealt with the notion in relation to his virtue theory. For him, virtues arise out of practice in a form that is called “habit.” Habit is obtained by repetitive actions. The production of moral habits by repeated moral actions will result in moral virtues. It is noteworthy that for Aristotle habit does not arise from nature but is consistent with nature. Thomas Aquinas inherited the Aristotelian notion of habit. “Thomas draws so heavily on Aristotle,” as Bonnie Kent puts it, “that he seems at first glance to be following ancient thought quite closely.”

Like Aristotle, Thomas places habits in close connection to action. He also agrees with Aristotle that as a rule, habits are caused by the repetition of acts. Thomas contends that the habit is an aspect of the

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260 Cleveland, *Thomism in John Owen*, 71. Aristotle writes, “From this it is also plain that none of the moral excellences arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do excellences arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit” (εξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθέν γάρ τῶν φύσει ἀντικτὸν ἄλλος ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυρίακις αὐτὸν ἐθιζή τις ἄνω ρυπτόν, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλος ἄν ἐθισθείη, οὐτ' ἂρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ περικόπτει μὲν ἡμῖν δὲξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους). Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a18–25. The English translation is cited from Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:1742–43.

261 Kent, “Habits and Virtues Ia-IIae, qqs. 49-70,” 117.


263 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia Iae, q. 51, a. 3. “Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act” (Ergo habitus virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non
nature of a subject whereby it is able to act in a certain manner. Thomas, like Aristotle, claims that habit is a quality. For Thomas a habit is a condition, as Cleveland puts it, “that whereby any subject possesses a certain quality, and the corresponding action is that whereby that subject acts in accordance with that habit.”\textsuperscript{264} It should be noted that when Thomas deals with the “habitude” of God, he omits the repetitive character of habits.\textsuperscript{265} Although Cleveland applies the Thomistic notion of habit to Owen’s formulation of sanctification, it is obvious that Owen endorsed the notion in his formulation of the pactum salutis with regard to the Trinity. Owen takes from Aristotle the idea that habits do not arise from nature but are consistent with nature. But he, like Thomas, discarded the idea that the habitude of the Godhead does not arise from repetitive acts.

Aquinas argues that there are “four real relations” in God, which are “paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession.”\textsuperscript{266} Real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those four internal actions. If no real paternity or filiation existed in God, argues Aquinas, “it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.”\textsuperscript{267} Aquinas makes it clear that “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility.”\textsuperscript{268} In God, relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one

\textsuperscript{264} Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen, 75.

\textsuperscript{265} Aquinas uses the same Latin word “habitus” to denote “habit” and “habitude.” Compare the word “habitus” in Ia Iae, q. 51, a. 3 and Ia, q. 28, a. 2, ad 1.

\textsuperscript{266} Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 28, a. 4.

\textsuperscript{267} Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 28, a. 1, co.

\textsuperscript{268} Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, co.
and the same. Other predicaments in the Godhead, beside the essence and the internal relation of the three persons, are expressed as “habitude” in Aquinas’ trinitarian theology. He writes:

These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation.

So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to the habitude wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the habitude of identity; and this by reason of God’s supreme simplicity.

There are other relations in the Godhead beside the mode of substance (i.e., paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession). Aquinas calls this relation “habitude.” Owen endorses this notion of “habitude” in his doctrine of the pactum salutis. The habitude

269 In Objection 1 of Ia, q. 28, a. 2, Aquinas cited Augustine’s De Trinitate, v that “not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance.”

270 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, ad 1 (emphasis mine). I corrected a little bit of the translation of Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920), which omits the important word “habitude” twice. “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verba illa Augustini non pertinent ad hoc, quod paternitas, vel alia relatio quae est in deo, secundum esse suum non sit idem quod divina essentia; sed quod non praedicatur secundum modum substantiae, ut existens in eo de quo dicitur, sed ut ad alterum se habens.

271 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2. Aquinas writes, “Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of signification” (emphasis mine).

272 In Owen, “habitude” means the state of a person or a thing with relation to something else.
of the Godhead in Owen’s *pactum* is a new relation *ad extra*. It does not belong to the nature or essence of God not only because it arises from the divine freedom but because it is not the mode of substance. It belongs to the distinct *ad extra* work of the mode of subsistence.\(^{273}\) In addition, Aquinas argues that the generation of the Son is necessary, but that creation is a voluntary act of God according to habitue.\(^{274}\) Likewise, the Father’s mission of the Son for the salvation of the fallen humanity is done by habitue.\(^{275}\) For Aquinas, thus, the redemptive work of God is consistent with the divine nature but is not a necessary work for God. When Owen argues that the habitue of the distinct actings of the will of the Father and the Son in the *pactum salutis* “is not natural or necessary unto them, but freely taken on them,” his conception of the habitue is exactly the same with that of Aquinas. The habitue differs from the internal relationship of paternity and filiation but is related to the redemptive work. It is consistent with the nature of God but is not a necessary work for him.

### 3.3.3.2. Aquinas’ Theory of Mutual In-Being

Owen’s idea of mutual in-being of the three persons of the Trinity also sides with the

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\(^{273}\) For the subsistent relations of the Trinity in Aquinas’ theology, see Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas*, 114–19.

\(^{274}\) Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, q. 41, a. 2, co. “I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will—that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitue of a principle as it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that *sense it must be said that God the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will*” (emphasis mine).

\(^{275}\) Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, q. 43, a. 1, co.
Thomistic tradition. In his entire works, Owen uses the notion of mutual in-being just once besides the above text. He writes:

That Jesus Christ in his divine nature, as he was the eternal Word and Wisdom of the Father, not by a voluntary communication, but eternal generation, had an omniscience of the whole nature and will of God, as the Father himself hath, because the same with that of the Father, their will and wisdom being the same. This is the blessed συμπεριχώρησις, or in-being of each person, the one in the other, by virtue of their oneness in the same nature. Thus, as God, he had an absolute omniscience. Moreover, the mystery of the gospel, the eternal counsel and covenant of it concerning the redemption of the elect in his blood, and the worship of God by his redeemed ones, being transacted between Father and Son from all eternity, was known unto him as the Son, by virtue of his own personal transactions with the Father in the eternal counsel and covenant of it. See what we have elsewhere delivered concerning that covenant.276

Owen is convinced that Jesus Christ is omniscient because of the mutual in-being.277 The eternal covenant between the Father and the Son is known to Jesus Christ by virtue of his own personal transactions with the Father, of which foundation was the mutual in-being.

The notion of “συμπεριχώρησις, or in-being” can be traced in the Eastern church fathers.278 Owen’s idea of mutual in-being of the three persons of the Trinity, however, also corresponds with the theology of Aquinas.279 This reciprocal in-being finds its most

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277 For some scriptural texts such as John 14:28, Mark 13:32, and Matthew 24:36 in which “the prerogative of God the Father” above Christ is shown, Owen writes, “It is true, there is an order, yea, a subordination, in the persons of the Trinity themselves, whereby the Son, as to his personality, may be said to depend on the Father, being begotten of him; but that is not the subordination here aimed at by Mr B., but that which he underwent by dispensation as mediator, or which attends him in respect of his human nature. All the difficulty that may arise from these kinds of attribution to Christ the apostle abundantly salves in the discovery of the rise and occasion of them, Phil. 2:7–9. He who was in the form of God, and equal to him, was in the form of a servant, whereunto he humbled himself, his servant, and less than he.” Owen, Works, 12:170, 201 (bolds are mine). For a deeper discussion of Matthew 24:36, see 4.3 of this study.

278 Letham points out that Owen endorses here “the classic patristic teaching of perichoresis.” However, he does not note that Aquinas himself used the notion very frequently.

279 For a very persuasive argument for this, see Chapter 12, “The Reciprocal Interiority of the Divine Persons” in Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, 298–311. This paragraph
eloquent expression in John’s Gospel (14:10-11, 10:38). The word “perichoresis,” which can be translated as interpenetration, first appeared in Christology, clearly observable in the seventh century writings of Maximus the Confessor (following Gregory of Nazianzus). In a christological sense, it means that in Christ, the human nature is united and bonded to the divine nature within a reciprocal communication. Through the development of the notion, this Christological terminology was extended to Trinitarian theory by John of Damascus. When it is used in a trinitarian sense, perichoresis means the communal immanence, or the reciprocal interiority of the three persons of the Trinity. Damascene writes:

> We do not say that there are three gods, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, but one God. . . .They are united but not confused, and they are in one another, and this perichoresis, each in the others, is without fusion or mixture.

Perichoresis is an expression of the unconfused unity of the three persons. Through a kind of reciprocal compenetration, each person is contained in the other.

When John Damascene’s work, De fide orthoxoa, was translated into Latin by Burgundio of Pisa, the term “perichoresis” was translated into the Latin terms

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282 Cf. The Confession of Chalcedon.

283 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, 1.8. Cf. De fide orthodoxa, 1.14: “The hypostases remain and are each in the others, for they are inseparably and indivisibly one in the others by their perichoresis, one in the others without confusion, nor in fusion or mixture but by the fact of one being conveyed into the others.”
“circumincessio” and “circuitio” (circulation). In his Commentary on the Sentences, written before Thomas’ commentary, Bonaventure is already fluent in this use of the word “circumincessio.” Thomas uses neither of these Latin words, but he draws on the biblical expression “being in” (cf. John 14:10-11): each person “is in” the other (esse in).

In presenting the “in-being” of the persons, Thomas uses the expressions: union or intrinsic conjunction, interiority, intimacy, existing in, being in that which is the most intimate and most secret (this is how the Son is in the Father), reciprocal communality of “in being,” communal union, etc. For Thomas, as Gilles Emery puts it, the communal presence of the divine persons means a presence in complete equality. It also means that the persons are not just characterized by internal real relations (e.g., filiation) but related with each other by means of a relative acting. For this reason, reciprocal in-being is really only carried off by divine persons. In Owen’s doctrine of the pactum salutis, the notion of “in-being” of the three persons of the Trinity implies these two points—the essential unity of the three persons and their reciprocal relations. To summarize, in Owen’s pactum theory, the key notions of habitude and mutual in-being are nearly identical to that of Thomas on the same subject.

284 For the Latin edition, see John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa (Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus), ed. Eloi Marie Buytaert (New York and Louvain: Franciscan Institute, 1955), 45, 64.

285 Thus, it seems that the two conceptions of “the mode of subsistence” and “the mutual in-being” are used in a similar semantic boundary. In Ioan. 1.1 (no. 45): “conjunctio intrinseca,” “intrinsecum”; Cf. Summa contra Gentiles IV, ch. 11 (no. 3461): “intimum”; In Ioan. 1.1 (no. 32): “existential Filii in Patre”; In Ioan. 1.18 (no. 218); Super Dion. de div. nom. II, lect. 2 (no. 155): “Mutuo enim Pater est in Filio et Filius in Patre.”; Super Dion. de div. nom. II, lect. 2 (no. 148): “unitio ad invicem.” See Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, 302.

286 Aquinas, In Ioan. 10.38 (no. 1466); cf. Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 42, a. 5. Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, 303.

3.4. Conclusion: The Oneness and Threeness of the Trinity in the *Pactum Salutis*

Owen’s doctrine of the Trinity stands along with the Augustinian-Thomistic tradition. He argues that “God is one, in respect of his *nature, substance, essence, Godhead,* or divine being; how, being Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he subsisteth in these three distinct persons or *hypostases.*”[288] Owen firmly maintains the doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis.* The economic work of the three persons of the Trinity is distinct but not separable. He agrees with Augustine that the three persons are distinct but work inseparably in their *opera ad extra.* Owen, like his contemporary Reformed theologians, endorses a basic solution of the doctrine of *terminus operationis* to answer the question of how the work of the three persons of the Trinity is distinct but inseparable. The undivided works of the three persons of the Trinity *ad extra* manifest one or another of the persons as their end or limit of operation (*terminus operationis*). The incarnation of the Son, for example, is willed and effected by the three persons of the Trinity but terminate in the Son alone. The doctrine of *terminus operationis* is a Thomistic legacy, which combines the trinitarian theologies of Augustine and John of Damascus. In his endorsement of Augustine and Damascene, Aquinas argues that assumption is the work of the three persons of the Trinity in principle, but it is the work of the Son in term.

Owen also inherited the two doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis* and applied them in his formulation of the *pactum salutis.* The *pactum* is related to the doctrine of inseparable operations in that the three persons of the Trinity are the common cause of the redemptive work. It is also connected to the doctrine of

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terminus operationis in that the distinctive work of the persons of the Trinity is revealed in the stipulations of the pactum. In Owen’s theology, the doctrine of the pactum salutis not only correspond with the doctrines of inseparable operations and of terminus operationis, but it becomes the nexus of the two doctrines. The pactum salutis is an ad intra transaction among the three persons of the Trinity regarding their ad extra redemptive works.

The present study has two practical applications. Firstly, it points to a theological implication for Owen’s construal of the pactum salutis. The doctrine of the pactum salutis in Owen’s theology not only corresponds with the doctrine of the Trinity but offers an excellent model of how to understand the Trinity. Modern scholars, who believe the doctrine of the pactum contains tendencies to tritheism, tend to interpret the pactum as something for which the closing of the pactum must be preceded by a state in which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were not yet one. Owen makes it clear, however, that this interpretation could never capture the intention of the pactum salutis. Owen’s doctrine of the pactum salutis seems more trinitarian than tritheistic. Secondly, for a constructive dogmatics more generally, this study has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the Trinity. In the doctrine of the pactum salutis there are distinctions in God, but they are distinctions that in no way detract from the oneness of the divine essence and the triunity of the divine persons. The threeness of the persons and their distinct works does not conflict with the oneness of essence. If the real relation of the three persons shows the ad intra distinction of the Trinity, the terminus of the redemptive work shows the ad extra distinction of the Trinity. The pactum is an ad intra agreement with regard to the ad extra redemptive work of the Trinity. It articulates both the oneness
dimension and the threeness dimension of the trinitarian work of redemption. In the non-temporal moment of habitude of the *pactum salutis*, the will of the three persons of the Trinity voluntarily concurs because of their in-being. In the *pactum* of Owen’s trinitarian theology, therefore, God the Trinity is one in his nature and his inseparable operations, three persons subsist both *ad intra* and *ad extra* in mutual in-being, the will of God voluntarily concurs in a new habitude, and the works of God are not separable but terminating in one person. Comprising these conceptions very effectively, Owen’s formulation of the *pactum salutis* is completely trinitarian and magnificently exemplifies the oneness and threeness of the Trinity.
CHAPTER 4

THE *PACTUM SALUTIS* AND CHRISTOLOGY: DAVID DICKSON

4.1. Subordinationism in the *Pactum Salutis*?

This chapter delves into the relationship between the *pactum salutis* and Christology in the theology of David Dickson. It will address the following issues. What are Dickson’s terminology and formulation of the *pactum salutis*? What basic elements does his Christology have? What is the biblical foundation of the mercantile language in his *pactum* formulation? How does he explain the suretyship of Christ in his commentaries of the Scriptures? What is the polemical role of his *pactum* doctrine against the Arminians? How are the divinity and humanity of Christ preserved in his *pactum* formulation? How does he endorse the notion of Christ’s voluntariness in the doctrine? This chapter will argue that the *pactum salutis* does not include the danger of the immanent subordination of Christ but explains the logic of Christ’s economic subordination and obedience to the Father.

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* depicts the Son as the mediator and surety for the redemption of the fallen human beings.\(^1\) The Son obeys the will of the Father to save the elect. Some critics argue that the covenant of redemption between the Father and Christ emerges as subordinationism since it seems to presuppose an unequal alliance between master and servant. The will of the Father is a commandment which he imposes on the

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\(^1\) For recent studies of the *pactum salutis*, see notes 3 and 86 of chapter 1 of this study.
Son with a forceful authority. Johannes Wesselius (1671-1745), a professor of Leiden University, criticized the doctrine claiming that the *pactum salutis* comprises a form of subordinationism.\(^2\) Robert Letham opines that in the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* “strong elements of subordinationism were introduced in the case of the Son.”\(^3\) G. H. Kersten also argues that the covenantal conception between the Father and the Son would be to make the Son subordinate to the Father.\(^4\) For him one party of the *pactum salutis* is the three divine persons, and the other party is the Son who is acting as “the *Servant* of the Father” and is representing the elect.\(^5\) Kersten asserts that the *pactum salutis* should not be a covenant between the Father and the Son in order not to imply subordinationism. In similar lines of thought, Herman Hoeksema argues with regard to the *pactum salutis* (he preferred “counsel of peace”) that “the relation between the one who sends and the one who is sent is a relation of authority.”\(^6\) Though retaining the term *pactum salutis*, he rejected the essence of the traditional doctrine as a legal transaction involving mutual

\(^2\) Wesselius, “Voorrede.” In this study, “subordinationism” is a view that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not merely economically subordinate to the Father, but also subordinate in nature and being. Thus, in this view, the Son and the Holy Spirit are ontologically inferior to the Father.

\(^3\) Letham, *The Work of Christ*, 53. Letham argues incorrectly that the pre-temporal covenant of redemption was “first broached by Cocceius in 1648.” For a pre-history of the doctrine prior to Cocceius, see Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 11–14.


stipulations, conditions and promises. He distinguished between the “covenant God established with Christ as the Servant of the Lord” and the “eternal covenant of the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity.” He charged that the traditional failure to make this distinction has led to the practical denial of “the coequality of the Son with the Father.”

According to Hoeksema, implicit in Louis Berkhof’s formulation was an unintentional denial of the Trinity and subordination of the Son to the Father. Hoeksema advocated a covenant between the triune God and Christ because for him the one who is sent is completely subordinate to his sender. Thus, he does not want to establish the relation between the one who sends and the one who is sent in the Godhead. In a more nuanced approach, Bert Loonstra proposes a revision of the traditional formulation of the pactum salutis by removing any notion of contract from covenant theology. In order not to lean toward Nestorianism, he rejects to locate the pactum salutis in the being of God.

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Loonstra, the traditional construction of the *pactum* has the two divine parties equal in its contracting but unequal in its administration. Thus he excludes the suretyship of the Son in the doctrine and reshapes it to focus on the history of redemption in Christ. In so doing, he tries to make the doctrine to serve as an account of the Son’s voluntary self-humiliation. Questioning the ordering of the divine decrees, Oliver Crisp argues that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* seems to imply “an unwarranted subordination of the Son to the Father in the ordering of the divine decrees” because “the Son’s ‘choice’ to become the Mediator occurs subsequent to the Father decreeing to elect some number of humanity according to his good pleasure and will.” He points out that the Reformed covenant theology, for example that of Herman Witsius, with respect to the election of Christ in the *pactum salutis* “does not lend itself readily to answering questions about the ordering of the divine decrees.” This chapter will show that the inherent logic of the

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14 Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond*, 347–51. A criticism of Loonstra’s view can be found in VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 178. VanDrunen and Clark refer to Owen’s use of the *pactum* to argue, contra the Socinians and Remonstrants, “that the subordination [of the Son to the Father] was not ontological but economic.” They, however, offer no analysis of Owen’s formulation regarding the issue. VanDrunen and Clark, “The Covenant Before the Covenants,” 196.


16 Crisp cites Witsius as follows: “For, as that engagement was nothing but the most glorious act of the divine will of the Son, doing what none but God could do, it implies therefore no manner of subjection: it only imports, that there should be a time, when that divine person, on assuming flesh would appear in the form of a servant. . . . If the Son be considered as God, the whole of this covenant was of his own most free will and pleasure. . . .” Herman Witsius, *The Economy of the Covenants between God and Man: Comprehending a Complete Body of Divinity*, trans. William Crookshank (Escondido, CA: The Den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1990), 180, 184. Crisp, *God Incarnate*, 49n26.

17 Crisp, *God Incarnate*, 49n26. It should be noted, however, that the suretyship of the Son was without any difficulty consistent with his voluntary self-humiliation in many formulations of the *pactum salutis*, as evidenced by Witsius. See 2.2.6 of this study. Also, the will of the Son does not conflict but concur with that of the Father in Owen’s formulation of the *pactum*. See 3.3.2.2 of this study. It is noteworthy that although Crisp criticizes the older Reformed theology with regard to the ordering of the divine decrees, his final conclusion is very similar to the *pactum* formulations of Witsius and Owen in many ways. Especially see his discussion of the *fundamentum electionis* and the *fundamentum salutis* in Crisp, *God Incarnate*, 50, 52.
Reformed doctrine of the *pactum* does not entail subordinationism on the part of the Son. David Dickson (c. 1583-1662), the Scottish Reformed theologian, points out the equality of the two divine parties in the *pactum salutis*. In much of the literature regarding the *pactum*, he emphasizes that the Son concluded the *pactum* not forcefully as a subordinate being but voluntarily as one member of the Trinity. This is the main reason why for him the doctrine of the decree is in effect one with the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. The identification of the eternal decree of redemption and the covenant of redemption in Dickson’s covenantal theology can be more fully understood from this perspective.\(^1\)

4.2. David Dickson’s Christology and the Doctrine of the *Pactum Salutis*

4.2.1. Dickson’s Terminology and Formulation of the *Pactum Salutis*

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was formed as a theological *locus* through the accumulation of biblical exegesis in the early modern Reformed theology, and it was endorsed by many early modern Reformed theologians as a useful artillery to attack the Arminians, the Socinians, and the antinomians.\(^2\) Carol Williams argues that in the history of British theology, “exegesis of Scripture gave grounds for theological formulation on the subject of covenant and led to the conclusion of an intratrinitarian covenantal relationship particularly between the Father and Son for the work of

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\(^1\) Dickson writes, “This covenant of redemption, is in effect one with the eternall decree of redemption,” and “the decree of redemption is in effect a covenant.” David Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra; shewing briefly the method of healing the diseases of the conscience, concerning regeneration: written first in Latine by David Dickson, professor of divinity in the colledge of Edinburgh, and thereafter translated by him* (Edinburgh: Evan Taylor, 1664), Book I, Chap. 4 (p. 25).

\(^2\) For a detailed discussion, see Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 207–18.

\(^2\) Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 11–65
salvation.”21 She points out that “the distinct formulation of the *pactum salutis* was not evident prior to 1638 in British theological circles as a separate covenant.”22

The development of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in Dickson’s theology is in accordance with the above historical observation. He generates and extends the doctrine in his biblical exegesis, and he endorses it in various theological contexts. Dickson’s commentaries are representative of “the typical genuine Scottish commentary,” containing explanation, application, and relevant doctrinal issues of each verse or group of verses of each chapter.23 Dickson’s adumbration of the *pactum salutis* is found in numerous places in his commentaries on Hebrews (1635, 1645, 1659), Paul’s Epistles (1645 in Latin and 1659 in English), Matthew (1647), and Psalms (1653, 1655). The doctrine is very useful to Dickson. The doctrine is seen as one of the core Christian doctrines in *The Summe of Saving Knowledge* (1650). He appropriates it to refute the Arminians in his “Speech to the General Assembly” (1638), and pastorally and practically applies it with regard to the doctrine of regeneration in *Therapeutica Sacra* (Latin edition, 1656; English edition, 1664).

To denote the *pactum salutis*, Dickson uses the terms, “foedus redemptionis,” “pactum inter Patrem & Filium,” “pactum redemptionis,” and “foedus inter Patrem & Christum” in his Latin works, and uses the terms “the covenant of redemption” and “the covenant past between the Father and Christ.”24 Both “pactum redemptionis” and “foedus

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21 Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 117.

22 Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 118.


24 David Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra, Seu, De Curandis Casibus Conscientiae Circa*
“foedus redemptionis,” are found in his comment on Ephesians 2:5-6. The preferred term, “foedus redemptionis,” appears also in his comment on Ephesians 1:3, 2:6; Colossians 1:20; 2 Timothy 1:9; and Titus 1:2. Dickson sometimes refers to this covenant or some aspect of it as “pactum” (Philippians 2:8, Colossians 2:15, Hebrews 1:27) or “foedus inter Patrem & Christum” (Ephesians 1:3). “Pactum salutis,” the other major term used by other theologians in their works, does not appear in his commentary on the epistles. He prefers to use the Latin phrase, “foedus redemptionis,” and its English translation, “the covenant of redemption.”

Although Dickson points toward an initial formulation of the *pactum salutis* in his commentary on Hebrews, it seems that Dickson did not use a specific terminology, such as *Regenerationem, per Faderum Divinorum prudentem applicationem. Libri Tres* (London: Stationariorum, 1656), 18; Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 24. Some of Dickson’s works were published first in Latin for learned people and later translated into English for more audience. According to William Taylor, the theological curriculum in Scotland during Dickson’s period was very demanding. Lectures were usually delivered in Latin, so proficiency was expected of the student at admission. In addition to the knowledge of languages such as Latin and Greek, theological students should study rhetoric, ethics, physics, geometry, history, and the Eastern languages with which theological study is connected. “This course continued for six years,” adds Taylor, “and without those long vacations which have crept into modern education.” William M. Taylor, *The Scottish Pulpit from the Reformation to the Present Day*. (New York: Harper, 1887), 111–12. For an overview of the methodology and contents of the seventeenth century Reformed theological education, see B. Hoon Woo, “The Understanding of Gisbertus Voetius and René Descartes on the Relationship of Faith and Reason, and Theology and Philosophy,” *Westminster Theological Journal* 75, no. 1 (2013): 56–57.

25 For the analysis of Dickson’s terminology of the *pactum salutis* in his commentaries, I have drawn on Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 133–34.


27 Dickson wrote two commentaries on Hebrews—one in 1635, and the other in 1645 in Latin (1659 in English). It is the latter commentary on Hebrews (1645/1659) which contains explicit terms of the *pactum salutis*. Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 161, 166.

28 Dickson, *Expositio analytica omnium apostolicae epistolarvm*, ad loc. Philippians 2:8, Christ is made man not by obligation but “by a voluntary covenant” (*ex pacta voluntaria*); Colossians 2:15, by paying the price of redemption, Christ obtains “by covenant to the Father” (*ex pacta à PATRE*) deliverance of the redeemed from ignorance, sin and death; Hebrews 1:2 Christ is appointed heir “by special covenant” (*ex pactione speciali*).
as foedus redemptionis, pactum inter Patrem & Filium, pactum redemptionis, foedus inter Patrem & Christum and their English equivalents, to denote the doctrine until his 1638 “Speech to the General Assembly.” The above specific terminologies denoting the pactum salutis are easily found in Dickson’s works after 1638. Following the “Speech to the General Assembly,” clear statements of the doctrine are found in his commentaries on Paul’s Epistles of 1645 and at greater length in Matthew commentary of 1647, all predating the publication of the formulations of the doctrine of both Lodewijk de Dieu and Johannes Cocceius in 1648. The commentaries on Psalms and Therapeutica Sacra among others offer the most delicate formulations of the pactum salutis and are also the most important with regard to the issue of subordinationism.

Dickson makes it clear that the covenant of redemption is distinguishable from the covenant of grace. Although most Reformed theologians of the second half of the seventeenth century unanimously regarded the pactum salutis as the foundation of the covenant of grace, there were two main types in the development of the doctrine of the pactum salutis concerning the relationship between the pactum salutis and the covenant

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29 Although Dickson interchangeably uses pactum and foedus to denote covenant, Williams writes, “Dickson seemed to prefer foedus to pactum when speaking particularly of a covenant between God and humanity, though there are exceptions. Foedus is employed consistently for: the covenant of works, foedus operum; foedus legale and rarely legis pactum, the legal covenant or the old legal covenant under the Levitical priesthood, along with its parties, conditions and punishment for sin; foedus gratiae, the covenant of grace; and novum foedus, whether the new covenant with Israel and Judah or the new covenant of the gospel.” Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 131.

30 Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 161. Cf. Dieu, Animadversiones in Veteris Testamenti libros omnes, 728; Cocceius, Summa Doctrinae, 5.27. Robert Letham argues that when John Owen wrote The Death of Death in the Death of Christ in 1650, “the idea of the pactum salutis was new, advocated first in developed form by Cocceius only two years earlier.” Letham also argues that the doctrine of the pactum salutis was given extended treatment for the first time by Cocceius, Summa Doctrina. Robert Letham, “John Owen’s Doctrine of the Trinity in Its Catholic Context,”, 185, 194n50. It should be noted, however, that Dickson already developed an extended treatment of the pactum salutis in Hebrews commentary (1645) and Matthew commentary (1647).
of grace. The first type, which distinguished the *pact* from the covenant of grace, stems from Cocceius and Dickson, and includes theologians such as Patrick Gillespie, Obadiah Sedgwick, John Owen, Thomas Goodwin, Samuel Rutherford, and Peter Bulkeley. They argue that the pact was on the side of the triune God’s eternal counsel, and that the covenant of grace pointed to the temporal covenanting in salvation history. For the first type, the eternal *pact* concerns the elect only, and the covenant of grace embraces a broader category than the elect. The second type was developed by Thomas Boston and the particular Baptist John Gill. John Brown of Haddington, Edmund Calamy, Alexander Comrie, and many so-called Antinomians belong to this type. They maintain that the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace are one and the same covenant. Dickson stands for the first type and is convinced that the covenant of redemption differs from the covenant of grace. In his “Speech to the General Assembly,” Dickson declares that the *pactum salutis* between the Father and the Son is not to be confused with the covenant of grace which God makes with humanity concerning salvation. The intratrinitarian covenant of redemption precedes and grounds the covenant of grace between God and the elect. Dickson’s formulation of the *pactum salutis* can be

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33 Gill contends that the covenant of redemption and the covenant of grace are one covenant, and that they denote the same transaction under different considerations. Gill, *A Complete Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity*, 1:303, 309–11, 491. For a helpful discussion, see Muller, “The Spirit and the Covenant,” 7–8.

summed up as presented in his later work, *Therapeutica Sacra*. The covenant of redemption is an intratrinitarian pact which was agreed upon among the three persons of the Trinity regarding the designation of the mediator to save the elect, wisely and powerfully to be converted and sanctified owing to the Son of God’s satisfaction and obedience.35

4.2.2. The Relationship of Christology and the *Pactum Salutis* in Dickson’s Major Works

4.2.2.1. Sermons

Dickson connects Christology with the *pactum salutis* in many of his works. He alludes for the first time in his literature to the *pactum salutis* in his sermon on 2 Timothy 2:19, without specific terminology. He endorses the doctrine to assure the elect that God “knows them, while he calls them to his kingdom of both grace and glory; he knows them, when it was agreed betwixt him and his Son about the price of their redemption, when he gave them to Christ, and Christ took in hand to satisfy for them.”36 Dickson argues that Christ paid the price of redemption to the Father for the elect. The mercantile language of the redemption price is a theme recurrent in Dickson’s works with regard to the *pactum salutis*. Some critics of Dickson’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* criticize that the trinitarian involvement expressed in Dickson’s works as a human contract makes the relationship between God and humanity dispassionately legal, mercantile, and conditional.

35 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 25.

36 David Dickson, *Select practical writings of David Dickson*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1845), 101 (italics mine).
For example, C. G. M’Crie avers that *The Summe of Saving Knowledge* of Dickson and Durham is objectionable in form and application because it describes redemption “as a bargain entered into between the first and second Persons of the Trinity in which conditions were laid down, promises held out, and pledges given, the reducing of salvation to a mercantile arrangement between God and the sinner, in which the latter signifies contentment to enter into a relation of grace, so that ever after the contented, contracting part can say, ‘Lord, let it be a bargain.’”\(^{37}\) M’Crie contends that such presentations have obviously a tendency to reduce the Gospel of the grace to the level of a legal compact entered into between two independent and equal parties.\(^{38}\) “The blessedness of the mercy-seat is in danger of being lost sight of in the bargaining of the marketplace,” continues M’Crie, “the simple story of salvation is thrown into the crucible of the logic of the schools and it emerges in the form of a syllogism.”\(^{39}\) Along the same lines of thought, M. C. Bell criticizes Dickson for using the common mercantile terminology of the day that led people to conceive of God’s covenants in terms of their own bilateral, conditional, social contracts, thereby distorting the nature of grace, which is free and unconditional.\(^{40}\) T. F. Torrance also asserts that the Gospel formulation of *The Summe of Saving Knowledge* of Dickson and Durham expressed “in popular mercantile terms . . . appears to have had the effect of undermining any suggestion as to


\(^{38}\) M’Crie, *The confessions of the Church of Scotland*, 72.

\(^{39}\) M’Crie, *The confessions of the Church of Scotland*, 72–73. Moral’Crie also identified the Father and the Son in covenant as “two equal parties,” which distinguishes him from the other critics of the doctrine and of Dickson.

the unconditional nature of saving grace, as in the citation from Isaiah 55.1-5.\textsuperscript{41} Dickson’s use of mercantile language in his \textit{pactum} formulation, however, is based on biblical exegesis. Scripture itself uses mercantile language (i.e., redemption) to offer patterns of explanation of salvation.\textsuperscript{42} Jesus’ innocent life became the ransom price for the redemption of humanity. The New Testament passage used to support this idea came from the very lips of Jesus: “The Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom (\textit{λύτρον}) for many” (Matt 20:28; Mark 10:45; cf. 1 Tim 2:6). Therefore, as Carol Williams puts it, Dickson’s use of mercantile language is neither secularly derived nor innovative, but shows conscious and careful borrowing of the biblical language and imagery.\textsuperscript{43}

4.2.2.2. Explanation of the Epistle to the Hebrews

Some indications of the \textit{pactum salutis} are found in Dickson’s early commentary, although he does not use precise \textit{pactum salutis} terminology. He wrote two commentaries on Hebrews—one, taken from his sermons, appeared as a single volume (first published

\textsuperscript{41} Thomas F. Torrance, \textit{Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John Mcleod Campbell} (T. & T. Clark, 1996), 119. Torrance agrees with C. G. M’Crie that “the effect of this formalisation of the plan of salvation in the language of the market-place was to mislead” (at p. 122).

\textsuperscript{42} Modern scholarship also supports the idea. Joel Green and Mark Baker argue that the saving effect of Christ’s death is explained in the Bible through five constellations of images borrowed from the public life of the ancient Mediterranean world—the court of law (justification), the world of commerce (redemption), personal relationships (reconciliation), worship (sacrifice), and the battleground (triumph over evil). Mark D. Baker and Joel B. Green, \textit{Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament and Contemporary Contexts}, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011), 41. John Driver also points out that the New Testament adopts ten different imageries including “redemption” to represent the salvation of Christ. John Driver, \textit{Understanding the Atonement for the Mission of the Church} (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1986).

\textsuperscript{43} For more criticisms of Dickson’s use of mercantile language and persuasive refutations against them, see Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 28–30, 38–44, 153–58. For a defense of the use of mercantile language of Owen and Goodwin, see Jones, \textit{Why Heaven Kissed Earth}, 134.
in 1635, and then reprinted in 1645 and 1659), and the other, taken from his lectures, was published in his commentary on Apostles’ Epistles (1645 in Latin and 1659 in English). Dickson’s commentaries on Hebrews (1635, 1645, 1659) shows no definite evidence of major alternations in covenantal ideas. They present a two-covenant system with signals pointing toward the doctrine of the covenant of redemption. In his later commentary on Hebrews 1:2, Dickson argues that “by the eternal appointment of God to his Mediatorship, and by special Covenant, hee [Christ] is appointed Heir.” Dickson offers nine arguments to prove the incomparable excellency of Christ: (1) Christ made “our condition under the Gospel,” which is better than “the condition of the Fathers under the law.” Christ is superior to Old Testament prophets who were acted on by the Spirit of Christ; (2) Christ is by nature born “Heir, or Lord Proprietor, of all the creatures in heaven and earth; (3) The Father made the world by Christ; (4) Christ was “begotten of the substance of the Father, who, although the Father never was without him, nor can bee, yet hee is distinct from the Father, and eternally undivided, by whom the Father reveals and communicates his glory”; (5) Christ is the express image or character of the person of the Father; (6) Christ upholds, supports, preserves all creatures in heaven and earth, by

44 David Dickson, A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes (Aberdeen: Edw. Raban, 1635).

45 Dickson, Expositio analytica omnium apostolicae epistolarum; David Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with an explanation of those other epistles of the apostles; st. James, Peter, John & Jude: wherein the sense of every chapter and verse is analytically unfolded, and the text enlightened (London: R. I. for Francis Egglesfield, 1659).

46 Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 161, 166.

47 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 185.

48 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 185.

49 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 185.
the divine word of his power, or the virtue of his deity; (7) He has obtained and purchased the purging of our sins fully as the high priest; (8) After the expiation of our sins, by himself alone once made, covenant sat down as king of the church at the right hand of the Majesty; and (9) The name of the Son of God belongs to Christ, and “according to his Divinity by eternal Generation, the whole Divine Essence being communicated to him; And further according to his Humanity, not by Adoption, but this Name is given to him by union, so that the same person which was the Son of God to bee incarnate, is now the Son of God incarnate, his humane Nature being taken unto the unity of the second Person.”

It is noteworthy that Dickson emphasizes the coequality of the Son and the Father (e.g., the fourth and ninth arguments above) on the same page where he offers the idea of the *pactum salutis*. He never thinks of any kind of subordination of the Son in the eternal appointment or the special covenant for the installation of the Son’s mediatorship.

Dickson’s comments on Hebrews 1:5 in the early and later commentaries contain a reference to Psalms 2:7. Although his comments on Hebrews 1:5 do not contain idea or language of the *pactum salutis*, his commentary on Psalm 2:7-8, dated 1655, has the discussion of the *pactum salutis* four times and expresses it as “the Covenant of Redemption,” “the decreed agreement between God the Father and the Son in the Covenant of Redemption,” and “the Fathers compact with the Son.” In his early

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50 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 185–86.


comment on Hebrews 1:5, Dickson maintains that God has many sons “by Creation, by Office, by Grace, and Adoption,” yet he has only son, Christ, “by Generation.” He continues:

Christ is of the same Nature, and Essence, with the Father, consubstantially with him; because begotten of him, in himselfe, without beginning; the Sonne being eternallie in the Father, and the Father eternallie in the Sonne, of the selfe-same Nature, and Godhead.

This line of thought continues in Dickson’s later commentary on Hebrews 1:5. He argues that this biblical passage with Acts 3:33 and Romans 1:4 manifests “the Deity of Christ, which hee had from Eternity, before hee was manifested in his Resurrection from the dead.” Explicating Psalms 2:7 referenced in both commentaries on Hebrews 1:5, Dickson depicts Christ as “the substantial Word of the Father; and who before the world was created, was with God, and was God, John 1.1, 2.” Dickson’s Christological exegesis of the Hebrews passage and the related Psalms passage shows a strong affinity with the ancient creeds such as the Nicene Creed (325) and the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (381). He argues the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son when he thinks of the pactum salutis.

Dickson does not use a specific pactum language in his early commentary of Hebrews. There, however, he deals with the issue of the suretyship of Christ, which is an

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53 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 12.

54 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 10.

55 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 10–11.

56 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 186.

57 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 11.
interrelated theme with the *pactum* formulation. Dickson comments on Hebrews 7:22 that “the Father hath consented, and ordained, and made him Suretie.”\(^{58}\) Although Dickson deals with the covenant of grace in this passage, he does not offer subordinationism. Rather, he points out the God-man character of Christ. He writes, “GOD hath CHRIST to craue, for our performance of the Covenant: and wee haue Christ to craue, for GOD’S parte of the Covenant.”\(^{59}\) In the 1645 commentary on Hebrews 7:22 Dickson depicts Christ as surety, *sponsor*, of the covenant of grace with regard to the excellency of his priesthood.\(^{60}\) The 1659 English version of the commentary draws the same idea, in which Christ is described as “the Surety of a Covenant so much the more excellent.”\(^{61}\) Dickson writes that “where there is a Priest, there is a Covenant, the Surety whereof is a Priest.”\(^{62}\) As the true priest of the surety of the covenant of grace, Christ gave satisfaction to God for our debt so that “as the friends of God in the Covenant of Grace woe should walk to life eternal.”\(^{63}\)

Both in the early version and the later version of the Hebrews commentary, Dickson

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58 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 133.

59 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 133.


61 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 196.

62 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 196.

sometimes does not clearly distinguish the intratrinitarian covenant from the covenant of grace with the elect. In his early comment on Hebrews 1:9, Dickson writes, “God is his [Christ’s] God by Covenant: Christ, as Man, is confederate with God. . . . And hee hath FELLOWES in the Covenant: that is, others of mankynde.”64 The later commentary of Hebrews continues the thought of Christ’s fellows in the covenant of grace (foedus gratiae). Dickson writes, “That one part of that Covenant of grace, which hee [Christ] entered into with his Father, was, that as man, and the chief head of the Covenanters, his Father should be his God.”65 In the interpretation of Hebrews 2:13, Christ is numbered among the believers.66 The deity of Christ is fully presented in these two commentaries. In the former, Dickson argues that “the Spirit is not given to him [Christ] by measure; but to dwell bodilie, or substantiallie.”67 In the latter, Dickson is convinced that Christ “is God” and has “an eternal Throne or Dominion over the Elect.”68

In his 1635 discussion on Hebrews 9:16 Dickson contends that “the necessitie of Christ’s death” is proved “from the force of the word COVENANT, which signifieth also a Testament.”69 This covenant denotes the new covenant, but it is related with the eternal

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64 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 14.

65 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with an explanation of those other epistles of the apostles*, 186; Dickson, *Expositio analytica omnium apostolicarvm epistolarvm*, 590 (“Quod foederis Gratia cum Patre initi, altera pars foederata fuerit, qua homo & princeps Foederatorum, Patrem suum, Deum suum habitutus”).

66 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 30–31 (“one of the Covenant of Grace”); Dickson, *Expositio analytica omnium apostolicarvm epistolarvm*, 596 (“quia in numero foederatorum”); Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with an explanation of those other epistles of the apostles*, 188 (“put in the number of the Covenanters”).

67 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 14.

68 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 186.

69 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 180.
decree. Dickson states that “Christ Iesus, is both the Maker of the Covenant which is in IEREMIE xxxj. and the Mediatour thereof also: the Testatour, and Executour, of that blessed Testament.” Christ’s death “was concluded, and resolved vpon, and intimated, before Hee came into the World.”

The sacrifice of the body of Christ was a perfect purchase for all the elect (1635 comment on Hebrews 10:10). “These ALL, for whome hee offered, were condescended vpon, betwixt the Father, and the Mediator. GOD knewe those whome hee gaue to the Sonne, to bee ransomed: and CHRIST knewe those whome he bought.”

Because of the condescension another offering is needless. Dickson offers a similar idea in the comment on Hebrews 10:14 in the same commentary. Christ, having made the one offering, has “onlie to beholde the fruite of his Sufferings, brought about by the Father; and to concurre with the Father, on his Throne, for that ende.”

Dickson uses concurrence language in his explanation of Christ’s suffering and offering. Christ offered himself to concur with the Father, and there is no tension in the ordering of the divine decrees. It is also noteworthy that Dickson argues for the deity of the Holy Spirit in his interpretation of Hebrews 10:15-17. He maintains that the Holy Spirit is “one in essence with the Father, and the Sonne; even the LORD, IEHOVAH;

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70 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 181.

71 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 208.

72 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 208.

73 Dickson, *A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes*, 213.

74 See chapter 3 for the importance of concurrence language in relation to the will of the three persons of the Trinity in the *pactum salutis*.

75 Regrettably, Crisp fails to find concurrence language in the older formulations of the *pactum*. Crisp, *God Incarnate*, 48–49.
Author of the Newe Covenant, with the Father, and the Sonne.”76 Through all of the preceding trinitarian covenantal works, Dickson’s robust doctrine of the Trinity also proves that he clearly avoids any kind of subordinationism on the part of the Son.

4.2.2.3. Speech to the General Assembly

The General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland gathered together in December 1638 to refute Arminianism.77 The Assembly began November 21, and Dickson, as a committee member, attended the eighth session of the Assembly.78 The Assembly dealt with two issues—doctrines and church polity. Dickson’s speech focused on the first issue, and he declared, the “preaching of error is like the selling of poisoned pestied bread, that slay the eater of it, and infects with the breath of every man that comes near hand.”79 The doctrine of the pactum salutis is appropriated to support the doctrine of particular redemption (i.e., limited atonement) against the errors of Arminianism.80 Dickson

76 Dickson, A short explanation, of the epistles of Pavl to the Hebrewes, 215.

77 The entire record of the Assembly can be found in Alexander Peterkin, ed., In Records of the kirk of Scotland, containing the acts and proceedings of the general assemblies, from the year 1638 downwards, as authenticated by the clerks of assembly; with notes and historical illustrations by Alexander Peterkin, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: John Sutherland, 1838), 128–93. For the background and cause of the Assembly, see Margaret Steele, “The ‘Politick Christian’: The Theological Background to the National Covenant,” in The Scottish National Covenant in its British Context, ed. John Morrill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 35–36. For the Arminian controversy of the time, see Stephen William Peter Hampton, Anti-Arminians: The Anglican Reformed Tradition from Charles II to George I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

78 The committee was composed of nine people: David Lindsay, Andrew Cant, James Martine, Harie Rollock, Thomas Mitchell, David Dick, Walter Balcanquell, Robert Hendersone, and Thomas Wilkie. Peterkin, Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland, 1:151.

79 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.

80 Paul Brown argues that “federal theology in England, which preceded the development in Cocceius, was engaged in a struggle with Arminianism.” Paul Edward Brown, “The Principle of the Covenant in the Theology of Thomas Goodwin” (Ph.D. diss., Drew University, 1950), 89. Dickson’s speech shows that Scottish theologians of the early seventeenth century also struggled with Arminianism.
addresses four errors of the Arminians. (1) Their doctrine of the election “makes man to be a choosrer of God, and not God to be choosrer of man.”\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.} (2) They argue that “Christ layes doune his blood, and buyes no waires bot a possibilitie of some mans salvation.” In so doing, “they extend his death in drawing on of a bargane betwixt God and man.”\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.} (3) In their doctrine of conversion, “God shall be the giver of abilitie to convert by giving the man a power of frie will, but the man shall have the glorie to turne himselfe to God or receave grace.”\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.} (4) They aver that “there is no assurance of perseverance.”\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.}

Dickson opposes these four errors. First, Dickson argues that “there is a number severd out, in Gods speceall purpose, from the race of mankind, and advanced above the state of nature, to the estate of Grace and Glorie, by a speceall designation, and that for no foirseene good workes in the man, but for his free Grace and good purpose.”\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.} In this passage and the following, Dickson refutes the notions of Arminian universalism and election by foreknowledge. He makes it very clear that the number of the elect is determined, and that salvation is given to them by the free grace of God. Second, Dickson asserts that “our Lord made no blind blocke, but wist weill what he bought, as the Father wist what he sold; and has hid scheepe before his eyes and was content to lay doune his lyfe for them; all thinges that belongs to lyfe and Salvation he layd doune such a pryce

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81 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.
82 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.
83 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.
84 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 156.
85 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.
to the Father.” Christ’s purchase by his death was full and enough for salvation so there is no need or possibility for human beings to settle a bargain with God. Third, for conversion, Dickson is convinced that “a naturall man” is “so wicked” that only God’s grace makes conversion. The Spirit of God is “concurring therewith,” and “he is able, not onlie morallie to perswade and convince the man, but effectuallie to induce the mynd of him—keeping himselfe still in a freedome of will, that most willinglie and frielie makes the man tune unto God, and to take his Mediator and God in his armes.” Thus, it is God who effectually converts the sinner. Keeping the freedom of will of the man, the Spirit of God concurs with it, and effectually induces him to willingly and freely turn to God. Fourth, Dickson asserts that although there is “nothing lighter” than the believer who is “fickler,” and “at his between estate he is altogether vanitie,” God “who hes bought him deare will never leave him nor forsake him.” God, who calls the believer according to his purpose, “admonishes him, reproves him, corrects him, and causes him to eat the fruit of his owne wayes in cace he deborred, that he causes him cast all consolations from himselfe . . . and brings him through all doubts, and rubbe difficulties and temptations, and never leaves him till he sett him before his Master and Lord.”

Dickson here reflects the article 11 of the fifth main point (“The Perseverance of the

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86 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.

87 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.


89 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.

90 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.
Saints”) of the Canons of Dort.\footnote{See the translation in Ecumenical Creeds and Reformed Confessions (Grand Rapids, MI: CRC Publications, 1988). It reads, “Meanwhile, Scripture testifies that believers have to contend in this life with various doubts of the flesh, and that under severe temptation they do not always experience this full assurance of faith and certainty of perseverance. But God, the Father of all comfort, ‘does not let them be tempted beyond what they can bear, but with the temptation he also provides a way out’ (1 Cor. 10:13), and by the Holy Spirit revives in them the assurance of their perseverance.”}

Dickson suggests three grounds of the errors of the Arminians. First, the Arminians “confound the decreet of God concerning the last end of man with the maner of the executiones of the decree of the meanes”\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.} God decrees the salvation of the elect, but he uses the preacher’s sermon to every one of the auditors and the free will of human beings as means of his decree.\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157.} That God uses the means does not support universalistic thought or any synergistic view of conversion. Second, the Arminians “extend the death of Christ only to a possibilitie of the salvation of all men, and to the possibilitie of the salvation of no man.” In the Arminian doctrine of salvation, Christ just offers the possibility of salvation of human beings, but he does not engage the actual process of salvation. Dickson argues that the Arminians make Christ “a spectator” in the salvation of human beings.\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 158.} For him their doctrine allows Christ to be “so evill a Merchant as to lay doune his lyfe, and never will therefore, not sick a foole as to make a bargane whilk might be suspended by mans fickle frie-will, who hes that much prudence that he forsee a losse or danger he will governe it.”\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 157–58.} Dickson rejects the Arminian proposition that humanity has the power to bargain directly with God. Third, the Arminians “think Gods
effectuall working in the conversion of man cannot subsist with the reservation of the
tnature of his owne frie-will.” In the Arminian doctrine of conversion, argues Dickson,
God’s effectual working cannot concur with the free will of humanity. Thus, their
doctrine leaves no room between human freedom and divine necessity. Dickson argues
that if such view were right, “the saints in Heaven, and the spirits that are perfyted, and
Jesus Christ our Lord, in his manhead, had never done, nor could never doe, a turne but
of necessitie, and nothing of frie-wil.” To the contrary, however, the saints in heaven
and the incarnate Christ have free will, although the will of God rules them. The
Reformed doctrine of conversion does not destroy “the mans frie-will.” Rather, it
acknowledges that “without Christ we can doe nothing,” and that “with Christ, we are
able to doe all things, and bring any thing about that he is to imploy us in.”

After suggesting these three grounds of the errors of the Arminians, Dickson points out
that “thair maine errour” lies in their “not knowing the Scriptures, and the power of God
in the matter of the Covenant of redemption betwixt God and Christ.” First, Dickson
contends that the covenant of redemption differs from the covenant of grace. He writes:

the Covenant of Salvation betwixt God and man is ane thing, and the Covenant
of Redemption betwixt God and Christ is ane uther thing. The Covenant betwixt
God and Christ was done and endit before there was word in the world; but the
Covenant betwixt God and man is by the means of the Mediator, which makes all
sufficient, and he is our strength and bulwarke.

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96 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 158.
97 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 158.
98 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 158.
99 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 158 (italics mine).
100 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 158.
The covenant of redemption is an eternal transaction between the Father and the Son to appoint the mediator, and the covenant of grace is based on the transaction and fulfilled by means of the mediator. The covenant of redemption is the ground of the covenant of grace, and the covenant of grace is the fulfillment of the covenant of redemption.

According to the doctrine of the covenant of redemption, the salvation of the elect is not in any way fortuitous or uncertain. Thus the Arminian view of conversion and salvation is wrong. Dickson argues:

the Articles of a Superior Covenant made by Jesus Christ, our Mediator and Advocat, in which there are articles contradictorie to all Arminians, that so there shall be no more possibilitie of the breaking of these Articles, nor of garring God and Christ faill.\footnote{Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 158.}

That the salvation of the believer is grounded on the covenant of redemption guarantees the certainty of the perseverance of the believer. Thus the above “four errors” of the Arminians—their doctrine of the election making humans to be choosers of God, their view of Christ offering only the possibility of salvation, their acknowledgement of the direct bargain between God and humanity, and their rejection of the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints—are repudiated by the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis}: God is the chooser of the elect in the \textit{pactum}; Christ does not merely create a possibility of salvation, but rather effectively engages the salvation in the fulfillment of the \textit{pactum}; the fallen humanity cannot directly bargain with God because only Christ is able to do that and did that through the \textit{pactum}; and Christ protects and leads the believer because of the \textit{pactum}.

In the conclusion of the Speech, Dickson summarizes the theses. First, the covenant of
redemption between God and the mediator Christ precedes the covenant of grace between God and the believer through Christ. The covenant of redemption is “the ground of all this treating that God hes with Man in the preaching of the Gospell.”  

Second, the covenant of redemption designed the mediator between God and humanity, the particular number and names of the elect, the gifts and graces to be bestowed upon the elect, and the time and means of bestowing them. These specifics were “condescendit and agried upon” by God and the second person of the Trinity.  

Third, in this covenant the details of the price of the redemption, the associated gifts to be paid by the Redeemer, and the length of the Redeemer’s captivity to death were determined.  

Fourth, the mediator “was made sure of succes” so to bring peace to all the elect “against all Arminian doubts.”  

Fifth, management of the matter of redemption is so wise that none has “any reasonable ground either to presume of Gods mercie or to despair of Gods grace.”  

It makes it sure that “the holiest man shall have no matter of comfort except he walke in the way of holinesse, and the wickedest man shall not be put out or hopes but to be receaved whensoever he will turne in to seeke Grace, and lyfe, and holiness in Jesus.”  

Among these five theses, the second and third theses indicate the mutually voluntary nature of God and Christ in the covenant of redemption. Dickson’s formulation of the pactum salutis does not hint any subordinationism. Rather, it shows the coequality between God

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102 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 159.
103 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 159.
104 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 159.
105 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 159.
106 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 159.
107 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 159.
and Christ in the mutual agreement of the eternal transaction of the *pactum*, and the sovereignty of Christ the mediator, who actually effects and protects the salvation of the elect.

4.2.2.4. Exposition of the Epistles

The theme of the covenant of redemption appears in several places in Dickson’s *Exposition of the Epistles* with regard to the mediatorship and suretyship of Christ and the price of redemption. Dickson notes that “Christ the Redeemer . . . hath purchased for us Righteousness and Salvation” (comment on Romans 3:24). Christ was appointed by God for the greater confirmation of faith of the believer, and he “is made all these things by merit, imputation, application, and effectual accomplishment to the use of all the faithful” (comment on 1 Corinthians 1:30). Dickson states, regarding Galatians 4:5, that “the Son of God is sent into the world, takes upon him flesh, and is born of the Virgin Mary, and subjected to the Covenant of works.” For Dickson, Christ completed the redemptive work as the Son of God with divine authority. Although the technical terminology is not given in the comment on Philippians 2:7-8, Dickson speaks of the voluntary humiliation of Christ and the voluntary covenant made by Christ to take on the yoke of the law. Thus, Dickson alludes that the “exinanition or emptying” of Christ

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108 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 8.

109 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 41.

110 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 100. Dickson describes Christ as “our Advocate . . . who keepeth us and all ours” (comment on Colossians 1:14). Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 136.

111 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 128. A. B. Bruce writes, “there are two senses in which voluntariness may be predicated of Christ’s sufferings and
was due to the covenant of redemption.  

In his interpretation of Galatians 3:17, which was one of *loci classici* for the discussion of the *pactum salutis* of the day,  Dickson does not illustratively discuss the *pactum salutis* but noticeably points out that the covenant with Abraham “was confirmed . . . with relation unto Christ” (*respectu Christi*).  He also comments that the covenant “is duely made betwixt God and Abraham for the uniting all the faithful, both Jews and Gentiles, into one seed, Christ, an incorporation being made of Christ the head, and all his members, into one Christ mystical, by faith.” In so doing, Dickson makes it clear that the covenant between God and Abraham is grounded on the mediatorship of Christ.

The mediatorship of Christ is more fully explained in Dickson’s commentary on Ephesians. The epistle has two principle parts beside the Preface and the Conclusion: the first is the “Doctrine of Grace for the confirmation of their Faith” (chapters 1-4) and the second is the “Doctrine of gratitude and thankfulness tending to holiness of life”

experiences of infirmity: one which is perfectly compatible with the ascription to His human nature of the same liability to sinless infirmity as that under which ordinary men lie; another, which excludes that liability, and makes all Christ’s pains the miraculous effects of the forthputting at His pleasure of His divine power.” Alexander Balmain Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ in Its Physical, Ethical, and Official Aspects*, 5th ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900), 243. It seems that Dickson’s view is closer to the fomer meaning of voluntariness.

112 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 127.

113 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 128.

114 For a discussion Witsius’ exegesis of Galatians 3:16-20, see 2.3.2 of this study.

115 The scriptural text Galatians 3:17 Dickson cites reads: “And this I say, that the Covenant that was confirmed before of Christ. . .” Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 98. Dickson, *Expositio analytica omnium apostolicarvm epistolarvm*, 321. “Hoc autem dico pactionem ante confirmatam à Deo, *respectu Christi*, Lex quae post annos quadringentos, & triginta coepit, non facet irritiam, ut aboleat promissionem” (bolding is mine).

116 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 98.
In his exposition of Ephesians 1:3, Dickson asserts that “the Grace of God in Christ ought be celebrated with an acknowledgement of God’s blessing towards us.” For him our blessing “is nothing else but an acknowledgement that God is every way the Author of all blessing or Grace towards us.” Continues Dickson:

In this Proposition hee [Paul] puts a difference between God the Father, and Jesus Christ the Mediator God-man, that the person and office of the Mediatour might more manifestly appear. And hee calls God the Father the God of Christ, (1) Because of that Grace, whereby the humane nature of Christ was predestinated to the personal union with the Word, his Son. (2) Because of the Covenant of Redemption made between God and Christ the Mediatour. And then hee calls him the Father of Jesus Christ, (1) Because of the eternal Generation of the Son, by which the Father hath from all eternity communicated to him his whole infinite essence. (2) Because of the personal union of the assumed humane Nature, by which the Son of man is made the Son of God.

Dickson explains the mediatorship of Christ in terms of the covenant of redemption. For him, in Ephesians 1:3, the Apostle Paul differentiates between the Father and Christ so as to present more clearly the mediatorship of Christ. God the Father is “the God of Christ” because he made the covenant of redemption with Christ. That the covenant of redemption does not imply subordinationism is known, argues Dickson, in that Paul calls God “the Father of Jesus Christ” owing to “the eternal Generation,” in which the

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117 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 107.
118 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 107.
119 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 107.
120 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 107–8.
122 Origen formulated the doctrine of the “eternal generation” (*aiōnios genēsis*) of the Son to
Father communicated to Christ “his whole infinite essence” from all eternity.

The doctrine of the pactum salutis has two important features in Dickson’s commentary on Ephesians. First, it is a very practical doctrine giving believers full assurance of God’s grace.123 About Ephesians 1:7, Dickson argues that “Christ alone redeemed us without any merit or help from us, the price of our salvation being both covenanted for, and paid by himself alone.”124 Christ is the surety of the believer because the redemption is “not in ourselves without reference to Christ” (comment on Ephesians 1:7; cf. comment on 1:6).125 In the explication of the second chapter of Ephesians, Dickson maintains that “wee are saved by grace . . . that in the Covenant made between God and the Mediator” (comment on 2:5). The Son of God was as redeemer given to believers who were dead in sins.126 Dickson goes on to contend, regarding Ephesians 2:6, that “in the Resurrection of Christ, by the Covenant of Redemption, the Redeemed did also rise with him judicially, or in a judicial way.”127 The redeemed can

refute Adoptionism, a belief that Christ as man became God’s Son only by adoption and grace. See Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 115–19 (Adoptionism), 129 (the eternal generation); Maurice F. Wiles, “Eternal Generation,” Journal of Theological Studies 12, no. 2 (1961): 284–91. Although Origen is criticized for his subordinationism, his view is different from that of Arius. He argues that Christ does not have a “beginning” (cf. De principiis, 1.2.2).


124 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 109.

125 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 109.

126 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 113.

127 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 113. In his Latin commentary on Ephesians 2:5, Dickson uses the phrase “pactum redemptionis” to denote the covenant between God and Christ while he uses the term “foedere” three times to denote the covenant in his comment on 2:6. Dickson, Expositio analytica omnium apostolicae epistolae, 366.
also believe that they “judicially ascend with” Christ because of “the Covenant made between God and the Mediator, or . . . the Covenant theology of Redemption.” The Holy Spirit will remain within the believer “until the covenanted Redemption be fully perfected and compleated” (comment on 1:14; cf. comment on 4:30). Therefore, the doctrine of the _pactum salutis_ was used very practically in Dickson’s commentary to give full assurance of salvation to believers.

Second, the doctrine of the _pactum salutis_ stands with the doctrine of decree in Dickson’s commentary on Ephesians. God’s grace is given in time to the believer, which was decreed from eternity before the creation. “For the decree of the creation of the world,” argues Dickson, “was subservient as a means to bring to pass the already decreed salvation of the elect” (comment on 1:4). Against the Arminians, Dickson contends that God “has chosen us of grace, and not for fore-seen works.” He also writes that “our election is not from faith fore-seen, or works fore-seen, but of meer grace, which as it is the cause of election, so of all holiness, and happiness, which follows election” (comment on 1:4). A similar idea—“Wee were predestinated by God”—is also offered in his interpretation of 1:11. Dickson continually interweaves the doctrine of the _pactum salutis_ with the doctrine of divine decree. Loonstra wrongly supposes that for

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128 Dickson, _An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles_, 113.
129 Dickson, _An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles_, 111.
130 Dickson, _An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles_, 108.
131 Dickson, _An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles_, 108.
132 Dickson, _An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles_, 108.
133 Dickson, _An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles_, 110.
Dickson the *pactum salutis* refers to the elect, not the whole work of redemption or to the decree itself. For him Dickson separates the *pactum salutis* and atonement from the decree of incarnation.\(^{134}\) It should be noted, however, that the *pactum salutis* parallels the eternal decree in many places of Dickson’s commentary.\(^{135}\) The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* to Dickson is a covenantal explanation of the divine willing in the eternal decree of redemption.\(^{136}\)

The divinity of Christ is emphasized in the commentary on Colossians 1:15. For Dickson, “Christ is the most perfect Image of the invisible God.”\(^ {137}\) He is begotten from eternity, and “because of his eternal Generation of the Father, hee is the Lord of all creatures by right.”\(^ {138}\) On the same page, Dickson mentions the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Christ became the mediator to renew the “friendship betwixt God and” those who “God would have expiation for sin” (comment on Colossians 1:19).\(^ {139}\) “Angels are added to Christ,” maintains Dickson, “as a surplusage in the Covenant of Redemption (*foedere redemptionis*)” (comment on 1:19).\(^ {140}\) Another passage to teach the covenant of redemption comes in the interpretation of Colossians 2:15 with regard to the price of

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\(^{134}\) Loonstra, *Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond*, 100–1.

\(^{135}\) For the criticism of Loonstra’s idea, see Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 41–42, 44–45, 210–11.

\(^{136}\) Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 42.

\(^{137}\) Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 136.

\(^{138}\) Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 136. For the eternal generation, see note 123 of this study.

\(^{139}\) Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 136.

redemption. Dickson contends that Christ has brought the devils “overthrown by the price of Redemption paid upon the Cross, and gloriously triumpheth over them openly in the sight of God, Angels and men.”  

“Christ, paying the price of our Redemption,” argues Dickson, “hath obtained, by Covenant of the Father, that all the redeemed should bee delivered from the prison of darkness, ignorance, sin and death.” Again with practical implication, Dickson is convinced that the doctrine about the price of redemption paid by Christ encourages the believer to “follow after good works” (comment on Titus 2:14).<sup>143</sup> 

The technical term is not present in the comment on 2 Timothy 1:9, but Dickson relates the price of redemption with the covenant of redemption. He writes:

Christ the designed Mediatour, the second person of the Trinity, subsisted from eternity, who covenanted with his Father, for us his Elect, before all time, and afterwards in time paid the price of our Redemption, and in our name received the grace assigned to us, by which in time wee should bee called, justified, and freely saved in due season.<sup>144</sup> 

This passage undoubtedly shows that the covenant of redemption does not entail any kind of subordinationism. Dickson makes it very clear that the one who made the covenant of redemption with the Father is the second person of the Trinity. He does not point to an inferior state of Christ in the pactum; rather, he stresses the active and voluntary work of

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<sup>141</sup> Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 140.

<sup>142</sup> Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 140.

<sup>143</sup> Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 181. Dickson notes, “Christ hath purchased eternal Redemption with his own blood” (comment on Hebrews 9:12). Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 200.

<sup>144</sup> Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 171 (italics mine). “CHRISTUS tamen designatus Mediator, secunda persona Trinitatis, ab æterno subsistebat, qui pro nobis in fœdere redemptionis ante tempora secularia cum Patre inito, pro electis sui pactus est illud quod postea in tempore persolvit pretium redemptionis, & nostro nomine accepti assignatam nobis gratiam, per quam in tempore nos vocaremur, justificaremur, & singuli salvereurum gratis, temporibus idoneis” (italics mine). Dickson, *Expositio analytica omnium apostolicae epistolarvm*, 546–47.
the second person of the Trinity in the transaction of the *pactum* and its fulfillment in
time. In the comment on Titus 1:2, God is said to have promised the truth of hope of
eternal life “not onely in the beginning of the world, preaching it to our first Parents in
paradise, but also covenanting with his Son (designed to bee our Mediatour) about it
before the world was made, in the Covenant of Redemption (*in fœdere redemptionis*).”\(^{145}\)

To summarize, in his commentary on the Epistles, Dickson argues three main points:

(1) Christ, as the second person of the Trinity, voluntarily made the *pactum salutis* with
the Father for the redemption of the elect with regard to his mediatorship, suretyship, and
the price of redemption; (2) Christ, as the mediator, paid the price of redemption in his
humiliation; and (3) Christ gives salvation to the elect with power and right, which he
obtained through the covenant of redemption and his fulfillment of it.

4.2.2.5. Exposition of the Evangel according to Matthew

Dickson’s *Exposition of the Evangel according to Matthew* (1647) shows high
frequency of the use of the terminology of the covenant of redemption. In the preface
Dickson explains the name of the Old and New Testament in terms of the *pactum salutis*:

> The whole Bible is commonly called by the name of Old and New Testament, or
Covenant: one word signifying both *Covenant* arid *Testament*, as it were *A
Testamentary Covenant*. The reason why the holy Scriptures written before and
since Christ came, are called by the name *Covenant*, is, because the **Covenant of
Redemption between the Father and the Son**, for purchasing of Salvation, and
saving graces to the Elect; and the *Covenant of Grace* made with the Church
through CHRIST, for application of all purchased graces leading unto salvation,
are the sum and substance of the whole Bible.\(^{146}\)

\(^{145}\) Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 178.

\(^{146}\) David Dickson, *A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew*
(Glasgow: George Anderson, 1647), A (author’s italics; bolding is mine).
Dickson argues that the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son was made for two reasons: first, to purchase salvation and saving graces to the elect; second, to apply the grace to the believer in the covenant of grace. The holy Scriptures written before Christ came are called by the name, covenant, because of this covenant of redemption. The Son of God laid down “his life . . . as the price of Redemption.”\(^{147}\) For Dickson the covenant of redemption does not suggest subordinationism. Rather, he emphatically stresses the equality between the Son of God and the Father on the next page, which deals with Christ’s genealogy: “The book of the generation of JESUS CHRIST, such a man as is true God also, and worthy to be called, in the most proper and strict sense, JESUS the true SALVATOR and DELIVERER of men from sin and wrath; which Styl properly taken, belongeth onlie to him who is almightie God, and JESUS in effect” (comment on Matthew 1:1).\(^{148}\) Dickson makes it clear that Jesus Christ is true and almighty God. It is this Jesus who, born as the son of Abraham and the son of David, becomes the anointed savior.\(^{149}\)

The baptism of Jesus specifies the meaning of the covenant of redemption (comment on Matthew 3:17). In the baptism, the Father calls Jesus “my Son . . . my native and only begotten Son, by eternall Generation.”\(^{150}\) Dickson writes about Jesus, “This is he who from all eternity was with GOD the Father, and was GOD, Joh. 1.1).”\(^{151}\) Christ stood “in

\(^{147}\) Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, A.

\(^{148}\) Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Av.

\(^{149}\) Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Av.

\(^{150}\) Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, C2.

\(^{151}\) Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, C2.
his office of the Mediator and surety for us, offering himself for us unto death in Baptisme.”

In the baptism the three persons of the Trinity were revealed: the eternal Father, the Son, and “the Spirit of GOD the third Person, proceeding from the Father and the Son, [who] descendeth in the similitud of a Dove.” All three persons were “distinguished, remaining One infinit and undivided.” Thus, the baptism of Christ reveals most clearly “the glorious mystery of the Trinity.”

For Dickson, notably, the baptism of Christ demonstrates the execution of the pactum salutis. He writes, “By this also we have the Covenant of Redemption laid open to us, for The Son incarnat offereth here himself Redeemer, and Surety for the Elect, to be baptized unto death; The Father accepteth the offer, and declareth himself well pleased in him.” Thus, Dickson’s understanding of the covenant of redemption presupposes his doctrine of the Trinity.

The Lord’s Supper seals up to believers the doctrine of the covenant of grace, which was “confirmed abundantly by miracles;” and it also shows the judicial aspect of Christ’s sacrificial work, which was made in the covenant of redemption. The words of Christ for the ordinance of the Lord’s Supper were appointed of Christ “judicially” to

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152 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, C2. Against Roman Catholic theologians’ assertion that Christ is mediator only according to the human nature and states, Dickson argues that Christ is prophet, priest and king according to both his natures. David Dickson, Truths victory over error (Edinburgh: John Reid, 1684), 63–64; Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, I5r–I6v, K5r–v, K11r; Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 294 (1 Peter 3:18); Dickson, A brief explication of the first fifty psalms, 117–19 (Ps 2: 1–2). For a succinct discussion, see Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 142–43.

153 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, C2.

154 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, C2.

155 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, C2.

156 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, C2.

157 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Cc4.
make believers “sure of [their] right unto [his] death and blood-shed, and unto all benefits bought thereby.”

In his comments on Matthew 26:26-28, Dickson argues:

There is a **Covenant of Redemption** past between the Father and the Mediator CHRIST, wherein Christ was **bound** to lay down his life, by the shedding of his blood to purchase to the Redeemed remission of sins; This is imported in the words of, *The blood of the Covenant for the remission of sins*, shewing, that the Son had before promised to powre out his blood for purchasing remission, and that the Father had granted remission upon this condition.

The testament that Christ made before his death is attributed to the covenant of redemption. Christ voluntarily concluded the covenant; once he did it, however, he is bound to the covenant. The sacrament of the Lord’s Supper is “the Seal of the new Covenant.” Dickson states, “By the new Covenant of Righteousness, and life through faith in CHRIST, sealed in the Sacrament, the Beleever getteth right unto the **Covenant of Redemption** made between GOD and CHRIST, to the behove of the Redeemed; this is imported in the words of *Testament* or *Covenant of Blood-shed*, to satisfie the Father, *for many, for the remission of sins*”

The covenant of redemption is the basis of the covenant of grace; the latter is sealed in the Lord’s Supper. Thus those who participate in the Lord’s Supper can get right into the covenant of redemption and be sure of the remission of sins. The reason why Christ guarantees the remission of sins of the believer is that he is voluntarily bound to the covenant of redemption.

In the commentary on Matthew 26:39, Dickson presents the doctrine of the *pactum*

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158 Dickson, *A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew*, Dd2 (my change of the pronouns).

159 Dickson, *A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew*, Dd2 (bolding is mine).

160 Dickson, *A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew*, Dd2–Dd2v.
salutis in relation to Christ’s prayer to the Father, asking that the cup of wrath and curse might pass from him.

The love that our Lord hath to our redemption, and his special Covenant made with the Father, for the paying of our ransome, made him to subject his holy Nature and Will to that which otherwise it abhorred: therefore looking to the Fathers will, thus to expiat the sins of the Redeemed, he sayeth, Nevertheless, not as I will (in a holy naturall choice) but as thou wilt, let it be, I voluntarily doe choose it; that is, according to the condition past between Us, for redemption of the Elect, Let mee drink this cup: and heer the merit of sin, the strictness of Divine Justice, the horrour of the wrath of GOD, with the weight of the curse, the mercy of GOD toward sinners, and the unspeakable love both of GOD and CHRIST toward the Elect, is to be seen vively set forth before us in our Lords passion.\textsuperscript{161}

The ransom paid by Christ demonstrates the divine love and mercy of the Trinity.

Although Christ wanted to abhor the cup “in a holy natural choice,” he voluntarily chose to receive it in his love and the “special Covenant made with the Father.” The mercantile language of Dickson’s doctrine of the pactum salutis is consistent with the “unspeakable love both of GOD and CHRIST toward the Elect.”\textsuperscript{162} The voluntariness of Christ and thus his divinity are underlined in Dickson’s formulation of the covenant of redemption.

Another occasion for a discussion of the pactum salutis is offered in the exposition of Matthew 26:42-44. Jesus had a deep agony in his prayer of Gethsemane. He had to choose between the joyful communion with the Father and the submission to him for the salvation of human beings. Dickson describes it as follows:

And therefor it is alike agreeable to the holiness of humane nature in Christ to speak one word to the Father, in the language of pure holy nature, simply looking to what is destructive of nature; and another word from holy voluntar Resolution,

\textsuperscript{161} David Dickson, \textit{A Brief Exposition of the Evangel of Jesus Christ According to Matthew}, 3rd ed. (London: Ralph Smith, 1651), Dd3v (bolding is mine).

\textsuperscript{162} Dickson, \textit{A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew}, Dd3v.
subjecting the simple desires of nature to the furthering of the supreme designes of the Creator, and so it standeth well with his holines to say to the Father.\textsuperscript{163}

According to Dickson’s understanding of the agony of Gethsemane, Christ did not want to break the relationship with the Father, so much as to lose his human nature. He was “with the holiness of humane nature . . . naturally and necessarily sensible of pain and grief . . . and feared for the wrath of the Creator.”\textsuperscript{164} From his holy voluntary resolution, however, Christ subjected himself to the will of the Father. In so doing, he demonstrated in history the unity of divine willing of the covenant of redemption. Dickson’s adumbration of the \textit{pactum salutis} refers to the voluntary aspect of the transaction of the \textit{pactum}, in which the equality of the Father and the Son is clearly seen. Christ assented to the will of the Father because “no other way of our salvation at this time being possible, love made him submit to the condition, and say, \textit{Thy will be done}” (Matthew 26:42).\textsuperscript{165}

Dickson argues that Christ became “surety for the Redeemed, who cannot defray their own debt” (comment on Matthew 26:50).\textsuperscript{166} The “worthiness of the person who is surety suffering for us” should be considered with “the ferafull and horrible deservings of sin in us” and “strictness of Divine Justice, which will have sin punished condignly, and will neither quite the sinner without a ransome, nor the Redeemer without full satisfaction and punishment, equivalent to the principall Debters deservings.”\textsuperscript{167} Thus Dickson argues, “The eternall, and only begotten Son of GOD, in his humane nature” suffered “according

\begin{footnotes}
\item[163] Dickson, \textit{A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew}, Dd4.
\item[164] Dickson, \textit{A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew}, Dd4.
\item[165] Dickson, \textit{A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew}, Dd4v.
\item[166] Dickson, \textit{A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew}, Ee.
\item[167] Dickson, \textit{A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew}, Ffv.
\end{footnotes}
to the pactum of redemption past between him and the Father . . . for the expiation of our sins, and purchase of righteousness and life eternall unto us.

To satisfy the conditions of the covenant of redemption, only the eternal Son of God can be the one party of the covenant. To recapitulate briefly, in Dickson’s formulations of the *pactum salutis* in his *Exposition of the Evangel According to Matthew*, the divinity of Christ is completely consistent with the *pactum salutis*. The covenant of redemption to Dickson does not stand to the exclusion of the equality between the Father and the Son.

### 4.2.2.6. *The Summe of Saving Knowledge*

In his *Truths Victory over Error* (ca. 1650), the first commentary on the Westminster Confession of Faith, Dickson holds to the twofold covenant scheme. He does not address the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. In *The Summe of Saving Knowledge* (1649), a companion piece to the Westminster Confession of Faith and collaborative work with James Durham, Dickson clearly set forth the threefold covenant scheme—the covenant of works (HEAD I), the covenant of redemption (HEAD II), and the covenant of grace (HEAD III). The doctrine in *The Summe of Saving Knowledge* is presented as a *medulla*; it is a collection of primary loci summarized briefly, with abridgment of the saving knowledge of the Scriptures accompanied by a longer section to offer more detail.

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168 Dickson, *A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew*, Ffv.

169 For the publication date of *Truths Victory over Error*, see Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 7n15.


of some practical uses of the knowledge.172 A sum of the book is taken up in four heads:

“1. The woeful condition wherein all human beings are by nature, through breaking of the Covenant of Works. 2. The Remedy provided for the Elect in Jesus Christ, by the Covenant of Grace. 3. The means appointed to make them partakers of this Covenant. 4. The blessings which are effectually conveyed into the Elect by these means.”173 The Summe of Saving Knowledge, though never judicially approved, was generally accompanied with the confession of faith and catechisms in Scotland and was considered a suitable statement of orthodoxy by the church of Scotland.174 It gives a “remarkably clear picture of the understanding of Scottish Theology.”175

In HEAD I of The Summe of Saving Knowledge, the doctrines of the decree, creation, and the fall of Adam and Eve through breaking of the covenant of works are suggested. The HEAD II offers a discussion of the covenant of redemption.

God for the glory of his rich Grace, hath revealed in his Word a way to save sinners, to wit, by faith in Jesus Christ the Eternal Son of God, by vertue of and according to, the tenor of the Covenant of Redemption, made and agreed upon between God the Father and God the Son, in the counsel of the Trinity before the World began.176

It is very clear in The Summe of Saving Knowledge that the one who made the covenant

172 Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 162.

173 Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, 14.


175 Torrance, Scottish Theology, 112.

176 Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, 15.
of redemption is the eternal Son of God. The covenant of redemption was agreed upon between “God the Father and God the Son, in the counsel of the Trinity.” A summary of the pactum salutis is adumbrated:

God having freely chosen unto life, a certain number of lost mankind, for the glory of his rich Grace did give them before the world began, unto God the Son appointed Redeemer, that upon condition he would humble himself so far as to assume the humane nature of a soul and body, unto personal union with his Divine Nature, and submit himself to the Law as surety for them, and satisfy Justice for them, by giving obedience in their name, even unto the suffering of the cursed death of the Cross, he should ransom and redeem them all from sin and death, and purchase unto them righteousness and eternal life.177

The covenant of redemption is the basis of the redemptive work of Christ and its application. Christ is acting as God both in the eternal transaction and the temporal fulfillment of the covenant of redemption. He paid the ransom price by virtue of “theforesaid bargain made before the World began.”178 Continues The Summe, “For the accomplishment of this Covenant of Redemption, and making the Elect partakers of the benefits thereof in the Covenant of Grace, Christ Jesus was clad with the threefold Office of Prophet, Priest, and King.”179 Thus, in the covenant of redemption, the divinity of Christ is totally preserved.

The means of the covenant of grace are four: the word of God, the sacraments, “Kirk Government,” and prayer.180 The way of reconciliation was in all ages one and the same in substance—by forgiving the sins of sinners who acknowledge their sins and their

177 Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, I5–I5v.
178 Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, I5v.
179 Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, I5v.
180 Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, 16.
enmity against God, and seek reconciliation and remission of sins in Christ.\textsuperscript{181} The “reconciliation of friendship” is made with God only through Christ.\textsuperscript{182} The doctrine of the covenant of redemption is beneficial for strengthening the faith of believers because in it Christ is considered as God’s gift guaranteeing “the sure and saving mercies” toward them.\textsuperscript{183}

The relationship of the covenant of reconciliation (i.e., the covenant of grace) and the covenant of redemption is as follows:

\textit{It is agreed betwixt God and the mediator Jesus Christ the Son of God Surety for the redeemed, as parties contractors, that the sins of the redeemed should be imputed to innocent Christ, and he both condemned and put to death for them upon this very condition, that whosoever heartily consents unto the Covenant of Reconciliation offered through Christ, shall by the imputation of his obedience unto them, be justified and holden righteous before God, for God hath made Christ who knew no sin, to be sin for us (saith the Apostle) that we might be made Righteous of God in him.}\textsuperscript{184}

The covenant of redemption provides the condition, according to which the covenant of reconciliation would be fulfilled. Jesus Christ, the mediator and the surety of the redeemed, is the Son of God, who obeyed unto death because of the conditions of the covenant of redemption. The doctrines of the \textit{pactum salutis} and the equality of the Father and the Son cannot be regarded as warring explanations in this formulation of the \textit{pactum}.

\begin{enumerate*}
\item Dickson, \textit{The Summe of Saving Knowledge}, K6v.\textsuperscript{181}
\item Dickson, \textit{The Summe of Saving Knowledge}, K7.\textsuperscript{182}
\item Dickson, \textit{The Summe of Saving Knowledge}, K4v–K5.\textsuperscript{183}
\item Dickson, \textit{The Summe of Saving Knowledge}, K8 (emphasis original).\textsuperscript{184}
\end{enumerate*}
4.2.2.7. Commentaries on the Psalms

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* appears in Dickson’s comments on Psalms 2, 22, 40, 80, 90, 118, and 130. It is prominent, among others, in the comments on Psalm 2. Dickson argues that “this Psalm doth mainly, if not only, concern Christ.” He divides the Psalm by two parts. The former part (vv. 1-9) describes “the stability of Christ’s kingdom, against all the enemies thereof (ver. 1, 2, 3).” Christ’s kingdom is stable for two reasons; first because God the Father takes part with his Son, against all his enemies, and will establish Christ’s kingdom in spite of them (vv. 4-6); second because “in the Covenant of Redemption, the Father hath promised to the Son enlargement of his kingdom, and victory over all his enemies, ver. 7, 8, 9.” In the latter part of the Psalm the prophet delivers the use of this doctrine in an exhortation to repent and to believe in Christ (vv. 10-12). In this scheme, Dickson regards Psalm 2 as depicting the process of the transaction and fulfillment of the covenant of redemption. He offers the *pactum salutis* as one of the reasons for the stability of Christ’s kingdom.

The second reason of the stability of Christ’s Kingdom is, the decreed agreement between God the Father and the Son in the Covenant of Redemption; some articles whereof Christ by his Prophet doth here reveal; for this is the speech of Christ the Son of God, to be incarnate, speaking by his Spirit, concerning the stability of the Church, and his Kingdom over it.

The believers can have certainty about the stability of the church even in time of the

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185 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 7.


persecution of the church, because “it is grounded upon the mysterious and unchangeable decree of God.”

Dickson depicts the *pactum salutis* as “the secret counsel of the Trinity.” The Christ who made the *pactum* with the Father is “the substantial Word of the Father” and the one “who before the world was created, was with God, and was God, *John* 1.1, 2.”

Thus Dickson points out the divinity and equality of Christ who made the covenant of redemption with the Father. He presents more explanation about the Son.

The Son of God as he is a person, concurring in the decree of establishing of the Church, and Kingdome of God in it, against all opposition; So is he party contractor in the Covenant of Redemption: And as he is the promiser and undertaker, to pay the price of the Redemption of his people; so also is he the receiver of promises, made in favour of his Church and Kingdome: It is he to whom the Father directeth his promise concerning his Church, *first and immediately*; for the Son, in declaring the decree, saith, *the Lord said to me*.

The Father and the Son concurred in the covenant of redemption. The Son of God is both the promiser—because he concurred in the transaction of the covenant—and the receiver of promises in the covenant—because the Father directs the promise to him in the accomplishment of the covenant. According to the first article of the covenant of redemption, Christ “shall not be disowned of the Father” (comment on Psalm 2:7)

Rather, Dickson argues:

in and after his deepest humiliation and sufferings, as he shall be, and remain really the very Son of God, so shall he really at the set day, be acknowledged by the Father, to be the only begotten Son of God; which day, is the day of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, as the Apostle, *Rom. 1:4*, teacheth us,

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190 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 11.
192 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 11 (author’s emphasis).
saying, *He was declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead.*

Christ is the Son of God not only in the eternal covenant of redemption but also in its fulfillment. This fact is “a sufficient demonstration of the impregnable stability of the Church, maugre all the opposition of all the power in the world; for to this very end is the decree of revealing Christ to be the Son of God, here declared.” For Dickson the doctrine of the covenant of redemption is very practical for it gives a full assurance of faith to the Christ. In this vein he applies the covenant of redemption not only in the eternal transaction and its accomplishment in Christ’s earthly work, but in Christ’s work in the church after his resurrection.

Another article of the Covenant of Redemption here declared is, That after Christ’s Resurrection, and declaration of his formerly over-clouded God-head, he should continue in the office of his mediation, and intercession; and by virtue of his paid ransom of Redemption, call for the enlargement of his purchased Kingdom among the Gentiles: for this is the Fathers compact with the Son, saying, *Ask of me, and I will give thee the Heathen.*

God’s declaration of Psalm 2:8 is interpreted as the promises of the second article of the covenant of redemption, which would be given to his Son when he fulfilled the work of redemption. Before the resurrection, Christ’s Godhead was “over-clouded,” but now in his resurrected state he continues in the threefold office of the mediator. Christ offers intercessory prayer for the spreading of his kingdom even among the gentiles because he possesses what he had bought “by his precious blood.”

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194 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 11.
196 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 12.
197 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 12.
Psalm 2:9 contains a “third article of the covenant of redemption,” which is a promise made to Christ to have full victory over all his enemies. Christ will destroy those who “refuse salvation offered by him, and subjection to be given to him.” This gives great comfort to his church because “though Christs Church is weak and unable to help itself against persecution, yet Christ will owne the quarrel, and fight against all the enemies thereof himself.” Although the enemies seem numerous and strong, with Christ protecting his church, “they are but weak, brittle, and naughty things.”

In Psalm 22, Dickson finds both similarities and differences between David and Christ. They share four things in common: both are under a sense of God’s wrath; both are tempted to doubt; both wrestle against temptation; and both gain the victory. However, because Christ is far more superior to David, this Psalm is not so much about David as it is about Christ. Thus Dickson comments:

God is Christs God; he being considered as God and man, in one person, entred in the Covenant of redemption with the Father as Mediatour and Surety for men; That he shall satisfie justice, and doe all the Fathers will in behalf of the Elect, and that God shall be his God, and the God of all the Elect redeemed by him. Therefore doth he here say, My God, my God.

As in his exposition of Ephesians 1:3, Dickson argues that Christ calls his Father “my God” because of the covenant of redemption. He extends this notion to soteriology
and asserts in a comment on Psalm 22:9-11 that “Children borne within the Covenant have God for their God.” Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 122.

Christ, who is considered God-man, entered into the covenant of redemption. Thus both the divine and human nature of Christ play a part in his mediation and surety for the elect. Dickson does not hint at any sense of subordinationism in this *pactum* formulation.

In his interpretation of Psalm 40, Dickson considers David as “a type of Christ.” Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 246. Dickson argues that the theme of Psalm 40 is repeated in “Heb. 10:5, 6, & c.” Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 249.

David is “the shadow,” but Christ is “the substance.” Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 250.

Identifying “the Covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son coming into the world” in verses 6-7, Dickson notes, “The work of Redemption by Christ, the Covenant betwixt the Father and the Son about our Redemption, the incarnation of the Son of God, and the course of the salvation of the redeemed, is one of the most wonderful things that ever was heard tell of, wherein so many wonderful works of God, so many wonderful thoughts of God about us concur, that they can neither be declared, nor numbered, nor set in order.” Notably, Dickson points out the voluntariness of Christ in the *pactum salutis*: “The Son of God incarnate becomes voluntarily, a very capable, discreet, ready, and obedient servant to the Father for us.” Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 249.

All of Christ’s sufferings and service for redemption “were most
This is also the Father’s will. Both in the book of God’s eternal decrees and in the book of holy Scripture, taking away the sins of human beings by Christ’s doing and suffering was established, the only way to fully effect it. Thus, the way of the redemption is “God’s own device, his very will and pleasure.” Thus, the will of the Father and the Son concur in the covenant of redemption.

This covenant of redemption is the basis for the covenant of grace. About Psalm 40:7, Dickson writes, “Jesus Christ, God incarnate, is in covenant with God the Father, that believers may be in covenant with God by this means also . . . John, 20:17.” He goes on to state, regarding Psalm 40:9-10, that Christ executed “his Priestly Office” to expiate sin, so those who believe in him will be “saved according to the Covenant past between the suffering Mediatour and God the faithful promiser.” Thus, grounds for the believer’s assurance are “the truth of God, and faithfulness of God, obliging himself to make good this way of justification and salvation by the Covenant of Redemption made between the Father and the Son our Mediatour, as in the promises of the Covenant of grace, is set down in Scripture” (comment on Psalm 40:10).

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210 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 250.

211 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 250.

212 Dickson, *A brief explication of the first fifty psalms*, 250.


performed by “Christ’s Prophetic Office.”\textsuperscript{215} Christ will surrender all opposition in “the Kingly Office” and give the kingdom to the Father.\textsuperscript{216} In his comments on Psalm 40:9-10, Dickson, much like his contemporary Reformed theologians such as Witsius and Owen, deals with Christ’s threefold offices with regard to the covenant of redemption. As a God-man Christ performs these offices and intercedes for his church.\textsuperscript{217}

In the interpretation of Psalm 80:17, Dickson depicts Christ as the “refuge, rest, consolation and confidence of a distressed Church or person.”\textsuperscript{218} Christ is always at the right hand of the Father, in power and glory. The human nature he assumed does not degrade him from the glory which he had with the Father, even before the world began (John 17:5). This is because, as Dickson argues, “his human nature is united with his divine nature in one person; his incarnation was made sure by the eternal and immutable decree of the Covenant of Redemption, wherein the elect were given over to Christ, and grace was granted and given to them, in Christ Jesus, before the world began, 2 Tim. 1.9.”\textsuperscript{219} The incarnate Christ has the same glory that he always had with the Father, and if so, then the covenant of redemption cannot be on the basis of any kind of subordinationism. Christ is God’s Son, who became the Son of man and the “partaker of flesh and blood with us, of the same stock that we are of, in all things like to us, except

\textsuperscript{215} Dickson, \textit{A brief explication of the first fifty psalms}, 252.

\textsuperscript{216} Dickson, \textit{A brief explication of the first fifty psalms}, 252.

\textsuperscript{217} The intercession of Christ is a recurring theme in Dickson’s \textit{pactum} formulation in his commentary on the Psalms. Dickson, \textit{A brief explication of the first fifty psalms}, 12 (Ps 2:7–8); 127 (Ps 22:23–24); 254 (Ps 40:11–13).

\textsuperscript{218} David Dickson, \textit{A brief explication of the other fifty psalmes, from ps. 50 to ps. 100} (London: T. M. for Ralph Smith, 1653), 243.

\textsuperscript{219} Dickson, \textit{A brief explication of the other fifty psalmes, from ps. 50 to ps. 100}, 243.
sin: for the *Son of man* is the stile, whereby Christ stiled himself in his humiliation.”

“The Son of man” is a title and not a status which degrades Christ’s divinity.

The comment on Psalm 90:2 states that the “comfort of the Believer against the miseries of this short life, is taken from the decree of their Election, and the eternal Covenant of Redemption of them, settled in the purpose and counsel of the blessed Trinity for their behoof, wherein it was agreed before the world was, that the *Word* to be incarnate, should be the Saviour of the Elect.” Dickson’s emphasis on the connection between the covenant of redemption and the Trinity is evident in this comment. The covenant of redemption was settled by the counsel of the Trinity. Thus believers can be sure that God’s good-will to them *in time* was ordained for them *before time*. Dickson declares, “From special love shown to us in time, we may conclude love toward us, not only before time, from everlasting, but also that it shall continue toward us after time for ever” (comment on Psalm 90:2).

Referring to 2 Timothy 1:9, Dickson argues that the apostle “leadeth us to a completed Covenant before the world was made, between God the Father and God the Son, according whereunto all conditions required of the Redeemer are settled; and all the Elect, all the redeemed are delivered over to the Son, the *Word* to be incarnate, designed Redeemer; and all saving grace is given over into Christs hand, for behoof of the elect, to be let forth unto them in due time.” For Dickson the knowledge

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220 Dickson, *A brief explication of the other fifty psalms, from ps. 50 to ps. 100*, 244.

221 Dickson, *A brief explication of the other fifty psalms, from ps. 50 to ps. 100*, 332.

222 Dickson, *A brief explication of the other fifty psalms, from ps. 50 to ps. 100*, 332.

223 Dickson, *A brief explication of the other fifty psalms, from ps. 50 to ps. 100*, 332.

224 Dickson, *A brief explication of the other fifty psalms, from ps. 50 to ps. 100*, 332–33 (comment on Psalm 90:2).
of God’s eternal good-will is a sufficient remedy to soften and sweeten all our grief and affliction in this life.\textsuperscript{225}

In Psalm 118:28, the psalmist, as a type of Christ, calls God “my God.” Dickson sees him as proclaiming “the covenant between the Father and Christ, and between God and himself in Christ, as a setled and ratified bargain.”\textsuperscript{226} Dickson describes the covenant of redemption as a covenant between God the Father and God the Christ. To give more explanation, he notes, “The Father and Christ, both before he was incarnate and after, do stand agreed in the covenant of Redemption.”\textsuperscript{227} This gives comfort to the believer that “by virtue of the covenant of Redemption between God and Christ the Mediator, all sufferings and battles for the Elect are undertaken, and such deliverance given from all troubles, and victory over all enemies is obtained, as the Mediatour is satisfied about it.”\textsuperscript{228} To exhort the believer to praise God, Dickson claims, “By virtue of the Covenant of Redemption, God is the believers God also, and ought to be praised, and more and more exalted in our hearts, and outwardly by us; for as Christ called God his Father, and our Father, his God and our God; so every one that do believe in him, may say to God, \textit{Thou art my God, and I will praise thee: thou art my God, and I will exalt thee.}”\textsuperscript{229} In his comments on Psalm 130:7-8, Dickson also declares, “The delivery of Gods people from

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{225} Dickson, \textit{A brief explication of the other fifty psalms, from ps. 50 to ps. 100}, 333 (comment on Psalm 90:2).
\bibitem{226} David Dickson, \textit{A brief explication upon the last fifty psalms} (London: T. M. for Ralph Smith, 1655), 159.
\bibitem{227} Dickson, \textit{A brief explication upon the last fifty psalms}, 159.
\bibitem{228} Dickson, \textit{A brief explication upon the last fifty psalms}, 159.
\bibitem{229} Dickson, \textit{A brief explication upon the last fifty psalms}, 159.
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sin and trouble floweth all from the Covenant of Redemption, & every delivery of them is a part of the execution of that Covenant.”

Two main points can be abstracted from the observations above. First, Dickson strongly connects the covenant of redemption with the divinity and humanity of Christ in his pactum formulation in his commentary on Psalms. Second, Dickson argues repeatedly in this Psalms commentary that the covenant of redemption is the basis for the covenant of grace. In both the eternal transaction of the covenant of redemption and its fulfillment in time as the covenant of grace, the divinity of Christ, the Son of God, is not spoiled in Dickson’s adumbration of the covenant of redemption.

4.2.2.8. Therapeutica Sacra

Therapeutica Sacra is a loci communes, which treats the doctrine of regeneration with carefully drawn definitions and explanations of: what regeneration is; who the regenerate are; the role of divine covenants and how to apply them; impediments to regeneration; confronting doubts plaguing the regenerate person; and addressing a range of issues related to the life and attitudes of the converted. Here, Dickson presents a very extensive explanation of divine covenants in order to correct the errors of Arminianism. There are three divine covenants, wherein God is at least the one party contractor—the covenant of redemption, the covenant of works, and the covenant of grace. These three covenants are explained in detail, and each of them is related to the doctrine of

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230 Dickson, A brief explication upon the last fifty psalms, 269.

231 Williams, “The Decree of Redemption,” 162, 190, 193.

232 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 22–23, 133.
regeneration in *Therapeutica Sacra*. The covenant of redemption is a pact “past between God, and Christ God appointed Mediatour, before the world was, in the council of the Trinity.” The covenant of works is a contract “made between God and men, in Adam in his integrity induced with all natural perfections, enabling him to keep it, so long as it pleased him to stand to the condition.” The covenant of grace and reconciliation through Christ is a pact “between God and believers (with their children) in Christ.”

Dickson, above all, makes it very clear that the covenant of redemption is an *intratrinitarian* covenant. He argues, “When we name the Father as the one party, and His Son Christ as the other party in this covenant, we do not seclude the Son and holy Spirit from being the party offended, but do look upon the Father, Son and Spirit, one God in three Persons, as offended by man’s sin.” All three persons of the Trinity were content to satisfy divine justice for the sin of humanity in the person of the son. Accordingly, the Son was designed to be incarnate as a mediator. Dickson maintains:

> the Son is both the party offended as God, one essentially with the Father and holy Spirit; and the party contracter also, as God designed Mediatour personally for redeeming man, who with consent of the Father and holy Spirit, from all eternity willed and purposed in the fullness of time, to assume the humane nature in personal union with Himself, and for the elect’s sake to become man, & to take the cause of the elect in hand, to bring them back to the friendship of God, and full enjoyment of felicity for evermore.”

That Christ belongs to both parties, God and human beings, of the covenant of redemption shows the mediatory aspect of the person of Christ. The will of the three persons of the Trinity concurs in this intratrinitarian covenant. God the Son who was

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offended by the sin of human beings took the work of redemption and became the mediator to save them.

This covenant of redemption, is in effect one with the eternall decree of redemption, wherein the salvation of the elect, and the way how it shall be brought about is fixed, in the purpose of God, who worketh all things according to the counsell of His own Will, as the Apostle sets it down, Ephes. I. unto the 15 verse.
And the decree of redemption is in effect a covenant, one God in three persons agreeing in the decree, that the second Person, God the Son, should be incarnate, and give obedience and satisfaction to divine justice for the elect: unto which piece of service the Son willingly submitting Himself, the decree becometh a reall covenant indeed.236

As mentioned above, Dickson is convinced that the “decrease of redemption is in effect” the intratrinitarian covenant of redemption. It is noteworthy that Dickson identifies the covenant of redemption not with the divine decree itself but with “the decree of redemption.” The divine decree is the eternal decree of God, according to which God wills and orders all things. The decree of redemption, however, is a restricted sense of the divine decree only concerning the redemption, but it comprises the incarnation of the Son. The two parties of the covenant of redemption are God the Trinity and the second person, God the Son. The Son of God has coequality with God the Father and God the Spirit in the eternal intratrinitarian covenant.

There are six proofs that Dickson offers for the doctrine of the pactum salutis. The first proof outlines the covenant of redemption as a covenant “wherein God disposer and God Redeemer, are agreed, that the elect shall go free for God the Redeemer’s obedience unto

236 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 25. Loonstra argues that Dickson separates the pactum salutis from the decree of incarnation in his Verkiezing - Versoening - Verbond, 100–1. This passage of Dickson, however, closely relates the pactum salutis and the incarnation of the Son.
the death, who hath now bought them with His blood” (Acts 20:28). Dickson argues that the scriptural verses such as 1 Cor 6:20 and 1 Pet 1:18-21 teach the mercantile ideas regarding the price of redemption of the pactum salutis—“God the disposer selleth, and God the Redeemer buyeth the elect to be His conquest, both body and spirit.” It is God the redeemer who made the covenant of redemption with God the disposer. Thus the covenant of redemption is a transaction between the persons of the Trinity.

The second proof deals with the “titles and styles . . . given to Christ in relation to the procureing of a Covenant of grace and reconciliation between God and us.” Christ is the mediator (1 Tim 2:5-6), redeemer (Job 19:24 [25]), surety (Heb 7:22), atonement (Rom 5:11), and propitiation (1 John 2:2). The first title shows both the divinity and humanity of Christ. Dickson describes the mediator as “God Incarnat . . . who gave Himself a ransom for all (to wit, elect children) to be testified in due time.”

The third proof is related “with the eternall decree of God [which] was fixed about the way of Redemption to be fulfilled in time.” Because of this eternal decree, Christ the eternal Son of God became man and laid down his life for his sheep. “God the Son, before He was incarnat,” argues Dickson, “declares the decree of the Kingdom promised unto Him by the Father.” The will of the Trinity comes into agreement in the eternal

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237 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 26.
238 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 26.
239 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 27.
240 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 27.
241 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 29.
242 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 29.
243 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 29. Dickson refers to Psalm 2:7.
covenant of redemption. For Dickson, the psalmist states in Psalm 2:7,

> presupposing . . . the decree of God, of sending His eternall Son into the World, to become a man and to suffer, and thereafter to reign for ever, we must also necessarily presuppose the consent of the Son, making paction with the Father and the Spirit, fixing the decree and agreement about the whole way of Redemption, to be brought about in time: for, the same Person, Christ Jesus, who dwelt among men in the days of His humiliation.  

For Dickson the covenant of redemption is a trinitarian agreement over the Son’s incarnation, suffering, and the eternal reign after his humiliation. In the paction with the Father and the Spirit, the Son consented to the decree of redemption. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are completely equal in the act of agreement. There is no subordination among the three persons of the Trinity in the making of the covenant of redemption.

The fourth proof is connected with the levitical priesthood and ceremonies. Dickson asserts that these were “testimonies, preachings, declarations and evidences of a Covenant, past of old between God the disponer, and the Son the Redeemer, about the way of justifying and saving such as believed in the Messiah by an expiatory sacrifice, to be offered in the fullness of time, for the redeemed.”  

The priesthood and ceremonies of the Old Testament were “prefigurations, predictions, prophecies and pledges, of the Redeemers paying of the promised price of Redemption.”  

God the Father and God the Son agreed upon the price of redemption in the covenant of redemption. There was no coercion in the Godhead concerning this.

The fifth proof also offers evidence of the trinitarian aspect of the covenant of

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245 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 30.

246 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 30.
redemption. The incarnate Christ ratifies all things “which the Father and Himself not yet incarnat, and the holy Spirit had spoken in the Old Testament, about the salvation of the elect, and the price of their redemption, and of the conditions to be performed on either hand.” Thus, argues Dickson, “all that He [Christ] doth, is with the Fathers consent and concurrence.”

The sixth and final proof of the covenant of redemption stands on the four articles of the covenant wherein the Father and the Son were in agreement. The four articles are explained:

The first article, shall be of the persons redeemed.
The second article, shall be of the price of Redemption to be payed by Christ in the fullness of time.
The third article, shall be about the gifts and benefits purchased for, and to be given unto, the persons Redeemed.
The fourth article of this Covenant of redemption, past between the Father and the Son, shall be of the means and ways whereby the gifts and benefits purchased, may be wisely, orderly and effectually applied to the Redeemed.

There are three distinctive features to Dickson’s account of these four articles. The first feature is the relation of the doctrine of the covenant of redemption to the doctrine of divine decree. Dickson already declared that the covenant of redemption is “in effect one with the eternall decree of redemption.” In this decree of redemption, some among all

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247 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 31.

248 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 31. The Latin text reads: “profitetur se omnia facere ex consensu Patris.” Dickson, Therapeutica Sacra, Seu, De Curandis Casibus Conscientiae Circa Regenerationem, 22.

249 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 33.

250 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 25.
fallen human beings were elected in Christ.251 The means and manner of executing the
divine decree are agreed upon between the Father and his Son Christ in the covenant of
redemption.252 The second feature is the infralapsarian perspective on the pactum salutis.
For Dickson the eternal object of the pactum salutis is created and fallen humans. He
argues that the Trinity, offended by sinful human beings, made the covenant of
redemption.253 Human beings are considered “as now fallen by their own fault” in this
covenant.254 The third and most important feature is Dickson’s rejection of universal
redemption. He points out that Christ refuses to intercede for the reprobate (John 17:9).255
Dickson also repudiates hypothetical universalism. He writes, “In no place of Scripture is it
said, that all and every man are elect, or every man is given to Christ, or every man is
predestinat unto life.”256 Dickson continues on to use the doctrine of the covenant of
redemption to support particular redemption. On this matter he states, “In no place of
Scripture is it said, that Christ hath made paction with the Father for all and every man
without exception; But by the contrary, it is sure from Scripture, that Christ hath merited
and procured Salvation for all them for whom he entered himself Surety.”257 He
explicitly argues that the covenant of redemption, a bargain between Christ and the

251 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 30.
252 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 70.
253 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 24.
254 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 35.
255 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 35.
256 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 36.
257 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 36.
Father for the elect, rejects “universall Redemption of all and every man.”

Dickson’s argument here, as in his “Speech to the General Assembly” (1638) challenges the Arminian doctrine of salvation. The basic implications of Dickson’s covenantal thought in *Therapeutica Sacra* are developed against a background of debates with Arminianism. Arminius construed the relationship between the Father and the Son to be that the Son is subordinate to the Father not simply in terms of office but in terms of his divinity. Such subordination would be evident in the decree of predestination as well.

Dickson offers a strong trinitarian formula of the covenant of redemption against the Arminian view of the divine decree. For Dickson, the covenant of redemption past between the Father and the Son is “by way of an eternall decree of the Trinity,

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258 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 63. See also, Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 61, 67, 134.


260 Trueman, *The Claims of Truth*, 134–35. This is clear from his *Apology* 21 in Jacobus Arminius’s *The Works of James Arminius*, trans. James Nichols and William Nichols, London ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1986), 2:29–32. For a discussion of this issue in the works of Arminius, see Jacobus Arminius, *Opera Theologica* (Leiden: Apud Godefridum Basson, 1629), 117–33. Muller offers a similar but different view regarding the relationship of Christ’s two natures, the *pactum salutis*, and the Trinity. According to Muller, the early modern Reformed theology identified Christ as mediator according to both natures—a point heavily critiqued by Roman theologians like Bellarmine. For Bellarmine, Christ could not be mediator according to both natures because Christ is fully God and cannot mediate with himself. If this were possible, argues Bellarmine, the Father and the Spirit would be mediators as well. Moreover, if Christ is mediator according to both natures, then in some sense the divinity of Christ, with the humanity, is subordinate to the Father in engaging the task of mediation. This issue, coupled with the Augustinian trinitarian sensibility of the persons as radically co-equal according to essence, generated a series of adumbrations of *pactum salutis* in Reformed theologies written prior to 1630. Muller, “Toward the Pactum Salutis,” 48–49. Pannenberg also writes, “Reformation theology did not follow this relating of the mediatorial office only to Christ’s human nature, since it regarded the divine-human person as a whole as the bearer of the office. . . . The older Protestant dogmatics gave stronger emphasis to the basic structure of Anselm’s satisfaction theory by putting the Father at the center as the recipient of Christ’s offering of satisfaction. In so doing it contributed not least of all to Socinian criticism of the traditional view of the need of satisfaction for the sin of Adam and his progeny and criticism also of the idea of imputing the merits of Christ to others.” Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, trans. G. W. Bromiley, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 406.
comprehending all and whatsoever belongeth to Redemption.” 261 Although God refuses “all ransome that can come from a meer man,” he would have “His own co-eternal and only begotten Son to become a man, to take on the yoke of the law, and to do all His will, that He alone might redeem the elect, who by nature are under the curse of the law.” 262 For Dickson, the grace and justice of God shall be satisfied for the elect “in and by the second Person of the Trinity, the co-eternal and co-essential Son of the Father.” 263 He argues that the conversion of the elect depends on the omnipotence of the Father and the Son. 264 In Therapeutica Sacra, Dickson’s formulation of the covenant of redemption is clearly presented to be of trinitarian form, and there is no subordination involved.

4.3. Christ’s Voluntary Obedience and Kenosis in Therapeutica Sacra

Therapeutica Sacra contains another distinctive feature regarding the doctrine of the covenant of redemption, which does not appear in Dickson’s previous works—the relationship between Christ’s voluntary obedience and kenosis (emptying). 265 Dickson argues that Christ’s “active and passive obedience, are but two notions of one thing.” 266

261 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 33. When translating this definition into English, Dickson changed the original Latin version of Therapeutica Sacra to give a clearer definition of the covenant of redemption. In the Latin version he writes, “Nam fœdus Redemptionis inter Patrem & Filium initum, in se rationem habet decreti æterni, comprehendentis omnia ad Redemptionis executionem, pertinentia.”

262 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 37.

263 Dickson, The Summe of Saving Knowledge, 24.

264 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 66.

265 Dickson contends in his exposition of Philippians 2:7-8 that the “exinanition or emptying” of Christ was due to the covenant of redemption. Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 127–28.

266 Dickson, Therapeutica Sacra, 38.
He continues:

his [Christ’s] incarnation, subjection to the law, and the whole course of his life was a continued course of suffering, and in all his suffering he was a free and voluntary agent, fulfilling all which he had undertaken unto the Father, for making out the promised price of Redemption, and accomplishing what the Father had given him command to do. His obedience, even to the death of the cross, did begin in His emptying himself to take on our nature, and the shape of a servant, and did run on till his resurrection and ascension.267

Christ suffered both passive and active obedience as “a free and voluntary agent” to fulfill the covenant of redemption.268 He emptied himself to take on human nature and took on the shape of a servant until his resurrection and ascension. For Dickson, Christ emptied himself of “natural abilities, such a down-throwing of his mind, such a fainting

267 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 38. Owen also argues that Christ voluntarily accomplished the redemptive work. He writes, “Observe also, that such was the inconceivable love of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, unto the souls of men, that he was free and willing to condescend unto any condition for their good and salvation. That was the end of all this dispensation. And the Lord Christ was not humbled and made less than the angels without his own will and consent. His will and good liking concurred unto this work.” Owen, Work, 20:369. See also, his Works, 12:346 and 23:56.

268 Along similar lines of thought, Witsius argues that Christ’s emptying of himself was decreed by the Trinity. He writes: “They [The Remonstrants] distinguish not the person of the Son of God, and the grace by which he humbled himself to undertake obedience in the assumed human nature, from the human nature itself, and obedience of Christ, now in his state of humiliation. The grace of the Son of God was so free, that he could not be against this humiliation, or emptying of himself, that he might come under an obligation to obedience. There is no reason, but the most free good pleasure of the divine will, why this future humiliation was decreed by the adorable Trinity, and consequently by the Son himself. Yet, upon supposing this free decree, the human nature assumed by the Logos, or Word, could not decline, or draw back from the office assigned to Christ, and now undertaken by the Logos himself, without sin and disobedience” (bolding is mine). Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, I.3.27; Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, 1:158. Witsius also asserts that the divine nature of the Son did not exert or display all its majesty by virtue of the covenant of redemption. He writes: “as the human nature does not, without the divine, complete the person of the Mediator, it does not appear that the Mediator, as such, did not engage to be subject to the law, without bringing his divine nature likewise to share in that subjection. In order to remove this difficulty, we are accurately to distinguish between both natures, considered separately, and the same natures united in the person of God-man. It was proper, that both natures should act suitably to themselves and their distinct properties. Since the divine nature, as subsisting in the Son, could not truly and really be subject; therefore, by virtue of the covenant, it did not exert or display all its majesty, in the assumed form of a servant; nor hinder that nature, to which it was united by the hypostatical union, from being truly subject to the law, both as to the condition of the reward, and as to the penal sanction; which, indeed, was neither a real renunciation nor degradation of the divine superiority, but only a certain economical veiling of it for a time” (bolding is mine). Witsius, De oeconomia foederum, I.3.16–17; Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, 1:154.
and wounding of his joy, and so heavy a weight of sorrow on him.” 269 This was the reason why he “not only . . . desired that small comfort of his weak disciples watching with him a little, and missed of it, but also stood in need of an Angel to comfort him, Luke 22.43.” 270 Christ abhorred the cup of wrath in his human nature, but he submitted to receive it, “upon the consideration of the divine decree and agreement made, upon the price to be payed by him.” 271 In doing so, Christ did “demit His person to assume humane nature, and empty Himself so far as to hide his glory and take on the shape of a servant, and expose Himself willingly to all the contradiction of sinners.” 272

Christ also willingly emptied himself of the natural strength of his soul in suffering and spiritual death. Dickson argues:

> Albeit the con-natural holiness of the soul of Christ could not be removed, nor the personal union of it be dissolved, no not when the soul was separated from the body, yet it was subject, by Christ’s own consent, to be emptied of strength-natural, to be deprived for a time of the clearness of vision of its own blessedness, and of the quiet possession of the formerly felt peace, and of the fruition of joy for a time, and so suffer an eclipse of light and consolation, otherwise shining from His God-head; and so in this sort of spiritual death might undergo some degrees of spiritual death. 273

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269 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 44.

270 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 44.

271 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 45.

272 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 53.

273 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 40. The Latin version reads, “Sicut propter Creationis decretum, neque extingui, neque in nihilum redigi potuit Christi anima; Sic propter decretum assumendi naturam humanam in unionem personalem cum Filio Dei, nec separari potuit ipsius anima à Deitate personaliter unita, nec sanctitate connaturali privari potuit, ne vel solveretur unio personalis, vel Agnus ille cessaret esse immaculatus; Potuit tamen, quod ad vires animae attinet, exinaniri; quod ad visionis claritatem: quod ad pacis sedatam possessionem, quod ad gaudii frutionem attinet, eclipsin pati potuit lucis, & consolationis à facie Deitatis unitæ oriundæ, in eoque genere mortis spiritualis nonnullos gradus subire.” Dickson, *Therapeutica Sacra, Seu, De Curandis Casibus Conscientiae Circa Regenerationem*, 27.
Christ experienced not only a physical death but a spiritual death in his soul, which is the separation of the soul from communion with God. He had “habitual heaviness of spirit”—the Scriptures say “that He weeped, but never that he laughed, and but very seldom that he rejoiced.”

He learned “experimental obedience” from what he suffered (Dickson’s comment on Hebrews 5:8). In his suffering and death, he experienced the difference “between foresight and feeling, between resolution and experience.”

Dickson writes, “these sufferings Christ did not endure unwittingly, or unwillingly, but by consent, by covenant deliberately” (Isaiah 53:7).

In his prayer of John 12:27-28, referring to the cross, Christ “repeats the sum of the Covenant of Redemption.” In light of this, Dickson argues that biblical statements reflective of Christ’s subordination to the Father are only to be understood from the perspective of the covenant of redemption, in terms of Christ’s humiliation and saving mission.

In sum, Dickson’s language of kenosis should be understood in terms of Christ’s

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274 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 40–41.

275 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 43.

276 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 60.

277 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 50.

278 Perkins holds a similar view in his *Golden Chaine*: “Question. How can Christ be subordinate unto Gods election, seeing hee together with the Father decreed all things? Ans. Christ as he is mediatour, is not subordinate to the very decree it-selfe of election, but to the execution thereof onely.” William Perkins, “Golden Chaine,” in *The workes of that famous and worthy minister of Christ, Mr. William Perkins* (Cambridge: John Legatt, 1612), xv (p. 24, col. 2A). Perkins cites 1 Peter 1:20 and Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chap. 15. Witsius also writes, “if the Mediator be considered in the state of humiliation and the form of a servant, he is certainly inferior to the Father, and subordinate to him. It was not of his human nature only, but of himself in that state, that he himself said, John 14:28. ‘The Father is greater than I.’ Nay, we may look upon the very mediatorial office in itself, as importing a certain economical inferiority or subordination.” Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, I.3.22; Witsius, *The Economy of the Covenants*, 1:155. For a similar view of Warfield regarding the economical subordination of the Son, see Fred G. Zaspel, *The Theology of B.B. Warfield: A Systematic Summary* (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010), 241; Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, *The Lord of Glory: A Study of the Designations of Our Lord in the New Testament with Especial Reference to His Deity* (New York: American Tract Society, 1907), 237–38.
suffering and spiritual death. He does not attempt to depict Christ’s kenosis as an emptying of divine attributes or properties such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. Rather, he describes the kenosis from the perspective of Christ’s soul.

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279 Thus, Dickson’s kenosis language is different from modern kenotic Christology. In typical nineteenth-century versions of kenotic Christology, kenotic Christology may be briefly described as maintaining that the divine Logos, in order to take the human nature and submit in reality to its earthly conditions and limitations, abandoned what kenoticists call his relative or his metaphysical attributes such as omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. More recent kenotic theologians have developed their theories in an attempt to harmonize the Chalcedon Creed with biblical statements about the incarnate Christ’s humiliation and his lack of omniscience. In his dissertation, Feenstra defends kenotic Christology, arguing: (1) that kenotic theology’s claims about the self-emptying of the Son Incarnate does not necessarily imply a denial of his true divinity; (2) nor does it imply a denial of the true humanity of the incarnate Son of God in either the state of humiliation or exaltation; (3) that its presupposition of the pre-existence of Christ does not imply a denial of his true humanity; and (4) that by asserting his distinct personality and activity, kenosis theology does not create insurmountable problems for the doctrine of the Trinity. Ronald J. Feenstra, “Pre-Existence, Kenosis, and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1984), abstract. A succinct summary of kenotic theory is found in Ronald J. Feenstra, “Incarnation,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 538–39. For the history of kenotic Christologies, see I. A. Dorner, History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, vol. II (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1839), 2:281–307; Francis J. Hall, The Kenotic Theory: Considered with Particular Reference to Its Anglican Forms and Arguments (New York: Longmans, Green, 1898), 13–20; Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ in Its Physical, Ethical, and Official Aspects, 133–91; H. R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1921), 463–86; Feenstra, “Pre-Existence, Kenosis, and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ,” 10–91; Ronald J. Feenstra, “Reconsidering Kenotic Christology,” in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 128–52; Ronald J. Feenstra, “A Kenotic Christological Method for Understanding the Divine Attributes,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 150–54; Thomas G. Weinandy, “Kenotic Christology: ‘Become’ As Compositional,” in Does God Change? The Word’s Becoming in the Incarnation (Still River, MA: St. Bede’s Publications, 1985), 101–23; Sarah Coakley, “Kenosis and Subversion: On the Repression of ‘Vulnerability’ in Christian Feminist Writing,” in Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 3–39. Coakley explores six primary ways in which kenosis has been understood throughout the tradition: (1) Jesus temporarily relinquishes his divine powers which are Christ’s by right (cosmic redeemer model); (2) Jesus pretends to relinquish divine powers whilst actually retaining them (gnostic redeemer model of Cyril of Alexandria); (3) Jesus chooses never to have certain (false and worldly) forms of power—forms sometimes wrongly construed as “divine”; (4) Jesus reveals “divine power” to be intrinsically “humble” rather than “grasping”; (5) The divine Logos takes on human flesh in the incarnation, but without loss, impairment, or restriction of divine powers (divine Logos model); and (6) Jesus’ life is a temporary retracting (or withdrawing into “potency”) of certain characteristics of divinity during the incarnate life (retraction model). Dickson’s formulation of the pactum salutis is similar to the model (6). In his comment on Matthew 24:36, the locus classicus for kenoticists, Dickson argues, “Concerning the precise time of his second coming, he sayeth, that neither man nor Angel knoweth, but only, the Father, whereby he doth not exclude the rest of the persons of the God-head, but only the creatures.” Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Bb1. It is interesting that Dickson cites Matthew 24:36 changing some words (“But of that day and houre knoweth no man, no, no the angels of heaven, but my Father only”). Compare it with modern English Bible’s rendering, “But concerning that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but the Father only” (English Standard Version; italics are mine). It seems that Dickson just follows popular English Bibles of his time such as the King
Dickson writes, “Hence came such a wasting and eating up of all his humane strength, and emptying of his natural abilities, such a down-throwing of his mind, such a fainting and swounding of his joy, and so heavy a weight of sorrow on him, that not only he desired that small comfort of his weak disciples watching with him a little, and missed of it, but also stood in need of an Angel to comfort him, Luke, 22.43.” In his spiritual death, Christ lost the clear vision of blessedness, the full possession of peace, and the fruition of joy. The soul of Christ suffered from the absence/delay of divine felicity arising from the union of his two natures. It does not mean that the union was dissolved, but that the divine blessings of the union were hidden and delayed because of the kenosis of attributes. The kenosis as krypsis was even to the point of being hidden from the human nature to which the divine is joined. According to Dickson’s pactum formulation, Christ and Christ only became incarnate and emptied himself because of the covenant of redemption. Christ emptied himself to assume human nature “so far as to

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280 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 44. The Latin version reads, “26. Hinc virium humanarum tanta depastio fuit, & exinanitio; animi tanta prostratio, & deliquium gaudii tantum, tristitiae que pondus tam grave, ut non solum desideratum sit ab eo solutium illud perpusillum, quod ex vigilantia & consortio trium infirmorum discipulorum decerpi potissima, Sed opus fuerit etiam Angelo consolatore, Luc. 22.43.” Dickson, Therapeutica Sacra, Seu, De Curandis Casibus Conscientiae Circa Regenerationem, 29.

281 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 40.

282 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 43.

283 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 38. Thomas Aquinas argues that each of the divine persons could have assumed human nature because the divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the persons, and the nature of personality is common to all the persons (Summa Theologiae, IIIa, q. 3 a. 5). Anselm of Canterbury, by contrast, asserts that only the person of the Son ought to be made incarnate, rather than that of the Father or the Holy Spirit (Cur Deus Homo, II.9). He writes, “Supposing any other of the persons is to be made incarnate, there will be two sons in the Trinity, namely: the Son of God, who is Son even before the incarnation, and he who will be the Virgin’s son through the incarnation. . . . Also, if it is to be the Father who is made incarnate, there will be two
hide his glory\textsuperscript{284} and take on the shape of a servant, and expose Himself willingly to all
the contradiction of sinners\textsuperscript{285} in order to fulfill the stipulations of the divine agreement
made between the persons of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{286} In this vein, Dickson’s understanding of

\textbf{grandsons in the Trinity}, because, through his assumption of manhood, the Father will be the grandson of
the parents of the Virgin, and the Word, despite having no trace of human nature in him, will none the less
be the grandson of the Virgin, because he will be the son of her son. All these eventualities are incongruous,
and do not come about if it is the Word who is made incarnate. . . . It sounds more appropriate for the Son
to make supplication to the Father than for any other of the persons to supplicate another” (bolding is mine).
324. Early modern Reformed theologians, such as Goodwin, Turretin, Arrowsmith, and Brooks, followed
along these lines of thought. Goodwin argues that “the \textit{iδιοματα}, or the proper titles by which the persons
of the Trinity are distinguished, should be kept and preserved distinct, and no way confounded,” and that “it
was not fit there should be two sons, or two persons in the Trinity to bear the relation or title of sons.”
Thomas Goodwin, \textit{The Works of Thomas Goodwin} (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1863), 5:41 (“Of Christ the
Mediator”). Turretin asserts similarly that the Holy Spirit could not be sent to be mediator because “there
would have been two sons, the second person by eternal generation and the third by an incarnation in time.”
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1992), 13.4.5. For Arrowsmith, the Father cannot be the mediator
because “he is of none, and therefore cannot be sent.” John Arrowsmith, \textit{Theanthropos, or, God-man being
an exposition upon the first eighteen verses of the first chapter of the Gospel according to St. John}
(London: Printed for Humphrey Moseley and William Wilson, 1660), 214. Echoing Arrowsmith, Brooks contends
that “the first Person in the Trinity should not be the Mediator,” because “he is of none, and therefore could
not be sent.” Thomas Brooks, \textit{Paradice opened, or the secreets, mysteries, and rarities of divine love, of
infinite wisdom, and of wonderful counsel, laid open to publick view} (London: Printed for Dorman
Newman, 1675), 155. Thus, the order and mode of subsistence among the persons of the Trinity is decisive
for Anselm, Goodwin, Turretin, Arrowsmith, and Brooks. For a good discussion with regard to Goodwin,

\textsuperscript{284} For a kenotic interpretation of the divine glory that Jesus Christ emptied of, see Stephen T.
Stephen Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 132. Davis writes, “It will seem to some that
‘having the divine glory’ is just as much an attribute or property as ‘being omnipotent’ or ‘being
omniscient’.” From this perspective, he argues that “every orthodox Christologist is a kenoticist in some
sense” (p. 121). Calvin argues, however, that the majestic glory of Christ’s divinity, though “concealed and
not exerting its force” during his ministry on earth, was by no means absent from his person. John Calvin,
\textit{Calvin’s Commentaries}, trans. Calvin Translation Society (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1999), comment on
John 12:27.

\textsuperscript{285} Dickson, \textit{Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration}, 53. For a kenotic interpretation of
the divine glory that Jesus Christ emptied of, see Stephen T. Davis, “Is Kenosis Orthodox?,” in \textit{Exploring
2006), 132. Davis writes, “It will seem to some that ‘having the divine glory’ is just as much an attribute or
property as ‘being omnipotent’ or ‘being omniscient’.” From this perspective, he argues that “every
orthodox Christologist is a kenoticist in some sense” (p. 121).

\textsuperscript{286} If Dickson stands alongside of some modern kenoticists such as Davis and Feenstra, his
formulation would be as follows: (1) Christ has the “omni properties”-unless-the-pactum-salutis-is-
executed-in-time. (2) The three persons of the Trinity would have these “covenantal kenotic omni
properties.” (3) The incarnate Christ alone, however, actually had the “covenantal kenotic omni properties”
Christ’s humiliation is similar to that of Hilary of Poitiers (c. 330-c. 368). Hilary conceived of the Logos incarnate as having exchanged the form of God for the form of a servant.  

4.4. Conclusion: Non-Subordinational Features of Christ in the Pactum Salutis

There are three major reasons by which one may argue that Dickson’s doctrine of the covenant of redemption does not imply subordinationism of the Son of God. First, the divinity of Christ in the transaction and fulfillment of the covenant of redemption is highlighted in his pactum formulation. Dickson stresses in the formulation that Christ is co-equal with the Father. Christ was begotten of the substance of the Father, thus he is both distinct from the Father and eternally undivided from him. The name of the Son of God belongs to Christ according to his divinity by eternal generation, and the whole

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287 “In forma Dei manens formam servi assumpsit, non demutatus sed se ipsum exinaniens, et intra se latens, et intra suam ipse vacuefactum potestatem; dum se usque ad formam temperat habitus humani, ne potestem immensamque naturam assumptae humilitatis non ferret infirmitas, sed in tantum se virtute incircumscripta moderaretur, in quantum oporteret eam usque ad patientiam connexi sibi corporis obedire.” Hilary, De Trinitate, lib. xi. 48. Bruce points out that “Thomasius, without good ground, claims Hilary as a supporter of kenosis in his own sense.” Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ in Its Physical, Ethical, and Official Aspects, 168. For Thomasius’s view of Hilary, see Gottfried Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk: Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus (Erlangen: A. Deichert, 1886), 2:117, 140, 344.

288 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 185.
divine essence is communicated to him. Dickson relates the divinity of Christ with his sovereignty, whereby Christ actually effects and protects the salvation of the elect. If Christ withdraws himself from the covenant of redemption, God’s decree of redemption would become void. Christ, who made the covenant of redemption with the Father, is himself true and almighty God, who became the anointed savior. Dickson claims that the eternal, only begotten Son of God became incarnate and suffered in his humane nature “according to the pactum of redemption past between him and the Father.” The Christ who made the *pactum* with the Father is the substantial Word of the Father and the one who was with God and is God. This idea of Christ’s consubstantiality with the Father is stressed further when Dickson begins to depict the covenant of redemption as an eternal intratrinitarian covenant among the three persons of the Trinity in *Therapeutica Sacra*. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are completely equal in the covenant.

Second, Dickson clearly distinguishes between Christ’s natural consubstantiality with the Father and his voluntary subordination to him for the fulfillment of the covenant of redemption. The covenantal interaction between the Father and the Son has the characteristics of a mutually voluntary, contractual agreement. That the Son obeyed the Father in his earthly ministry does not show the Son’s subordinate rank but

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289 Dickson, *An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles*, 185–86.

290 Dickson, *A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, A–Av*.

291 Dickson, *A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Ffv*.


293 Dickson, *Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration*, 25.

demonstrates the unity of will between the divine persons. The covenant of redemption decreed the mediator between God and humanity, the particular number and names of the elect, and the gifts and graces to be bestowed upon these elect. These specifics were agreed upon by God and the second person of the Trinity. The incarnate Christ voluntarily obeyed unto death because he willingly accepted the conditions of the covenant of redemption. The one who paid the price of redemption is God the Son who subsisted with the Father from eternity. Dickson interprets Philippians 2:7-8 through the voluntary humiliation of Christ and the voluntary covenant made by Christ to take on the yoke of the law. Christ’s voluntariness in the covenant of redemption makes sure the salvation of the elect because he is bound to this covenant that he has voluntarily made. In his redemptive work, Christ subjected himself to the will of the Father by his holy, voluntary resolution. The obedience of Christ does not imply a subordination because, as Anselm puts it, it is done by his free, voluntary will, not by any coercion. All Christ’s sufferings and service done for the redemption “were most willingly and heartily undertaken and discharged by Christ” to fulfill the

295 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Dd4.
296 Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland,” 159.
297 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 171.
298 Dickson, An exposition of all st. Pauls epistles, together with...other epistles, 128.
299 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Dd2.
300 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Dd4.
302 Dickson, A brief explication of the first fifty psalms, 250, 38.
covenant of redemption.

Third, the covenantal characteristic of Christ’s redemptive work is connected with the idea of the self-emptying of Christ. Dickson argues, Christ’s “obedience, even to the death of the cross, did begin in His emptying himself to take on our nature, and the shape of a servant, and did run on till his resurrection and ascension.” Christ emptied himself of “natural abilities, such a down-throwing of his mind, such a fainting and wounding of his joy, and so heavy a weight of sorrow on him.” Christ hated the cup of wrath but voluntarily chose to receive it owing to the covenant of redemption. Christ demitted his person to assume human nature, emptied himself to hide his glory, took on the shape of a servant, and willingly exposed himself to temptations of sin. Christ, per Dickson’s pactum doctrine, did not exert his majesty by virtue of the covenant of redemption. It does not indicate subordinationism because it is an economical humiliation, and “the con-natural holiness of the soul of Christ could not be removed, nor the personal union of it be dissolved.” For Dickson, Christ’s economical subordination to the Father should be understood from the perspective of the covenant of redemption.

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303 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 38.
304 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 44.
305 Dickson, A brief exposition of the evangel of Jesus Christ according to Matthew, Dd3v; Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 45.
306 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 53.
307 Dickson, Therapeutica sacra . . . concerning regeneration, 40.
CHAPTER 5
THE PACTUM SALUTIS AND THE HOLY SPIRIT: THOMAS GOODWIN

5.1. Modern Critique of the Pactum Salutis as Binitarianism

This chapter concentrates on the Spirit’s role in the pactum salutis in the theology of Thomas Goodwin. It will reply to the following questions. What is the relationship between Christ and the Holy Spirit in Goodwin’s theology? What are the key features of his Pneumatology? How does he relate “two-nature Christology” to “Spirit-Christology”? What are the terminology and formulation of his doctrine of the pactum salutis? How are the nature, will, and wisdom of God interconnected in his pactum formulation? What is the biblical basis of the inner-divine discourse in his pactum doctrine? What is the role of the Holy Spirit in the transaction of the pactum salutis? What is the role of the Holy Spirit in the application of the pactum salutis? This chapter will make it clear that the Holy Spirit cannot be omitted from the pactum since he makes the temporal administration of the pactum actually effective for the believer. When the pactum is recognized as an ad intra trinitarian grounding for the ad extra work of salvation, the doctrine should take its place not just in Christology but in Pneumatology in its full meaning.

The doctrine of the pactum salutis is criticized from a pneumatological perspective for allegedly omitting a role for the Holy Spirit.¹ Robert Letham describes the pre-temporal

¹ For recent studies of the pactum salutis, see notes 3 and 86 of chapter 1 of this study.
covenant of redemption as an “extreme development” of covenant theology in which the
“Holy Spirit tended to be left out.” Herman Hoeksema argues that the place of the Holy
Spirit was left rather dubious in the traditionary doctrine of the covenant of redemption. He criticizes Louis Berkhof’s codification of the doctrine of the pactum salutis because
Berkhof defines the pactum salutis as “an agreement between the Father as the first
person of the holy Trinity and the Son as second person, not between the triune God and
Christ as the head and mediator of his people.” Hoeksema asserts that in so doing “the
Holy Spirit, the third person of the holy Trinity, is not a party of this covenant” in
Berkhof’s formulation of the doctrine. After a brief summary of Owen’s formulation of
the doctrine of the pactum salutis, Ralph A. Smith concludes without any definite
evidence that Owen’s “discussion of the covenant itself is not explicitly trinitarian”
because it seems to lack pneumatological dimension. Willem van Asselt acknowledges
that the doctrine of the pactum salutis was criticized for its omission of pneumatological
aspects and attempts to respond to the criticism by explicating Johannes Cocceius’s
formulation of the Spirit’s role in the eternal covenant. Carl Trueman suggests that

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2 Letham, *The Work of Christ*, 52–53. Letham points out that A. A. Hodge makes no reference to

3 Herman Hoeksema, *Reformed Dogmatics*, ed. Mark Hoeksema (Reformed Free Publishing
Association, 2004), 1:406. Hoeksema does not point to specific theologians.

Hoeksema’s critique of Berkhof is Hoeksema’s full view of the doctrine of the pactum salutis. Ralph A.
Smith, *The Eternal Covenant: How the Trinity Reshapes Covenant Theology* (Moscow, ID: Canon Press &
Book Service, 2003), 15. Hoeksema himself, however, expounds the doctrine at length and positively
endorses it with his own formulations.

5 Smith, *The Eternal Covenant: How the Trinity Reshapes Covenant Theology*, 20. For a useful
discussion of the subject matter, see O’Donnell III, “The Holy Spirit’s Role in John Owen’s ‘Covenant of
the Mediator’ Formulation.”

Edward Fisher and Peter Bulkeley, with their exclusive focusing on the Father-Son relationship, are “arguably vulnerable to the accusation of developing a sub-Trinitarian foundation for the economy of salvation.”¹ These criticisms cannot be regarded as entirely wrong, since the Spirit’s role in the pactum was obscure in some pactum formulations of the seventeenth-century Reformed theology. For instance, Rutherford, although affirming an intratrinitarian transaction in regard to redemption, argued that not all trinitarian transactions should be called covenant, and that the Spirit was not a covenanting party in the pactum salutis.⁸ Thus, there is some truth in the recent criticism which revolves around the contention that the Holy Spirit is never properly mentioned in the transaction of the pactum salutis, and that the pactum does not really have a Trinitarian character and so it leads to binitarianism. However, some early modern theologians, such as Herman Witsius, John Owen, David Dickson, Thomas Goodwin, and Johannes Cocceius, do justice to the Trinitarian quality of the pactum salutis. Goodwin’s pactum doctrine, above all and in a sophisticated way, relates the pactum with the person and work of the Holy Spirit.

Goodwin’s theology is worthy to be read and pondered upon for its profoundness and exactness. His leadership upon the Independent churches was second to none, and traces of the influence can be found in English speaking Christianity down through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁹ Goodwin, however, is a highly neglected theologian

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¹ Trueman, John Owen, 86.


and is little read. There are only a few secondary works about Goodwin. This neglect is partly attributed to the difficulty of reading Goodwin—his sentences are long and complex, and his exegetical work is intricate and thorough to the point of excess.

Goodwin’s discussion of the relationship of the two doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the *pactum salutis* shows the delicacy and thoroughness of his theology, but it has not attracted enough scholarly interest. Goodwin is one of the main proponents of the doctrine, evidenced by the Savoy Declaration, upon which he and John Owen had spent a great deal of energy. The Savoy Declaration 8.1 added eight words to the Westminster Confession 8.1 to address the *pactum salutis* clearly. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is

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14 *The Savoy Declaration of Faith and Order: The Confession of Faith of the Congregational-Independents (1658)* (London: Evangelical Press, 1971), 8.1: “It pleased God, in his eternal purpose, to choose and ordain the Lord Jesus his only begotten Son, according to a covenant made between them both, to be the Mediator between God and man; the Prophet, Priest, and King; the Head and Saviour of his Church, the Heir of all things and Judge of the world; unto whom he did from all eternity give a people to be his seed, and to be by him in time redeemed, called, justified, sanctified, and glorified” (bolds are mine.
pervasive in Goodwin’s theology. His theological scheme is vitally enhanced by his strong Pneumatology.\textsuperscript{15} As Mark Jones demonstrates, Goodwin’s doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} represents one of his significant contributions to the discussions of the eternal intratrinitarian transaction.\textsuperscript{16} Jones’s study, however, focuses on the survey of the Spirit’s role in Goodwin’s treatise directly related to the \textit{pactum salutis}. This study will expand the area of the texts and examine not only the Spirit’s role in Goodwin’s \textit{pactum} formulations but also his \textit{pactum} ideas in his pneumatological texts. In so doing, the present study will demonstrate that Goodwin gives a full light upon the role of the Holy Spirit in relation to the \textit{pactum salutis}. In the first and second sections, I will explore the distinctive features of Goodwin’s doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the \textit{pactum salutis}. These two sections will be a foundation to understand the third part, which deals with Goodwin’s portrayal of the Spirit’s role in the eternal covenant. I will also point out that the pneumatological aspects of Goodwin’s \textit{pactum} doctrine offer a practical implication for understanding theology in a balanced, fully trinitarian way.

5.2. Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Covenant of Grace in Goodwin’s Theology

5.2.1. Christ and the Holy Spirit in Goodwin’s Theology

5.2.1.1. \textit{Filioque} both in the Immanent and Economic Perspective

Goodwin basically stands along the Western double procession tradition of the Spirit (to denote the added eight words). Goodwin referred to the Savoy Declaration as the “latest and best” because of these kinds of revisions. See Goodwin’s speech to the newly appointed Lord Protector, Richard Cromwell (1626-1712), in the weekly newspaper, \textit{Mercurius Politicus} 438 (1658), 924. Cited from Jones, \textit{Why Heaven Kissed Earth}, 127n27.


\textsuperscript{16} Jones, \textit{Why Heaven Kissed Earth}, 139–44.
for the question of the *filioque* but adumbrates it in a more nuanced way in relation to the economic Trinity. Blackham offers an ambivalent interpretation about this issue. On the one hand, he is convinced that Goodwin “repeatedly agrees with the classic Western view of the Spirit ontologically proceeding from the Father and the Son.” On the other hand, he argues, “Goodwin sees an ontological Trinity of single procession, and a ‘dispensatory’ Trinity of double procession.” Blackham asserts that although it seems historically difficult to see Goodwin as rejecting the *filioque*, “viewed through Turretin’s careful handling of the issue, it does appear that *Goodwin does understand the ontological Trinity in the Eastern sense.*”

Blackham’s ambivalent interpretation is attributed to his misunderstanding of Goodwin’s comment on John 15:26, where Goodwin writes:

> There is therefore, in those speeches, a manifest distinguishing between that dispensatory sending of him from the Father to them, and that substantial proceeding of his from the Father, *as a third person*; and this is added to shew the original ground, why it must be from the Father that he sends him, and with his consent first had; because his very person is by proceeding from the Father, and therefore this his office too. And therefore that latter is spoken *in the present time*, whereas that other speech of Christ’s, ‘Whom I will send from the Father,’ *is in the future*; because the Holy Ghost his dispensatory sending, both from the Father and from Christ, was yet to come; whereas this personal proceeding of his from the Father was then, when he spake it, and is continually, and had been

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18 Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 15. See a fine explanation of this point in Jones, *Why Heaven Kissed Earth*, 139–45. Jones writes (on p. 143), “[in Goodwin’s theology] certain works bear the character of one Person more than of another. For example, election is attributed to the Father (2 Tim 2:19); redemption, flowing from and depending on election is appropriated to the Son (Heb 9:15-17); and the application of election and redemption is ascribed to the Spirit (Eph 4:30) since his subsistence proceeds from the Father and the Son.”


from eternity.\footnote{Thomas Goodwin, \textit{The Works of Thomas Goodwin} (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1863), 6:5 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”; italics are mine). The works will be abbreviated as \textit{Works}. I added the title of the book or subsection of \textit{Works}. Lawrence and Jones argue that the 1681-1704 edition of his works is superior to the 1861-1866 edition, since the latter has a number of interpolations as well as a number of omissions from Goodwin’s original writings. Lawrence, “Transmission and Transformation: Thomas Goodwin and the Puritan Project 1600-1704,” 125; Jones, \textit{Why Heaven Kissed Earth}, 19–21. For this study, I basically used the 1861-1866 edition because it is more widely used and more easily available for modern readers; however, I used the original texts when the 1861-1866 edition shows any substantial difference from Goodwin’s original writings.} Blackham suggests, “Here it seems as if Goodwin makes one of the few divisions between the economic and the immanent Trinity in his whole theology.”\footnote{Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 16.} According to his interpretation of Goodwin, in the ontological Trinity, the Spirit derives his being and person from the Father; however, in the economic Trinity, the Spirit is seen as proceeding from the Father and the Son, most especially in terms of being sent out upon the church, but also in terms of his person and being.\footnote{Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 16. Beeke and Jones argue that “Goodwin sees both ontology and economy in verse 26 [of John 15].” Beeke and Jones, \textit{A Puritan Theology}, 99.} In the above passage, however, Goodwin contrasts two kinds of economic processions of the Holy Spirit—the present sending of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the future sending of him from both the Father and the Son. In the present time, the Spirit is said to be sent from the Father because the Spirit is regarded as a third person who will authenticate Jesus’ sayings. In the future, however, the Spirit will be said to be sent from both the Father and the Son because the dispensatory sending is based on the ontological double procession. Without harming the Western trinitarian tradition, Goodwin tries to explain the scriptural text that seemingly supports the Eastern view of the single procession of the Holy Spirit. Blackham, however, fails to understand Goodwin’s intention, as if Goodwin here made a distinction between
an ontological Trinity of single procession and a dispensatory Trinity of double procession. Yet, Goodwin points out two aspects of the dispensatory or economic procession of the Holy Spirit: one is regarded as a single procession as an “ambassador” or another “witness”; the other is considered as a double procession as a mirror of the ontological double procession. If Goodwin really offered Blackham’s idea in the above passage, his comment would be self-inconsistent because just a few paragraphs above, he presupposes that “the Holy Ghost is indeed the last in order of the persons, as proceeding from the other two, yet in the participation of the Godhead he is equal with them both.”

In another comment on John 15:26, Goodwin points to “the Son’s concurrence, as second person, in sending him [the Spirit] as well as the Father” with regard to the Spirit’s person procession from both. He claims that “the Father himself sends him [the Spirit] not, but in and through Christ.”

Goodwin acknowledges the *filioque* not only from the ontological perspective but from the economic perspective. Endorsing Augustine’s mutual love model in relation to the ontological Trinity, he calls the Holy Spirit “vinculum Trinitatis” as the union of the


26 Richard Muller has argued that among the Reformed orthodox the “*ad intra* procession of the Spirit is mirrored and followed by the *ad extra* procession or ‘mission’ of the Spirit.” Muller, *PRRD*, 4:378.


Father and the Son and depicts the Spirit as proceeding from both by way of love.30 Goodwin makes the dispensatory double procession very clear in his comment on Acts 2:32-33, saying that when Christ went to heaven, “both Father and Son would send the Holy Ghost from thence.”31 In his comment on Acts 2:33, Goodwin also contends that the Spirit, whom Christ first received for the believers and sent forth on them, “came from Christ, as well as from the Father.”32 About Revelation 22:1, he argues that the Spirit proceeds out of the throne of God and of the Lamb.33 He goes on to state, regarding 2 Corinthians 13:14, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son.34 The Spirit proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father, because the Son “purchased not only all the graces of the Spirit for us, but the Spirit himself.”35

Goodwin’s doctrine of the filioque is closely connected with his view of the Holy Spirit as a personalized love. Some modern scholars criticize that the Augustinian portrayal of the Spirit as love makes the Spirit merely a subordinated and depersonalized bond between the Father and the Son.36 The Spirit in Goodwin’s filioque doctrine is different from the one of this criticism. Goodwin maintains that the Spirit as love in the


31 Goodwin, Works, 6:7 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).


34 Goodwin, Works, 6:53 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).

35 Goodwin, Works, 6:52 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).

Father and the Son is “the original of his [the Spirit’s] person.” Continues Goodwin, “he [Spirit] is the love that is between them both [Father and Son], so it is he who sheds abroad the love of both into our hearts; and it is he who is grieved, as a friend or person that loves us (as Eph. 4:30), when we sin, or neglect that duty which is his care and charge to work in us.” In Goodwin’s *filioque* doctrine, the Holy Spirit is the personalized love, who links the Father and the Son, and works in the believer. Goodwin applies the notion of love not only to the work of the Spirit but to his person. Goodwin considers the essence of the work and person of the Spirit as love, so it is natural in his trinitarian theology that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son not only in the ontological aspect, but also in the economic dimension. Therefore, Goodwin’s *filioque* formulation does not have sufficient reason for suggesting, as Blackham does, that “the inner direction of Goodwin’s Trinitarian thought is towards the East.” Rather, standing along the lines of Western tradition, Goodwin argues for the *filioque* both from the ontological and economic perspective and develops the economic dimension in a more sophisticated way.

5.2.1.2. The Consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son

Another distinctive feature of Goodwin’s Pneumatology consists in his emphasis on

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40 Jones argues that “Goodwin falls within the mainstream of Reformed orthodoxy by advocating the *filioque.*” Jones, *Why Heaven Kissed Earth*, 121.
the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son. Goodwin stresses this point on the first page of his work on the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit “is a person in the Godhead equal with the Father and the Son; and the work he doth for us in its kind is as great as those of the Father or the Son.”41 Like Basil of Caesarea, Goodwin stresses that the Spirit partakes of the same nature with the Father and the Son, and that the Spirit works both in the creation of the world and in the re-creation of sinners.42 Goodwin demonstrates the Spirit’s co-equality with the Father and the Son in two ways. Goodwin claims:

Let the same law, I beseech you, take place in your hearts towards the Holy Ghost, as well as the other two persons of the Trinity. The Holy Ghost is indeed the last in order of the persons, as proceeding from the other two, yet in the participation of the Godhead he is equal with them both; and in his work, though it be last done for us, he is not behind them, nor in the glory of it inferior to what they have in theirs. And indeed he would not be God, equal with the Father and the Son, if the work allotted to him, to shew he is God, were not equal unto each of theirs.43

First, Goodwin is convinced that the double procession of the Holy Spirit is the ground of his co-equality with the Father and the Son. Although the Spirit is the third person in the subsistence of the divine being, he is not inferior to the Father and the Son. In his

41 Goodwin, Works, 6:3 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).

42 See Basil’s De Spiritu Sancto, 22.53-54 (of the same nature), 19.49 (of the work of the Holy Spirit). For the Greek text and translation, see Saint Basil, Bishop of Caesarea, Sur le Saint-Esprit, trans. Benoit Pruche, Réimpression de la deuxième édition revue et augmentée, Sources chrétiennes, 17 bis (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2002); Saint Basil, Bishop of Caesarea, On the Holy Spirit, trans. Stephen M. Hildebrand, Popular Patristics Series, 42 (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011). Goodwin cites Basil once in his entire works regarding the Spirit’s operation on the believer. He writes, “So then, like as the natural birth brings a man forth with all the powers of sight, hearing, &c., so doth the new birth the like. The child exerciseth not these in the womb at the first, yet hath them all in the principle. It is Basil’s comparison [De Spiritu Sancto, cap. 26.]: As the power of seeing in a sound eye; as art in him who hath acquired it; such is the grace of the Spirit in him who receives it; always indeed present, but not perpetually operating.” Goodwin, Works, 6:194 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).

interpretation of John 15:26, Goodwin also contends that this verse shows “the divine procession of the Holy Ghost, and the original and the consubstantiality of his person, to be out of the substance of the Father, proceeding from him.” He follows Augustine’s idea that “the Son is not therefore less because He is sent by the Father, nor the Holy Spirit less because both the Father sent Him and the Son.” Second, Goodwin asserts that the work of the Holy Spirit shows his co-equality with the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit does the work that is allotted only to God. Again, Goodwin sides with Basil who states that the Holy Spirit’s work on the believer shows his deity. The Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son, argues Goodwin, “so it is not in anywise to be understood that he subsisted extra Deum, out of, or separate from God; for he had said, [1 Corinthians, chap. 2] ver. 11, that he is in God, even as the spirit of a man is said to be in him.”

Further, Goodwin appropriates the doctrines of inseparable operations and terminus operationis in his Pneumatology. The early modern Reformed theologians seek harmony between the unity of the three persons of the Trinity and the diversity of their works with the doctrines. They make a distinction between the principium (principle or beginning) and its terminus (term or end) of the works of the Trinity. Goodwin endorsed the

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46 Basil’s *De Spiritu Sancto*, 26.61. The chapter IV of Goodwin’s “Of the Work of the Holy Ghost” deals with the Spirit’s operations upon the church.


48 For a more comprehensive study of this subject matter, see chapter 3.
distinction for his Pneumatology. He claims that “a joint concurrence, and yet distinct appearance” of “all three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost” will be found “in any work done for us.”

On the one hand, Goodwin underscores the doctrine of inseparable operations: “It is true there is a joint concurrence of all three persons in every action that is done; for opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa.” Although any work of God “in several and scattered places of Scriptures . . . is scatteredly attributed to the Father . . . and to the Word, and to the Spirit,” there is some time “when in any work one finds at once and together all three appear, all mentioned in a chapter.” Since “all Three Persons concur in every work,” maintains Goodwin, “the Father is said to create, the Son is said to create, and the Holy Ghost is said to create.” On the other hand, the doctrine of terminus operationis is underlined. Goodwin affirms that the three persons of the Trinity “have a special, distinct, and extraordinary hand and operation.” In the Scriptures, “the Father is said to raise him [Christ], the Son is said to raise himself, and the Holy Ghost to raise him too.” However, in Christ’s resurrection, his body “concurred nothing to it, for that was dead,

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but the Son of God, the Second Person, concurred and raised up that Body and Soul.”

Goodwin claims that although the persons share the same essence, the operation of each person can be differentiated for their distinct personalities. He writes:

Yet though they be but one essence, yet they are three distinct subsistencies or personalities, and still that axiom follows us, that the operation of each follows the distinction of their existences, and bears the resemblance of them; and look what order or distinction they have in subsisting, they have in operation to accompany it; but the distinction of their personality (if abstractedly considered from the essence) being but modus essendi, therefore in like manner the distinction of their operation and concurrence is but modus operandi, a distinct manner of concurring. . . . Hence, as the Father is the fountain of the other two subsistencies, begetting the Son, and breathing the Holy Spirit, so he is in like manner the fountain of all action and operation: John 5:19. . . The Father begins, the Son carries on the motion, the Holy Ghost from both perfects, consummates, and executes the work: 1 Cor. 8:6. . .

Certain ad extra works of the Trinity are more peculiarly attributed to one of the persons because the work bears the distinctiveness of the subsistence of the person. Goodwin succinctly notes that there is a parallel between the modus essendi (i.e., the distinction of the three persons) and the modus operandi (i.e., the distinction of their operation and concurrence).

In his work on the Holy Spirit, Goodwin applies this doctrine to incarnation. It is the Holy Spirit who formed the man Jesus in the virgin’s womb although the Father and the Son “did join in that great action . . . according to the measure of that general rule, that opera ad extra sunt indivisa.” Likewise, the action of incarnation “is more peculiarly to be attributed to the Son himself, as second person, who took up into one person with

50 Goodwin, Works, 1:461 (“Sermon XXX. Ephesians 1:20”).
57 Goodwin, Works, 7:530 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”).
himself that human nature.”59 Thus, the work of formation of Christ’s humanity terminates on the Holy Spirit; whereas, the assumption of the humanity terminates on the Son. Goodwin endorses the doctrine of terminus operationis in soteriology, so he maintains that “faith as justifying . . . is only terminated on Christ.”60

To summarize, in Goodwin’s Pneumatology, the Holy Spirit has the same nature with the other two divine persons because he proceeds from both of them. The consubstantiality is also attested by the works of the Spirit, which are allotted only to the Godhead. Goodwin interweaves the co-equality of the Spirit with the Father and the Son in his doctrines of inseparable operations and terminus operationis in his Pneumatology. The effecting of the work of regeneration consists “in a set distinct concurrence and appearance of all three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost therein; which will yet further shew the greatness of divine mercy in this work.”61

5.2.1.3. The Holy Spirit’s Work on Christ

Goodwin’s Pneumatology demonstrates that the person and work of the Spirit are incorporated into the person and work of Christ in a remarkably inter-connected way.62 Goodwin claims that the Son of the living God requires the living power of the Spirit of the living God to concur for the creation of his person and works.63 All “habitual Graces”


60 Goodwin, Works, 6:270 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).


of Christ’s soul “were from the Holy Ghost, and “this inhabitation of the Holy Ghost did in some sense and degree concur to constitute him Christ.”

Thus, for Goodwin, Jesus Christ, the God-man, cannot exist without the power of the Holy Spirit. In the hypostatic union of Christ, his divine nature acts not immediately, but, as Mark Jones puts it, acts mediately through the work of the Spirit. The graces and excellencies of Christ were a result of the work of the Spirit who is “the immediate author” of graces. Goodwin contends that “where one Person is, there the other must needs be also: and therefore the gifts and graces in the man Jesus without measure are attributed to the Spirit, as well as to the second Person, the Son, in him.”

Goodwin explains the redemptive work of Christ from the pneumatological perspective. Although the Spirit proceeded from Christ (as well as from the Father), it was Christ who first received the Spirit for the work of redemption. The Holy Spirit is given to Christ

64 Goodwin, Works, 6:50 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
65 Jones, Why Heaven Kissed Earth, 166.
“without measure,” and so Christ, being filled with the Spirit, was able to accomplish the salvation. The Spirit worked upon Christ in every step of his redemptive work. “It was the Holy Ghost that formed his [Christ’s] human nature in the womb,” maintains Goodwin, “so then he made the man Jesus, both body and soul.” Goodwin here endorses the distinction between the *principium* (principle or beginning) and its *terminus* (term or end) of the work of the Trinity and applies it for his formulation of the relationship between the Son and the Spirit. The external works of the Trinity (*opera Trinitatis ad extra*) are not divisible, but they are distinct in their termination. The incarnation in its *principium* was a communal work of the three persons of the Trinity, and the “great and eminent concurrence of all three may perhaps more clearly be gathered from the story of the angel’s coming to Mary, Luke 1:26, 27, &c.” The termination (*terminus*) of this communal work, however, was clearly distinguishable. God the Father gave the commission to his angel Gabriel and sent him to Mary. The formation of the human nature in Mary’s womb terminated on the Spirit, and the assumption of it unto one person terminated on the Son. Thus, for Goodwin, the Holy Spirit actively worked upon the incarnation of Christ.

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At Christ’s baptism, like his conception, a “triple testimony of the three in heaven” was mentioned by John the apostle, and the Holy Spirit also actively worked at the event.\(^{76}\) The three persons of the Trinity appeared at Christ’s baptism: the Father’s voice from heaven, the Spirit’s descent like a dove, and Christ the baptized. The Father proclaimed Christ to be his Son from heaven, and the Spirit descended on him to give him “tender dispositions unto sinners.”\(^{77}\) The Spirit “anointed or qualified” Christ “with these gifts and dispositions suitable to” his work.\(^{78}\) The Holy Spirit worked at the baptism of Christ as well as at his conception to make “virtual influence.”\(^{79}\)

In his sermon on Ephesians, Goodwin writes, “Jesus Christ was declared with the greatest power, to be the Son of God, by the resurrection from the dead.”\(^{80}\) He cites Romans 1:3-4 to show that it was the Holy Spirit who raised Christ from the dead.\(^{81}\) Thus, the Holy Spirit was “the immediate cause” of Christ’s resurrection.\(^{82}\) In Goodwin’s Christology, as Blackham rightly puts it, it was the Spirit who “raised Christ up into a re-created, new, immortal body, free from corruption and weakness.”\(^{83}\) In Goodwin’s Christology, it would be valid to say that the incarnate Son’s human nature


\(^{80}\) Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 1:428 (“Sermon XXVIII. Ephesians 1:19, 20”); See also \textit{Works}, 8:176 (“Of the Object of Faith”).

\(^{81}\) Goodwin also argues that “our resurrection is made sure, because we have the Spirit in us that raised up Christ.” Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 2:238 (“Sermon 16. Ephesians 2:6”).


and his works come from the Spirit, just as the Spirit, both in the ontological and economic dimension, is sent by the Son.\footnote{In this vein, John O’Donnell argues that the Spirit is passive in the immanent Trinity, while the Son is passive in a certain economic sense. John J. O’Donnell, \textit{The Mystery of the Triune God} (London: Sheed & Ward, 1988), 83.}

### 5.2.1.4. Harmony of “Two-Nature Christology” and “Spirit-Christology”

Goodwin’s Christology is basically a two-nature Christology, but he reformulates it with some emphasis of Spirit-Christology.\footnote{In this study, “Spirit-Christology” has to do with the idea that the Holy Spirit acts to sustain the person and work of Christ during his earthly ministry. Generally Spirit-Christology focuses on the role of the Holy Spirit in Christology and seeks to understand both the person and work of Christ from a pneumatological perspective. For the definition, see Ralph Del Colle, \textit{Christ and the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in Trinitarian Perspective} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3–4; Oliver D. Crisp, \textit{Revisioning Christology: Theology in the Reformed Tradition} (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 93. Crisp argues (on pp. 91-109) that Owen formulated a robust Spirit Christology. He claims that Jonathan Edwards also espoused a Spirit Christology, which is similar to that of Owen. For the Spirit Christology of Edwards, see Stephen R. Holmes, \textit{God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards} (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 136–42; Amy Plantinga-Pauw, \textit{“The Supreme Harmony of All”: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards} (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 145–48.}

He is fully convinced of the need for a two-nature Christology in his various treatises on Christ.\footnote{Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 38.} The fabric of his Christology thoroughly follows the Chalcedonian formula that for soteriological reasons Christ must be incarnate as fully God and fully man in one person. In his treatise “Of Christ the Mediator,” Goodwin asserts both that “it was necessary for our mediator to be God” and that “it was necessary our mediator should be man.”\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:37-41, 44-48 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).} He argues, commenting on Romans 1:3-4, that “two natures are . . . in Christ, his human nature and his divine nature.”\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 1:428 (“Sermon XXVIII. Ephesians 1:19, 20”). See also \textit{Works}, 1:30.} He also writes, “Jesus Christ had in his person both a human and a divine
nature: the divine nature, that is called Spirit; and the human nature, that is called flesh."89 On the one hand, it was necessary for the mediator to be God. Goodwin writes about the mediator:

He could not otherwise have been present at the making of the eternal covenant of redemption.—None but God could have the power to bestow such great blessings as are those of the covenant.—None but God could be the object of our trust, faith, and hope, and obedience.—None but God could be sufficiently able to succour us at all times.90

Only God could make the eternal covenant of redemption, so the other party with whom the Father made the pactum salutis should be God. Only God could accomplish the eternal covenant of redemption, so the mediator should be God.

On the other hand, the mediator had to be fully human. Goodwin provides three reasons that the mediator should be lower than God, and then enunciates that the mediator should be a human being. First, if the mediator is a reconciler, “he must become a priest, and offer up something by way of satisfaction to God.”91 His offer must be greater than all things but God because nothing else would be a sacrifice great enough to expiate sin. Thus, he must offer himself, “for otherwise there could nothing be greater than all things.”92 “But if he be God only,” maintains Goodwin, “he cannot be sacrificed

89 Goodwin, Works, 2:81 (“Sermon 5. Ephesians 2:3”). Similarly Goodwin argues, commenting on 1 Peter 3:18, that “By Spirit is meant the power of his Godhead and divine nature, whereby he was at once both raised from the grave, and from under the guilt of sin together. He was at once both quickened, or raised, and justified also. And that by Spirit they mean his divine nature, the opposition in both places evidently implies; for it is opposed to his flesh, or human nature.” Goodwin, Works, 4:36 (“Faith Supported by Christ’s Resurrection”). See also Works, 7:94 (“Of the Creatures”).

90 Goodwin, Works, 5:37 (“Of Christ the Mediator”; italics are mine).

91 Goodwin, Works, 5:44 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

92 Goodwin, Works, 5:44 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). This argument is very much Anselmian. In Book I of Cur Deus Homo, Anselm articulates that the recompense of sinners should be proportional to the size of the sin, and that a human being cannot make this recompense. In the below, the first number inside
nor offered up.” Second, if the mediator is God only, “he should reconcile us to his own self; but he that is a reconciler must be some way made diverse from him unto whom the reconciliation is made, for he is to be a surety to him.”

Thus, Christ became man. Since he is the Son of God, he is fit to become “a party between us.” Third, if Christ is a reconciler and mediator, he must “become some way subject to God, and less than God ratione officii [for the reason of office].” Thus, the mediator must “become an intercessor and entreator, and so become subject, as Christ did, who, when he was equal with God, humbled himself.” It is not so fit that the mediator should assume the angelical nature; rather, he must be a human being. First, the mediator should be “a kinsman of our own nature” for human beings to be reconciled. Second, the “relations that were to be between us and him might be founded upon the greatest nearness,” so “it was meet that the mediator should be of the same nature with us.”

(1) The mediator

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93 Goodwin, Works, 5:45 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

94 Goodwin, Works, 5:45 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).


97 Goodwin, Works, 5:46 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

98 Goodwin, Works, 5:46 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
who reconciled us was to be head to us. It was fit the head and the body should be “of the
same nature, homogeneal, not diverse, else there would be a monstrosity in it.”

(2) We were to be made sons in him, and he to be our brother, and therefore to be of the same
nature. (3) The mediator was to be a husband to us, and man and wife must be of the
same nature.

After arguing that the mediator should be fully God and fully man, Goodwin goes on
to assert the necessity of a union of the two natures in one person. It was fit that the
mediator should be both God and man in one person, “so he might partake of the nature
of both parties, and be a middle person between them, and fill up the distance, and bring
them near to one another.” Only in that, the mediator might be “in a better capacity to
communicate unto us his benefits,” and he might be “capable of performing what our
redemption required.” For Goodwin, Christ was “a medium, not only between God
and us, but one with God and us, and symbolising with both.” He continues:

Therefore our divines say, that mediatio operativa [operational mediation] is
founded, and hath influence from his mediatio substantialis [substantial
mediation], that his works of mediation, whereby he mediates for us, ariseth from
his person, that they arise from both natures, so as both natures have an influence
into all his works, and they are the works of both, so that he might be totus
mediator, a whole, entire mediator, in his person and in his works.

99 Goodwin, Works, 5:46 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
100 Goodwin, Works, 5:46 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
101 Goodwin, Works, 5:48 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
102 Goodwin, Works, 5:48 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
103 Goodwin, Works, 5:48 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
104 Goodwin, Works, 5:48 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). I put my translations of the Latin phrases
in brackets.
The work of Christ is closely connected with his person. The mediating work of Christ is based on and attributed to the mediating substance of his personality. Christ’s mediation can be possible because in his substance he has two natures. Christ is *totus mediator* inasmuch as he is a *whole, entire mediator* both in his person and in his works.¹⁰⁵ Goodwin goes on to show clearly that the union of the divine Son to the human nature could not be a union of persons. He argues that Christ “took not a person on him, yet he took our whole nature for substance.”¹⁰⁶ Christ is called “a whole man” who “had a perfect body as ours, and a soul, and both united.”¹⁰⁷ Goodwin completes the agenda of Chalcedonian Christology with these three steps of argumentation: the mediator should be true God; he should be true man; and he should be the God-man as one person.

Some modern theologians criticize two-nature Christology of the Chalcedon Creed because philosophically its logic seems to be problematic, and theologically it would tend towards unrealistic representations of the earthly life of Jesus Christ.¹⁰⁸ For example,

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¹⁰⁵ The distinction between *totus* and *totum* was used by the early modern Reformed theologians, usually with regard to the omnipresence of Christ. The *totus Christus* (i.e., the whole person of Christ), is omnipresent, inasmuch as the divine person is, by virtue of his divinity, omnipresent; but the *totum Christi* (i.e., all of Christ according to both natures) cannot be omnipresent, since the human nature must be contained in or limited to the flesh while incarnate. Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 305.


Jürgen Moltmann repudiates two-nature Christology in four points and attempts to formulate a Spirit-Christology in opposition to it. Goodwin’s Christology, however, overcomes the potential dangers of a straight two nature Christology with its strong emphasis on Christ’s dependence on the Spirit. Goodwin appears to reconcile between two nature Christology and Spirit-Christology. He offers a picture of Jesus’ earthly life as a human being, but never once does he lose sight of Christ’s full deity by the emphasis of the Spirit’s work on Christ.

Christ, the mediator, is God-man through the working of the Holy Spirit in Goodwin’s Christology. In other words, the task of assuming humanity was Christ’s, and the humanity which he assumed was one prepared for him by the Spirit. Regarding the


Moltmann offers four criticisms: first, “if the eternal Logos assumed a non-personal human nature, he cannot then be viewed as a historical person, and we cannot talk about Jesus of Nazareth”; second, “if the eternal Logos has assumed a human nature without sin, then he is immortal not merely in his divine nature, but in his human nature too, since mortality is a consequence of sin”; third, “in the framework of two-nature Christology, all statements about the lowliness of Jesus, his humanity, his suffering, and his death on the Cross are reduced in favour of statements about his divinity, his exaltation and his triumph, and are integrated into these”; and fourth, two-nature Christology is drawn from a general metaphysical view of the world so that “the passion of his [Christ’s] love and its capacity for suffering can no longer be stated.” rather than from the particular history of Jesus. See Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 1990), 51–52, 74.


incarnation of the Word, Goodwin not only contends that only the Son is the agent of the incarnation, but also maintains that the Spirit is the person who makes the unity of the two natures effective and possible. On the one hand, the active aspect of Christ in the incarnation is fully stressed. Goodwin writes, “He [Christ] joins our nature first with God in his own person, and makes both one there, that so God and man becoming one in person, he might the easilier make God and man one in covenant. God and man were at division, and when he would make utrumque unum [both natures one], he becomes et unum ex utroque [one from both natures].” On the other hand, Goodwin underlines that the Holy Spirit “made the man Christ partaker of the divine nature.” The virgin birth by the Holy Spirit is the only way by which the incarnate Christ has two natures in one person. Without the Spirit’s working on the virgin birth there could be no incarnation at all. With his emphasis on these two aspects, Goodwin tries to complement two-nature Christology with Spirit-Christology without arguing for a kind of Spirit-adoptionism.

The Son was dependent upon the Spirit from the very first moment of human life, and after that, he still was. The Holy Spirit was continually working upon Jesus in his earthly ministry. Goodwin regards the knowledge of Jesus as “a fruit of the Spirit,” and Jesus’

112 Goodwin, Works, 6:11 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
113 Goodwin writes, “It was the Spirit who overshadowed his mother, and, in the meanwhile, knit that indissoluble knot between our nature and the second person, and that also knit his heart unto us. It was the Spirit who sanctified him in the womb.” Goodwin, Works, 4:118 (“The Heart of Christ in Heaven”).
knowledge “is enlarged” since his ascension “for before he knew not when the day of judgment should be.” It was the Holy Spirit who gave Christ an understanding of his mission. The impeccability of Christ is also explained from a pneumatological perspective. Goodwin writes, “in preparing this nature of Christ, the Holy Ghost sanctified that matter, and purified it . . . his business being to part sin and our flesh, it was fit he should take such flesh as, though once sinful, yet now sin was parted from it.” Christ has a human nature, but it is “quickened in and by the Spirit” that he is “separate from sinners.” The Spirit prepared and sanctified the human nature of Christ because unless it is formed by the Holy Spirit, it is a corrupt humanity. It was the Holy Spirit who made Christ a preacher of the gospel and helped him to do the miracles and good works. Thus, Goodwin claims:

The graces of Christ, as man, are attributed to this Spirit, as the immediate author of them; for although the Son of God dwelt personally in the human nature, and so advanced that nature above the ordinary rank of creatures, and raised it up to that dignity and worth, yet all his habitual graces, which even his soul was full of, were from the Holy Ghost. The Holy Spirit is therefore said to be ‘given him without measure.’ And this inhabitation of the Holy Ghost did in some sense and degree concur to constitute him Christ . . . Now, then, if the Spirit made him Christ, and concurred in this respect to make him the anointed of God, much more is it he that makes us Christians.

117 Goodwin, Works, 4:121 (“The Heart of Christ in Heaven”)
118 Goodwin, Works, 6:12 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
119 Goodwin, Works, 5:60 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
120 Goodwin, Works, 5:59-60, 135, 176 (“Of Christ the Mediator”); see also Works, 4:20 (“Christ Set Forth”).
122 Goodwin, Works, 6:12 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
123 Goodwin, Works, 6:50 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
The Holy Spirit gave all habitual graces to Christ and made him the true mediator. Goodwin is convinced that the personality and work of Christ should be understood from this dynamic perspective. In his theology, the person and work of the Spirit are thoroughly integrated into the person and work of Christ, so his Christology cannot be fully understood without due attention to his Pneumatology. It should be noted, however, that Goodwin basically maintains “a strict allegiance to a two-nature Christology.”

Goodwin never argues that the divinity of Christ was only attributed to the full indwelling of the Spirit. Rather, he emphasizes that the agent of the incarnation is Jesus Christ. What he intended was to offer a robust Christology with his explanation of Christ’s mediatorial personality and work in terms of the acting of the Holy Spirit upon Christ. He does not feel any tension in combining the strengths of two-nature Christology and Spirit-Christology. In so doing, his Christology fully illuminates the divinity and humanity of Christ in his Spirit-filledness.

5.2.2. The Covenant of Grace and the Holy Spirit in Goodwin’s Theology

5.2.2.1. The Holy Spirit as the Promise of the Covenant of Grace

The Holy Spirit is the promise of the covenant of grace in Goodwin’s theology. The gospel is the ministration of the Holy Spirit, and “this ministration of the Spirit is by

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virtue of a covenant made (Isa. 59:21) with Christ.” The Holy Ghost was in Christ who preached the gospel which “makes men partakers of the Holy Ghost.” The gift of the person of the Spirit is traced back to the covenant made with Christ and is endowed in the covenant of grace.

If Christ was the promise in the Old Testament, the Spirit is “the promise of the New.” The Spirit is given to New Testament believers by the covenant of grace for their good. The promise of the Spirit is given to believers for Christ’s sake, so “under the New Testament this promise was to be fulfilled in such a manner and measure as was never under the Old.” Goodwin states, “This gift of the Spirit is bestowed, not according to the covenant of works, but of grace and free love.” In Goodwin’s interpretation of Haggai 2:5, the promise of the Holy Spirit for the New Testament era was already included in the covenant of Sinai. This demonstrates the “supereminence of Christ above Moses.” The Holy Spirit is present immediately among the believers in the New Testament era. Goodwin writes, “Now for the manner of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost’s person; it is no error to affirm that it is the same in us and the man Christ

130 Goodwin, Works, 6:59 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
133 Goodwin, Works, 6:68 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
134 Goodwin, Works, 5:439 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
Thus, for Goodwin, the most important factor of the covenant of grace is the Holy Spirit who is the promise and bearer of the covenant.

5.2.2.2. The Holy Spirit as the Applier of the New Covenant

The Holy Spirit applies the covenant of grace effectively to the believer. He is the executor of the new covenant in Christ. The Spirit who worked upon Christ does also work upon those who believe in Christ. There is a strong parallelism or “correspondency” between Spirit/Christ and Spirit/Christians. In several crucial points, what the Spirit has with Christ is what the Spirit has with Christians. First, in relation to the union with Christ, Goodwin writes:

The same person that made the man Christ partaker of the divine nature maketh us also. There is a higher correspondency yet. The Holy Ghost is vinculum Trinitatis, the union of the Father and the Son, as proceeding from both by way of love; and who so meet to be the union of God and man in Christ, of Christ and men in us, as he that was the bond of union among themselves?136

The Holy Spirit as vinculum Trinitatis (bond of the Trinity) is not only the union of the Father and the Son, but he also binds the believer with the Trinity. Although the perichoretic union of the Trinity is incommunicable to any other creatures, human beings can attain a special union with God through the work of the Holy Spirit.137

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137 Goodwin writes, “we must now extricate the person of Christ also from the like entanglements, and vindicate the transcendency of his union with God, and distance of his person from ours. And then all unions left below him are left free for us to attain, and shall be obtained by us.” Goodwin, *Works*, 4:405 (“The Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ”). See also *Works*, 4:362-63.
believer’s participation of the divine nature is depicted in terms of personal binding between the believer with the triune God. The believer can become partakers of the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4) through the work of the Spirit, who unites the believer with God. The reason that there is no condemnation to those in Christ (Romans 8:1), notwithstanding all the remaining corruptions that are in them, is that there is such a perfect holiness in Christ, which is of the believer by the union with Christ. It is through “the union with Christ, and the perfect holiness of his nature,” that a believer receives all the benefits and “privileges of the covenant of grace.” Goodwin emphasizes, “It is not my being regenerate that puts me into a right of all those privileges, but it is Christ takes me, and then gives me his Spirit, faith, holiness, &c.” Only the Holy Spirit can make this union with Christ happen. “As Jesus Christ’s work was to redeem you, so the Holy Ghost’s work is to work all grace and glory into you,” Goodwin enunciates, “therefore when you receive the Holy Ghost you receive all glory in the seed and foundation of it. It is the foundation of our union with Christ.”

Second, the correspondency between Spirit/Christ and Spirit/Christians is also shown in sanctification. The most important element of the “privileges of the covenant of grace” is the union with Christ, which is “the first fundamental thing of justification, and

139 Goodwin, Works, 5:351 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
140 Goodwin, Works, 5:350 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
sanctification, and all.”\textsuperscript{143} This takes place through the work of Christ and the Spirit. Christ first takes the believers and then sends his Spirit to sanctify them.\textsuperscript{144} In his comment on Romans 8:2, Goodwin argues that the Spirit is called “the Spirit of life” because he is the same Spirit who is in Christ. The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus is “a perfect holiness in Christ, which being mine by my union with him, frees me from the law and power of sin and death.”\textsuperscript{145} The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus is the holiness of his nature. The Spirit who made the human nature of Christ sinless does work upon believers to sanctify them. Thus, Goodwin writes, “It is called, ‘the Spirit of life,’ because it is the same that is in Christ. It is born of him, and this quickens us.”\textsuperscript{146}

Third, there is also the correspondency between Spirit/Christ and Spirit/Christians to the 	extit{preaching} of the gospel. The Holy Spirit came upon Christ to preach the gospel and deliver the covenant of grace to the Jews.\textsuperscript{147} Christ was fitted to be a preacher because the Spirit was on him.\textsuperscript{148} Likewise, a preacher can deliver the gospel and the covenant of grace only through the work of the Spirit because “the Spirit is still in our preaching and in your hearts, in hearing, in praying, &c., and persuades you of Christ’s love to this very day.”\textsuperscript{149} When the apostles preach, it is the Holy Spirit who prompts them with their

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{143} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:350 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

\textsuperscript{144} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:350 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

\textsuperscript{145} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:351 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

\textsuperscript{146} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:350 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).


\textsuperscript{149} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 4:107 (“The Heart of Christ”).
\end{footnotes}
sermons. Goodwin, the Spirit “fires their tongues and hearts, that they should not speak mere empty and powerless words, nor shoot powder, but fiery bullets, such as have warmth and life in them.” Thus when the apostles preach, the Holy Spirit makes their sermons to be “the ministration of the Spirit, to convey himself unto their hearts, and to make the gospel ‘the power of God unto salvation.’” Goodwin is quite convinced that “all the power of sermons is from the Holy Ghost.” Commenting on 1 Thessalonians 1:5 and Malachi 2:7, he claims that the congregation receives “not only the fruits of the Holy Spirit, but the Spirit himself” in the preaching of the word. The preaching of the gospel is called the “demonstration of the Spirit.” It is “the communicating the same Spirit unto his members.” The Spirit applies the Word to the heart that the preacher speak of. Therefore, declares Goodwin, “value ministries by this; and let ministers seek to be filled with the Holy Spirit.”

For these three reasons, Goodwin depicts the Holy Spirit as the applier of the covenant and salvation, the giver of grace, the accomplisher of the gospel. In his interpretation of the baptismal formula (Matthew 28:19) and the benediction (2 Corinthians 13:13), he

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152 Goodwin, Works, 6:15 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
156 Goodwin, Works, 6:30 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
calls God the Father “the founder of the covenant [of grace]”, Jesus Christ “the mediator of the covenant”, and the Holy Spirit “the applier of the covenant.” The Holy Spirit is also the applier of the salvation whose initial form was typified out by Noah’s first covenant (1 Peter 3:20, 21). The Spirit gives Christ graces to “constitute him Christ,” and he gives graces to his people to make them Christians. The preaching of the gospel is an ordinance instituted by Christ to give these graces. God the Father appointed it, God the Son prayed for it, and “God the Holy Spirit is by promise and covenant engaged to accompany it with his blessing unto the seed of Christ for ever.” The triune God wills to give gracious salvation to the believer through the preaching of the gospel, and the Holy Spirit is the accomplisher of the will. To summarize, the Holy Spirit is the one who makes the covenant of grace effective. In the covenant, he binds the believers with the Trinity through the union with Christ. Christ first unites himself with believers and then sends his Spirit to sanctify them. The Spirit gives himself and his fruits when the gospel of Christ is preached. Therefore, the person and work of the Holy Spirit always concur with Christ’s in the covenant of grace.

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159 Goodwin, *Works*, 9:52 (“A Discourse of Election”). It is certain that the covenant of this passage is the covenant of grace because Goodwin talks about “the seal of the covenant of grace” in the same paragraph.


5.3. Goodwin’s Doctrine of the *Pactum Salutis*

5.3.1. Goodwin’s Terminology and Formulation of the *Pactum Salutis*

5.3.1.1. Goodwin’s Terminology of the *Pactum Salutis*

In the theology of Goodwin, the *pactum salutis* is primary, and later covenants (which belong to the covenant of grace) are made because this eternal covenant was accomplished.\(^{164}\) The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* can be found and is presupposed in his entire works, and he used various terms to denote the *pactum salutis*. He refers to it as “God’s transaction of this business [the work of reconciliation] with Christ,”\(^{165}\) “his transactions with Christ from everlasting,”\(^{166}\) “God’s ultimate purposes and transactions with his Son,”\(^{167}\) “transactions between the Father and the Son,”\(^{168}\) “covenant of redemption,”\(^{169}\) “eternal transactions between God the Father and God the Son,”\(^{170}\) “the everlasting transaction which the Father had with his Son, in calling him to the work of redemption of us men, considered as sinners,”\(^{171}\) “the eternal transactions of God the Father for man’s salvation,”\(^{172}\) “compact between God and him for us,”\(^{173}\) “a compact


\(^{166}\) Goodwin, *Works*, 4:211 (“Encouragements to Faith”).

\(^{167}\) Goodwin, *Works*, 4:487 (“The Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ”).


\(^{172}\) Goodwin, *Works*, 5:7 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

\(^{173}\) Goodwin, *Works*, 5:30 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
with Christ,”174 “this compact and covenant made by God with Christ,”175 “this covenant made by God with Christ for us, upon which the acceptation of all depends,”176 “the eternal covenant of redemption,”177 “God’s eternal transaction with Jesus Christ,”178 “compact between his Father and him [Christ],”179 “God the Father’s original transaction with Christ,”180 “a covenant made between God and Christ in our behalf,”181 “the great transactions of man’s salvation,”182 “agreement between the Father and the Son,”183 “that everlasting transaction,”184 “transactions between himself [Christ] and his Father,”185 “all those everlasting transactions he [God] had with Christ about thee,”186 “the bottom counsel of the heart of God among the Holy Three from everlasting,”187 “Sacratissimus Consessus Trinitatis,”188 “these things having been thus transacted

174 Goodwin, Works, 5:30 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
175 Goodwin, Works, 5:30 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
176 Goodwin, Works, 5:31 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
177 Goodwin, Works, 5:37 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
178 Goodwin, Works, 5:72 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
179 Goodwin, Works, 5:203 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
181 Goodwin, Works, 6:120 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
182 Goodwin, Works, 6:419 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
183 Goodwin, Works, 8:134 (“Of the Object of Faith”).
184 Goodwin, Works, 8:135 (“Of the Object of Faith”).
185 Goodwin, Works, 9:111 (“A Discourse of Election”).
186 Goodwin, Works, 9:123 (“A Discourse of Election”).
188 Goodwin, Works, 9:144 (“A Discourse of Election”).
between God and Christ,”\textsuperscript{189} and “this foregone transaction between God and Christ”\textsuperscript{190} 

The term most frequently used to signify the \textit{pactum salutis} is “transaction.” Goodwin tends to use the term “transaction” interchangeably with “covenant.” He uses it to point to other covenants; for example, God made a transaction with Noah and Moses.\textsuperscript{191} In most cases, however, he uses the term to denote the intratrinitarian covenant of redemption.

5.3.1.2. Reconciliation as the End of the \textit{Pactum Salutis}

Goodwin’s doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} is organically connected to his Christology and Pneumatology, but it takes a remarkably nuanced formulation in the discourse “Of Christ the Mediator.” This discourse is an expository treatise on 2 Corinthians 5:18-19, which is about the work of reconciliation of God in Christ.\textsuperscript{192} Goodwin makes it clear that the \textit{pactum salutis} is transacted among the three persons of the Trinity regarding the redemptive work for fallen humanity. It is, however, a transaction to design Christ as the mediator of reconciliation between God and human beings, so Goodwin assigns a large portion to deal with the work of the Father and the Son. Goodwin’s remark about the Holy Spirit in this transaction will be separately discussed below, and this section will focus on the work of the Father and the Son.

\textsuperscript{189} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 9:307 (“A Discourse of Election”).

\textsuperscript{190} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 9:362 (“A Discourse of Election”).


\textsuperscript{192} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:3 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). Goodwin cites the verse as “And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed to us the word of reconciliation.—2 COR. 5:18, 19.”
Goodwin claims that the main purpose of Christ’s incarnation was reconciliation.193 The word reconciliation implies that although the whole of humankind were created “in an estate of amity and friendship with God,” they became fallen, so God made them friends again for “former friendship.”194 The reconciliation, argues Goodwin, “sets and limits the subject of these eternal transactions between God the Father and the Son, to have been man considered as fallen.”195 Thus, the purpose of the pactum salutis is reconciliation of the fallen humanity.

God the Father made these eternal transactions because he “is infinite in love and rich in mercy.”196 The content of the pactum salutis is that the Son should be “a mediator, and umpire, and surety” between God and the fallen humanity.197 The Father and his

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193 Goodwin, Works, 5:3 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
194 Goodwin, Works, 5:3 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
195 Goodwin, Works, 5:3 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). Goodwin here regards the object of the pactum salutis as fallen humanity. In other passages, he also describes “the first and original part of the gospel” as “the everlasting transaction which the Father had with his Son, in calling him to the work of redemption of us men, considered as sinners” (italics mine; Works, 5:6) This sounds like he is infralapsarian. Horton, Trueman, and Jones have different conclusions on Goodwin’s position on the order of the divine decrees. Although Horton argues that early Puritanism does not seem to be any more occupied with predestination than the Reformed orthodox on the Continent, he concludes that Goodwin “is an infralapsarian Calvinist.” Horton, Thomas Goodwin and the Puritan Doctrine of Assurance,” 65–66, 68. Horton’s claim is based on Goodwin’s statement that “in his decree of the means or way to that glory, he had not a respect unto that fallen condition of man; and both thus, the one and the other, and all lying at once afore him, whether he did not place and pitch his decree to the end upon their unfallen and creable condition, and make that estate or condition the terminus à quo of it, and his decree to the means upon his fallen condition; and this is it that I affirm.” Trueeman, however, contrasts the infralapsarian Owen with the “more vigorously supralapsarian theology of . . . Goodwin.” Trueeman, The Claims of Truth, 138. Mark Jones, on the one hand, maintains that “Horton seems to have misread Goodwin by judging him to be an infralapsarian instead of a supralapsarian.” On the other hand, he concludes, “The problem may be that the usual taxonomies of infra- and supralapsarianism may need to be revised since Goodwin does not appear to fit nicely into either position.” Jones, Why Heaven Kissed Earth, 29n68, 128n31.

196 Goodwin, Works, 5:4 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). Goodwin writes, “God, who is infinite in love and rich in mercy, bearing everlasting and secret good will to some of these now become rebels, in all ages hath maintained certain lieger ambassadors in the world, to treat with this rebellious rout, and to conclude a peace betwixt them and him.” He repeats the same sentence at Works, 5:481 (“The One Sacrifice”).

197 Goodwin, Works, 5:4 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
only Son have laid their counsels together from eternity for this, and both contrived and agreed that “Christ should undertake to satisfy his Father, for all the wrong was done to him, all which he should take upon himself, as if he were guilty of it.”

5.3.1.3. The Father’s Initiative Actions in the Pactum Salutis

Goodwin points out that although the works of the three persons of the Trinity are engaged in the pactum salutis, 2 Corinthians 5:19 stresses mainly the action of the Father. He offers three expected objections against the centrality of the Father in the pactum and elaborates his own answer according to a scholastic method. The first objection is that the reconciliation is made to the three persons of the Trinity. Goodwin’s answer consists of two points. (1) The Father is the first person, and his “name is used for the whole.” (2) The covenant of works, “which occasioned the performance of reconciliation,” is “made especially with the Father in the name of the rest.” The second objection is that Christ is made “the special person to whom the reconciliation is made.” Goodwin acknowledges that the whole business of the pactum salutis “is in an especial manner attributed to Christ” because it “is done and performed wholly by Christ as the mediator.” Both the Father and the Son are “the first movers or the seekers” of the

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199 Goodwin, Works, 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

200 Goodwin, Works, 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

201 Goodwin, Works, 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

202 Goodwin, Works, 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
*pactum salutis*, but the Father is particularly “active in it” in two meanings.  

(1) It is the Father who “draws the platform of all the works that the other two persons do put their hand to effect.”

(2) “The first purpose and resolution” to have the work of the *pactum salutis* done are also attributed to the Father. The third objection is that the Father “is not only made to have the first hand in it, but a universal hand in it also.”

Goodwin substantiates five answers. (1) All blessings and benefits the believers have by Christ are of the Father. (2) The believers are in Christ but of God in Christ. (3) Jesus Christ as mediator is all and wholly dependent on the Father’s appointment of him as a king, priest, and prophet. (4) Whatever Christ did for the believers in doing or suffering, it was what his Father appointed him. (5) The Father is said to give Christ all the glory Christ has as mediator.

### 5.3.1.4. Christ in the *Pactum Salutis*

Paul the Apostle writes that God does the work of redemption “in Christ, for Christ, for Christ.”

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208 For the threefold office of Christ with regard to the *pactum*, see 2.2.5 of this study.

and through Christ.”210 When Paul says “in Christ,” comments Goodwin, “he speaks of Christ as of a common head, whom God looked at as such, when he endowed us with all blessings in him, by way of a covenant with him for us.”211 The expression of “for Christ” depicts Christ as “the meritorious cause, for whose sake we obtain those blessings, for he was to purchase them.”212 The third phrase, “through Christ” notes out “Christ as the efficient cause, that dispenseth that grace, as a king, to us.”213 God the Father is the first moving cause of all, and everything is in his will and good pleasure. Thus, Goodwin begins with what God the Father has done for the reconciliation.

God the Father had “a strong purpose and resolution to reconcile some of the sons of men to him, though they would or should turn rebels against him.”214 The reason of “this strange affection in our God” is that God is “love, even love itself, 1 John 4:16.”215 God demonstrates his love for us, his enemies, in giving his Son to die in our place.216 Although God might have pardoned sin without satisfaction, he would not do that because of his nature and will.217 The righteous God “resolves to be just, and have his justice and law satisfied, as well as to justify the sinner.”218 His wisdom thought of a

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210 Goodwin, Works, 5:12 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
211 Goodwin, Works, 5:12 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
212 Goodwin, Works, 5:12 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
213 Goodwin, Works, 5:12 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
214 Goodwin, Works, 5:12 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
215 Goodwin, Works, 5:13 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
216 Goodwin, Works, 5:14 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
217 Goodwin, Works, 5:14 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). This subject matter will be discussed below in detail.
commutation so that the satisfaction should be performed by a surety who might be a mediator and umpire.\textsuperscript{219}

Jesus Christ was made a surety because “\textit{redditio æquivalentis pro æquivalenti}” is requested for the satisfaction.\textsuperscript{220} He voluntarily gave himself as a ransom (\textit{ἀντίλυτρον}), “a sufficient adequate satisfaction,”\textsuperscript{221} so the maxim of “\textit{volenti non fit injuria}” is valid in the transaction.\textsuperscript{222} In a word, Christ suffered and died “by compact between his Father and him, for so it was he covenanted with God to suffer.”\textsuperscript{223} The\textit{ pactum salutis} is a great manifestation of God’s love and justice. If God means to give his Son, he gives the greatest instance of his love and justice: “of his love in that he is not only content to commute the punishment, but lay it on his Son; of his justice in that he will not only punish sin in us, but even in him.”\textsuperscript{224} While human beings could have had pardon

\textsuperscript{218} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:16 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). “Satisfaction” is the making amends for sin required by God for forgiveness to take place. Satisfaction has two meanings: (1) the satisfaction made by individual sinners according to the Roman Catholic sacrament of penance, and (2) the all-sufficient satisfaction of Christ or vicarious satisfaction (\textit{satisfactio vicaria}) made by Christ on the cross for sin. The former meaning was held by the medieval church but rejected by the Reformers on the ground that Christ’s obedience was sufficient payment for both our guilt and our punishment. “Vicarious satisfaction” of Christ means Christ’s work of propitiation and expiation considered as payment for sin made for the sake of believers and in their place. Almost verbally cited from Richard A. Muller,\textit{ Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology} (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2006), 271.

\textsuperscript{219} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:17 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

\textsuperscript{220} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:17 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). Goodwin maintains that the “satisfaction is \textit{redditio æquivalentis pro æquivalenti}; that which is given in way of restitution must be of an equivalent worth to that which is damaged” (\textit{Works} 5:85).


\textsuperscript{222} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:18 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). Goodwin explains the principle “\textit{volenti non fit injuria}” as “if the party undertaking be willing, justice may well be satisfied” (\textit{Works} 5:490 [“The One Sacrifice”]).

\textsuperscript{223} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:203 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

\textsuperscript{224} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:21 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
without Christ, God not only pardoned them, but he pardoned them through Christ. Thus, it is an infinite grace. Christ also did the work of redemption “out of love to us, yet chiefly for his Father’s entreaty and command, and out of love to him.”

5.3.1.5. The Reward and Joy of the Pactum Salutis

God the Father decided to reward Christ upon his acceptation of the agreement of the pactum salutis and to bestow all the blessings which Christ should purchase to those redeemed by him. All these blessings of grace and eternal life were promised to the believers in Christ from all eternity. For Goodwin, this bargain-wise covenant is described in Isaiah 49 “by way of a most elegant dialogue.” As all promises are made in Christ, so all promises were first made to him, and then to those who are united with him. God the Father promises to give all spiritual blessings to Christ and will bless his people with all spiritual blessings in Christ (Eph 1:3). These graces are given to the believer “on the account of his [Christ’s] merits.” God accepted the satisfaction on the basis of the pactum salutis. Thus, first, the covenant of redemption was made with

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225 Goodwin, Works, 5:22 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
226 Goodwin, Works, 5:25 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
227 Goodwin, Works, 5:27 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
228 Goodwin, Works, 5:28 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). For the dialogue form of the pactum salutis, see the discussion below.
230 Goodwin, Works, 5:30 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
231 Goodwin, Works, 5:30 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
232 Goodwin, Works, 5:31 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). Goodwin refers to the schoolmen’s phrases,
Christ, and then, the covenant of grace is *mediately* made for the believer. The three persons of the Trinity were delighted greatly “upon the conclusion of this agreement or covenant of redemption.” The delight of the three persons rests upon the certainty of the *pactum salutis* in redeeming sinners, although the temporal administration of the covenant of grace had not yet taken place in time, but only in the divine counsel.

5.3.2. Some Distinctive Features of Goodwin’s Doctrine of the *Pactum Salutis*

5.3.2.1. The Nature, Will, and Wisdom of God in the *Pactum Salutis*

The *pactum salutis* which designs the redemptive work of the Trinity contains God’s desire to forgive the sin of fallen humanity. For Goodwin this forgiving desire of God is based on his nature, will, and wisdom. Some of the early modern Reformed theologians had discussions about this issue. Some theologians such as Calvin, William Twisse (c.1577-1646), Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661), Thomas Manton (1620-1677), Goodwin, and the early Owen argued that God could have pardoned sin by a free act of his will. Some other theologians such as Franciscus Junius (1545-1602), Sibrandus

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“Quando aliud offertur quam est in obligatione, satisfactio est recusabilis.”


236 For this discussion, I referred to Mark Jones’ study in Jones, *Why Heaven Kissed Earth*, 131–34.

237 Rutherford’s massive Latin work on this issue represents the complexity of the debate. On Rutherford’s position see Samuel Rutherford, *Disputatio scholastica de divina providentia* (Edinburgh, 1649).

Lubbertus (c.1556-1625), Johannes Maccovius (1588-1644), John Cameron (1579-1623), and Francis Turretin (1623-1687) maintained that God’s vindicatory justice is essential to his nature. In his later work, *A Dissertation on Divine Justice* (1652), Owen represented this latter view that God’s justice has priority over his will. Thus, in this view, to pardon sin God must pardon in a manner consistent with his nature.

Although Goodwin sides with Calvin, Twisse, Rutherford, and Manton, he offers a very nuanced formulation for this issue. He argues:

He [God] might have pardoned without satisfaction. I will not now dispute it; only this I will say for the confirmation of it, to punish sin being an *act of his will*, as well as other works of his *ad extra*, may therefore be suspended as he himself pleaseth. To hate sin is his *nature*; and that sin deserves death is also the natural and inseparable property, consequent, and demerit of it; but the expression of this hatred, and of what sin deserves by actual punishment, is an *act of his will*, and so might be suspended. But besides that this way would not manifest such depths of *love*, though thus to have pardoned one man had shewn more love than was shewn to all the angels who never sinned; it also was not adequate and answerable to all those his glorious ends, and purposes, and other resolutions in this plot, which he will be constant unto, and make to meet in it (and it is the proper use of *wisdom* to make all ends meet); and God will not break one rule or purpose he takes up; and he hath other projects afoot besides.

By his nature God hates sin, so there is no necessity for him to forgive fallen human beings. He can express his hatred and punish them according to his nature. He, however, shows mercy in his act of his will. The *pactum salutis* is a free act of God’s will. In the eternal transaction among the Trinity, God manifests both his love and wisdom and at the same time he does not break his justice. God resolves to be just as well as to justify the

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*Nisbet & Co., 1870*, 10:213 (“Sermons Upon John XVII”). For Calvin, Christ’s incarnation and subsequent death is not an absolute necessity; rather, “it has stemmed from a heavenly decree, on which men’s salvation depended” (*Institutes*, II.xii.1). Owen’s 1647 work, *The Death of Death*, promotes the view of Calvin, Twisse, Rutherford, and Goodwin.

239 Goodwin, *Works*, 5:15 (“Of Christ the Mediator”); bolds are mine.
sinner through the death of his Son on behalf of the elect. Goodwin supports this position for two reasons. He elucidates it:

I dare not say the contrary, as some are bold to do; for this reason sways with me, namely, to punish sin being but an act of his will (as all his other works ad extra are), and not of his nature; for what is the reason else that he sometimes suspends the punishing of wicked men, out of the riches of his forbearance? It is because to punish them is but an act of his will. If it were an act of his nature, then whosoever sinned should die for it immediately; but it being an act of his will, he may suspend it, as he oftentimes doth. . . . To hate sin indeed is an act of his nature, but to express his hatred by punishing is an act of his will, and therefore might be wholly suspended. And that which yet further confirms me in it is, that Christ, when he prayed that ‘the cup might pass from him,’ Mark 14:36, useth this argument, ‘All things are possible to thee.’ The thing he entreated for was, that the cup might be taken away; and he intimates this as the ground of his prayer, that it was possible to God, that notwithstanding he was resolved to have the world saved, yet to have that end of his brought about another way, though in view there is none that we know of but this. Now there was a truth in this, else Christ would not have used it as an argument to this purpose. The impossibility lay only in God’s will to have it done by Christ’s satisfaction, and no way else; which therefore Christ submitted unto—‘not my will, but thine be done’—only nature in him, to shew its averseness to that cup as simply in itself considered, sought a diversion. And to shew that there was another way, he useth this as the greatest argument, thereby the more to set forth his and his Father’s love, that he yet underwent this most difficult one.

First, if to punish sin is an act of God’s nature, then the sinner would die immediately.

Thus, it must be an act of God’s will in order for him to suspend the sentence of death.

Second, when Christ prayed that the cup be taken from him, he confesses that “all things are possible unto thee.” Christ’s words suggest the possibility for God to forgive apart from his suffering and death. To beget his Son as God was an act of God’s nature, therefore it could not be otherwise; but to prepare a body for him so that he should be

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240 Goodwin, Works, 5:16 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

241 Goodwin, Works, 5:72 (“Of Christ the Mediator”; bolds are mine).
born the Son of man, was an act of his will. In another passage, Goodwin asserts that “generation is an act of God’s nature, and he did it necessarily; but predestination is an act of his will.” Both God the Father and Christ concur in willing the satisfaction, and thus the satisfaction should be accomplished.

The distinctiveness of Goodwin’s discussion on this issue consists in that he underlines the role of God’s wisdom here. Both love and justice belong to God’s nature, and he can punish or pardon sin according to an act of his will. The will of God always accompanies his wisdom. In the pactum salutis, God resolves to pardon the sin of fallen humanity through the redemptive work of Christ; and “this invention . . . is God’s wisdom.” In his will and wisdom, God the Father decrees to receive Christ’s offering as a satisfaction. God’s depths of wisdom are in it, and his will has counsel joined with it.

5.3.2.2. The Inner-Divine Discourse in the Pactum Salutis

Another characteristic of Goodwin’s doctrine of the pactum salutis lies in his

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242 Goodwin, Works, 5:485 (“The One Sacrifice”).
244 Goodwin, Works, 5:495 (“The One Sacrifice”).
245 Goodwin, Works, 5:20 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
247 Goodwin, Works, 5:24 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). Goodwin refers to Hebrews 10:10 and presents his own translation, “We are sanctified through his will, through the offering of the body of Christ.”
248 Goodwin, Works, 5:15 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
formulation of it as an *inner-divine discourse*.

His presentation of it can incur a suspicion of tritheism inasmuch as it *seems* to assume three *separate* persons. Some theologians express nervousness over this inner-divine discourse within the Trinity, but Goodwin’s formulation of the *pactum salutis* does not fail to evade tritheism, of which danger he is clearly conscious. Goodwin does not assume three *separate* or *discrete* persons in the inner-divine discourse but “three *distinct* persons in the nature of one God.”

Goodwin’s adumbration of the inner-divine discourse is offered with his exegesis of related scriptural texts. For him the Scriptures do represent the Trinity as a “knot and society” of the three persons. The inner-divine discourse shows one aspect of this inner-trinitarian relationship.

There are several instances of the inner-divine discourse in the Scriptures. First, God’s work of creation is depicted in a dialogue form. Goodwin maintains that “when God made man, he called a council: ‘Let *us* make man’ [Genesis 1:26]” and that “all the three persons did concur and join in that great work.” This “consultation of the persons” does not lead to tritheism. Rather, Goodwin argues that “each of the persons in the Trinity do speak one of and to the other in this language of *us* and *we*, and withal that

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249 Blackham calls this inner-divine discourse “inter-personal conversations within the Trinity” or “an inter-Trinitarian speech.” Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 29n39, 36.

250 For a discussion of tritheism and social Trinitarianism regarding the *pactum*, see 7.1.2 of this study.


254 In *Works*, 9:131 (“A Discourse of Election”), Goodwin writes, “At the first making of man there was such a consultation of the persons held, and God the Father says to the other two, ‘Let us make man according to our image.’”
their being one in essence or in the Godhead.”

Thus, to Goodwin, the inner-divine discourse does not infringe the oneness of the Trinity.

Second, John 17 describes God’s ordaining the elect unto union and communion with himself as a consultation among the persons. Goodwin maintains that in the Scriptures “the oneness and intimacy of communion which the Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost had and have amongst, themselves, was an original and primordial motive of God’s ordaining us unto union and communion with himself.”

This “super-creation union, whereby the elect were to be made one with Christ,” is expressed in Jesus Christ’s prayer to his Father. Goodwin takes this prayer to be an inner-divine discourse in which the Son prays the Father to grant his followers the great communion. Citing Gregory Nazianzen’s saying, “Bonum unitatis a Trinitate originem ducit,” Goodwin claims that the “good blessing of unity draws and derives its rise and original from the Trinity.”

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255 Goodwin, Works, 9:130 (“A Discourse of Election”).
256 Goodwin, Works, 9:130 (“A Discourse of Election”).
258 Blackham writes that according to Goodwin’s interpretation of this passage, “the Son is seeking to persuade the Father to allow the Church to enjoy the same blessed union and communion that they had, until now, exclusively enjoyed.” Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 31. Blackham’s remark, however, seems like an exaggeration because Goodwin clearly writes that “this union [between God and his people] is a lower union than the first [union between the Father and the Son], and the first is the original and the ground of this.” Goodwin, Works, 9:132 (“A Discourse of Election”). It is true, as Blackham puts it (at p. 34, note 47), that “Goodwin is aware of the fact that here [Works, 4:362-63] he is, to a certain degree, undermining the high claims he has made in his Discourse on Election. In Works, 4:362-63, Goodwin writes, “Whatever use I have made of this 17th of John, in discoursing of this union to another purpose, my scope now is to shew, how all the ancients have judged this very thing, (which I have asserted) with clear evidence of reason, from Christ’s manner of speech, both negatively and affirmatively, as I shall allege their testimonies by and by.”

259 Goodwin, Works, 9:130 (“A Discourse of Election”). The frequent citation of the church fathers, such as Augustine (or “Austin”), Irenaeus (2nd century), Tertullian (160-235), Cyprian (d. 258), Basil of Caesarea (329-379), John Chrysostom (347-407), Cyril of Alexandria (378-444), Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389), and Jerome (347-420), is prominent in Goodwin’s writings. For a short analysis for this, see Jones, Why Heaven Kissed Earth, 59–60.
The three persons of the Trinity, subsisting and being one in the Godhead, are the foundation and original inducement for the union of a creature with God.\textsuperscript{260} The inner-divine discourse demonstrates this truth.

The idea of the inner-divine discourse permeates in Goodwin’s doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis}, which accompanies his biblical exegesis. He argues:

God rested not in a decree only, but entered into \textit{covenant} with Christ to save sinners by him if he would die. This covenant you have \textit{dialogue-wise} set out, Isa. 49. First, Christ begins at the first and second verses, and shews his commission, telling God how he had called him, and fitted him for the work of redemption, and he would know what \textit{reward} he should receive of him for so great an undertaking. God answers him, ver. 3, and at first offers low, only the elect of Israel. Christ who stood now a-making his \textit{bargain} with him, thought these too few, and not worth so great a labour and work, because few of the Jews would come in, but would refuse him, therefore, ver. 4, he says, he should ‘labour in vain,’ if this were all his recompence; and yet withal he tells God, that seeing his heart was so much in saving sinners to satisfy him, he would do it however for those few, comforting himself with this, that his ‘work was with the Lord.’ Upon this God comes off more freely, and openeth his heart more largely to him, as meaning more amply to content him for his pains in dying. ‘It is a light thing,’ says God to him, ‘that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob;’ that is not worth the dying for, I value thy sufferings more than so, ‘I will give thee for a salvation unto the ends of the earth.’ Upon this he made a promise to Christ, Titus 1:2, and a promise is more than a purpose. A purpose may be in one’s self, as Eph. 1:9, but a promise is made to another. Now God cannot lie in himself, but most of all, not to his Son.\textsuperscript{261}

Goodwin, like Dickson, sees God’s decree of redemption as a covenant.\textsuperscript{262} According to his interpretation, Isaiah 49 is a \textit{dialogue} between the Father and the Son in relation to the eternal covenant of redemption. The Father and the Son made a bargain. The Son told the

\textsuperscript{260} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 9:130 (“A Discourse of Election”).

\textsuperscript{261} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 4:213 (“Encouragements to Faith”), bolds are mine.

\textsuperscript{262} David Dickson writes, “This covenant of redemption, is in effect one with the eternall decree of redemption,” and “the decree of redemption is in effect a covenant.” David Dickson, \textit{Therapeutica sacra} (Edinburgh: Evan Taylor, 1664), Book I, Chap. 4 (p. 25).
Father that he would voluntarily accomplish the commission the Father gave to him. The Father will give him a reward—the Son will be a light for the nations that the salvation may reach to the end of the earth (Isa 49:6).

Goodwin displays the pactum salutis as an inner-divine discourse in his other treatises. For the work of redemption, “there must be an intercourse of persons promising, and that received and accepted the promise.”

“There was not only a predestination-act on the Father’s part, that passed upon Christ to be God-man in common with God predestinating us,” states Goodwin, “but that there accompanied it, at the instant, on the second person’s part, an acceptance of what God had predestinated him unto.” In their converses, one finds the dignity “which utterly varies the case from that of our predestination by a single act of God’s.”

Goodwin portrays this inner-divine discourse as “Sacratissimus Consessus Trinitatis” (most sacred sitting of the Trinity), as Gerhard speaks on John 16:14-15 or “Concilium Trinitatis” (consilium of the Trinity), as Rollock on the same place. The original ground of the motion toward the redemptive work was “the communion the three persons do hold in that one Godhead.”

In various places, Goodwin continues to argue that the inner-divine discourse takes place while in no way compromising the one essence of the three persons. He claims, “All three persons are

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264 Goodwin, Works, 4:489 (“The Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ”).

265 Goodwin, Works, 9:144 (“A Discourse of Election”).

266 Goodwin, Works, 9:144 (“A Discourse of Election”). Goodwin calls “the second or middle person, God’s counsellor, Angelus magni Concilii (as the Septuagint renders it, Isa. 9:6).” He also refers to John 17.

essentially one God, although persons distinct enjoying that Godhead. And thus the Father and Spirit do dwell naturally or essentially in him, as he is the second Person.\textsuperscript{268}

He stresses that each of the three persons dwells within each other person.

Goodwin seriously takes the concept of person in his account of the immanent Trinity, so he contends that the very words of Scripture teach that God is a society of persons. He argues:

The Scriptures do present the three persons, not only as three witnesses to us, but as \textit{three blessed companions of a knot and society among themselves, enjoying fellowship and delights accordingly in themselves}; and indeed, if this had been wanting, there had not been an abundant or a complete happiness, for much of sweetness lies \textit{in society} (the ‘sweetness of a man’s friend,’ is Solomon’s character), which, if the divine nature had not afforded in having in it three persons really distinct, knowing, rejoicing in, glorying of, and speaking unto each other, there had not been a perfection of blessedness. But from forth of this society, an all-satiety did and doth arise . . . And the Son speaks not, but what he hears of the Father, as you find again and again in that Gospel of John; nor doth the Spirit speak but what he hears of both: John 14:13–15 . . .\textsuperscript{269}

The personality of the triune God plays a basic role in Goodwin’s understanding of the Trinity. The oneness and threeness of God is tuned by the emphasis on the concept of person. The three persons of the Trinity are distinct, but this definite distinctiveness of the


\textsuperscript{269} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 9:145 (“A Discourse of Election”). For this reason, Blackham writes, “Goodwin is not finally satisfied with the psychological model of the Trinity, which sees the three persons of God as three aspects of an individual Psyche, that is, memory, understanding and will (Augustine’s version). In this kind of model the Second Person, as Logos, becomes the sort of speech capacity of the Godhead, which would make inter-Trinitarian conversation an almost inconceivable notion.” Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 32. Goodwin regards the psychological model of the Trinity as “so obscure and uncertain.” He writes, “when some would argue this same from the distinction of those three powers of the soul, the understanding, memory, and will, fancying the memory in man should peculiarly resemble one person, suppose the Holy Ghost, and the understanding the Son, and the will the Father; others, that in man’s soul, the understanding, the will, and the power to act, and put forth the acts of these, are lively characters of the persons; but these all are so obscure and uncertain in their evidence or character of these three persons and their distinction, as they all vanish as shadows, when wistly pried into, and most narrowly searched into when applied.” Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 7:531 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”).
persons does not undermine their union. The “blessed society of three in the Godhead” allows them “no other reality in the divine being, but as three manifestations, or else operations of God in us, and to us.”

It should be noted, however, that for Goodwin this particular communion enjoyed by the members of the Trinity can never be enjoyed by any creatures. Goodwin enunciates that the union and communion the three persons in the Godhead have between themselves apart are “incommunicable unto us.” He notes that the schoolmen termed it as “circumincension” (circumincessio), which is used as a synonym of the Greek word perichoresis and refers to the coinherence of the persons in the Trinity. Even when he emphasizes the union with God, he clearly notes that the union between God and his people is “a lower union” than the first union between the Father and the Son, and the first is the original and the ground of this. Therefore, Goodwin’s formulation of the society of the three persons of the Trinity is different from modern social Trinitarianism which tries to apply the perichoretic communion of the Trinity to creaturely relationships. To recapitulate briefly, Goodwin’s adumbration of the pactum salutis

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270 Goodwin, Works, 4:351 (“The Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ”).

271 Blackham, “The Pneumatology of Thomas Goodwin,” 34; Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology, 90.

272 Goodwin, Works, 4:362 (“The Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ”).

273 Goodwin, Works, 2:398 (“A Sermon on Ephesians 3:17”). See also James Ussher, A Body of Divinitie (London: Downes, 1645), 87. The term, “schoolmen,” was used to refer to Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274), Gerard of Csanád (c. 980-1046), Duns Scotus (1266-1308), Alexander Hales (1186-1245), and Boetius (1230-1285) in Goodwin’s writings, both positively and negatively. For Goodwin’s use of the term, “schoolmen,” see Jones, Why Heaven Kissed Earth, 60–62; Trueman, The Claims of Truth, 31–32; Muller, PRRD, 1:34–37.


275 For an example of such social Trinitarianism, see Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom,
has two distinctive characteristics: first, it demonstrates that God’s forgiving of sin, though based on his nature (love and justice in particular), is an act of his will and wisdom; second, it exhibits the transaction as a dialogue among the three persons of the Trinity, under the presupposition that there is a blessed society of three persons in the Godhead, enjoying fellowship and delights in themselves.

5.4. The Holy Spirit in Goodwin’s Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis

5.4.1. The Trinitarian Dimension of Goodwin’s Soteriology

Goodwin is a trinitarian theologian.276 A trinitarian approach is a basic methodology in his exegesis.277 Goodwin is convinced that although many people judge that “the doctrine of the Trinity, and the doctrine that Christ is God, is but a matter of speculation and contemplation . . . it is such a truth as thy life lies in it, even eternal life.”278 He endorses a trinitarian logic in his soteriology.

First, Goodwin describes election from a trinitarian perspective. In his comment on John 17, he argues that Jesus’ prayer of this passage shows “the bottom counsel of the

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276 Goodwin endorses Calvin’s doctrine of the Trinity and defends it from “a wretched papist” who wrote a book, titled “Calvin Judaizing,” and was criticized by Pareus. Goodwin, Works, 4:460 (“The Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ”). Goodwin seems to make a mistake—the author of Calvinus Judaizans, to whom Pareus responded was Aegidius Hunnius (1550-1603) who was a Lutheran. For a related discussion, see G. Sujin Pak, The Judaizing Calvin: Sixteenth-Century Debates over the Messianic Psalms (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Pak examines the debate over Calvin’s exegesis between the Lutheran Aegidius Hunnius, who accuses Calvin of a “judaizing” exegesis for its undermining the christological and Trinitarian readings of Psalms, and the Reformed theologian David Pareus (1548-1622), who defends Calvin by appealing to Calvin’s use of typology for its referring David as a type of Christ.

277 This feature can be easily detected in his sermons on Ephesians in Works, 1 and 2.

278 Goodwin, Works, 8:187-88 (“Of the Object of Faith”).

For him the gospel itself contains “the glorious mystery of the Trinity.”

Second, the faith (fides qua) of the believer is examined in a trinitarian point of view. Goodwin, Works, 4:231 (“The Glory of the Gospel”); 4:262-63 (“A Discourse of the Glory of the Gospel”)

In the conversion of a person there is “the concurrence of all the three persons in the Trinity to that work, and that they all put forth conjointly a renewed act of agreement in it.”

There must be a “special consent and concurrence, and joint-meeting of all three persons in the Trinity” in the great union by faith between Christ and believers. Goodwin, Works, 8:144 (“Of the Object of Faith”).

As God called a council when he made man, so there is a solemn “council called of all the three persons when this new man is made.”

In the work of faith, “Christ is bestowed.” The Holy Spirit does concurrently work with Christ. When Christ dwells in the believer, the Holy Spirit “immediately” dwells in them.

Father, Son, and Holy Spirit set their hands to the redemptive work and bear offices in it, “because all three persons, not only as in other works, but distinctly and apart, concur unto it.”

Thus, for Goodwin, faith is the gift and work of the three persons of the Trinity who are the

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279 Goodwin, Works, 9:144 (“A Discourse of Election”).


281 Fides qua is the act of believing; whereas, fides quae is the content of believing. Cf. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 117.

282 Goodwin, Works, 8:482 (“Of the Object of Faith”).

283 Goodwin, Works, 8:482 (“Of the Properties of Faith”).

284 Goodwin, Works, 8:482 (“Of the Properties of Faith”).

285 Goodwin, Works, 8:482 (“Of the Properties of Faith”).

286 Goodwin, Works, 2:395-96 (“A Sermon on Ephesians 3:17—Some general premises touching the whole prayer”).

fountain of grace and peace.\textsuperscript{288}

Third and most importantly, Goodwin appropriates the trinitarian logic in his doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis}. There is “a blessed intercourse” between the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit is not excluded in this relationship.\textsuperscript{289} Father, Son, and Holy Spirit always work together \textit{ad extra} as is shown in John 16:13-14.\textsuperscript{290} Goodwin clearly enunciates that “there is a joint concurrence of all three persons in every action that is done; for \textit{opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa}.”\textsuperscript{291} This is based on “the common concurrence which the three persons have in other works besides our salvation.”\textsuperscript{292} God’s external action mirrors his being. “All operations [are] flowing from essence,” maintains Goodwin, “therefore when the essence is but one, the operation must needs be one and the same, which here must be understood \textit{quoad substantiam operis}, for the substance of the work.”\textsuperscript{293} Although the three persons are really distinct, they are enjoying perfect fellowship, and this is a perfection of blessedness. The Son speaks not but what he hears of the Father; nor does the Spirit speak but what he hears of both (John 14:13-15).\textsuperscript{294} This \textit{ad extra} trinitarian dimension is a resonance of the \textit{ad intra} trinitarian relationship. Goodwin claims that “the work of salvation . . . hath been transacted by the

\textsuperscript{288} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 8:482 (“Of the Properties of Faith”); 1:16 (Sermon I—Ephesians 1:1, 2)


\textsuperscript{290} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 9:145 (“A Discourse of Election”).


\textsuperscript{292} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 7:529 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”).

\textsuperscript{293} Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 7:530 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”).

three persons.”

As mentioned above regarding the terminologies, the word “transaction” is used in Goodwin’s works to denote “covenant,” but it takes most frequently the meaning of the *pactum salutis*. Goodwin resisted any sort of subtrinitarianism or binitarianism for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Rather, he stresses that the three persons of the Trinity concur in the entire work of salvation. A “joint concurrence, and yet distinct appearance” shall be found in any work done for the believer “in a set and solemn conjunction of all three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.” Therefore, the basic structure of Goodwin’s soteriology is trinitarian in *ad intra* dimension as well as in *ad extra* dimension. If all three persons concur in every work, the *pactum salutis* cannot be an exception. It is not unnatural, then, that the Holy Spirit takes an important place both in the transaction and the application of the *pactum salutis*.

5.4.2. The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Transaction of the *Pactum Salutis*

The Holy Spirit should be a party of the *pactum salutis* inasmuch as the Spirit was also offended by the sins of humanity. If fallen human beings are to be reconciled to the

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296 See 5.3.1.1 of this study.


301 Goodwin, *Works*, 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
triune God, they must be reconciled to the Holy Spirit inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity. Although the work of redemption promised the pactum salutis will “be done and performed wholly by Christ as the mediator,” the Holy Spirit’s role is also essential for the making and accomplishment of the pactum.

Goodwin understood the eternal transactions of the pactum as a trinitarian activity, in which the Holy Spirit prominently functions.302 First, if the Holy Spirit concurs in all redemptive works of God, he must be active in the transactions of the pactum. Being injured by the human sins against the first covenant, God the Father is active in the pactum salutis and “draws the platform of all the works that the other two persons do put their hand to effect.”303 Just as David the father drew and gave his son Solomon the pattern of the temple, so God gave his Son the platform of reconciliation, of the temple his church. The believer receives “a spiritual blessing, or the promise of the Spirit” in Christ.304 The pactum salutis is a transaction for the appointment of Christ as a mediator for the redemption of fallen humanity. The Holy Spirit concurs in the redemptive work of Christ, so the Holy Spirit should be a party of the pactum salutis.305

Second, the Holy Spirit is identified as the “Recorder” of the transactions of the eternal counsel of the pactum. “The Holy Ghost, the great secretary of heaven, who alone was by at that great council,” claims Goodwin, “hath recorded it.”306 Goodwin regards Hebrews

302 Jones, Why Heaven Kissed Earth, 141; Beeke and Jones, A Puritan Theology, 249–51.
303 Goodwin, Works, 5:9 (“Of Christ the Mediator”), italics are mine.
304 Goodwin, Works, 1:51 (“Sermons IV—Ephesians 1:3”); 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
305 Goodwin, Works, 5:10 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
5:5-6 as the content of the record of the Holy Spirit in the transaction of the *pactum*.

Third, the Spirit’s role in the *pactum salutis* is particularly explicit in the inner-divine discourse between the three persons concerning the redemptive work. Goodwin suggests, as pointed out above, a scriptural type of intra-trinitarian discourse to describe the *pactum salutis*. He reads this inner-divine discourse from his exegesis of Isaiah 49, in which the covenant of redemption is presented as a “dialogue” between the Father giving commission and the Son voluntarily accomplishing it. In light of Goodwin’s doctrine of the Trinity, the Spirit must be present by an ontological necessity when the Father commissioned the Son and the Son accepted the proposal. The counsel in God’s work of creation is compared with the counsel of the *pactum salutis* in the comment on chapter 5 of Second Corinthians. Goodwin writes:

He [The Father] gave his Son, and he gave himself both to us, and for us, and both gifts are invaluably infinite; and because he had no more left, he hath given *his Spirit* also, as, 2 Cor. 5, ye have it; when man was first made, then only God said, ‘Let us make man;’ this was spoken, say some, with a farther eye and foresight than to the creation, this counsel expressed what special care they each should have unto the like piece of workmanship was then afore them, even unto the gospel state. I will choose him to life, saith the Father, but he will fall, and so fall short of what my love designed to him; but I will redeem him, says the Son, out of that lost estate. But yet being fallen he will refuse that grace, and the offers of it, and despise it; *therefore I will sanctify him, said the Holy Ghost*, and

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308 See 5.3.2.2 of this study.

309 Goodwin, *Works*, 4:213 ("Encouragements to Faith"). For the predestination of God, Goodwin writes, “we must consider that there was not only a predestination-act on the Father’s part, that passed upon Christ to be God-man in common with God predestinating us; but that there accompanied it, at the instant, on the second person’s part, an acceptance of what God had predestinated him unto, a sustaining of that person afore God ever after, and a glory given him all along by his Father in their conversations, answering that dignity, which utterly varies the case from that of our predestination by a single act of God’s.” Goodwin, *Works*, 4:489 ("The Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ").

overcome his unrighteousness, and cause him to accept it. And having this
counsel and resolution about him, they still said, however, ‘Let us make him,’
and thereupon fell to making him, and have since done all, this for him.311

The three persons of the Trinity had a counsel in connection with the new creational work
just as they had it in respect to the creational work.312 In the inner-divine counsel, the
Father says that human beings will fall, the Son says that he will redeem them, and the
Holy Spirit says that he will sanctify them. The believer will overcome the
unrighteousness and accept the salvation through the work of the Holy Spirit. Goodwin is
very clear that the Holy Spirit speaks of his soteric activity in the transaction of the
pactum salutis. Thus, in the pactum, the Spirit’s role is not confined to the recorder of it
but is identified as a principal actor. The Holy Spirit is the ultima manus (the last hand)
in the transaction of the pactum salutis as well as in creation.313 Goodwin argues:

And for this Christ hath expressly told us, that as he and his Father do confer
together about the great transactions of man’s salvation, so that the Spirit hears
all that passeth, John 16:13. Nor yet did he stand by as a bare witness to relate it
and confirm it to us, but was sent down by both as a principal actor, that had the
great and ultimate hand in effecting of it.314

In the pactum salutis, continues Goodwin, the Father declares the redemption as his will,
both to the Son and the Spirit; the Holy Spirit, as the person sent by the Father, declares
to perform and fashion the body of Christ in Mary’s womb; the Son declares to assume

311 Goodwin, Works, 7:540 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”), italics are mine.

312 Goodwin uses this comparison several times in various works. See Goodwin, Works, 8:144
(“Of the Object of Faith”); 9:131 (“A Discourse of Election”). For Goodwin’s use of the term “new creation”
to signify the redemptive work of God, see Works, 1:365, 377, 395, 401; 2:373; 4:65; 3:506; 5:365, 374;
6:428; 7:36, 126; 8:32, 182; and 10:150, 152.

313 Goodwin states that “in creation the ultima manus, the last hand is attributed to him [the
Spirit].” Goodwin, Works, 7:530 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”).

the body prepared for him. Thus, the Spirit is never absent but plays a very significant role in the transaction of the pactum salutis. Without the consent and promise of the Spirit, the pactum salutis cannot stand. That is why the whole Trinity rejoiced in the transaction of the pactum salutis for that reason.

5.4.3. The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Application of the Pactum Salutis

5.4.3.1. The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Person and Work of Christ

In Goodwin’s soteriology, there are “three sorts of works whereby our salvation is completed and accomplished”; first, immanent in God towards us, as his eternal love set and passed upon us, out of which he chose us, and designed this and all blessings to us; second, transient, in Christ done for us, in all he did or suffered representing us in our stead; third, applicatory, wrought in us and upon us, in endowing us with all those blessings by the Spirit in calling, justification, sanctification, and glorification. The work of the Holy Spirit regarding the pactum is not only immanent but applicatory. The Holy Spirit acted as “a principal actor” in the transaction of the pactum, who made an

315 Goodwin, Works, 6:419 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).
316 Goodwin, Works, 5:31 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).
317 Goodwin, Works, 6:405 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”). Against the view popular among antinomian Calvinists of the day, Goodwin argues that the elect are justified from eternity only in that “God told Christ, as it were, (for it was a real covenant), that he would look for his debt and satisfaction of him, and that he did let the sinners go free; and so they are in this respect justified from all eternity” (Works, 8:135 (“Of the Object of Faith’’)). Horton maintains that “Goodwin grants justification from eternity no farther than he will grant the covenant of redemption between the members of the Trinity before time,” Horton, “Thomas Goodwin and the Puritan Doctrine of Assurance,” 185. Goodwin repudiates the opinion that “sanctification . . . should be the first and immediate medium of election” or the opinion of the Roman Catholic theologians that “our good works and actual obedience is an ingredient matter of our justification, as well as the blood of Christ.” Goodwin, Works, 7:536-37 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”).
essential contribution to make it effective.\textsuperscript{318} In the accomplishment of the \textit{pactum}, the Holy Spirit’s role is accented all the more since Christ’s person and work are essentially the outworking of and contingent upon the work of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{319}

The Holy Spirit acts both in the person and work of Christ (as is seen in this section) and in the life of the believer (as is seen in the next section). Goodwin’s treatise “Of the Work of the Holy Ghost” is dedicated to deal with these two aspects. The \textit{pactum salutis} is accomplished in every phase of Christ’s salvific life under the influence and working of the Holy Spirit. First, it was the Holy Spirit who formed Christ’s human nature in the womb of Mary (Matt 1:18, 20). The Spirit made “the man Jesus, both body and soul.”\textsuperscript{320} Although it was the Son who took flesh, the Holy Spirit prepared and formed the flesh that the Son assumed.\textsuperscript{321} The graces of Christ with respect to his human nature are attributed to the Spirit, and the divine nature of Christ acts not mediately through the work of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{322}

Second, it was the Holy Spirit who had the honor of the consecration of Christ to be the messiah, and that by anointing him without measure (John 3:34; Isaiah 11:2), Only “the Most Holy One anointed” is “Messiah, or \textit{Χριστός}” (Daniel 9).\textsuperscript{323} Goodwin elaborates on the threefold office of Christ according to the Reformed tradition that

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\item[319] Jones, \textit{Why Heaven Kissed Earth}, 127.
\end{footnotes}
combines the person and work of Christ in the threefold office. Christ, the anointed, is the name that speaks all his offices—king, priest, and prophet. He was baptized with the Holy Spirit as with fire and received the Spirit without measure, though he was personally full of grace and truth himself, as he was the Son of God.

Third, it was the Holy Spirit who anointed him to be “a prophet and preacher of the gospel” (Hebrews 2; Luke 4:18). The Spirit was he who made Christ “a preacher of the gospel, to utter things which man never did, and to speak in such a manner as man never did.” When Christ was full of the Holy Spirit, he could stand for his preaching (Luke 4:1, 14). Jesus could preach salvation to the captives because he was anointed by the Spirit. His message was powerful and effective only because of the empowering of the Holy Spirit. The pactum salutis is revealed to humans through the work of preaching. Before creation God made the promise and covenant with Christ, and in due time he manifested his word by preaching.

Fourth, the Holy Spirit anointed Christ with “power to do all his miracles, and all the good he did” (Acts 10:38; Matthew 12:28). For many Reformed divines, Matthew

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324 See Goodwin, *Works*, 5:10 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). See also 2.2.5 of this study for the connection between the pactum salutis and the threefold office of Christ.


330 Goodwin, *Works*, 5:29 (“Of Christ the Mediator”). For Goodwin’s teaching on sermon and the Spirit, see 5.2.2.2 of this study.

12:28 clearly teaches that Christ performed miracles in the power of the Spirit. In this regard, Owen contends that the Spirit “is the *immediate, peculiar, efficient cause* of all external divine operations,” and so he ascribes Christ’s miracles to the Holy Spirit rather than the Son.

Fifth, it was the Holy Spirit who raised Jesus Christ from the grave (Acts 13:33). The Spirit was “the immediate cause of this new advancement, whereby he [Christ] was born into the other world” (Romans 8:11). God by his Spirit raises up both Christ and us.

Sixth, the Holy Spirit filled Christ with glory when Christ ascended into heaven (Psalm 45; Acts 10:38). It was the Spirit who glorified Christ at his ascension. He was finally and fully anointed with the Spirit in his glorious ascension.

Seventh, it was the Spirit that “solemnly anointed him as king in heaven” (Acts 2:33, 36). Christ sat at the right hand of God and received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit. God has made this Jesus, whom the Israelites crucified, both Lord and Christ. The Lordship of the Christ in heaven is due to his having received the promise of the

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334 Goodwin, *Works*, 6:12 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”). Goodwin writes that the work of resurrection “was so great a work, as God himself accounts it as a new begetting, or making him anew; and as it were a second conception of him, a new edition of his Son Christ.”


Eighth and finally, the Holy Spirit proclaims Jesus Christ in all people’s hearts. He sets the crown upon him in the believer’s heart, as well as in heaven, in so much that no person could ever come to acknowledge him the Christ but from the Spirit (1 Corinthians 12:3). It is the Spirit that publicly proclaimed him Christ and brought him in all his subjects (John 16:14).

The above eight points are all the works that the Holy Spirit has done to and for Christ. The life of Christ concurs with the consistent outworking of the Holy Spirit. The only time the Logos acted unilaterally is in the assumption of the human nature, which terminated on him alone. Both in the hypostatic union of Christ’s two natures and in every phase of his redemptive work, however, the Holy Spirit gave him special graces and anointed him without measure. In a word, Christ’s conception, threefold office, baptism, sermons, miracles, resurrection, ascension, and heavenly kingship are all performed in the power of the Holy Spirit. When the pactum salutis was accomplished through the person and work of Christ, it was the Spirit who was responsible for inaugurating, sustaining, and perfecting them. In Goodwin’s doctrine of the pactum salutis, Christology and Pneumatology are interwoven in a deep level of connection.

341 Jones, Why Heaven Kissed Earth, 169.
5.4.3.2. The Role of the Holy Spirit in the Life of the Believer

One of the strongest points of Goodwin’s theology is that he tries to give practical applications of every theological locus for the life of faith.342 His doctrine of the pactum salutis does not stop at a speculative discussion but extends to a practical application. Goodwin argues, in the above eighth part of the Spirit’s work of Jesus, that the Spirit proclaims Christ in the believer’s hearts.343 He expands the discussion of the work of the Spirit in relation to regeneration of a person. He deals with the necessity of regeneration (Book III and IV), the Spirit’s work in it (Book VI), its three part (Book VIII), its relationship with Christ’s resurrection (Book IX), and its connection with sanctification (Book X). Regeneration is the prime work of the Holy Spirit in humans.344 All the three persons of the Trinity concur in regeneration, so there is a set of “distinct concurrence and appearance of all three persons” at the effecting of the work of regeneration.345 The work of regeneration, however, is efficiently and more eminently attributed to the Holy Spirit.346 The Spirit makes the work of the Father and the Son actually the possession of human beings. Regeneration, in this point of view, is not achieved for humanity at all

342 This was one of the distinctive patterns of the early modern Reformed theology. For example, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) underscores both academic specialty and practical piety in the study of theology. For him, theology is most of all “a practical science” (scientia practica). See Woo, “The Understanding of Gisbertus Voetius and René Descartes on the Relationship of Faith and Reason, and Theology and Philosophy,” 56–57; Andreas J. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676). Sein Theologieverständnis und seine Gotteslehre” (Doctoral Thesis, Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2007), 428–29.


344 Goodwin, Works, 6:11 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).


until it is applied by the Holy Spirit. Goodwin maintains:

Let the same law, I beseech you, take place in your hearts towards the Holy Ghost, as well as the other two persons of the Trinity. The Holy Ghost is indeed the last in order of the persons, as proceeding from the other two, yet in the participation of the Godhead he is equal with them both; and in his work, though it be last done for us, he is not behind them, nor in the glory of it inferior to what they have in theirs. And indeed he would not be God, equal with the Father and the Son, if the work allotted to him, to shew he is God, were not equal unto each of theirs. And indeed, no less than all that is done, or to be done in us, was left to the Holy Ghost’s share, for the ultimate execution of it; and it was not left him as the refuse, it being as necessary and as great as any of theirs. But he being the last person, took his own lot of the works about our salvation, which are the last, which is to apply all, and to make all actually ours, whatever the other two had done afore for us.

If the *pactum salutis* is the triune God’s transaction regarding redemption, the starting point of its actual application in human beings is regeneration. It is the Holy Spirit who makes this happen in individuals. Thus, to Goodwin, regeneration is not achieved at all until the Spirit applies all and makes “all actually ours.” The work of the Holy Spirit for regeneration is so powerful and absolute that Goodwin is even reluctant to call faith a condition, due to that which he considers abuses.

In accordance with many other Reformed theologians, such as Perkins and Polanus, Goodwin argues that the Father is the foundation of election, the Son is the foundation of redemption, and the Holy Spirit is the foundation of sanctification. Eternal election “is

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348 Goodwin, *Works*, 6:3-4 ("Of the Work of the Holy Ghost")


350 Goodwin, *Works*, 7:534-35 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”). Sometimes Goodwin calls Christ “the foundation of election” (Works, 1:68; 4:536; 9:85). Some of the early modern Reformed theologians tended not to ascribe the phrase “the foundation of election” to Christ since Arminians used the term to denote Christ.
peculiarly attributed to the Father, whose person is the original, the fountain of the other two.”

Redemption supposes election, depends on it, and “flows from God’s decree and speaking to his Son.” It is appropriated to the Son. There is the application of election and redemption, and it is ascribed to the Spirit more eminently. As the subsistence of the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so this work springs both from election and redemption. For the work of redemption, Christ paid the price of redemption, and the Spirit applied that price to redeem his people. In this regard, Goodwin points out that some interpreters consider the Holy Spirit as “the cause of redemption.”

The covenant of grace is a temporal application of the *pactum salutis*. The Spirit is given us by the covenant of grace, and he is the accomplisher of the covenant. Although the covenant of grace is resulted from the transactions of the three persons of the Trinity, its effectual application is eminently attributed to the Holy Spirit.

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355 Goodwin, *Works*, 1:262 (“Sermon XVII—Ephesians 1:14”). Goodwin writes, “There is a redemption by Jesus Christ’s paying the price, and there is a redeeming us by the Spirit, applying that price; therefore he is said to be the earnest of our inheritance for the redemption—that is, to work redemption; so some interpret εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν, he is the cause of redemption, he is ἀῤῥαβών εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν, on purpose to work it, not as an idle earnest that lieth by us, but as a hostage; being a person that works the redemption of the party, he is a hostage for us. Therefore if you read Rom. 8:9, 10, 23, you shall find that the redemption of our bodies, and the raising up of our bodies, is ascribed unto the Spirit of God. So now you easily understand what is meant by redemption” (bolds are mine).


application of the covenant of grace, the Spirit imports “all spiritual blessings” to the believer.\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 1:51 (“Meditation”).} The gift of the Holy Spirit is the gift of his person to dwell in the believer.\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 6:59 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).} In prayer, the Son is “the master of requests, the intercessor, in whose name therefore our prayers are to be made”; whereas, the Holy Spirit is “the inditer of our prayers, and helper of our infirmities” (Romans 8:26, 27). The Spirit himself makes intercession for the believer with groanings which cannot be uttered. He makes intercession for the believer according to the will of God. If the Father is the party to whom believers pray, and the Son is the intercessor of their prayer, the Holy Spirit is the one who helps their prayer and makes intercession in their stead.\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).} In sum, the believer is regenerated and sanctified through the work of the Holy Spirit. The work of the Spirit is “the commensurate effect of the covenant of grace.”\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 7:540 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”).} The Spirit plays a significant role in the application of the pactum salutis. That is why the Holy Spirit said “I will sanctify him [the believer]” in the transaction of the pactum salutis.\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 7:540 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”)}

5.5. Conclusion: The Holy Spirit and Christ in the \textit{Pactum Salutis}

The doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} is not just christological but trinitarian in its full meaning. Goodwin’s explication on the role of the Holy Spirit in this doctrine made a significant contribution to Reformed orthodoxy. The basic structure of his theology is

\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 1:51 (“Meditation”).}  
\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 6:59 (“Of the Work of the Holy Ghost”).}  
\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 5:8 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).}  
\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 9:287 (“A Discourse of Election”).}  
\footnote{Goodwin, \textit{Works}, 7:540 (“Man’s Restoration by Grace”)}.  

trinitarian, and his formulation of the *pactum salutis* demonstrates this characteristic in many ways.

First, the ground of the Holy Spirit’s work in the *pactum* lies in that the Holy Spirit is God and one person of the Trinity. Goodwin follows the basic tenet of the Western double procession (*filioque*) tradition. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son both in the immanent and economic perspective. There is no subordinationism, however, in Goodwin’s Pneumatology. He stresses the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the other two persons. The *ad extra* works of God are not indivisible, and the Holy Spirit is working in equal rights and equal dignity in the *ad intra* works. Thus, the Spirit concurs with the Father and the Son in the transaction of the *pactum salutis*. He was not a bystander but a principal actor in the *pactum salutis* since he was one party of the trinitarian transaction. The Spirit participated in the inner-divine discourse of the *pactum* and promised to sanctify the people for whom Christ gave the price of redemption.

Second, the reason for the Holy Spirit’s work in the *pactum* is explained by the fact that the person and work of Christ are dynamically connected with the Spirit. In Goodwin’s Christology, a two-nature Christology and a Spirit-Christology are combined with each strength. The Spirit prepared and sanctified the human nature of Christ, although it was Christ alone who assumed the human nature. The Spirit took an active hand in the redemptive work of Christ, which was the fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. The Holy Spirit led the accomplishment of Christ’s conception, threefold office, baptism, sermons, miracles, resurrection, ascension, and heavenly kingship. The Spirit performed his grace and power in inaugurating, sustaining, and perfecting the redemptive work of Christ.
Third, the role of the Holy Spirit is eminent in the application of the *pactum salutis*. Goodwin appropriates a trinitarian logic in his soteriology. The trinitarian structure of the *pactum* corresponds with its application. God the Father is the foundation of election, God the Son is the foundation of redemption, and God the Holy Spirit is the foundation of sanctification. The Holy Spirit applies both election and redemption of the *pactum salutis* in time. Although all the three persons of the Trinity concur in regeneration, it is efficiently and more eminently attributed to the Holy Spirit. The Spirit makes the work of the Father and the Son actually the possession of the believer. If the covenant of grace is the fruit of the *pactum salutis*, it is the Holy Spirit who grows the fruit. Thus, the *pactum salutis* should be understood to include the soteric dimension of the Spirit as well as the christological aspect.

Although the Scriptures are relatively silent on the Spirit’s role in the *pactum salutis* as a party, it does not mean that there is no place for the Spirit in the *pactum*. Rather, the Spirit plays a very significant role in the transaction and application of the *pactum*. If the *pactum salutis* is an argument for the *ad intra* trinitarian foundation for the *ad extra* work of salvation, the Holy Spirit cannot be omitted for the *pactum* since without the Holy Spirit there is no salvation. The Holy Spirit makes actually effective the temporal administration of the *pactum salutis* for the believer. Goodwin makes it clear that regeneration and sanctification are the prime work of the Holy Spirit.

One practical implication of this study is that every christological locus of soteriology should place equal emphasis on Pneumatology. If a soteriology is too christocentric, it becomes ironically more difficult to understand Christ’s work of redemption correctly.363

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“The relationship between Jesus and God and the role of Christ in redemption,” as Del Colle puts it, “cannot be fully understood unless there is an explicitly pneumatological dimension.” Goodwin’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* represents the necessary trinitarian framework for a fuller understanding of the person and work of Christ regarding soteriology, illuminating the cardinal trait of his trinitarian theology. His soteriology has a decidedly christological and pneumatological emphasis, so in his *pactum* formulation, the Holy Spirit prepares, empowers, and fulfills the person and work of Christ for redemption. Thus, Goodwin’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* helps us to evade the danger of an isolated christocentric soteriology. Cross-fertilization between Christology and Pneumatology must occur in any soteriological locus.

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364 Del Colle, *Christ and the Spirit*, 4. In this regard, he argues that Christ without the Holy Spirit leads to “a truncated Christology.”
CHAPTER 6

THE PACTUM SALUTIS AND THE FREEDOM OF HUMAN BEINGS:

JOHANNES COCCEIUS

6.1. Modern Critique of the Pactum Salutis as Determinism

This chapter focuses on the relationship between the pactum salutis and human freedom in the theology of Johannes Cocceius. It will address these questions. What is the biblical foundation of Cocceius’ doctrine of free choice? How does he appropriate the Greco-Roman, patristic, Jewish, Roman-Catholic, and Protestant writings for his doctrine of freedom? How does he interpret Augustine’s works for polemical purposes against the Socinians, the Molinists, and, in particular, against the Tridentine theologians? What is his understanding of freedom, mutability of the will, indifference, concupiscence, concurrence, and contingency? What are the terminology and formulation of his pactum doctrine? How does he use the pactum doctrine against universalism, the Socinians, the Remonstrants, and the Tridentine theologians? How is the freedom and voluntariness of the Son portrayed in his pactum formulation? How does he connect the freedom of the people of God with the pactum salutis? How is Cocceius’ abrogation theory related to his doctrines of freedom and the pactum salutis? This chapter will argue that Cocceius combined well the doctrines of freedom and the pactum salutis, and convincingly demonstrates that the doctrine of the pactum salutis never leads to determinism.
The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was harshly criticized as determinism.¹ Some scholars argued that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* brings about a perverted view of the redemptive history. Klaas Schilder’s understanding of the doctrine is ambivalent. On the one hand, he underscores the importance of the *pactum salutis*. The *pactum* is only a manifestation of the Trinitarian life of the covenantal God. Schilder writes, “Actually, every decision can be reduced to a pact and represented as convention: There is a *pactum salutis*, but also a *pactum damni*, a counsel of peace, but also a counsel of condemnation, a *pactum creationis*, a counsel of creation, but also a *pactum restorationis*, a counsel of redemption. Thus we can continue *ad infinitum.*”² The covenant relationship between the

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¹ The term “determinism” has been given various, usually imprecise definitions. Following some of modern scholarly understanding of the term, I will define “determinism” as an idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions, in such a way that nothing can happen otherwise than it does. For the conception, see Jeremy Butterfield, “Determinism and Indeterminism,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998); Galen Strawson, “Free Will,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1998, 2011). The term “determinism” with this notion was not known in the early modern era. It originated from the late eighteenth century German philosophy. “Le terme déterminisme est récent. Il ne se trouve pas dans LEIBNIZ... Le mot Déterminisme se trouve dans un passage de KANT, *La Religion dans les limites de la Raison.*” André Lalande, “Déterminisme,” in *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1926), 157. Lalande offers four definitions of the term (p. 157): “A. Sens concret : Ensemble des conditions nécessaires à la determination (au sens D) d’un phénomène donné. “Le médecin expérimentateur exercera successivement son influence sur les maladies dès qu’il en connaîtra expérimentalement le déterminisme exact, c’est-à-dire la cause prochaine.” Claude Bernard, *Intro. à la médecine expérimentale*, 376. B. Principe expérimental suivant lequel tout phénomène dépend de certains autres phénomènes d’une façon telle qu’il peut être prévu, produit, ou empêché à coup sûr suivant que l’on connaît, que l’on produit ou que l’on empêche ceux-ci. « La critique expérimentale met tout en doute, excepté le principe du déterminisme scientifique. » *Ibid.*, 303. C. Doctrine philosophique suivant laquelle tous les événements de l’univers, et en particulier les actions humaines, sont liés d’une façon telle que les choses étant ce qu’elles sont à un moment quelconque du temps, il n’y ait pour chacun des moments antérieurs ou ultérieurs, qu’un état et un seul qui soit compatible avec le premier. D. Doctrine philosophique suivant laquelle certains événements sont fixes d’avance par une puissance extérieure et supérieure à la volonté, en sorte que, *quoi qu’on fasse*, ils se produiront infailliblement. On dit souvent en ce sens « déterminisme externe », et on l’oppose alors au « déterminisme interne », ou liaison des causes et des effets constituant la volonté.” The present study uses the above modern definition that is close to Lalande’s definitions C and D. Although determinism is deeply connected with modern understanding of the physical sciences, some scholars argue that the idea has been used excessively in many ways and should have limitations for quantum physics. For example, see Michel Paty, “La Notion de déterminisme en physique et ses limites,” in *Enquête sur le concept de causalité*, ed. Claude Debru and Laurence Viennot (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2003), 85–114.

² Klaas Schilder, *Heidelbergsche Catechismus* (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1947), 1:383. “feitelijk kan men elk besluit tot een pact herleiden, en als conventie voorstellen; er is dan een pactum
three divine Persons was not first created in God’s eternal counsel; rather, it is the very
classic characteristic of God’s nature. Those who consider the essence of God without the
covenantal structure, argues Schilder, make an error of caprice (willekeur). The pactum salutis in this view is nothing more than the whole work of redemption in the counsel and
decision of God. In so doing, Schilder expands the meaning of the pactum salutis into
infinity. On the other hand, however, the doctrine of the pactum salutis is weakened in
his theology. He denies that Christ is constituted as the mediator of salvation in the
pactum salutis. For him the constitution of the mediator is possible only in time and
history inasmuch as the union of the divinity and the humanity of Christ occurred in time
and history.

If the mediatorship of Christ was constituted before time, one should
acknowledge the notion of the “mediator of creation” and the so-called “common
grace.” The eternal decree of God is not prior to or discrete from a temporal history, but
is an ever-present act of the eternal God who acts in history. The eternal decree of God is
the eternal God himself.

Schilder wants to reject the Reformed scholastic distinction

3 Schilder, Heidelbergsche Catechismus, 1:383.

4 Schilder offers his own interpretation regarding “the eternal constitution of the mediator” in The Canons of Dort I.7. For him it is just a proclamation about the mediator, not a real constitution of the mediator. Klaas Schilder, Heidelbergsche Catechismus (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1949), 2:196, 604.

5 Schilder, Heidelbergsche Catechismus, 2:195–202. Schilder repudiates both conceptions of the
“mediator of creation” and the “common grace.”

6 Schilder, Heidelbergsche Catechismus, 1:385.
between time and eternity. He regards the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* of older Reformed theology as a hindrance to understanding the work and revelation of God. By his peculiar emphasis of the reality of the work of God in history, Schilder tends to eradicate the rationale for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.

The Reformed philosopher Klaas Johan Popma opposes the doctrine of the covenant of redemption because it makes an unbiblical duality of time and eternity. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* forces us to speak of God who is above time, as if he were already in time and his actions have been thought of already in time. This is related to the separation between God’s action in this cosmos and his action above this cosmos. Popma calls this a theo-ontological tradition (*een theo-ontologische traditie*) that has unmistakably a pagan origin. Along similar lines of thought, Matthias Schneckenburger maintains that the Reformed doctrine of the *pactum salutis* leads to a form of determinism which is inconsistent with the inherent freedom of the intratrinitarian relationship.

T. F. Torrance also repudiates the notion of the *pactum salutis*. He believes that the federal theology of the older Reformed theology, unlike the theologies of Calvin and Knox, is based on the premise of a contract or “bargain” made between the Father and the Son in eternity, not on election in the incarnate person of Christ. This scheme imposes necessary and strictly causative terms on the relation between God’s eternal decrees and external

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10 Matthias Schneckenburger, *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformirten Lehrbegriffs* (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler’schen, 1885), 1:34.
their end. It also introduces an inappropriate distinction between God’s acts beyond time and his acts in time.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, Torrance rejects the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* since it tends to restrict the proclamation of the Gospel to the “heathen” due to a “forensically predetermined covenant-structure.”\textsuperscript{12}

Much of the recent scholarship has challenged deterministic interpretations of early modern Reformed theology. In *Reformed Thought on Freedom*, for example, the authors try to rectify a widespread misunderstanding about the early modern Reformed doctrine of freedom.\textsuperscript{13} They contend that by interpreting predestination as the fundamental “central dogma” of Reformed theology, many modern scholars judged that “no place is left for freedom in such a deterministic system.”\textsuperscript{14} The authors demonstrate that both God and human beings are free agents in the early modern Reformed doctrine of freedom. The early modern Reformed theologians maintained a refined balance of necessity and contingency, and in so doing they enabled the notion of free agency of human beings.\textsuperscript{15} The authors, in particular, argue that early modern Reformed theologians developed “synchronic contingency,” which means that “for one moment of time, there is a true alternative for the state of affairs that actually occurs.”\textsuperscript{16} With this conception of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Thomas F. Torrance, *The School of Faith: The Catechisms of the Reformed Church* (London: J. Clarke, 1959), lxxxix.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Torrance, *Scottish Theology*, 107, 118.
\item \textsuperscript{13} W. J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds., *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), Introduction, 1.1.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Van Asselt, Bac, and te Velde, *The Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 18.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Van Asselt, Bac, and te Velde, *The Reformed Thought on Freedom*, Introduction, 1.4.1.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Van Asselt, Bac, and te Velde, *The Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 40–41. For more discussions, see Duns Scotus and Antonie Vos, *Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39* (Boston: Kluwer
\end{itemize}
synchronic contingency, they argue, early modern Reformed theologians could account for real freedom of choice, both on God’s part and on humans’ part. By so doing, the authors attempt to correct older scholarship’s deterministic readings of early modern Reformed theology. The present study of Cocceius’ doctrines of freedom and the *pactum salutis* will show that this recent scholarship provides a more acceptable perspective on the Reformed thought on freedom.  

I will argue that Cocceius’ doctrine of the *pactum salutis* does not lead to a determinism and can be consistent with his notion of the freedom of both the triune God and human beings. The study proceeds in three steps: first, I will expound on Cocceius’ reception of Augustine in the doctrine of free choice; second, I will elucidate Cocceius’ terminology and formulation of the *pactum salutis*; and third, I will show that Cocceius’ view of free choice harmonizes with his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*.

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6.2. Cocceius’ Reception of Augustine in His Doctrine of Freedom and Free Choice

6.2.1. Cocceius’ Definition of Free Choice

Cocceius dealt with the topic of freedom (libertas) and free choice (liberum arbitrium)\(^\text{18}\) in various works and used multiple sources to formulate it. Among his exegetical works, the *Explicatio Analytica Capitis IX epistolae ad Romanos* contains relevant passages.\(^\text{19}\) Some of his works against Bellarmine and against the Socinians take up the topic of free will. *Summa Theologiae ex Scripturis repetita*, most of all, offers the most extensive and systematic discussion of the topic. Cocceius elaborates on the idea of free choice at least four places in his *Summa Theologiae*.\(^\text{20}\) Two of them are related to the state of fallen human beings;\(^\text{21}\) the other two places are connected with the state of the Christian.\(^\text{22}\) Cocceius enunciates the free will of human beings in their four states—the prelapsarian, post-lapsarian, redeemed, and glorified state. Among these places, Cocceius’ full understanding of free will is found in the three *capita* of 25, 32, and 74.

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\(^{19}\) This miscellaneous work is in Tomo Secundo (XIII.9) of Cocceius’ *Opera anekdota*.

\(^{20}\) Johannes Cocceius, *Summa Theologiae ex Scripturis repetita* (Leiden: Elseviriorum, 1662), Locus 9 caput 25 (*De creaturae rationalis libertate & mutabilitate*), Locus 13 caput 32 (*De libertate arbitrii peccatoris*), Locus 25 caput 74 (*Distinctione Ecclesiae Novi & Veteris Testamenti, & Libertate Christiana*), and Loci 30–32. Hereafter, this work will be abbreviated as *STh* and will be cited with the numbers of caput (cap.), section (§), and page (p.) from Johannes Cocceius, *Opera omnia theologica* (Amsterdam: Ex officina Johannis à Someren, 1701), 7:131–403.

\(^{21}\) Cocceius, *STh*, Locus 9 caput 25 and Locus 13 caput 32.

\(^{22}\) Cocceius, *STh*, Locus 25 caput 74 and Loci 30–32.
The main thesis of his argument is that human beings are free only when God gives them grace, and that those who do not believe in God are not free but in servitude of sin.²³

Cocceius cited a variety of sources in his formulation of the doctrine of free choice—the Scriptures,²⁴ Greco-Roman writers,²⁵ Jewish writers,²⁶ the church fathers,²⁷ and his

²³ Cocceius, StTh, cap. 32, §44 (p. 234).

²⁴ Cocceius presents a relatively long explication of 1 Corinthians 2:14-15 in his treatment of De libertate arbitrii peccatoris. Cocceius, StTh, cap. 32, §13 (p. 231). Cocceius’ Latin sentences of this passage read: “Animalis homo non recipit ea, quae sunt spiritus Dei. Stultitia enim ipsi sunt. Neque potest ea cognoscere; quia spiritualister examinantur & iudicandur.” His wording is slightly different from the Latin Vulgata, which reads, “[14] animalis autem homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei stultitia est enim illi et non potest intellegere quia spiritualiter examinatur [15] spiritualis autem iudicat omnia et ipse a nemine iudicatur.” For the conception of Christian liberty, the passage of Galatians 2:14-21 is interpreted at length with other biblical texts. Cocceius, StTh, cap. 74, §§16–20 (p. 344). In his comment on this passage, Cocceius describes Christ as “the declarer of liberty” (praedicator libertatis). The biblical texts Cocceius uses are correlated and accumulated to substantiate his views. For the method of cross-referencing and collation of various scriptural texts of the early modern Reformed theologians, see chap. 2 of this study.

²⁵ As an excellent philologist, Cocceius cites the works of ancient Greco-Roman writers in his discussion of freedom. He quotes a passage from Section 1 of “On the Right Way of Listening” (De recta ratione audiendi) of Plutarch’s (c. 46-120 AD) Moralia. Cocceius, StTh, cap. 25, §12 (p. 212). Cocceius also quotes four passages from the Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ (c. 55-135 AD) work, Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae. Cocceius, StTh, cap. 25, §30 (p. 213).

²⁶ The work of Josephus (AD 37-c.100), The Antiquities of the Jews (Antiquitates Judaicae), is quoted on the same context in which Cocceius cites Epictetus. Cocceius, StTh, cap. 25, §§28–29 (p. 213). Josephus distinguishes three religious sects among the Jews—the Sadducees, the Pharisees, and the Essenes. The three sects had different views on fate and human actions. According to Josephus, the Sadducees believed that everything lies on the power of humans; the Essenes believed fate governs all things; and the Pharisees took a via media between these two sects—some actions are the work of fate and some of them are in the power of humans. Cocceius cites Josephus’ Antiquitates Judaicae, 13.5.9(§§171-73) in part and summarizes the main points. Although Cocceius does not opt for any group among the three sects, the pharisaic view seems closer to his idea than the other two groups, because the view shows a divine concurrentism. “Concurrentism” is an idea that when a work or event is produced, it is immediately caused by both God and the creature. God and the creature are both directly involved and “concur” in bringing about the work or event. Divine concurrentists typically argue that all secondary causation requires divine concurrence because the creature’s powers in themselves are never sufficient to bring about an effect. God’s power is such that he could always override the causal contribution of the creature and bring about a contrary effect. Despite such concessions, divine concurrentists nonetheless affirm the causal activity of the creature in producing the effect when the effect is concurrently produced. I referred to the following article to define “concurrentism.” Sukjae Lee, “Occasionalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/occasionalism, accessed September 18, 2014). See also Sukjae Lee, “Leibniz on Divine Concurrence,” Philosophical Review 113, no. 2 (2004): 203–48.

²⁷ In Summa Theologiae, Cocceius cites a cloud of witnesses from the church fathers such as Chrysostom, John of Damascus, Theodoretus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine. He receives these fathers critically: sometimes he agrees with their ideas, but from time to time he does not buy their ideas. Cocceius, StTh, cap. 10, §44 (p. 172). “Chrysostomus, Damascenus, et si qui alii, distinxerunt voluntatem
contemporary theologians.\textsuperscript{28} The major attacks of Cocceius’ \textit{Summa Theologiae} are directed against the Socinians, the Molinists, the Antinomians/Libertarians, and the Roman Catholic church.\textsuperscript{29} When Cocceius criticizes the Roman Catholic church, the attacks are in particular aimed at the Council of Trent. He repudiates various views of his opponents with patristic sources. In particular, he cites many works of Augustine—\textit{De libero arbitrio} (On Free Choice of the Will), \textit{Enchiridion} (The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love), \textit{De civitate Dei} (The City of God), \textit{De Genesi ad litteram} (On the

\textit{antecedentem et consequentem}. Ii intelligendi sunt per illam notare id, quod de voluntate Dei prius cognoscitur; per hanc, quod de ea posterius cognoscitur. Sed pericolosum est in docendo uti vocabulis \textit{mh \k \ur \bi} non proprie, distincte ac clare significantibus.” On the same page, Cocceius distinguishes between God’s positive will and his permissive will to speak of a divine decree to allow sin. “Pecatum enim Deus non \textit{vult}. Nam \textit{velle} signifit approbare, delectari, aestimare pro similitudine sua, jure esse, facere, ordinare vel ut finem, vel ut medium. Quae \textit{peccato} nullo modo conveniunt” (cap. 10, §43). Van Asselt argues with this passage that “Cocceius is emphatically infralapsarian.” Van Asselt, \textit{The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius}, 169n33 (cf. 58, 203, 278).

\textsuperscript{28} As far as I can tell, Cocceius does not mention Aristotle, Scotus, and Aquinas for his doctrine of free choice. Cocceius cites Robert Bellarmin (1542-1621) to support this argument. Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §37 (p. 213). Bellarmin, an Italian Jesuit and cardinal, was a leading figure of the Counter-Reformation, which he displayed in his influential \textit{Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos}. On Bellarmin, see James Brodrick, \textit{Robert Bellarmin, Saint and Scholar} (London: Burns & Oates, 1961); Peter Godman, \textit{The Saint as Censor: Robert Bellarmin Between Inquisition and Index} (Leiden: Brill, 2000). Cocceius, like other early modern Reformed theologians, attacks Bellarmin on many issues. For example, see Cocceius’ \textit{Animadversiones in Bellarmini controversias}, which he compiled at Franeker for his own private use. See also his \textit{Summa Doctrinae}, §§16, 20, 31, 60 etc. Bellarmin was the major opponent of the early modern Reformed theologians (Muller, \textit{PRRD}, 1:74). Ames published four volumes to criticize Bellarmin. William Ames, \textit{Bellarminus Enervatus}, 4 vols. (Amsterdami: Uldeciri Balck, 1625-1626); William Ames, \textit{Bellarmine Disarmed Divided into Four Volumes}, trans. Douglas Horton (Cambridge, MA, 1969). Cocceius, however, refers to Bellarmin to criticize the Remonstrants in Johannes Cocceius, \textit{Summa Doctrinae}, §99 (p. 63); Johannes Cocceius, \textit{The Doctrine of the Covenant and Testament of God}, ed. R. Scott Clark, trans. Casey Carmichael (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2015), §99. These two works will be abbreviated as \textit{SD} and \textit{DC}. According to Cocceius, Bellarmin also claims that “to be able to choose evil is not the virtue of free will but a defect from it” (Bellarmin, \textit{De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio}, lib. 3, ch. 6, §5; Cocceius, \textit{DC}, §99 [p. 128]). Cocceius depends on Luther’s commentary on Galatians to argue that even if a Christian sins, her freedom will not be lost. Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 74, §20 (p. 344); Martin Luther, \textit{A Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians} (London: J. Duncan, 1830), 117. For the original Latin text, see \textit{Weimar Ausgabe} 40. 1. Band, 2, \textit{Galatervorlesung} (cap. 1–4) 1531, comment on 2:17 (pp. 247-62).

\textsuperscript{29} Cocceius, \textit{STh}, “Socinians & Molinistae . . . Concilium Tridentinum,” cap. 25, §7 (p. 212); “Socinian,” cap. 25, §31 (p. 213) and cap. 74, §§24, 27 (p. 345); “Molinistas,” cap. 25, §32 (p. 213); “Antinomi & Libertini,” cap. 74, §31 (p. 346).
Literal Meaning of Genesis), and Epistulae (Letters), to name a few. He refers to the main themes of *De libero arbitrio* and *Enchiridion* to formulate his doctrine. Although he criticizes other church fathers, he never disagrees with Augustine. Rather, for him, Augustine is the most important authority to support his views. With an appeal to Augustine, Cocceius makes a common foundation on which he can have polemics with the Roman Catholic theologians.

The meaning of freedom is defined in the initial part of his doctrine on the mutability of the freedom of the rational creature. Cocceius begins with some prepositions: God is the God of order and eternal law (*lex aeterna*); the mind has governance over lusts by eternal law; and one cannot encounter any good thing which is not from God. Then, whence is evil (*unde malum*)? Some people such as the Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians say that evil comes from freedom (*libertas*), which is still given to human beings after the fall. The Tridentine theologians, in particular, argue that the

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31 Van Asselt writes, “Cocceius’ authorities include, among others, Plato, Aristotle, Quintilian, Augustine, and his former instructor in Bremen, Matthias Martini.” He also concludes that Cocceius’ “biblical hermeneutic exhibits significant affinity with that of Augustine.” Van Asselt, *The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius*, 26n7, 135.

32 *De libero arbitrio*, 1.6.150 cited in Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 25, §7 (p. 212).

33 *De libero arbitrio*, 1.10.20 cited in Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 25, §7 (p. 212).

34 *De libero arbitrio*, 2.20.54 cited in Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 25, §20 (p. 212).

35 Augustine often does not distinguish the four terms, *libertas, liberum arbitrium, liberum voluntatis arbitrium*, and *libera voluntas* (*De libero arbitrio*, 2.1.1, 2.1.3). Sometimes he identifies *voluntas*
concupiscence which remains in the Christian as well as in the unregenerate is not sin.36 The Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians contend that fallen humanity can choose between good and evil with their freedom.37 In so doing, they acknowledge the possibility of the good works of fallen humanity. Against these ideas, Cocceius argues that fallen human beings cannot choose between good and evil, and that their concupiscence is sin. They do not have true freedom. Then, what is freedom (quid libertas)? True freedom is the servitude for God because those who serve God do everything most voluntarily.38 In De libero arbitrio, 2.13.37, which Cocceius mentions, Augustine writes, “Our freedom is this: to submit to this truth, which is our God Who set us free from death--that is, from the state of sin.”39 This is, for Cocceius, the most appropriate definition of freedom. He emphatically stresses that only those who love the

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36 For the issue of concupiscence, see 6.2.5 of this study.

37 Cocceius writes that the Molinists opts for the notion of liberty of indifference toward two opposite things. “Quis non novit horum socios Molinistas, quibus libertas est indifferentia voluntatis ad utrumque oppositorum & talis quidem, ut, positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, possit agere vel non agere, bonumque aut malum agere. Quorum hanc vocant libertatem contrarietatis sive specificationis, illam contradicitionis sive exerciti.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 25, §32 (p. 213). For the Tridentine theologians and the Socinians, Cocceius write, “Et Concilium Tridentinum, negans concupiscentiam, quae remanet in regenitis, esse peccatum: unde sequitur esse opus Dei. Et Sociniani, qui dicunt, in homine a creatione esse duplicem appetitum, recti & sibi boni in opposition recti.” Cocceius, Catechismus Religionis Christianae, Quaest. VI. VII. Dominica III. Question VI. (Opera Omnia Theologica, 1701, 7:7).

38 “Ergo servitus Dei vera libertas est. Rom. 6:18. Tali enim voluntate nihil magis est voluntarium.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 25, §13 (p. 212). Here Cocceius uses the term “true freedom” (vera voluntas), but usually he simply uses the term “freedom” to denote true freedom.

39 Cocceius, STh, cap. 25, §10 (p. 212). “Haec est libertas nostra, cum isti subdimus veritati: et ipse est Deus noster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a conditione peccati” (De libero arbitrio, 2.13.37). The English translation, except when noted otherwise, is taken from Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, on Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, 59. For the Latin text, see Augustine, De libero arbitrio, ed. William McAllen Green, Corpus christianorum series latina, no. 29 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1970).
truth are truly free from servitude.\textsuperscript{40} The slaves of God have true freedom and can do good works. Without a creator any creature cannot do good works.\textsuperscript{41} The will without freedom with which one serves God cannot do the work of God.\textsuperscript{42} The love by which the mind of a creature freely loves God is the work of God.\textsuperscript{43} The good works of a person, which are done without God, cannot lead him toward God but make him inferior and subservient to desire.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, for Cocceius, those who do not believe in God cannot have freedom and cannot do good works.

The early modern Reformed theologians generally argued that fallen humanity did not lose the faculty of will (\textit{voluntas}) or the inward freedom (\textit{libertas}) of the will but lost the freedom of choice (\textit{liberum arbitrium}), particularly, the ability freely to choose the good and freely to avoid that which is evil.\textsuperscript{45} They also maintained that all people—both regenerates and unregenerates—possess an external civil freedom (\textit{libertas externa ac civilis}) in natural matters of everyday life. Later, Cocceius makes it clear that he does not deny that all people—whether they are believers or not—have a natural, civil, and external freedom. This freedom is given to them by the protection and providence of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} “Quippe, qui veritatem amat, vere liber est ab omni servitute.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §11 (p. 212).
\item \textsuperscript{41} “creaturae enim bonum non potest esse nisi creator, neque bonitas, nisi ut sit sub ipso & ad ipsum.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §14 (p. 212).
\item \textsuperscript{42} “Quemadmodum autem voluntas sine libertate, qua servit Deo, non potest esse opus Dei.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §15 (p. 212).
\item \textsuperscript{43} “Porro amor, quo mens createorem libera diligit, opus Creatoris est.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, § (p. 212).
\item \textsuperscript{44} “Contra aspernatio hujus servitutis, quae est falsa libertatis affectatio . . . & sui elatio supra Deum, tanquam se inferiorem & libidini inservientem per opera sua, est sui in servitutem mendacii & φθρᾶς mancipatio.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §14 (p. 212).
\item \textsuperscript{45} Muller, \textit{Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms}, 177.
\end{itemize}
God. Cocceius also contends that some noble Gentiles do good works. He, however, is certain that their works are not from love but from fear and desire (timore vel cupiditate). Although Cocceius does not disagree with the common view of the early modern Reformed theology, he usually argues that fallen humanity lost freedom as well as free choice, and that only the regenerates regain true freedom. He approaches the doctrine of freedom only from the spiritual perspective (de hominis statu spirituali) because of a certain polemic context against the (Semi-)Pelagianism of the Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians. The scriptural verses and Augustinian sources are considered for this anti-Pelagian purpose.

6.2.2. Mutability of the Will as the Origin of the Fall

The fall of humanity to Cocceius is a change of the free choice from good toward evil, so the fall is attributed to the mutability (mutabilitas) of the human will. Freedom

46 “Qui volunt, liberum arbitrium non quidem valere ad spiritualia, valere tamen ad naturalia, civilia, externa . . . quod divinæ custodiae & providentiae est attribuendum. . .” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §49 (pp. 234-35).

47 “. . . sed non poterunt effugere judicium eorum, quos Scriptura appellat חנפים hypocritas; qui, quam viderint, quid intersit inter bonum & malum, tamen non operam dederunt, ut ex charitate facerent, quod timore vel cupiditate decrent.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §49 (p. 235).

48 In many places, he does not distinguish between freedom (libertas) and free choice (liberum arbitrium).

49 Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §2 (p. 230).

50 Cocceius refers to John 8:32, 34, and Romans 6:18 (STh, cap. 25, §§11, 13 [p. 212]). For Augustine’s support, he cites, among others, Enchiridion, §§105-106 (STh, cap. 25, §40 [p. 214]).

51 It is notable that for Cocceius the freedom (or free choice) which tends toward evil is not freedom but concupiscence. Freedom is considered only in a state in which a person serves God (cf. 6.3.1 of this study).
should be distinguished from mutability.\textsuperscript{52} It is not freedom—as the Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians wrongly think—but mutability that became the cause of the fall. To support his view, Cocceius refers to Augustine’s *De libero arbitrio*, 1.16.34. Augustine argues there that “the mind is not thrown down from its stronghold of dominance, and from the right order, by anything but the will.” He adds, “When a person uses something in an evil manner, the thing should not be blamed, but rather the person using it in that evil manner.”\textsuperscript{53} Human beings do evil, as Evodius the interlocutor of Augustine puts it, out of free choice of the will.\textsuperscript{54} Then, a question can be followed: if God gave this free choice, and human beings sinned with it, is God the author of sin since he gave them the ability to commit sin (*peccandi facultatem*)?\textsuperscript{55} Augustine answers to this: God gave free will to humanity so that they could act rightly; thus, if they commit sin with free will, they should be blamed for the abuse of free will.\textsuperscript{56} For Augustine, the fall is a change of good will to bad will. Everybody has a will,\textsuperscript{57} and the will is distinguished between good will (*bona voluntas*) and bad will (*mala voluntas*).\textsuperscript{58} Good

\textsuperscript{52} “aliud est mutabilitas aliud libertas.” Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 25, §37 (p. 213).

\textsuperscript{53} “nullaque re de arce dominandi, rectoque ordine mentem deponi, nisi voluntate” (*De libero arbitrio*, 1.16.34). Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will, on Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, 29.


\textsuperscript{55} *De libero arbitrio*, 1.16.35.

\textsuperscript{56} *De libero arbitrio*, 2.1.3. For a discussion on Augustine’s theodicy and free will, see Woo, “Is God the Author of Sin?,” 102–103, 110–11.

\textsuperscript{57} “negari non potest habere nos voluntatem” (*De libero arbitrio*, 1.12.25).

\textsuperscript{58} *De libero arbitrio*, 1.12.25 (“voluntatem bonam”), 1.13.27 (“mala voluntate”), and 1.13.30 (“per bonam vel malam voluntatem”). Seneca, prior to Augustine, made this distinction in his works such as *De beneficiis*, 1.5-6, 2.35, 7.15 and *Epistolae*, 34.3, 37, 71.36.
will is a will by which one seeks to live rightly and honorably, and to attain the highest wisdom;\textsuperscript{59} whereas, bad will is a will by which one loves something changeable and temporal.\textsuperscript{60} In the fall, human beings chose bad will by their free will. Therefore, the origin of the fall is human free will.\textsuperscript{61} Cocceius mentions another text of Augustine’s \textit{De libero arbitrio} to expand the argument. In Book 3 of \textit{De libero arbitrio}, Augustine claims that “the mind becomes a slave to lust only through \textit{its own will}: it cannot be forced to this ugliness by what is higher or by what is equal, since it is unjust; nor by what is lower, since it is unable. Hence it remains that \textit{the movement} by which the mind turns the will for enjoyment from the Creator to something created is \textit{its own.”}\textsuperscript{62} Cocceius enunciates Augustine’s ideas for his discussion. At the first glance, it seems that Augustine attributes the cause of the fall to free will itself. It becomes clear that in his later discussion Augustine distinguishes between good will and bad will, and that the movement of the will causes the fall. Cocceius takes this idea for his view that the origin of the fall is the mutability (\textit{mutabilitas}) of the human will. The fall did not result simply from free choice. It is the mutability of free will that became the cause of the fall.

Then, Cocceius asks, “whence is this mutability” (\textit{mutabilitas unde})? The mutability

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\textsuperscript{59} “Voluntas qua appetimus recte honesteque vivere, et ad summam sapientiam pervenire” (\textit{De libero arbitrio}, 1.12.25).

\textsuperscript{60} “amat mutabile aliquid amat ac temporale” (\textit{De libero arbitrio}, 1.15.31).

\textsuperscript{61} In relation to the fall, Augustine seems to argue that the origin of the human will is the will itself (cf. \textit{De libero arbitrio}, 1.12.26).

\textsuperscript{62} Augustine, \textit{On the Free Choice of the Will, on Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings}, 74. The Latin text reads: “Credo ergo meminisse te, in prima disputatione satis esse compertum, nulla re fieri mentem servam libido, \textbf{nisi propria voluntate}: nam neque a superiore, neque ab aequali eam posse ad hoc dedecus cogi, quia iniustum est; neque ab inferiore, quia non potest. Restat igitur ut eius sit \textbf{proprius iste motus}, quo fruendi voluntatem ad creaturam a Creatore convertit” (\textit{De libero arbitrio}, 3.1.2; all emphases are mine). Cocceius cites some part (italics in the above citation) from this text in \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §37 (p. 213).
did not arise out of the human physical body.\textsuperscript{63} The physical body obeys the mind, and for human beings no appetite exists except in the soul. Cocceius argues that Augustine wrote in this regard, “the soul, when as yet it lusts after carnal good things, is called the flesh” (\textit{De fide et symbolo}, 10.23).\textsuperscript{64} Therefore, Cocceius concludes that the origin of the fall is the mutability of the free will of the human soul.

6.2.3. Indifference and the Loss of Freedom of the Will

Cocceius strengthens his ideas by the notion of indifference.\textsuperscript{65} For him indifference is not a necessary condition for freedom. If it were, God who always does good works could not be free. Both the prelapsarian and postlapsarian human beings are not indifferent toward evil.\textsuperscript{66} Before the fall, the free choice of humanity tended toward good; after the fall, it tends toward evil. God made the will not indifferent but free. The will is right, well-ordered, dependent on God. It is the first causes of all things, but it is mutable for the time being without force by itself (\textit{pro tempore, nullo cogente, per se ipsam mutabilem}), so it can will good and evil.\textsuperscript{67} Here, Cocceius cites a long passage from

\textsuperscript{63} “ex \textit{ὕλη materie aut appetitu sensitivo, qui sit contra rationem, &... appetitus malus, qui homini adjaceat, non est mutabilitas.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §38 (p. 213).

\textsuperscript{64} “Anima, quum carnalia bona appetit, caro nominatur.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §38 (p. 213). Cocceius changed a little bit the original text of Augustine. He also mentions Augustine’s \textit{De civitate Dei}, cap. 3. & 14:15. The translation of \textit{De fide et symbolo} is taken from “A Treatise on Faith and the Creed,” in \textit{NPNF}, First Series, 3:331.

\textsuperscript{65} For the early modern Reformed understanding of “indifference,” see note 58 of this study.

\textsuperscript{66} “Quod si voluntas libera non est, nisi sit inddifferens ad malum: Deus ipse, qui est... exsore tentationis ad malum, mentiri nescius, sanctus, (Jacob. 1:13. Tit. 1:2. 1 Petr. 1:16.) liber non est; & homo, quum liberabitur, non manebit liber, nempe quum Deo \textit{ὑποταγήσεται subjicietur} & a Deo implebitur, ita ut is in ipso sit omnia. 1 Cor. 15:28. Quo tempore profecto non poterit peccare aut malum eligere.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §36 (p. 213).

\textsuperscript{67} “Ergo Deus voluntatem indifferentem non fecit, sed liberam, quia rectam, & ad factorem
Augustine’s *Enchiridion*:

105. But God’s arrangement was not to be broken, according to which He willed to show how good is a rational being who is able even to refrain from sin, and yet how much better is one who cannot sin at all; just as that was an inferior sort of immortality, and yet it was immortality, when it was possible for man to avoid death, although there is reserved for the future a more perfect immortality, when it shall be impossible for man to die. . . 106. The former immortality man lost through the exercise of his free-will; the latter he shall obtain through grace, whereas, if he had not sinned, he should have obtained it by desert. Even in that case, however, there could have been no merit without grace; because, although the mere exercise of man’s free-will was sufficient to bring in sin, his free-will would not have sufficed for his maintenance in righteousness, unless God had assisted it by imparting a portion of His unchangeable goodness. Just as it is in man’s power to die whenever he will (for, not to speak of other means, any one can put an end to himself by simple abstinence from food), but the mere will cannot preserve life in the absence of food and the other means of life; so man in paradise was able of his mere will, simply by abandoning righteousness, to destroy himself; but to have maintained a life of righteousness would have been too much for his will, unless it had been sustained by the Creator’s power.68

Augustine discusses the characteristic of the free will of humanity in the state of glorification. Human beings, when first created, had it in their power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong. In the future state of glorification, it will not be in their power to will evil. Augustine, however, argues that this state will constitute no

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68 Augustine, *Enchiridion*, 105-106, taken from *NPNF*, First Series, 3:271. For the Latin text, see Augustine, *Enchiridion ad Laurentium: De fide et spe caritate*, ed. E. Evans, Corpus christianorum series latina, no. 46 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969). “105. ostendere quam bonum sit animal rationale quod etiam non peccare possit, quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit; sicut minor fuit immortalitas, sed tamen fuit, in qua posset etiam non mori, quamvis maior futura sit in qua non possit mori. . . 106. Illam naturam humana perdidit per liberum arbitrium, hanc est acceptura per gratiam, quam fuerat si non peccasset acceptura per meritum. Quamvis sine gratia nec tunc ullam meritum esse potuisse, quia etsi peccatum in solo erat libero arbitrio constitutum, non tamen iustitiae retinendae sufficiebat liberum arbitrium nisi participatione immutabilis boni divinum adiutorium praebetur. Sicut enim mori est in hominis potestate cum velit, nemo est enim qui non se ipsum, ut nihil aliud dicam, vel non vescendo possit occidere; ad tenendum vero vitam voluntas non satis est si adiutoria sive alimentorum sive quorumcumque tutaminum desint; sic homo in paradiso ad se occidendum relinquendo iustitiam idoneus erat per voluntatem, ut autem ab eo teneretur vita iustitiae parum erat velle nisi ille qui eum fecerat adiuverat.” Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 25, §40 (p. 213).
restriction on the freedom of will. On the contrary, the will shall be much freer when it is impossible to be the slave of sin. In the future state of glorification, it will be wholly impossible for the soul to desire sin, so there will be a more perfect immortality than the previous immortality of the prelapsarian state. Cocceius takes this passage of Augustine to argue that there is no indifference in the will. The will of human beings was not indifferent toward evil before the fall, after the fall, and in the state of the glorification. Cocceius develops his arguments based on Augustine’s doctrine of grace. Augustine, in the above passage, maintains that Adam lost his immortality through the exercise of his free-will. If Adam had not sinned, he should have obtained the immortality by merit. Even in that case, however, there could have been no merit without grace because free will would not have been sufficient to maintain justice, save as divine aid had been afforded Adam. Fallen human beings shall obtain immortality again only through grace, for then the will itself has to be freed from the bondage in which sin and death are the masters. Cocceius focuses on Augustine’s idea that the will of fallen humanity is in the bondage of sin and death. If freedom is defined as a freedom to love truth and to obey God, as Cocceius puts it, fallen human beings do not have freedom of the will. The will of fallen human beings is not indifferent toward sin; rather, it is in servitude of sin and death. Thus, fallen human beings do not have freedom of the will.

6.2.4. The Will of Sinners and the Possibility of Good Works for Them

In caput 32 of *Summa Theologiae*, the characteristic of the will of sinners is discussed more deeply based on Augustinian sources. Cocceius is convinced that original freedom
was lost through the abuse of the free choice or free will of the sinner.⁶⁹ For him the understanding of freedom from “the spiritual state of human beings” (de hominis statu spirituali) follows the usage of the Scriptures.⁷⁰ The state of sinners is called a state “free from righteousness” (liber justitiae) because it is a state abdicated from God and put outside of the righteousness of God.⁷¹ The law of sinners forms servitude of sin, which lacks the holiness of God.⁷² Thus, there is nothing for humans to fear except arrogance, since one can do nothing apart from God and Christ.⁷³ Cocceius describes more on the state of sinners. The Apostle Paul calls the sinner “animalis homo” (1 Corinthians 2:14). There are four distinctivenesses of animalis homo: They have only anima and are deficient in right spirit; they cannot receive the things of the Spirit of God; they rely on themselves; and they cannot know spiritual things.⁷⁴ Cocceius expounds further on the inner state of sinners and enunciates the noetic effects of sin. Sin has affected the minds of sinners and causes their thinking to become futile apart from God.⁷⁵ Sinners have a

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⁷¹ “In quo statu liber justitiae dicitur ab Apostolo Rom. 6:20. quia fuit abdicatus a Deo & positus extra illud Dei jus . . .” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §3 (p. 230).


⁷³ “Nihil autem homini magis metuendum est, quam, ne superbus fit, seque quicquam absque Deo & Christo facere posse (Johan. 15:5:) . . .” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §6 (p. 231).

⁷⁴ “Ut recte possimus cum Paulo definire, quod est 1 Corinth. 2:14. Animalis homo non recipit ea, quae sunt Spiritus Dei. Stultitia enim ipsi sunt. Neque potest ea cognoscere; quia spiritualiter examinatur & djudicandur.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §13 (p. 231). Cocceius’ citation of the scriptural verse is different both from Vulgata and Bibbia Vulgata Clementina (1598). It seems that he himself translated the verse from the Greek text—not only here but in other quotations.

⁷⁵ Cocceius argues that Chrysostom sides with him in this thought. Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §32
stony heart (*cor lapideum*; Ezekiel 11:19 and 36:26) or a foolish heart; they are regarded as dead (Isaiah 8:19, 26:14, and Colossians 2:13); they have the mind of the flesh (*carnis φρόνημα*; Romans 8:5-7); and they do not have a heart to understand or eyes to see or ears to hear God (Deuteronomy 29).\(^76\)

After the presentation of the issue in the above form of thesis, Cocceius, following the scholastic method, notes three major objections to his thesis, and then offers his own answers and an elaboration of the thesis with authoritative sources—particularly the Augustinian texts.\(^77\) The first objection is that God does not order impossible commandments.\(^78\) The opponents aver that if God orders good works, the power to do good works should be in humanity.\(^79\) Cocceius, first of all, warns not to misunderstand his thesis inasmuch as its main point can be wrongly understood. God commands good works as long as he is the first cause of all good works, and creatures depend on him. This idea, however, does not support that God’s commandments are the possibility of transgression. One should not say that God’s commandments are the possibility of transgression because God does not command impossible things. God commands the first humans not to sin, but they sinned. If God commands only possible things, God’s commandment should be the possibility to those who transgressed it (*possibilia esse*

\(^76\) Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 32, §§13-25 (pp. 231-32).

\(^77\) For a succinct summary of the scholastic method of the early modern theology, see Muller, *After Calvin*, 27. Muller rightly argues, “Cocceius did attack his opponents as ‘scholastics,’ and his *Summa doctrinae* does combine a biblical-historical model with the *a priori* or synthetic pattern of organization typical of the theological systems of the day. Muller, *PRRD*, 2:122.

\(^78\) Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 32, §26 (p. 232).

\(^79\) The opponents who Cocceius have in mind are the Tridentine theologians. Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 32, §§54, 57, and 63 (pp. 235-36).
transgressiori) and thus, should be responsible for their sin.\textsuperscript{80} It is, however, human beings who are responsible for the sin. Thus, it is wrong to argue that God does not order impossible commandments. There is no one who can do justice and not sin, but the commandment of God still prohibits all sins.\textsuperscript{81} Fallen humanity cannot understand the entire commandment of God. Although they do good works, they do not know how to do good works for the glory of God.\textsuperscript{82} Rather, for them, the wisdom of God is regarded as a folly (1 Corinthians 1:23).\textsuperscript{83} Only those who live through the Spirit of grace can do good
things; the commandments of God are not burdensome to them (1 John 5:3).  

The second objection is that the sinner can do good works. The opponents argue that the carnal person who is devoid of the Spirit of God can choose true words and teaching, and thus do good works. In his answer, Cocceius maintains that sinners cannot do and choose good works. Sinners do good works impromptu (pro medio) not because they love God but because they are subject to concupiscence. They seek to establish an earthly or perishing good. Cocceius cites a phrase of Chrysostom who regarded the good works of sinners as “certainly good but dead” (bona quidem, sed mortua). Chrysostom argues that none of the good works of sinners have fruit because of their ignorance of the truth. The good works of sinners are good but done without faith. Nothing is really good without faith, so their good works are not really good and durable.

The third objection is that sinners can have apology and excuse if they cannot do good

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84 “Quando autem Deus declarat, suae opis & sui doni esse fidem ac amorem veritatis, neque aliter quam per spiritum gratiae & impossibile homini carnali, est manifesta ingratitudo & gratiae divinae abnegatio ac divini auxilii rejectio.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §§30-31 (p. 233).

85 “Potest quidem etiam homo spiritu Dei destitutus sive carnalis eligere sermonem verum & membriorum motum praeceptum, atque ita bonum velle.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §32 (p. 233).

86 “sed non potest id bene velle atque eligere, nempe ut id amans: verum ut id concupiscentiae subjiciat, sive pro medio assumat ad comparandum bonum terrestre ac periens.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §32 (p. 233).

87 “De qualibus malorum & injustorum operibus sive Chrysostomus sive alius dicit . . . bona quidem, sed mortua. in homil. 89. tom. 6. edit. Savil. pag. 838.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §32 (p. 233).

88 Cocceius also formulates the idea of the noetic effect of sin in Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §§13-25 (pp. 231-32).

works.\textsuperscript{90} The opponents argue, commenting on Romans 1:20-21, that Paul says sinners are not excusable because they have power to do good works. In response, Cocceius points out that Paul does not teach there the excusability of sinners, but teaches the imminence of God’s judgment. Sinners whose corruption is incorrigible ignored the divine patience and forbearance for a long time, so God will not be patient any longer.\textsuperscript{91} Those who are under the law of sin and are servants of sin cannot be excusable. God is not ignorant of what is in human beings; rather, he knows the greatest impotence of humans, which is not curable without the divine power.\textsuperscript{92} Cocceius goes on to state that the impossibility of good works of sinners can be proved through the cause of conversion and love toward God.\textsuperscript{93} Just as the sinner cannot be converted with his own power, so he cannot do good works with his own ability. With an appeal to Gregory of Nyssa, Cocceius contends that although the power (\textit{potentia}) is given to sinners, it becomes sin because of its inclination toward evil.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{90} “Sed, inquiunt, si homo est ita impotens, ergo habet apologiam & excusationem.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 32, §34 (p. 233).

\textsuperscript{91} “Respond. Apostolus non vult docere, eos, quos inexcusabiles dicit, habere potentiam ex se ad bonum, quod debent, faciendo; sed matures esse judicio, Roman. cap. 1. vers. 18. quorum militia & corruptio inemendabilis. . . . Roman. cap. 1. vers. 21. 2:5. per divinam patientiam & longanimitatem, atque etiam ostensionem divinae gratiae, est manifestatum & comprobatum.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 32, §34 (p. 233).

\textsuperscript{92} “Male existimat se quisquam excusationem habere, qui sub lege peccati est & peccati servus est. . . . Non Deus ignorabat, quid esset in homine, sed oportebat, quod occultum erat, in apricum proferri: nempe, summam in omnibus esse impotentiam; quae non nisi divina potentia posset sanari.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 32, §§34-35 (p. 233).

\textsuperscript{93} “Posset haec hominis impotentia ad bonum etiam clarissime demonstrari per causas conversionis ad Deum fideique ac amoris Dei, & per modum conversionis. . . Quod si deinceps reperientur cauae conversionis & modus convertendi verae impotentiae convenire, non poterit existimari, nimis se quenquam posse humiliare & de se sentire abjectius, quam oportet.” Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 32, §36 (p. 233).

\textsuperscript{94} For Cocceius’ use of Gregory of Nyssa, see 6.2.7 of this study.
After presenting these three objections and answers to them, Cocceius cites four passages from Augustine’s works in order to expound more on the characteristic of the free will of fallen humankind. First, in his *De correccione et gratia (On Reprimand and Grace)*, Augustine argues that the sinner is enslaved to sin. He writes:

Thus we must admit that we have free choice for doing both evil and good. But in doing evil each person is free from justice and enslaved to sin, whereas in doing good no one can be free unless he has been set free by Him Who said: “If the Son sets you free, then you shall truly be free” [John 8:36]. But, although each person has been set free from the domination of sin, this does not happen in such a way that he no longer needs help from his liberator. Rather, it happens in such a way that, upon hearing from Him Who says “Without me you can do nothing” [John 15:5], one also says to Him: “Be my hearer; do not forsake me!” [Psalm 26:9 (27:9)].

The main point of Augustine is that the sinner is a slave of sin, and that only those who are set free by Jesus are free. It is noted, however, that Augustine does not make it clear whether a sinner has a free choice. To make the point clearer, Cocceius quotes another passage of Augustine. In *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, Augustine writes:

1.3.7. But this will, which is free in evil things because it takes pleasure in evil, is not free in good things, for the reason that it has not been made free. Nor can a man will any good thing unless he is aided by Him who cannot will evil—that is, by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. For everything which is not of faith is sin [Romans 14:23]. 3.9.25. Also in that we say that the will is free in evil, but for doing good it must be made free by God’s grace. 1.2.5. Through sin freedom indeed perished, but it was that freedom which was in Paradise, to have a full righteousness with immortality. 4.3.3. The captive will cannot breathe into

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95 Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will, on Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*, 186. “Liberum itaque arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere: sed in malo faciendo liber est quisque iustitiae servusque peccati; in bono autem liber esse nullus potest, nisi fuerit liberatus ab eo qui dixit: Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberis eritis. Nec ita ut, cum quisque fuerit a peccati dominatione liberatus, iam non indigeat sui liberatoris auxilio: sed ipso potitus, ut ab illo audiens: Sine me nihil potestis facere, dicat ei et ipse: Adiutor meus esto, ne dereliquas me.” For the Latin edition, see Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, ed. Georges Folliet, Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, no. 92 (Vienna: Verlag Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000).
a wholesome liberty save by God's grace.  

Human beings have freedom according to their nature. Sinners have free will to do evil, but they cannot do good things unless they are liberated by the grace of God through Christ. With this thought, Augustine refuted Pelagius and his followers. Pelagius’ view is briefly summarized in Cocceius’ *Summa Doctrinae*: “the grace of God is given to men, that, what they are commanded to do through free will, they can fulfill more easily through grace.” The above quotation of Augustine is opposed to this idea and makes it clear that the will of sinners is not free in good things. Furthermore, in *Retractationes*, Augustine maintains that the will of sinners is free but is named desire (*cupiditas*).  

Without God’s grace, the will of humans cannot be called free because it is conquered and ruled by desire. Sin is from the sinner; righteousness is from God. Therefore, in

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97 Cocceius, *SD*, §227.


Cocceius’ quotations of Augustine, sinners have freedom of will in bad things but do not have it in good things. The will of sinners is not free until it is liberated by God’s grace. In this regard, argues Cocceius, sinners do not have freedom of will.

6.2.5. Concurrence, Contingency, and the Human Free Will

The absence of freedom for sinners in doing good works is the core of Cocceius’ doctrine of freedom, from the perspective of the spiritual state of human beings. The discussion is expanded toward the relationship between the human free will and the divine decree. If God decrees everything in the world, does the creature have freedom? Cocceius employs the notions of concurrence and contingency to face the issue. In this section, Cocceius considers the subject matter of freedom in general and does not confine it in a spiritual dimension. He makes it very clear that the divine will presupposes not only the description and determination of the divine counsel but also the concurrence of its action. The freedom of creature is not yet fixed but mutable (*necdum confirmatis sed mutabilibus constituit*), despite the counsel. Creatures enjoy the life and operation (*energeia*) in freedom, which God gave and will give to them. Although the counsel of God is antecedent to all creaturely actions (*ante actionem creaturae*), it works efficiently in time as if it goes with creaturely actions (*in tempore quasi comitatur creaturae operationem*). It occurs with them as an efficacy of primary cause. In this regard,

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101 Cocceius, STh, cap. 28 (De Providentia Dei), §§25-28 (pp. 218-19). See also Johannes Cocceius, Disputationes Selectae (Amsterdam: Ex officina Johannis à Someren, 1701), disp. 5, §§63–65 in Opera Omnia Theologica, 1701, 7:84. This work will be cited with the numbers of disputatio (disp.), section (§), and page (p.) from Opera Omnia Theologica, 1701.

102 “Ita ut praesupponat in Deo nutum voluntatis, descriptionemque & determinationem consili, ad quem actum velit concurrere: dum scil. creaturis liberis necdum confirmatis sed mutabilibus constituit dare, ut libere vita & ἐνέργεια, quam ipsis dedit & daturus est; etiam abutantur. Qua ratione & concursus
Cocceius argues that the providence of God in human sins was permission (*permissio*).

The notion of permission is not the same either with concession (*concessio*) of the law or with cessation (*cessatio*) of impediments to sin. In sin of a creature, God, though prohibiting the sin, concurs with the freedom of the creature’s operation. To Cocceius, the Jesuits mixed the two notions of *concursus* and *indifferentia* and put them in human power, and by so doing, they made the notions “mere Chimeras” (*merae Chimaerae*). Cocceius argues that in the Jesuit understanding of *concursus* and *indifferentia*, God does not foreknow what creatures will do, and his knowledge depends on the creaturely action. In the Jesuit view, continues Cocceius, God finally knows what happens only after he sees and recognizes the will of the creatures. Thus, according to Cocceius’


103 “Providentiae huic in peccato adest *Permissio*. Quae non est Concessio per remotionem legis obstantis, nec cessatio a ponendis impedimentis moralibus aut difficultitibus agenda . . . sed includit negationem illius ἐνεργείας, qua Deus facit, ut praecepta ipsius fiant a creatura, cum praehibitione concursus ad liberam creaturae ἐνεργείαν. Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 28, §26 (p. 218). Calvin did not like the permission language (*Institutes*, III.xxiii.8). Francis Turretin (1623-1687), however, defends Calvin against Bellarmine. He argues that Calvin never contended that God is the author of sin, and that he rightly understood the ways in which God permits evil to occur and uses the wicked as his instruments. For Turretin, Calvin’s denials of God’s permission are denials only of an unwilling or “idle permission” (*otiosa permissio*). See Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, 6.8.8 (auctor peccati), 10 (otiosas permissio), 11, 13, 14; Richard A. Muller, “Reception and Response: Referencing and Understanding Calvin in Seventeenth-Century Calvinism,” in *Calvin and His Influence, 1509-2009*, ed. Irena Backus and Philip Benedict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 193. Bullinger, Vermigli, Beza, and Perkins also used the permission language regarding Adam’s fall. Muller, *Christ and the Decree*, 39–47 (Bullinger), 57–67 (Vermigli), 86 (Beza), 162 (Perkins). More discussion on the notion of God’s permission of sin is found in Woo, “Is God the Author of Sin?,” 104–105, 116–20.

104 “Comminiscuntur Jesuitae *concursum indifferentem*, positum in hominis potentestate, non prius influentem in effectum sive bonum sive malum, quam voluntas influat. Quae sunt merae Chimaerae.” Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 28, §27 (p. 218).

105 “Nam hoc commento fingitur Deus concurrere, ubi incertum est, an quid fiat: concurrere ad utrumque & ad neutrum & ad alterum: & non concurrere ad volitionem hominis: & concurrere, antequam concurrat; & concurrere, quum homo influerit; ac dependere ab hominis influxu. & mutari in tempore tum quod scientiam, tum quod decretum. Nam, si concursus est ita plane indifferentes, Deus non prius sciet, quid creatura factura sit, sed, quum ea voluerit feceritque id, quod ei permissum fuerit, tum demum id sciet:
interpretation, the Jesuit understanding of *concursus* and *indifferentia* is Pelagian. Cocceius’ analysis of the Jesuit notion of *concursus* and *indifferentia* can be supported by a modern study. Réginald Marie Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., a leading neo-Thomist of the twentieth century, claims that the Jesuit Molinists understand concurrence as a natural, general, indifferent concurrence which the will, through its own volition, directs toward the good. In that case, argues Garrigou-Lagrange, God would be no more the author of a good work than of a bad one. Thus, Garrigou-Lagrange contends with Cocceius that the Jesuit idea makes God dependent on the creaturely action.

To make his point more clearly, Cocceius endorses the notion of *contingency* (*contingentia*). Contingency means a nonnecessary event or thing that either might not exist or could be otherwise. The action of a creature should be understood as the result

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106 Cocceius emphatically states that “concurrence is not indifference” (*concursus non est indifferentes*). Cocceius, *Disputationes Selectae*, disp. 5, §65 (p. 84). Arguments against the Jesuit notion of divine “middle knowledge” from divine foreknowledge and sovereignty were common among the early modern Reformed theologians. Muller writes, “The Arminian and Jesuit claim of a divine ‘middle knowledge’ not only offered a new and more refined way of stating the case for a semi-Pelagian doctrine of salvation, but also raised questions concerning the relationship between God and the entire order of finite being: how could God know future contingents lying outside of his will unless there were actualities not brought into being by God? Vorstius’ claim of sequence in God appeared to undermine all traditional conception of divine ultimacy, unity, and sovereignty—and the Socinian denial of an essential punitive justice threatened the logic of orthodox atonement theory.” Muller, *PRRD*, 3:121.


108 “Neque excluditur *contingentia*, quae est in iis, quae sunt & possunt non ess.” Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 28, §35 (p. 219). Cocceius utilizes the notion of contingency in his argument of the existence of God. He writes, “all things in the world are contingent, so they can exist or cannot exist equally” (*omnia, quae in mundo sunt, sunt... contingentia, quae ex aequo possunt non esse atque esse*). Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 8 (*De argumentis natura cognitis, quibus demonstratur, Esse Deum*), §91 (p. 163). Cocceius’ conception of contingency is very close to the so-called *Scotistic* notion of “synchronic contingency,” which means that “for one moment of time, there is a true alternative for the state of affairs that actually occurs.” Van Asselt, Bae, and te Velde, *The Reformed Thought on Freedom*, 40–41.
of the free operation of secondary causes which concurs with and under primary cause (secunda causa . . . cum prima & sub prima). An entirely possible and different interrelation of causes can produce a different result. The author of sin is not God but human beings, because they sinned in a contingent circumstance. To the contrary, God is the author of good because he is the provider of the grace present to human beings prior to the fall as assistance (auxilium [qua]). Cocceius takes great pains to argue that his doctrine of divine providence is not equated with a deterministic idea such as the Stoic fate. The notion of the concurrence of the divine operative will with all creaturely actions should not be viewed as a denial of the liberty of the secondary cause of creatures. Rather, the concurrence of divine primary and creaturely secondary causality guarantees the freedom of creatures. To recapitulate, as Cocceius puts it in Disputationes Selectae, the idea of concursus does not destroy the freedom of creatures or their mutability in time. The counsel or decree of God is not inconsistent with the freedom of human

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109 “Quando secunda causa agit cum prima & sub prima, dicitur Deus mediate operari: quando quid sine causa ulla alia sistit, immediate.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 28, §36 (p.219).

110 “Homo tame nest auctor peccati, non Deus.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 28, §30 (p.219).

111 “Nam in bono non tantum est permissio & concursus, sed auxilium. . . . In hoc igitur Deus & imperator & doctor & suasor & exemplar & praeparator & custos & retentor & per suam amabilitatem ad se quareendum invitatior & voluntatis bonae creator & operis boni formator, ejusdemque laudator ac remunerator; denique auctor est.” Cocceius, STh, cap. 28, §33 (p.219). Cocceius quotes Philippians 2:13 and Ezekiel 36:27. The early modern Reformed theologians distinguished between auxilium sine quo non (i.e., an assistance without which a desired result cannot occur) and auxilium quo (i.e., an assistance that, in a positive sense, inevitably brings about a result). The former term can be used to describe resistible grace (gratia resistibilibis); the latter, irresistible grace (gratia irresistibilis). The former was used to describe the grace present to the prelapsarian Adam as a necessary but resistible assistance; the latter was employed to depict the grace of election, which, according to the early modern Reformed theologians, is an irresistible assistance. See Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 54.

112 “Concursus libertatem sive etiam mutabilitatem creaturae non tollit.” Cocceius, Disputationes Selectae, disp. 5, §64 (p. 84).
Therefore, Cocceius’ doctrine of freedom does not fall into the danger of determinism; rather, it does secure the freedom of creatures in their being and operation. It is also noteworthy that Cocceius supports his doctrine with the Scriptures alone. He does not cite other sources such as Greco-Roman, patristic, or medieval works. For example, he cites Exodus 21:13 and Proverbs 16:33 to undergird his conception of contingency (contingentia).

6.3. Cocceius’ Understanding of Freedom in His Doctrine of the Pactum Salutis

6.3.1. Terminology and Formulation of the Pactum Salutis

6.3.1.1. Terminology, Place, and Polemical Use of the Doctrine

Cocceius consistently uses the term “pactum” to denote the covenant of redemption among the three persons of the Trinity. Sometimes he uses “conventio” and

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113 “The decretum aeternum can be distinguished from the counsel of God (consilium Dei) only formally, not essentially,” as Muller puts it, “since the essential acts of God belong to the divine essence in its simplicity . . . and are identical with the essence itself; nevertheless, in a formal sense, the consilium is the divine decision, and the decretum is the actual willing or expression of that decision.” Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 88.

114 Although Cocceius describes the pactum salutis as a pact between the Father and the Son, he does not ignore the role of the Holy Spirit in the pactum. See Cocceius, SD, §§89, 107; “The Place of the Holy Spirit in the Eternal Pact” in Van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius, 233–36. Cocceius also distinguishes the testamentary covenant from a covenant that is based upon pact and agreement (“foedus testamentarium à foedere, quod pacto conventioneque nititur, sive lege . . . distinguere,” SD, §87). The Abrahamic covenant is different from the pact God made about the inheritance of the land with the seed of Abraham, namely, Christ (“quid alius istic probat Apostolus ex formula foederis Abrahae, quam quod Deus cum semine Abrahae, scilicet Christo, pactus sit de haereditate terrae; SD, §88). A full discussion of the covenant terminology of Cocceius is found in Van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius, 38–40, 248–254; Brian J. Lee, “The Covenant Terminology of Johannes Cocceius: The Use of Foedus, Pactum, and Testamentum in a Mature Federal Theologian,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 14 (2003): 11–36; Brian J. Lee, Johannes Cocceius and the Exegetical Roots of Federal Theology: Reformation Developments in the Interpretation of Hebrews 7-10 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2009), 62–72. Lee concludes (on p. 36 of his 2003 article), “The foedus operum is a fully meritorious arrangement, a pact by which humanity as created could have earned the reward of eternal life. The foedus gratiae excludes this merit, and indeed approaches a testamentum as a legal instrument by which an inheritance is rewarded in a unilateral and irrevocable manner. The two are related to one another by the pactum salutis, the middle term which relates the demands of God’s justice to the operation of his grace in Christ.” For the difference between decretum and pactum in the federal theology of Cocceius, see Van
“contractus” to signify the covenant of redemption\textsuperscript{115} and utilizes the term “pactum” to denote God’s covenants with \textit{humans},\textsuperscript{116} but “pactum” is the most common term to designate the covenant of redemption. The doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} is adumbrated expansively and deeply in chapter 5 of \textit{Summa Doctrinae}, although it is dispersed in many chapters of the book.\textsuperscript{117} The chapter is exegetical, doctrinal, and polemical. Cocceius presents many comments on related scriptural verses in most of the sections of chapter 5, but the initial sections (§§88-96) are the most dense with the interpretation of the Scriptures. In other sections, Cocceius mixes exegetical, doctrinal, and polemical approaches to refute his main opponents—the Remonstrants and Roman Catholic theologians.\textsuperscript{118}

6.3.1.2. Definition and Related Scriptural Texts of the Doctrine

Cocceius gives a definition of the \textit{pactum salutis}. The \textit{pactum salutis} is a divine testament between the Father and the Son to constitute the Son as head and redeemer of his people. It is made not with fallen human beings but with the mediator. The \textit{pactum} contains the account of the agreement (\textit{rationem conventionis}) of both the Father and the Son. The Father requires (\textit{stipulans}) the obedience of the Son unto death and for that

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\textsuperscript{115} “rationem conventionis” and “Contractus inter duos [sc. patrem et filium]” in Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §88 (pp. 60-61).

\textsuperscript{116} For example, he uses the phrase, “a new pact with humanity” (\textit{pactum novum cum homine}), although he seems to take the phrase from the Remonstrants. Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §§169-74 (pp. 70-71).

\textsuperscript{117} Cocceius, \textit{SD}, Caput 5, §§88–176 (pp. 60–71).

\textsuperscript{118} Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §§96-99, 163-74 (\textit{Remonstrantes}); §§175-176 (\textit{Pontificii}). He once criticizes the Socinians (\textit{Sociniana}) in §155.
promises the Son a kingdom and spiritual seed; and the Son presents himself to do the will of God and requires from the Father the salvation of a people given to him out of the world.\textsuperscript{119}

The direct proof of the \textit{pactum salutis}, for Cocceius, is Zechariah 6:13, which says, “The counsel of peace is between both the LORD and the Man \textit{Tzemach} (Sprout).”\textsuperscript{120} Cocceius offers a collation of scriptural verses such as Isaiah 42:1, 53:10-11, and Romans 5:15.\textsuperscript{121} In Isaiah 42:1, God Jehovah promises that he will give his Son as a covenant for the people, a light for the nations. Isaiah 53 is a very important chapter since it contains the commission of God and the duty of the Son. The “grace of God” and the “grace of Christ” in Romans 5:15 is the love between the Father and the Son, “as a Surety for us” (\textit{tanquam Sponsoris pro nobis}). For Cocceius, this mutual love contains the specific nature of the pact. He writes, “the ‘grace of man’ indicates that this grace is the cause of the incarnation, without which it is ineffective; the ‘gift in the grace of Christ’ is the obedience of Christ to the law, securing what was given to us.”\textsuperscript{122} Cocceius, like other

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\item \textsuperscript{119} “Inest tamen in hoc Testamento divino Pactum, quo nititur eius firmitas. Pactum scil. non cum homine lapso, sed cum Mediatore. Scilicet voluntas Patris filium dantis caput & φιλότροφον \textit{redemptorem} populi praecognit, & voluntas Filii, sese ad hanc salutem procurandam sistentis, habet rationem conventionis, dum secundum ineffabilem illam oeconomiam negocii salutis nostrae consideratur Pater stipulans obedientiam Filii usque ad mortem, & pro ea ipsi regnum & semen spirituale repromittens: Filius autem se sistens, ad faciendam voluntatem Dei, & à Patre salutem populi sibi è mundo dati restipulans sive, ut clarius loquar, altrinsecus petens.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §88 (p. 60).
\item \textsuperscript{120} “Hinc dicitur \textit{inter utrumque}, \textit{DOMINUM} & \textit{Virum Tzemach}, h. e. \textit{GERMEN}, \textit{esse consilium pacis}, Zach. 6:13.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §88 (p. 60). For this scriptural verse, see 2.3.1 of this study.
\item \textsuperscript{121} For a cross-referencing and collation of related scriptural verses in the formulation of the doctrine in the early modern Reformed theology, see 2.2.8 of this study.
\item \textsuperscript{122} “Rom. 5. 15. \textit{Gratia Dei} & \textit{donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in multos abundavit. Ibi Gratia Dei} & \textit{Gratia Christi} est amor Patris & Filii, tanquam Sponsoris pro nobis; qui utriusque amor, ut dixi, pacti speclem habet: deinde \textit{Gratia hominis} significat, hanc gratiam esse causam incarnationis & sine illa esse inefficacem: deinde \textit{donum in gratia Christi} est Christi obedientia legi satisfaciens nobis donata.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §88 (p. 61).
\end{itemize}
formulators of the *pactum* doctrine, goes on to give many comments of scriptural verses about “surety” (*sponsor; ἔγγυος*), found in both the Old and New Testaments. The notion of surety is closely related with the *pactum salutis* because the *pactum* is an intratrinitarian covenant to constitute Christ as a surety of salvation of the people of God. It is also notable that Galatians 3:17 is interpreted with regard to the *pactum salutis*. Cocceius makes it clear that the covenant ratified in Christ (διαθήκη προκεκυρωμένην εἰς Χριστὸν) of the verse should signify “the promises of the testament or of the divine plan have been made manifest” (*promissiones Testamenti sive propositi divini declaratrices factas esse*).\(^{124}\)

6.3.1.3. The Role of the Holy Spirit in the *Pactum Salutis*

Cocceius does not omit the role of the Holy Spirit in the *pactum salutis*.\(^{125}\) Cocceius explicitly points to the Holy Spirit in his doctrine of the *pactum salutis* at least in three places. In *Disputationes Selectae*, §20, he argues that the *pactum salutis* belongs to all three persons of the Trinity (*totius . . . Trinitatis*), although it is considered first between the Father and the Son.\(^{126}\) In *Summa Doctrinae*, §§89, 93, 107 Cocceius describes the

\(^{123}\) Cocceius comments on Psalm 40:6, 7-8, 12, Hebrews 7:22, Psalm 119:12, Isaiah 38:14, etc. For the notion of suretyship and its relationship with the *pactum salutis*, see 2.2.3 (Witsius), 3.3.1/3.3.2.2 (Owen), 4.2.2.2 (Dickson), and 5.2.1.4/5.3.1.2/5.3.1.4 (Goodwin) in the present study.

\(^{124}\) Cocceius, *SD*, §88 (p. 61). Analysis of Witsius’ exegesis of Galatians 3:16-20 is found in 2.3.2 of this study.

\(^{125}\) For an extensive discussion on the role of the Holy Spirit in the *pactum salutis*, see chapter 5 of this study.

role of the Holy Spirit in the *pactum salutis*. He writes:

Hence He [the Son] is also called *God* who bought back the church with His blood (Acts 20:28), because the incarnate Son bought her not only for Himself but also for the Father and for the Holy Spirit. In another manner He is *God* who has reconciled the world to Himself in Christ (2 Cor. 5:19). 3. *The Holy Spirit* exercises the power of the Godhead by regenerating us, and its charity by uniting us to God and by sealing our inheritance; it is said that through Him both the Father and the Son dwell in us. . . . He [Christ] had the glory of the Lord by right of creation, and He had the glory of salvation not only because of the purpose of the Father, but also because of the will of the eternal Spirit.127

The Son brought back the church “not only for Himself but also for the Father and for the Holy Spirit.” It was the will of the Holy Spirit that granted the glory of salvation to the Son. The Holy Spirit regenerates the people of God, and both the Father and the Son dwell in them through him. Christ was made to be surety (*vadem*) for the elect in the eternal Spirit.128 The Son could not call off the undertaken agreement because “the θέλημα πνεύματος αἰωνίου, will of His eternal Spirit, by which He offered Himself to the Father, is immutable (Hebrews 10:10; 9:14).”129 Thus, it was the will of the Holy Spirit that granted the glory of salvation to the Son at the completion of the *pactum* and guaranteed the immutability of it. The Holy Spirit accomplishes in time the salvation

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127 “Unde & *Deus suo sanguine redemisse Ecclesiam. Actor. 20. 28. dicitur, quia Filius incarnatus non tantūm, sibi, sed & Patri & Spiritui Sancto eam emit; & alio modo, *Deus* in Christo mundum sibi reconciliasse, 2. Cor. 5. 19. 3. *Spiritus sanctus* potentiam Deitatis exercet in regenerandis nobis & charitatem in uniendis nobis Deo & ad haereditatem obsignandis. Per quem & Pater & Filius in nobis habitarę dicitur . . . Habebat gloriam dominii iure creationis; gloriam salutis tum ob destinationem Patris, tum ob spiritus aeterui voluntatem.” Cocceius, *SD*, §89 (p. 61) and §107 (p. 64). All italics in both Latin and English citations are Cocceius’ except when noted otherwise.

128 “Id vero, quod omni homini incumbit velle sub conditione, Christo homini incubuit absolute vi voluntatis aeternae, qua idem ipse *spiritu aeterno* se vadem pro electis constituerat.” Cocceius, *SD*, §93 (p. 61).

promised in the *pactum,* and is glorified through the success of Christ’s works stipulated in the *pactum.* In this sense, it can be argued that the Holy Spirit is a *partner* of the *pactum salutis* as well as its *executor.* Though Cocceius spares relatively small amount of discussion on the Spirit’s role in the *pactum salutis,* it does not mean that he permits no place for the Spirit as a party of the *pactum.* Rather, in Cocceius’ doctrine, the Spirit plays a significant role both in the transaction and in the application of the *pactum.*

6.3.1.4. The *Pactum* Doctrine aginst Universalism

Another noteworthy feature of Cocceius’ doctrine of the *pactum salutis* consists in his harsh criticism of universalism and hypothetical universalism. For the criticism he allows 41 sections (§§108-149) among the entire 88 sections of chapter 5 of *Summa Doctrinae.* With the Remonstrants in mind, though he does not name them explicitly, Cocceius claims that “Christ did not act as Surety for all without exception” (*Christum non spopondisse pro omnibus sine exceptione*). Notably, he endorses the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* to repudiate universalism and hypothetical universalism. The will of the Father in the *pactum salutis* follows his most wise counsel, and by this will those to

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130 Van Asselt writes, “we must conclude that the Holy Spirit is certainly involved in the immanent Trinitarian pact, but not as a legal partner. He is not a negotiating subject, but an implementing subject in his role as the *potentia Deitatis.*” Van Asselt, *The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius,* 235. He, however, did not refer to §§93, 96, and 107 of *Summa Doctrinae* and failed to see more positive works of the Holy Spirit in the transaction of the *pactum salutis.*


132 “facile & turum est (licet in re magni mysterii) definire, Christum non spopondisse pro omnibus sine exceptione, sive etiam pro illis, qui non salvantur.” Cocceius, *SD,* §108 (p. 65).
be saved are given to Christ for sons or for the seed of the promise. Cocceius argues that this teaching agrees with the commended words of Cartwright (1535-1603).

Cartwright writes in Hist. Christi, tom. 2, p. 84:

Christ’s benevolence is indeed remarkable and incredible to the whole human race, but nevertheless is restricted by the will of the Father. For while in His love toward men He may long for all to be saved, nevertheless, since He understands that it appears otherwise to the Father, He gathers His emotion and casts it on the will of the Father, and because it happens for the best and most just judgment of God, He rejoices with Him.

Thus, for Cocceius, Christ cannot be the Second Adam for those who are not predestined in him. The Scriptures do not teach that Christ died for all without exception. The phrase, “Christ died for men,” does not everywhere mean the same thing, and any of the related scriptural verses does not teach universalism. Thus, “if anyone says that Christ died for all, for each and every one,” categorically argues Cocceius, “it is not from the use of Scripture.”

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133 “insuper necesse est accedere voluntatem Patris (sine qua nulla sponsio locum habebat) quae voluntas sequitur sapientissimum consilium eius.” Cocceius, SD, §109 (p. 65). Thomas Goodwin also argues that the will of God always accompanies his wisdom, and that the invention of the redemption through Christ is God’s wisdom. Goodwin, Works, 5:19-20 (“Of Christ the Mediator”).

134 “Lubet hoc verbis Cartwrigti ex tom. 2. hist. Christi p. 84. ante me laudatis explicare: Christi philanthropia est quidem illa eximia & incredibilis erga hominum universum genus, sed tamen voluntate Patris circumscibitur. Ut enim pro suo erga homines amore omnes cupiat salvos, tamen cum intelligit secur Patris videri, contrahit affectum suum eumque ad Patris voluntatem adigit, & quod optimo iustissimoque Dei iudicio fit, ei congratulatur.” Cocceius, SD, §109 (p. 65).

135 Cocceius, SD, §112 (p. 65).

136 “Christus est mortuus pro hominibus, non ubique idem significare.” Cocceius, SD, §115 (p. 65).

137 “§118. At neutiquam concedimus, unquam aliter in scripturis dici Christum mortuum pro omnibus, quam sensu substitutionis in locum reorum ad orundem peccata expungenda & iustificationem actualen promerendum. §119. Unde consequens est, quum etiam ex mente auctorum tertiae sententiae id de omnibus & singulis dici non possit, ex scripturae, usu non esse, si quis dicat, Christum esse pro omnibus & singulis (h. e. ad bonum huius temporis) mortuum.” Cocceius, SD, §§118-19 (p. 66).
verses, he concludes, “If you take the words of the apostle otherwise, they will lack foundation and will be inconsequential, will not agree well with God, and among them will be contradictions.”

A peculiar characteristic of Cocceius’ criticism of universalism is that he does not want to endorse the distinction between “sufficient for all” and “efficient for the church.” He writes:

And the distinction of such significance ought not to be used by us which was used by those of old, who went before us, wishing in a certain manner to explain the Scriptures and to correct lapse and rather incautious statement, whereby they say that Christ died sufficiently for all, each and every one, but efficiently for the church.

Cocceius refuses to use the traditional distinction for four reasons: first, it is not established in the Scriptures; second, it is very difficult to distinguish between the two members of the sufficienter and efficienter; third, there is wondrous homonym in the phrases of Scripture and occasion for weakening it; and fourth, it establishes in place of principle that the sacrifice of Christ did not immediately or absolutely obtain propitiation.

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139 “Si aliter accipias verba Apostoli, ea & fundamento carebunt, & erunt inconsequentia, & Deo non bene convenient, & inter se erunt contraria.” Cocceius, SD, §142 (p. 68).


141 “Neque tanti nobis sit distinctio ab iis veterum usurpata, qui praecedentium in exponenda scriptura lapsum ac locutionem incautiorem corrigere aliquatenus voluerunt, qua Christum dixere sufficienter mortuum esse pro omnibus & singulis, efficienter pro Ecclesia.” Cocceius, SD, §145 (p. 68).
for the sins of all humans, but only from a law and condition and thus, the distinction
seems to make the gift of the Holy Spirit depend on the faith of sinners, which is another
gift. In the sufficiency-efficiency doctrine, for Cocceius, the payment and procurement of
the gift of salvation seem to be conditioned under the condition of another gift—a spirit
of faith.142 “Reconciliation does not have a law and condition,” argues Cocceius, “but is
the effect of the obedience of the Surety according to grace and of the Father, promising a
seed to the Son.”143 If Christ offers himself for satisfaction, he can claim according to the
pactum salutis the inheritance from the Father and will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit
to pour out to all flesh.144 It is Christ who has the plenipotentiary power to give salvation
to his people. The effectiveness of Christ’s satisfaction does not incidentally rely on the
faith of humans. In this regard, Cocceius refuses to endorse the sufficiency-efficiency
distinction as an effective doctrine to repudiate universalism. In so doing, he attempts to

142 “quum illa non fundetur in Scripturis, & membra vix distinguunt invicem (ut supra
demonstratum) quum miram homonymiam in phrasin Scripturae, occasionemque eam enervandi, & quae
electis propria sunt, extenuata vulgandi introductat, sitque multorum abusu suspicta, suspiciones gignat &
lites non tantum inter doctores, sed & discipulos doctoribus imperitiores, impeditaque aedificationem tum
consentientium in summa veritatis, tum dissentientium. 146. Et vero quo deducimur per istas phraseologias?
nimir. ut cogamur loco principii statuere, Christi sacrificium non immediate sive absolute impetrasse
propitiationem pro peccatis omnium hominum, sed tantum ea lege, & conditione, ut mediante fide à Spir. S.
producta peccatores salutem consequentur. Quasi esset solutio conditionata & impetratio conditionata
doni, sub conditione alterius doni, atque, ut planiùs dicam, reconciliatio pereuntium si modò eis donet Deus
spiritum fidei.” Cocceius, SD, §§145-46 (p. 68).

143 “Reconciliatio non habet legem & conditionem, sed est effectus obedientiae Sponsoris
secundum gratiam & Patris, filio promittentis semen.” Cocceius, SD, §147 (p. 68).

144 “si posuerit anima ipsius satisfactionem, & Filii ad hoc se offerentis illamque haereditatem
postulantis à Patre, eoque fine accipientis donum Spiritus Sancti effundendi in omnem carnem” (bolds are
mine). Cocceius, SD, §147 (p. 68). Although Cocceius does not mention the pactum salutis here, it is very
clear that he has it in mind since “postulare haeredatem” (to claim the inheritance) is a technical term to
denote the promise of the pactum as in Cocceius, SD, §88. Cocceius argues that “the Father made pact with
the Son in the eternal counsel about the inheritance to be given and the seed to be called” (qua pater cum
Filio in aeterno consilio de haereditate danda & semine vocando pactus est). Cocceius, SD, §142 (bolds
are mine). The people of God are identified with the inheritance (“populum & haereditatem” in §103).
exterminate the Pelagian tendency in universalism.\textsuperscript{145} The doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} is used here for that purpose. Cocceius is very clear that the doctrine cannot side with universalism, although some of the universalists utilized the doctrine to support their own view.\textsuperscript{146} “The pact between the Father and the Son pertains to \textit{us} who believe,” maintains Cocceius, “for whom the Father and the Son arranged a kingdom by testament.”\textsuperscript{147} Thus, he concludes that the \textit{pactum salutis} eradicates the universalistic idea from the root.

6.3.1.5. The \textit{Pactum} Doctrine against the Socinians, the Remonstrants, and the Roman Catholic Theologians

The Socinians did not believe in the substitutionary characteristic of Christ’s work, as exemplified in Jonas Schlichtingius (1592-1661).\textsuperscript{148} In his comment on Hebrews 7:22, Schlichtingius argues that Christ is called “Surety of the testament” only because “in the name of God He comes to us, made covenant with us, guaranteed that His promises

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{145} This does not mean that the scholastic distinction of the sufficiency-efficiency itself leads to universalism or contains a Pelagian tendency.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §149 (p. 69).
\item \textsuperscript{147} “Summa dictorum est, pactum Patris cum Filio pertinere ad \textit{nos}, qui credimus: quibus & Pater & Filius Testamento disponit regnum. Quippe Fideiussor in eo se gessit ut Caput nostrum, ut frater noster, ut eiusdem massae, quam assumsit, primitiae.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §150 (p. 69). Van Asselt rightly writes, “[In Cocceius’ theology] election in Christ logically precedes the eternal pact. The central notion in this eternal pact is that of the sponsorship of Christ as the \textit{Logos incarnandus}—a concept that presupposes the antecedent election by the Father. If one were to reverse this order and make election subsequent to Christ’s sponsorship, the result would be to ascribe to Cocceius a form of universalism which he emphatically rejects. Van Asselt, \textit{The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius}, 243.
\item \textsuperscript{148} The Socinians repudiated penal substitution theory and offered moral example theory. James Beilby and Paul Eddy, \textit{The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views} (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 17.
\end{itemize}
would be certain and took them upon Himself.”\textsuperscript{149} He does not buy the substitution theory of the atonement. For Cocceius, however, the \textit{pactum salutis} clearly shows that Christ takes upon himself the debts of the elected. “Christ is called Surety not on account of the announcement of promises alone, and the confirmation of those through miracles, through an upright life, and through death,” argues Cocceius, “but from this, namely \textit{that He took upon Himself the payment of our debts} for the execution of the testament.”\textsuperscript{150} Thus, the \textit{pactum} doctrine supports the substitutionary dimension of Christ’s redemptive work.

The Remonstrants are the main opponents Cocceius had in mind in his doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis}. Besides the universalistic idea of the Remonstrants, Cocceius’ target of criticism is their understanding of the forgiving desire of God and the merit of Christ. They argue that it was not necessary that Christ would merit the will of paying back the debt of sinners for grace, except it is complete.\textsuperscript{151} Thus, for them, the forgiving desire of Christ remains suspended until he enters into a new pact with humans.\textsuperscript{152} Cocceius acknowledges that among the Reformed theologians there are various views on this issue.

\textsuperscript{149} Cited from Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §155 (p. 69).

\textsuperscript{150} “Hanc tam evidentem tamque clare ubique inculcatam veritatem de Sponsione Christi ad Deum obnubilat Sociniana in torquendis Scripturis amentia. Nam ἔγγυον τῆς διαθήκης, quod Sponsorem Testamenti significat contendunt dici Christum eo duntaxat, quod Dei nomine ad nos venit, foedus nobiscum panxit, eiusque promissiones ratas fore soppondit & in se recepit. Schlich. ad Hebr. 7. 22. Quasi non ex omni tenore Scripturarum clarum esset, Christum non ob annunciationem solam promissionum, earumque confirmationem per miracula, per vitam innocentem, & per mortem dici Sponsorem, sed ex eo quod debitorum nostrorum solutionem in se receperit, ad Testamenti executionem.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §155 (p. 69).

\textsuperscript{151} “Praeterea aniadveertendum, secundum illos necesse non fuisset, ut Christus meretur voluntatem redeundi in gratiam, nisi completam; quia dicunt, antea habuisse voluntatem redeundi in gratiam, si modo interveniret id, quod intervenire aequum erat.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §168 (p. 70). For the discussion of the early modern Reformed theologians on the ground of the forgiving desire of God, see 5.3.2.1 of this study.

\textsuperscript{152} Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §§168-69 (p. 70).
For example, William Twisse claims that God could have forgiven the sins of humans without satisfaction, and that he also could have willed to forgive without imputation of righteousness.⁵³ Leaving aside the controversy within Reformed circles, Cocceius goes on to refute the Remonstrant notion of merit in five points; first, according to their dogma there is no one among humans whose sins have really been punished in Christ; second, it is contrary to their dogmas on the actual remission of sins; third, this explanation takes away the merit which agrees with the guarantee of Christ; fourth, they wish that it was the purpose of Christ that remission might come to them at last by means of some new pact, and to the payment of the condition, whatever that is, that they might remain under liability to guilt and punishment, and this weakens Christ’s acquisition of his peculiar people; and fifth, in this manner, it follows that one cannot have access through the merit of Christ in faith, into grace (Romans 5:2), nor indeed through the regenerating power of Christ but only through the declaration of the condition of the new pact.⁵⁴ In a word, for Cocceius, the merit of Christ is emptied by the Remonstrants because it is dependent on human responses.⁵⁵ Although they appear to extend the merit of Christ, in reality they nevertheless so diminish it that they entirely leave nothing for it.⁵⁶

The Roman Catholic theologians also diminish the merit of Christ, argues Cocceius,

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⁵⁴ Cocceius, SD, §171 (pp. 70-71).

⁵⁵ “adeo per istos Meritum Christi evacuari.” Cocceius, SD, §172 (p. 71).

⁵⁶ “Quanquam enim videantur extendere meritem Christi, reipsa tamen id adeo inminuunt, ut omnino ipsi relinquant, quod meritus sit.” Cocceius, SD, §163 (p. 70).
when they assert that by the satisfaction of Christ, the eternal punishment has been changed to temporal. They contend that certain sins have been remitted with respect to guilt, but not with respect to punishment. For them, remitted sins are either really punished or expunged by satisfaction. Furthermore, Christ merited in order that one may merit increments of righteousness and eternal life. Indeed, the Roman Catholic theologians aver that one may be able to merit for others, and that one may merit to help the merits of others in this life and after life.157 Gabriel Vasquez (c. 1549-1604), who was a Spanish Jesuit theologian at the Council of Trent, certainly excludes the merit of Christ, when he teaches, “without pact and without access of dignity from merits or person, the works of Christ, done in the condition of righteousness for the help of affecting grace, merit eternal life.”158 Cocceius does not deal with these ideas more deeply because for him “these are not dogmas but portents” (Quae sane non dogmata sed portenta sunt).159 To recapitulate briefly, the doctrine of the pactum salutis is endorsed in Cocceius’ Summa Doctrinae to criticize the Socinian view of Christ’s redemptive work and the Remonstrant and Roman Catholic notions of merit.

6.3.2. Cocceius’ Notion of Freedom in the Pactum Salutis

6.3.2.1. The Freedom and Voluntariness of the Son in the Pactum Salutis

157 “Imminuunt meritum Christi etiam Pontificii, dictantes, Christi satisfactione mutatam esse poenam aeternam in temporalem; quaedam peccata remissa esse quoad culpam non quoad poenam; & peccata remissa vel revera puniri, vel satisfactione expungi; meritum esse Christum, ut mereamur iustitiae incrementa & vitam aeternam; imo ut possimus aliis mereri; denique ut mereamur aliorum meritis in hac vita & post vitam adiuvari. Quae sanè non dogmata sed portenta sunt.” Cocceius, SD, §175 (p. 71).

158 “Inter illos tamen maxime detrahunt merito Christi; qui docent, citra pactum & citra accessionem dignitatis ex meritis aut persona Christi opera in statu iustitiae auxilio gratiae moventis facta vitam aeternam mereri. vide Gabr. Vasq. in 1. secund. tom. 2. disp. 214.” Cocceius, SD, §176 (p. 71).

159 Cocceius, SD, §175 (p. 71).
The notion of freedom in Cocceius’ doctrine of free choice is fully harmonized with his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. The believers regain freedom through the execution of the *pactum salutis*. Cocceius first emphasizes the freedom of the mediator, and then he underlines the recovery of the true freedom of the believers through the *pactum*. The freedom and voluntariness of the Son is an iterative theme in Cocceius’ formulation of the *pactum salutis*.  

160 “The pact, by the force of which the Son became the Surety of the testament of grace,” maintains Cocceius, “is of pure freedom and the will not only of the Father but also of the Son, as is readily clear.”  

161 The second Adam differs from the first in this regard. The first man was not free to be subject to the divine covenant; he could neither remove himself by the law of nature nor spurn the promise without violation of that law. The Son, however, was held by no law as equally as the Father. He made the *pactum salutis* with the Father and emptied himself (Philippians 2:6–7) “willingly and with a free will” (*sponte & voluntate libera*).  

162 That the Son freely took up the agreement of the *pactum* demonstrates that “it [the *pactum*] is indeed χάρις, grace, and the gracious εὐδοκία [good pleasure] of the Father and the Son, by which this agreement is decreed.”  

163 Christ is the one and only of all humans “who, not unwillingly, gave up His
life for others being snatched away, but willingly and from free opportunity to choose, as a most free Surety, paid the price of the satisfaction and resumed His position.\textsuperscript{164}

Cocceius has a different view from that of the Remonstrants regarding Christ’s obedience and his freedom. The Remonstrants deny the necessity of Christ’s obedience and argue that “Christ’s obedience was absolutely free and thus, He could not obey without sin or with sin.”\textsuperscript{165} Cocceius responds, “Christ most freely obeyed” (\textit{Christum librime obedivisse}).\textsuperscript{166} Referring to Augustine’s \textit{De Praedestinatione Sanctorum}, 1.15, Cocceius makes it very clear that “it is absurd that He is not free, who makes us free.”\textsuperscript{167} He quotes John 8:34, 36 to offer the notion of freedom from the spiritual state of human beings (\textit{de hominis statu spirituali}).\textsuperscript{168} True and perfect freedom is to love God’s good

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\textsuperscript{164} “ut ipse solus & unus omnium hominum non quidem animam aliis eripientibus invitus amitteret, sed sponte & ex libera potestate tanquam librerrimus Sponsor in satisfactionis precium poneret positamque resumeret.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §93 (p. 62).

\textsuperscript{165} Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §99 (p. 63).

\textsuperscript{166} Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §99 (p. 63).

\textsuperscript{167} “Absurdum, liberum non esse, qui nos liberos facit.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §99 (p. 63). In \textit{De Praedestinatione Sanctorum}, 1.15.30, Augustine writes, “What did He do before? What did He believe? What did He ask, that He should attain to this unspeakable excellence? Was it not by the act and the assumption of the Word that that man, from the time He began to be, began to be the only Son of God? Did not that woman, full of grace, conceive the only Son of God? Was He not born the only Son of God, of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary,—not of the lust of the flesh, but by God’s peculiar gift? Was it to be feared that as age matured this man, He would sin of free will? Or was the will in Him not free on that account? and was it not so much the more free in proportion to the greater impossibility of His becoming the servant of sin?” Cited from Augustine, “A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints,” \textit{NPNF}, First Series, 5:512. The Latin text reads: “Quid egit ante, quid credidit, quid petitut, ut ad hac ineffabili excellentiam perveniret? Nonne faciente ac suscipiente Verbo, ipse homo, ex quo esse coepit, Filius Dei unicus esse coepit? Nonne Filium Dei unicum femina illa gratia plena concepit? Nonne de Spiritu Sancto et virgine Maria Dei Filius unicus natus est, non carnis cupidine, sed singulari Dei munere? Numquid metuendum fuit, ne accedente aetate homo ille libero peccaret arbitrio? Aut ideo in illo non libera voluntas erat, ac non tanto magis erat, quanto magis peccato servire non poterat?” The Latin text is in \textit{Patrologia Latina}, 44:959-92.

\textsuperscript{168} John 8:34, 36, “Everyone who does sin is a slave to sin. If therefore the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed.” Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §99 (p. 63). For the spiritual meaning of freedom, see 6.2.1 of this study and Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 32, §2 (p. 230).
without obstinacy and vacillation. Cocceius cites Bellarmine, Descartes, and Plutarch to support his view.\textsuperscript{169} He cites the same texts of Bellarmine and Plutarch in caput 25 of \textit{Summa Theologiae}.\textsuperscript{170} Bellarmine argues that “those who cannot sin are most free”; Plutarch claims that “in untrained and irrational impulses and actions there is something ignoble, and changing one’s mind many times involves but little freedom of will.”\textsuperscript{171} For Cocceius, René Descartes also supports his view of freedom when the philosopher argues, “neither does divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminish freedom, but rather they increase and confirm it.”\textsuperscript{172} Therefore, for Cocceius, Christ was most free when he obeyed the will of God for the \textit{pactum salutis}.

6.3.2.2. The Freedom of the People of God through the \textit{Pactum Salutis}

The conception of freedom that Christ has in his obedience in the \textit{pactum salutis} is applied to the people of God, who are saved through the promises of the \textit{pactum}.

\textsuperscript{169} Bellarmine, \textit{De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio}, lib. 3, ch. 6, §5; Descartes, \textit{Meditationes} IV; and Plutarch, \textit{Moralia}, Section 1.

\textsuperscript{170} Cocceius, \textit{STh}, cap. 25, §12 (Plutarch) and cap. 25, §37 (Bellarmine). For the quotations of Plutarch and Bellarmine, see 6.2.3 and 6.2.5 of this study.

\textsuperscript{171} Cited from Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §99 (p. 63).

\textsuperscript{172} “Neque enim opus est me in utramque partem ferriposse, ut sim liber sed contra quô magis in unam propendeo, sive quia rationem veri & boni in ea evidenter intelligo, sive quia Deus intima cogitationis meae ita disponit, tantù liberius eam eligo. nec sane divina gratia nec naturalis cognitio unquam imminuat libertatem, sed potius augent & corroborant. Indifferentia autem illa, quam experior, cùm nulla me ratio in unam par tem magis quam in alteram impellit, est infrinus gradus libertatis, & nullam in ea perfectionem, sed tantummodùin cognitione defectum sive negationem quandam (etiam divinae gratiae sanctificantis) testatur (For it is not necessary that I be able to be brought to each part to be free, but on the contrary that I be more inclined to one, or that in that I clearly understand the reason of the true and good, or that God so arranges the inmost thought of mine that I choose it more freely; indeed, neither does divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminish freedom, but rather they increase and confirm it. And that indifference which I experience, when no reason compels me to one part rather than to the other, is the lowest degree of freedom, and gives evidence of no perfection in it, but only of defect in knowledge or a certain refusal [even of divine grace that sanctifies]).” Descartes, \textit{Meditationes} IV. Cocceius adds the four Latin words in brackets to Descartes’ work. Cited from Cocceius, \textit{SD}, §99 (p. 63).
Cocceius understands the freedom from the perspective of sin and grace. Just as Christ is free because he is free from sin (Hebrews 4:15; 7:26–27), so believers are free when they are liberated from the power of sin. According to the covenant of redemption, Christ is called the second Adam, and all human beings could be set free from judgment through him. The people of God have died to the law through the body of Christ and have been liberated from the law (Romans 7:1, 4, 6). God made them free from the law of sin and death (Romans 8:2). God’s foreknown people have been freed from the pernicious errors and defilements of the world, in which they were remaining before the advent of Christ.

Cocceius connects his notion of freedom with the ransom of Christ. Antilytron or its cognate lytron, which is found in Jesus’ own words (Mark 10:45 and Matthew 20:28), refers to Christ’s work on the cross. It is considered in Cocceius’ theology as payment for sin made for the sake of believers and in their place. He argues that “the death of Christ

173 Cocceius, SD, §98.

174 In Summa Doctrinae, Cocceius uses “a foreknown people” (populi praecogniti; §88), “the people of God” (populus Dei; §88), or “believers” (credentes; §§135, 140) to denote those who are saved through the promise of the pactum salutis. This people is identified with inheritance that Christ receives when he accomplishes the pactum salutis (“populum & haereditatem” in §103).

175 “Ex hoc foedere Christus vocatur Secundus Adam . . . per Secundum Adamum, tanquam caput novae generationis, hominess omnes ex judicio liberari potuerint.” Cocceius, SD, §90 (p. 61).

176 Cocceius, SD, §100 (p. 63). Cf. SD, §41.

177 Cocceius, SD, §105 (p. 64).

178 “quemadmodum morti Christi debent multi non vere fideles, quod à perniciosissimis erroribus & inquinamentis mundi, in quibus ante adventum Christi iacebant.” Cocceius, SD, §117 (p. 66).

179 Cocceius’ doctrine of the atonement is close to the penal substitution theory. When Cocceius mentions the ransom of Christ, his viewpoint is closer to the substitution paradigm of the atonement rather than to the so-called Christus Victor paradigm. For various theories of the atonement, see Beilby and Eddy, nature of the atonement, 12–20.
can be considered not only as a *sacrifice* (*victimam*), but also as a *payment* (*impendium*), which has been paid with the good of many."\(^{180}\) The people of God were redeemed from the curse through the ransom of Christ (Galatians 3:13).\(^{181}\) The ransom (*ἀντίλυτρον*) frees the one for whom he has received.\(^{182}\) The payment was not paid by accident but was paid according to the plan of the *pactum salutis*.\(^{183}\) It must be made to *God* because the wrath of God falls on the whole human race due to Adam’s fall.\(^{184}\) For Cocceius this was confirmed in the *pactum salutis* in which the Son, after the completion of his work, would ask to the Father, “Redeem them from the pit, because I have acquired *lytron* (ransom).”\(^{185}\) When Christ paid the ransom, he was able to claim the liberation of the people of God. Cocceius regards *ἀπολύτρωσις* (redemption) of Ephesians 4:30 as a

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180 “Veruntamen, ut illos omittamus, cum tertia sententia nunc nobis negotium est. Cui largimur, mortem Christi posse considerari non tantum ut *victimam* sed & ut *impendium*, quod cum multorum bono (in hoc tempore illud impendium sequente) expensum est.” Cocceius, *SD*, §117 (p. 66). For the mercantile language in the description of Christ’s work, see 4.2.2.1 of this study.

181 Cocceius, *SD*, §105 (p. 64). In the history of theology, *antilytron* (1 Tim 2:6), *lytron* (Mark 10:45; Matthew 20:28), and *pretium* were used to denote the “ransom” of Christ; whereas, *apolytrosis* (Romans 3:24), *lytrosis* (Hebrews 9:12), and *redemptio* were used to denote a payment of a ransom.

182 “neque *ἀντίλυτρον* accipienti non liberare eum, pro quo acceperit.” Cocceius, *SD*, §142 (p. 64).

183 Cocceius, *SD*, §117.

184 Cocceius, *SD*, §68 (“ira Dei toti generi humano incumbat”). With regard to this, Cocceius cites Psalm 49:7 (§§79, 105)—“A brother cannot redeem anyone; he will not give to God his *lytron* (ransom).” For the thesis, “Solvi Deo, non diabolo *λύτρον* persolvendum erat (the ransom was paid, not to the devil, [but] to God alone),” Muller writes, “a maxim adapted by Francis Pieper from Quenstedt (cf. Pieper, II, p. 380, and Baier-Walther, III, p. 112). The maxim encapsulates the central difference between the satisfaction theory of atonement held by both the medieval and the Protestant scholastics and the patristic ransom theory according to which the ransom was paid not to God, but to the devil.” Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms*, 284–285.

perfect liberation (perfecta liberatio) on account of λύτρον (ransom). Thus, the pactum salutis, which is a plan about the ransom of Christ, is the foundation of the freedom of believers.

The freedom that the believer enjoys is a freedom from the law (Galatians 4:5). Christ, the Surety, paid the debt so that the principal debtor might be freed. When the pactum salutis is accomplished in time as the covenant of grace, everyone who believes in God may not perish but may have eternal life to be a sharer in the Holy Spirit. Those have tasted the good Word of God will receive freedom and righteousness. Cocceius maintains, commenting on Zechariah 9:11-12, that the covenantal blood of Christ will set the people of God free. Thus, for Cocceius, the grace of God does not diminish freedom of the believer; rather, it provides the foundation of true freedom.

6.3.2.3. The Notion of Concurrence in Summa Doctrinae

If the freedom of the believer reflects the spiritual state of human beings, what is the relationship between human free will and the pactum salutis? Cocceius endorses the

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186 “Sic ἀπολύτρωσις dicitur & Ephes. 4:30. quae est perfecta liberatio propter λύτρον & precium jam expensum.” Cocceius, SD, §632.

187 Cocceius, SD, §154.

188 “Sponsoris enim intentio est, ut principalis debitor liberetur usque adeo, ut si debitor hoc beneficio uti velit, à creditore conveniri non possit.” Cocceius, SD, §171.

189 “quae indigitat epistola ad Hebr. 6. 4. 5. qui semel illuminati fuerint, agnitione veri Dei in verbo suo loquentis, gustaverint donum caeleste, gratiam Christi, qui ex caelo venit, quem Pater dedit ex dilectione mundi, ut omnis, qui credit in ipsum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam, imo ut mundus servetur per eum, & participes facti fuerint Spiritus sancti, in convictione: in donis ad aedificationem Ecclesiae pertinentibus, & bonum verbum Dei gustaverint, sermonem Evangelii, & potentias fut uri seculi, gaudii sub N. T. in libertate & iustitia mensuram.” Cocceius, SD, §113 (p. 65).

190 Cocceius, SD, §§87, 354.

191 Cf. Descartes’s words in Cocceius, SD, §99 (p. 63).
notion of concurrence to analyze it. Although he does not use the term “concursum” in his *pactum* doctrine, he does employ the term in other places of *Summa Doctrinae*. First, Cocceius explains the fall of Adam and God’s permission in terms of *concursum*. He writes:

Adam sinned voluntarily (that is, willing that act to which God had forbidden him), while God permitted it, that is, not giving grace, by which he certainly would have willed what he was able, i.e., to obey; and while holy He *concurred* to the act of sin, but certainly did not infuse an evil disposition or work sin in man.\(^{193}\)

Cocceius here applies the notion of concurrence to Adam’s sin. God permitted and concurred when Adam sinned. He, however, is not the author of sin because Adam sinned with his own willing against God’s commandment. It should be noted, however, that Cocceius does not receive the notion of concurrence that includes a Pelagian tendency. The Jesuit theologian Leonard Lessius (1554–1623)\(^{194}\) argued that “God and man act *with mutual dependence*, so that *God in the manner of working can be said to depend on a certain reason* from man, *since through such an influx* (placed in the power of man) *God is not able to produce the effect without concurrence of a second cause, nor is such an influx able to exist in the nature of things, unless at the same time there exists concurrence of a second cause.*”\(^{195}\) Lessius is certain that regeneration is owed to

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\(^{192}\) For Cocceius’ notion of *concursum*, see 6.3.5 of this study.

\(^{193}\) “*Peccavit Adam voluntariè (h. e. volens illum actum, quo Deus ipsi interdixerat) permittente Deo h. e. non dante gratiam, quod poterat, obedire; & sancte ad peccati actum concurrente, non vero habitum malum infundente vel peccatum in homine operante.*” Cocceius, *SD*, §62 (p. 55). For the notions of permission and concurrence in Cocceius’ theology, see 6.3.5 of this study.

\(^{194}\) Leonard Lessius was a Jesuit theologian trained by Suarez and Bellarmine, who advocated a Pelagian doctrine of grace.

\(^{195}\) “*quamvis Deus & homo agant cum mutua dependentia; sic ut Deus in modo operandi aliqua ratione possit dici dependere ab homine, quatenus per tale influxum (positum in hominis potestate) non*
humans. The Remonstrant minister Nicolaas Grevinckhoven (d. 1632) against Ames contended that faith is conferred to the one who does not resist the grace offered, and that those who obstinately resist the grace return themselves absolutely unworthy of eternal life. For Grevinckhoven the grace of conversion is given according to non-resistance. Cocceius harshly criticizes this conception of concurrence, calling it the teaching of adversaries (adversarii). Therefore, Cocceius, on the one hand, retains the basic meaning of concurrence to expound on the sin of human beings; on the other, he keeps strict guard against peculiar notions of concurrence of the Remonstrants and the Jesuits. It is very clear, however, that the human free will does not contradict the doctrine of the
pactum salutis in his theology.

6.3.2.4. The Abrogation Theory and the Freedom of the People of God

Cocceius combines his “abrogation theory” with the doctrine of freedom in *Summa Doctrinae.* The abrogation theory describes the gradual abolition of the covenant of works. It finds its biblical basis in Hebrews 8:13. By the abrogation of the covenant of works, argues Cocceius, “in the New Testament, *we are not under law* (as it has been abolished), *but under grace* (Romans 6:14), and the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law (Romans 3:21).” Cocceius adumbrates the abolition of the law or of the covenant of works according to the following phases:

1. with respect to the possibility of giving life, by sin;
2. with respect to damnation, by Christ set forth in the promise and received by faith;
3. with respect to terror, or influence of the fear of death and bondage, by the promulgation of the New Covenant, expiation for sin having been made, whereby those who have been redeemed are under the law of the Redeemer. So that same law, abolished by the Redeemer as the law of sin, becomes the law of the Savior and imputes righteousness to them, who are His own (Gal. 2:19; Rom. 7:4; 2 Cor. 5:15–21);
4. with respect to the struggle with sin, by the death of the body;
5. with respect to all created things, by the resurrection of the dead.

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200 “In that he saith, A new covenant, he hath made the first old. Now that which decayeth and waxeth old is ready to vanish away” (KJV).

201 “ut in N.T. non simus sub lege (tanquam abolita) sed sub gratia. Rom. 6:14. & manifestata est justitiae Dei sine lege Roman. 3:21.” Cocceius, *SD,* §58 (p.54).

202 Cocceius, *SD,* §58 (p.54). “Foedus operum antiquatione ἐγγίζει τῷ ἀφανισμῷ accedit ad abolitionem. Ita enim licet loqui cum Apostolo, Hebr. 8:13. . . Abolitio autem legis sive Foederis Operum hisce gradibus procedit: antiquatur 1. quoad possibilitatem vivificandi, per peccatum. 2. quoad damnationem, per Christum in promissione propositum et fide apprehensum. 3. quoad terorem sive efficientiam metus mortis et servitutis, per promulgationem foederis Novi, facta peccati expiatione. Qua facta, ii, qui redemti sunt, sunt sub lege Redemptoris. Ita ut eadem lex, in Redemtore abolita ut lex peccati, fiat lex Servatoris et iustitiam addicat iis, qui sunt ipsius. Gal. 2: 19, Rom. 7:4, 2 Cor. 5:15, 21. 4. quoad
There are four major interpretations on the abrogation theory. First, in the salvation-historical model of G. Schrenk, the abrogations are conceived of as a series of certain phases in salvation history. As the salvation history goes on, the aspect of the covenant of grace increases while the aspect of the covenant of works decreases until all of the consequences of the covenant of works are eliminated. Second, the salvation order model of W. Gass interprets the five abrogations as phases of the experience of faith. The believing subject, after having fallen out of the state of righteousness and into a state of sin, moves into a state of rebirth, until the state of glory is attained. Third, the Christological model of H. Faulenbach presupposes that in Cocceius’ theology there is no linear development in salvation history. In this model, the thought of Cocceius begins from the middle—from God’s activity in Jesus Christ. The abrogations of the covenant of works should be read from a christological dimension. They have a noetic function that retrospectively traces out the one salvific act of God. Fourth, the pneumatological framework of van Asselt stresses that the doctrine of abrogation is at its deepest level “a history of sanctification as the work of the Holy Spirit.” This interpretation assumes

203 I refer to van Asselt’s summary in Van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius, 274–75, 284-87. Van Asselt writes (on p. 275), “the doctrine of abrogations in this form appears neither before nor after Cocceius. While we can perhaps discern an initial impetus for this doctrine in Johannes Cloppenburg, Cocceius’ colleague in Franeker, all of the later federal theologians, with the exception of Franciscus Burman, dispensed with the notion of a five-stage abrogation.”

204 Schrenk, Gottesreich und Bund im alteren Protestantismus, 134.


that there is an analogy or coordination between the process of salvation history and the process within the *ordo salutis*. Among the above four interpretations, the pneumatological model seems more convincing since the five abrogations of Cocceius mix the aspect of salvational history and the aspect of the *ordo salutis* of a believer.

The more important point of the abrogation theory for the present study is that the abrogation of the ceremonial law gives more room for the freedom of the people of God. Cocceius maintains that freedom from the unbearable yoke of the ceremonies (Acts 15:10) could not be joined with servitude to the rulers of this age. Christians are set free by Christ from the written law. Liberated from the law of sin and death, they live according to the law of the Spirit of life in Christ. They are free not only from the yoke of the law, but also from slavery to sin and Satan. Therefore, the freedom that is given to a Christian according to the progress of the salvation history is experienced in the *ordo salutis* in the Christian. In *Summa Doctrinae*, Cocceius’ abrogation theory is not only well harmonized with his doctrine of freedom, but also supports it on a deeper

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208 Van Asselt argues that this coordination disappeared in later Cocceian theology—split into either the salvation history scheme (the “Green Cocceians”) or the *ordo salutis* scheme (the “earnest” Cocceians), Van Asselt, *The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius*, 287.

209 “Caeterum, ut lex ceremonialis paulatim abrogata est, ita paulatim etiam libertatis Christianae exercitium crevit.” Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 74, §28 (p. 346).


212 Cocceius, *SD*, §192.


214 This observation confirms the validity of van Asselt’s interpretation of the abrogation theory, in which the salvation history is closely interconnected with the *ordo salutis*.
6.4. Conclusion: The *Pactum Salutis* and the Freedom of Creatures

The Reformed doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, like the Reformed doctrine of freedom, has been misunderstood as determinism. The Cocceian adumbration of the doctrines, however, clearly flies in the face of criticism of the determinism between time and eternity, and God’s decree and human freedom. Cocceius formulates the doctrine of freedom with various sources such as the Scriptures, Josephus, Epictetus, Plutarch, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, Augustine, Theodoretus, John of Damascus, Luther, Bellarmine, Descartes, and Menasseh Ben Israel. It is notable that he, unlike Turretin, does not cite Aristotle or any medieval authors, including Scotus, to frame the doctrine of freedom. Augustine is Cocceius’ main interlocutor and provides a common place in which he can dispute with his opponents such as the Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians. The Socinians argue that if God gives humans the power to do good works, it would make the free choice of humans cease entirely. To the Molinists, human beings can have the indifference of will to choose between good and evil because they have the freedom of contrariety in moral issues. The Tridentine theologians assume that the free choice of the postlapsarian humans is the same with that of the prelapsarian state. Against these ideas, Cocceius offers four main points in his doctrine of free will.

First, the notion of indifference cannot be consistent with the foreknowledge of God. If the indifferent will of human beings does not depend on God, he cannot know the future. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* for the constitution of Christ as mediator, however, teaches that the fall of human beings must have been foreknown. Every moral being,
including God himself, is not indifferent toward evil. The will of human beings is not indifferent in the prelapsarian, postlapsarian, and afterlife states.

Second, sinners are not free, and only believers are free in the biblical sense. Cocceius tries to comprehend the conception of will from “the spiritual state of human beings” (de hominis statu spirituali).  

215 True freedom is a state in which one loves God and lives a holy life. One who does not believe in God is a slave of sin and does not have freedom. The will of the sinner is not a free will but concupiscence. In the polemic context against the Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians, Cocceius only focuses on free choice for spiritual things (liberum arbitrium ad spiritualia). Notably, he does not deny that both believers and non-believers have a natural, civil, and external freedom (liberum arbitrium ad naturalia, civilia, externa), which is given to them by the protection and providence of God.  

216 He points out, however, that although some noble Gentiles do good works, their works are not from love, but from fear and desire.  

217 Cocceius consistently emphasizes that the postlapsarian human beings lost freedom as well as free choice, and that only the regenerates regain the true freedom. For this reason, in his comment on Galatians 2:14-21, he calls Christ “the declarer of liberty” (praedicator libertatis).  

219 This notion of freedom is narrowly defined in the polemic

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215 Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §2 (p. 230).

216 “Qui volunt, liberum arbitrium non quidem valere ad spiritualia, valere tamen ad naturalia, civilia, externa . . . quod divinae custodiae & providentiae est attribuendum . . .” Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §49 (pp. 234-35).

217 Cocceius, STh, cap. 32, §49 (p. 235).

218 For the interchangeability of freedom and free choice in Cocceius’ doctrine of free will, see notes 175 and 188.

219 Cocceius, STh, cap. 74, §§16–20 (p. 344).
context against the (Semi-)Pelagianism of the Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians.

Third, the fall of human beings is attributed to the mutability (*mutabilitas*) of the will of humanity. Cocceius distinguishes between the freedom of will and the mutability of will. The Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians regard freedom as the cause of the fall; whereas, Cocceius sees mutability as its cause. Cocceius argues that Augustine sides with him in the thought that the movement of the will causes the fall.\textsuperscript{220} This mutability comes not from the physical body but from the soul. Thus, the origin of the fall of Adam is the mutability of the free will of the human soul. Humans lost freedom due to their own fault, so God is not the author of sin.

Fourth, the notions of concurrence and contingency are endorsed to explain the relationship between the divine decree and human free will in a general term.\textsuperscript{221} The divine will is operating according to the determination of the divine counsel, but it concurs with all creaturely actions without infringing creatures’ enjoyment of freedom. The divine concurrence does not destroy the freedom and mutability of creatures.\textsuperscript{222} Rather, it occurs with them as an efficacy of primary cause. God permitted the sin of Adam and, though prohibiting the sin, concurred with his action. Cocceius repudiates the Jesuit conception of *concursus* and *indifferentia* through his emphasis on divine

\begin{footnotes}
\item[220] Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, 3.1.2; Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 25, §37 (p. 213).
\item[221] In this section, Cocceius considers the subject matter of freedom in general and does not confine it in a spiritual dimension.
\item[222] “*Consursus libertatem sive etiam mutabilitatem creaturae non tollit.*” Cocceius, *STh*, cap. 28, §25 (p. 218).
\end{footnotes}
foreknowledge and sovereignty. It is absurd that God eventually knows what happens only after he recognizes the will of creatures. The divine concurrence guarantees the contingency of creaturely actions, so an event or thing either might not exist or could be otherwise. The primary cause of the divine decree and will does not deny the liberty of the secondary cause of creatures. Therefore, the Cocceian doctrine of freedom does not lead to determinism.

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* well symphonizes with the freedom doctrine in the theology of Cocceius. If Christ is the declarer and dispenser of spiritual freedom, the *pactum salutis* must be essential to recover that freedom, since it is an intratrinitarian covenant to constitute Christ as mediator. God’s people, who were previously slaves of sin, regain freedom through the execution of the *pactum salutis*. Cocceius develops this idea in four phases.

First, Cocceius reiterates the freedom and voluntariness of Christ in the transaction and fulfillment of the *pactum*. Christ follows the will of the Father “willingly and with a free will” (*sponte & voluntate libera*) in his mediatorialship. His voluntariness strongly demonstrates the gracious characteristic of the *pactum*. Also, it indicates that one who obeys the will of God is most free. The divine grace does not diminish freedom but increases and confirms it.

Second, Cocceius stresses that the people of God are liberated from the power of sin through the *pactum salutis*. The people of God died to the law through the work of Christ and are set free from the law of sin and death. Christ gave his life as a ransom for God’s

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223 For the argument from divine foreknowledge and sovereignty, see note 193 of this study.

224 Cocceius, *SD*, §91 (p. 61).
foreknown people. He paid to God the payment for their sin and claimed their liberation according to the Father’s promise of the *pactum salutis*. Thus, the plan of the *pactum salutis* is the foundation of the freedom of believers.

Third, the Cocceian conception of concurrence can be used to explain the relationship of human free will and the *pactum salutis*. The divine decree of the *pactum* does not encroach human free will; rather, it restores the true freedom of humanity. Although Cocceius does not accept the peculiar notions of concurrence of the Remonstrants and the Jesuits, he adopts *concursum* as a useful tool for the description of the relationship between the human free will and the *pactum salutis*.

Fourth, Cocceius’ abrogation theory offers a very creative idea for the understanding of freedom in the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. The abrogation of the covenant of works and the establishment of the covenant of grace allow more space for the freedom of the people of God. The believers of the New Testament are liberated both from the unbearable yoke of the ceremonies and from servitude to the rulers of this age. They are set free from the law of sin and death and live according to the law of the Spirit in Christ. Christian freedom increases more than the freedom of Old Testament believers in agreement with the advancement of the salvation history, and the Christian can enjoy and experience the freedom conforming to the *ordo salutis*. The doctrine of freedom chimes with the Cocceian abrogation theory, which chronicles the gradual application of the *pactum salutis* both in the salvation history and the *ordo salutis*. To epitomize what has been said in the present study, in the theology of Cocceius the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* never leads to determinism; to the contrary, it elucidates the true meaning of freedom and the relationship of the divine decree and human free will.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: FORMULATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF
THE PACTUM SALUTIS

7.1. Basic Elements in the Formulation of the Pactum Salutis

The history of the doctrine of the pactum salutis can be traced back to Jerome, who in his comment on Zechariah 6:13 argues that “the counsel of peace will be between the two, which is referred to Father and Son.”1 Although some indications of the doctrine were found in medieval theology, it received the most attention in seventeenth-century Reformed theology. It took its initial form in Oecolampadius, Olevianus, Gomarus, and Junius, and was developed into a significant doctrine in Dickson, Cloppenburg, Cocceius, Goodwin, Baxter, Owen, and Witsius. It received a fixed place in the early modern Reformed dogmatics of Ames, Bulkeley, Patrick Gillespie, Burman, Braun, Vitringa, Turretin, Leydekker, Mastricht, Marck, Moor, Brakel, Thomas Brooks, Blake, Rutherford, and Essenius.2 The doctrine, however, was criticized by Deurhof, Wesselius, Boston, and Comrie and almost totally forgotten in dogmatics since the eighteenth century.3 Things have not changed greatly in more recent times. Most of modern Reformed dogmatics, with very few exceptions, tend to ignore the doctrine or harshly criticize it, as in the case of Karl Barth. This study, however, has sought to demonstrate not only the

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1 Hieronimus, Patrologia Latina, 25:1458B–C.
2 See notes of 1.2 of this study.
3 See notes of 1.3 of this study.
invalidity of criticisms of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* but also its practical implications for theology and the church. The main criticisms of the doctrine provide an incentive to create a more robust doctrine. Although I dealt with only one theologian in each chapter of this study, the *pactum* doctrines of Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius share main features of the following sections.

7.1.1. *Collatio Scripturae* (Collation of the Scriptures)

When the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was formed and developed, it did not depend on only a few vital scriptural verses. Rather, it was formed by cross-referencing and collation of many passages of the Scriptures. As Oecolampadius and Dickson readily show, the doctrine was a product of an exegetical development. In early modern times, the basic hermeneutical methodology of the Reformed theologians in their biblical interpretation was established on the assumption of the unity of the Scriptures as a whole, so they used the method of cross-referencing as many related scriptural verses as they could find.

In his adumbration of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, Witsius uses a distinctive strategy to give scriptural evidences for the doctrine. First, he draws on directly related biblical verses and offers his own comments on them. Second, he points to the most crucial theological terms and conceptions in these verses. Third, he finds other scriptural verses that contain these theological themes and other relevant ideas. Fourth, he relates these verses and ideas toward the formulation of the doctrine. The scriptural verses of the first step are Luke 22:29, Galatians 3:17, Hebrews 7:21-22, Psalm 119:122, Isaiah 38:14, Jeremiah 30:21, and Zechariah 6:13. The key terms of the second step for Witsius are
covenant of the Father and Christ (Luke 22:29, Galatians 3:17, and Zechariah 6:13) and Christ’s suretyship (Hebrews 7:21-22, Psalm 119:122, Isaiah 38:14, and Jeremiah 30:21). In the third step, Witsius extends his thought on the subject-matter toward the threefold office of Christ, the voluntary character of Christ’s salvation, and the relationship of the law and Christ. He presents correlated scriptural texts for these themes and comments on Psalms 2:8, 16:2, 40:7-9, Isaiah 38:14, 49:4, 49:6-8, 53:10-12, John 8:29, 10:18, 12:49, 14:31, 15:10, 19:30, 17:4-5, Galatians 4:4, and Revelation 13:8. In the last and fourth step, the doctrine of the pactum salutis is formulated toward a synthesis of these biblical studies. Not a few scriptural verses but the cross-referencing and collation of a series of biblical passages point to the conclusion that the relationship of Father and Son should be referred to in an eternal covenantal term. One who misses the inner logic of the biblical hermeneutics of Witsius might not understand the complex and nuanced scriptural foundation of the doctrine. One should try to understand this inner logic of the early modern biblical hermeneutics, before disqualifying the doctrine as unbiblical in reliance on postcritical commentaries on each scriptural verse used by the proponents of the doctrine.

It is also noteworthy that Witsius’ exegesis of Zechariah 6:13 and Galatians 3:17 is still found in modern biblical scholarship. To Witsius, Zechariah 6:13 is a major foundation of the doctrine of the pactum salutis, and Galatians 3:17 is a primary proof for the doctrine. For Zechariah 6:13, modern biblical scholar Marko Jauhiainen argues that a

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4 This method is also found in the doctrine of the pactum salutis of Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius.

5 Luke 22:29 could be excluded because the Greek text Witsius used is different from modern edition of the Greek New Testament.
natural reading of the text takes the first party of the “two” to be the Branch, and that the nearest possible candidate for the second party of the “two” is Yahweh. Jauhiainen’s exegesis was also defended, though without reference to the pactum salutis, by earlier interpreters such as Charles Wright, William Lowe, Edward Pusey, and David Baron.\(^6\) All of them interpret the “two” of Zechariah 6:13 as denoting the Branch and Yahweh. Steven Baugh argues that the Galatians passage presupposes the idea of pactum between the Father and the Son. He maintains that those who do not assume the idea of pactum cannot fully interpret the passage because Moses cannot mediate the promise made to Abraham and to his seed. Both the promisor and the promisee are one in this eternal intratrinitarian transaction (Galatians 3:20). Therefore, Witsius’ argument for the pactum salutis based on the two texts does not lack exegetical legitimacy among modern biblical scholarship. It should be stressed again, however, that the biblical foundation of the doctrine of the pactum salutis could be most fully understood sub specie early modern hermeneutical methodology.

7.1.2. Conciliatio Trinitatis (Close Relationship of the Trinity)

The formation of the doctrine of the pactum salutis sides with the early orthodox understanding of the ad intra and ad extra works of the three persons of the Trinity. The pactum is portrayed as an ad intra grounding of the ad extra work of redemption of the Trinity. It not only shows the intimate nexus of the ad intra and ad extra works but also confirms the inseparable close relationship of the three divine persons. In the ad extra application of the pactum salutis, the three persons of the Trinity are distinct but not

\(^6\) See notes of 2.3.1.4 of this study.
separable inasmuch as the will of the persons is one in the ad intra transaction of the pactum. Owen’s formulation of the pactum salutis makes this obvious by combining it with the doctrines of inseparable operations and terminus operationis. Some scholars who regard the doctrine of the pactum as a tritheistic idea have a propensity to believe that before the intratrinitarian transaction of the pactum there was a state in which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were not yet one. For example, when Barth points out “a wider dualism was introduced into the Godhead” in the doctrine of the pactum salutis, he believes that the doctrine mars “the one will of the one God.” For Barth, the doctrine teaches that “in God there are not merely different and fundamentally contradictory qualities, but also different subjects, who are indeed united in this matter, but had first of all to come to an agreement.” He argues that the doctrine considers “the possibility of some other form of His [God’s] will.” Thus Barth writes, “The question is necessarily and seriously raised of a will of God the Father which originally and basically is different from the will of God the Son.”

Owen’s doctrine of the pactum salutis, however, reveals that this interpretation could never capture the meaning of the pactum salutis. The principal tone of Owen’s doctrine of the Trinity is resonant both with Augustine and with Aquinas. God is one in essence and subsists in three persons. Based on this oneness/threeness idea, Owen builds up the

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7 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65.
8 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65.
9 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65.
10 KD IV/1, 69; CD IV/1, 65. The line of thought that Barth depicts here can be found in (what David Brown chooses to call) the “Plurality Model” (PM) in trinitarian theology. Brown argues that PM starts with the “threefoldness.” Put in experiential terms, “the experience of distinct Personhood antedates the realisation of a common identity” in PM. David Brown, The Divine Trinity (London: Duckworth, 1985), 243, 287 (italic is mine).
two doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis*. In his doctrine of inseparable operations, Augustine argues that although a divine work of a person of the Trinity is distinct from that of the other persons, it is not divisible from the other persons because of the three persons’ essential unity. Owen maintains, following the Augustinian doctrine of inseparable operations, that the three persons are distinct but work inseparably in *opera ad extra*. The doctrine of *terminus operationis* of the early modern Reformed theologians suggests an answer to the question of how the work of the three persons of the Trinity is distinct but inseparable. Owen, like his contemporary Reformed theologians, asserts that although the three divine persons of the Trinity determine economic works in one decree and will *ad intra*, the undivided *ad extra* works of the three divine persons manifest one of the persons as their end or limit of operation (*terminus operationis*). For example, the incarnation of the Son is willed and effected by the three persons of the Trinity but terminate in the Son alone. The doctrine of *terminus operationis* is a heritage of Aquinas, in which the trinitarian theologies of Augustine and John of Damascus merge together. Aquinas combines these two trinitarian theologies to elucidate the distinction of the divine work *in principle* and the divine work *in term*.

The two doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis* are endorsed in Owen’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Owen argues, according to the doctrine of inseparable operations, that the three persons of the Trinity are the common cause of the *pactum salutis*. He claims, applying the doctrine of *terminus operationis*, that the
distinctive work of the persons of the Trinity is revealed in the stipulations of the *pactum*. The two doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis* are intimately associated in the *pactum* formulation of Owen, who considers the *pactum salutis* as an *ad intra* transaction of the three divine persons regarding their *ad extra* redemptive works.

To make the doctrine more lucid, Owen appropriates the notion of *habitus* (habit or habitude; *hexis* in Greek) and the conception of “mutual in-being” in a way Aquinas uses. In the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in *Vindiciae Evangelicae* (1655), Owen describes the habitude of the Godhead as a new relation *ad extra*, which arises from the unity of the will of the three persons of the Trinity. Habitude is an aspect of the nature of God whereby he is able to act in a certain manner. It does not arise from the nature—thus, salvation is not a *necessary* work of God—but it is consistent with the nature. In the *pactum* doctrine of *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (1668-84), Owen introduces the conception of “mutual in-being.” The will of one person of the Trinity does not exclude the will of the other persons; rather, the three persons of the Trinity always act concomitantly by way of their mutual in-being.12

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12 Owen, *Works*, 20:369. Owen writes, “Observe also, that such was the inconceivable love of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, unto the souls of men, that he was free and willing to condescend unto any condition for their good and salvation. That was the end of all this dispensation. And the Lord Christ was not humbled and made less than the angels without his own will and consent. His will and good liking concurred unto this work.” See also, his *Works*, 12:346 and 23:56. Owen so easily writes of the one will of God and yet ascribes a will to each person of the Godhead. This sounds like the so-called “social Trinitarianism.” Owen’s view, however, cannot be reconciled with social Trinitarianism. His view, as Wittman puts it, would likely be opposed to almost all the various forms of social Trinitarianism (Wittman, “The End of the Incarnation,” 291). For an overview of modern forms of social Trinitarianism, see McCall, *Which Trinity?*, 11–55; Holmes, “Three Versus One? Some Problems of Social Trinitarianism”; Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” 203–49. See note 219 of chapter 3 of this study. Generally, social Trinitarians envision three distinct wills or centers of consciousness which are often tied to person rather than nature. For example, Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom*, 144-45; Jürgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 243-44. See also Scott Horrell’s definition of the social model of the Trinity in his article, “Toward a Biblical Model of the Social Trinity,” 399 (i.e., “the one divine Being eternally exists as three distinct centers of consciousness, wholly equal in nature, genuinely personal in relationships, and each mutually indwelling the other”). See also Cornelius Plantinga, “Social Trinity and
Owen consistently locates the will in the divine nature and therefore affirms only one will in the Godhead. He does not consider three different consciousnesses in the Trinity. When Owen depicts the will of the three divine persons in their mutual in-being as distinct, he means that the persons are distinct modally (modaliter), as one manner of subsisting from another. The modal distinction (distinctio modalis), endorsed often by early modern Reformed theologians, is a distinction between various ways in which a thing subsists. Owen’s notion of the distinct will of the Trinity in mutual in-being

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13 Owen argues very clearly, “The will is a natural property, and therefore in the divine essence it is but one” (Works, 19:87).

14 Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 94, 195.
refers to *ad intra* “modal” distinctions, not—as in Sabellianism—to *ad extra* roles or modes of self-presentation.15 “The Trinity is not the union or unity of three,” maintains Owen, “but it is a trinity in unity, or the ternary number of persons in the same essence.”16

Owen uses not the notion of “community of will,” but the conception of “appropriation of will” in the Trinity.17 The notion of *community* of will can lead to a denial of the unity of the Trinity in the substance or essence that the three divine persons share in common. Owen maintains, however, that the will of the Father can be distinguished from the will of the Son “by the distinct application of the same will unto its *distinct acts* in the persons the Father and the Son.”18 For Owen, the will of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is only one, but in respect of their distinct personal actings, “this will is appropriated to *them respectively*; so that the will of the Father and the will of the Son may be considered [distinctly] in this business; which though essentially one and the same, yet in their distinct personality it is distinctly considered, as the will of the Father and the will of the Son.”19 In addition to that, if the appropriated will of the Trinity presupposes the unity of the essence of the Godhead, the intertrinitarian relationship cannot be endorsed to represent human relationships. Owen does not use the notion of mutual in-being for the

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17 Similarly, Witsius argues that in the intercessory prayer of John 17, the will of the Father *concurs* with the will of Jesus Christ. Witsius, *Sacred Dissertations*, 1:274–75.
19 Owen, *Works*, 12:497 (italics are mine).
description of human relationships.\textsuperscript{20}

Owen offers the ideas of mutual in-being without any citation of sources. It is clear, however, that the most possible source is the Thomistic formulation of trinitarian logic. Although the conception of mutual in-being, rooted in John’s Gospel, was developed through the Eastern fathers, it was passed to medieval Latin tradition through the translation of John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa. Aquinas uses the expression of “in being” (\textit{in esse}) to argue the complete equality between the three persons of the Trinity. Owen’s formulation of the \textit{pactum salutis}, arguably, follows the Thomistic notion of “in being.”

The doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis} in Owen’s theology, therefore, is not only consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity but is an excellent model for the understanding of the Trinity. In the doctrine, it is well demonstrated that the threeness of the persons and their distinct works do not conflict with the oneness of essence. The doctrine, as an \textit{ad intra} transaction with regard to the three persons’ \textit{ad extra} works and their \textit{terminus}, articulates both the oneness and threeness dimensions of the trinitarian work of redemption. The work of redemption is an undertaking of the one God in three persons, in which all cooperate and each one performs a special task in \textit{terminus}. It is the triune God who together conceive and carry out the \textit{pactum salutis}.

7.1.3. Christus Voluntarius (Christ’s Voluntariness)

The voluntariness of the Son in the \textit{pactum} is not omitted in the formulation of the

\textsuperscript{20} Goodwin is also convinced that the perichoretic union of the Trinity cannot be communicable to any other creatures. See note 137 of chapter 5 of this study.
doctrine of the *pactum* in the works of the early modern Reformed theologians. They not only explain it from the stance of the agreement of the will of the three divine persons but also emphasize the Son’s voluntary consent and obedience of the will. The Son’s obedience in the *pactum* does not lead to any subordination of his divinity or essence. Rather, it confirms the divinity of the Son, for the mediatorship and suretyship cannot be accomplished without the full divinity of the Son. Dickson’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* makes it very obvious that the *pactum* does not entail the subordination of the Son.

In his comments on Matthew 20:28 and Mark 10:45, Dickson points out that Christ willingly gave his life as a ransom (λύτρον) for many. His two commentaries on Hebrews also illuminate the divinity of Christ in the transaction and fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. Christ offered himself to concur with the will of the Father, and there is no tension or hierarchy in the ordering of the divine decrees. Dickson argues in his Speech to the General Assembly (1638) that there is a coequality between the Father and the Son in the mutual agreement of the eternal transaction of the *pactum*, and that Christ the mediator has the divine power to effect and protect the salvation of the elect. Dickson’s *Exposition of the Epistles* also highlights the voluntariness of Christ in the agreement of the *pactum salutis* for his mediatorship, suretyship, and the price of redemption. Christ, who obeyed the Father to pay the price of redemption in his humiliation, gives salvation to the elect with power and right, which he obtained through the fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. In *Exposition of the Evangel According to Matthew* (1647), Dickson, on the one hand, stresses that Jesus Christ is true and almighty God, and points out, on the other hand, that Christ voluntarily obeyed the will of the Father because of the stipulations of the *pactum*. Dickson’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* does not stand to the exclusion of
the equality between the Father and the Son. *The Summe of Saving Knowledge* (1649) also articulates that the one who made the *pactum salutis* is the eternal Son of God. The *pactum* was agreed upon between God the Father and God the Son in the counsel of the Trinity. Dickson’s *Commentaries on Psalms* holds on to this basic idea of the coequality of the Father and the Son in the concurrence of the *pactum salutis*. A strong connection between the *pactum salutis* and the divinity and humanity of Christ is clearly expounded in the *pactum* formulation in Dickson’s commentary on Psalms. *Therapeutica Sacra* (Latin edition, 1656; English edition, 1664) describes the *pactum salutis* as an intratrinitarian covenant, in which Christ determines to obey in both passive and active manner as a free and voluntary agent to fulfill the *pactum*. Christ voluntarily emptied himself for the redemptive work.

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* of Dickson’s theology has three points to refute any subordinationism. First, Dickson highlights the divinity of Christ both in the transaction and fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. Christ is co-equal with the Father in the transaction of the *pactum*. Christ is the only begotten Son of God and has the same substance with the Father. He is eternally undivided from God, and the whole divine essence is communicated to him. Christ, as the sovereign God, actually effects and protects the salvation of the elect. The Christ who administers the *pactum salutis* with the Father is the consubstantial Word of the Father. Second, there is a definite distinction between Christ’s natural consubstantiality with the Father and his voluntary subordination to him for the fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. The intratrinitarian covenantal interaction was a mutually voluntary agreement. The Son’s obedience in his earthly ministry does not signify his subordinate rank but exhibits the unity of will between the divine persons. The
incarnate Son of God voluntarily obeyed unto death because he willingly accepted the stipulations of the *pactum salutis*. He earns the right to bestow salvation to the elect through his obedience. Only the Son who subsists with the Father from eternity can pay the ransom price for his people. His voluntariness in the *pactum salutis* makes sure the salvation of the elect because he is bound to the *pactum* that he has voluntarily sanctioned. Third, Dickson relates the covenantal characteristic of Christ’s redemptive work with the idea of the self-emptying of Christ. Although Christ hated the cup of the wrath of God, he emptied himself of natural abilities and voluntarily chose to receive God’s wrath owing to the *pactum salutis*. In his humiliation, Christ emptied himself to hide his glory, took on the shape of a servant, and willingly exposed himself to temptations of sin. According to Dickson’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, Christ did not exert his majesty by virtue of the *pactum salutis*. This does not indicate subordinationism because it is an economical humiliation based on Christ’s voluntary transaction of the *pactum salutis*. Thus, for Dickson, the *pactum salutis* does not contain the danger of the immanent subordination of Christ but explains the logic of the economic subordination and obedience of Christ to the Father.

7.1.4. *Concurusus Spiritus* (Concurrence of the Holy Spirit)

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* can be misunderstood as if it implies binitarianism, since the *pactum salutis* is a pact *between the Father and the Son* to constitute the latter as mediator. The role of the Holy Spirit seems obscure in this transaction. It is noteworthy, however, that the doctrine was developed in the background of a concrete trinitarianism of the early modern Reformed theology. Those who examine the full scale
of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in Goodwin’s theology cannot but admit that the Holy Spirit plays a very significant role in the doctrine.\(^{21}\)

Goodwin’s understanding of the Holy Spirit is in accordance with the western tradition. He acknowledges the *filioque* not only from the ontological perspective but from the economic perspective. And then he identifies *two aspects* of the economic procession of the Holy Spirit—a *single procession* as an “ambassador” or another “witness” and a *double procession* as a mirror of the ontological double procession.\(^{22}\) The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by way of love, so the double procession of the Spirit is a basis of the Spirit’s peculiar role of “*vinculum Trinitatis*” (bond of the Trinity) for the union of the Father and the Son. Goodwin improves the Augustinian portrayal of the Spirit as love through his emphasis on the personality of the Spirit. He claims that the Holy Spirit is the *personalized love*, who links the Father and the Son, and works in the believer. The Pneumatology of Goodwin never fails to mark the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son. The double procession and the divine works of the Holy Spirit, argues Goodwin, shape the ground of his co-equality with the Father and the Son.

Some modern theologians such as Moltmann criticize the Chalcedon two-nature Christology because it could be problematic from their particular philosophical perspective and would tend towards unrealistic representations of Jesus’ earthly life from

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\(^{21}\) Witsius also argues that the Holy Spirit engaged the *pactum salutis*. Witsius, *De oeconomia foederum*, II.3.2. For the Spirit’s role in the *pactum salutis* in the doctrines of Owen, Dickson, and Cocceius see 3.3.2.1, 4.2.2.8, and 6.3.1.3 of this study.

\(^{22}\) Muller writes, “The *ad intra* procession of the Spirit is mirrored and followed by the *ad extra* procession or ‘mission’ of the Spirit” in the early modern Reformed theology. Muller, *PRRD*, 4:378. See also Beeke and Jones, *A Puritan Theology*, 97-98.
the biblical perspective. Goodwin’s Christology, however, overcomes the potential dangers of a seemingly rigid two-nature Christology with its strong emphasis on Christ’s dependence on the Holy Spirit. Goodwin tries to explain Christ’s full deity from the Spirit’s work on Christ. In relation with this idea, he combines the doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis*. Although the persons share the same *substance*, the operation of each person can be differentiated for their distinct personalities. Certain *ad extra* works of the Trinity are more particularly attributed to one of the persons because the work bears the distinctiveness of the *subsistence* of the person. There is a parallel between the *modus essendi* (i.e., the distinction of the three persons) and the *modus operandi* (i.e., the distinction of their operation and concurrence). The three persons of the Trinity, however, concur in every redemptive work *ad extra*.

Goodwin appropriates this trinitarian logic in his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. First, the Holy Spirit is one of the legal partners of the *pactum*. The work of salvation, claims Goodwin, has been transacted by the three persons of the Trinity. He portrays specifically the Holy Spirit as the “Recorder” of the transactions of the eternal counsel of the *pactum*. In a scriptural type of intra-trinitarian discourse to describe the *pactum salutis* (Goodwin’s exegesis of Isaiah 49), the Spirit promises to sanctify the people for whom Christ paid the price of redemption. For Goodwin, the Spirit is the *ultima manus* (the last hand) in the transaction of the *pactum* as well as in creation. Thus, the *pactum salutis* cannot stand without the consent and promise of the Spirit. Second and more importantly, the Holy Spirit concurs in every step of Christ’s earthly works. The elements of the *pactum salutis*, such as Christ’s conception, threefold office, baptism, sermons, miracles, resurrection, ascension, and heavenly kingship, are all accomplished through the power
of the Holy Spirit. Christ becomes incarnate and fulfills his work by the Spirit, and the Spirit works through Christ having been sent by the Father and imparted by the Son.\(^{23}\) The person and work of Christ are dynamically associated with the Holy Spirit. For example, the Spirit prepared and sanctified the human nature of Christ, although it was Christ who assumed the human nature. The Spirit grants his grace and power in inaugurating, sustaining, and perfecting the redemptive work of Christ. Third and lastly, the role of the Holy Spirit is prominent in the application of the \textit{pactum} for the believer. There are distinct concurrences and appearances of all three divine persons at the effecting of the work of regeneration in humans. For Goodwin, however, the work of regeneration is efficiently and more eminently attributed to the Holy Spirit. Goodwin endorses the trinitarian logic of the doctrines of inseparable operations and \textit{terminus operationis} in his soteriology. Although each of the three persons of the Trinity concurs in the work of redemption, it is the Holy Spirit who applies the redemption of the \textit{pactum salutis} in history. During the process of the execution of the \textit{pactum}, the Spirit makes the work of the Father and the Son actually the possession of the believer. Believers now have a Christ-and-Spirit-shaped vision that is described in the \textit{pactum}. They are the people of God in Christ, indwelt by the Spirit. The Spirit’s presence in the life of the believer cannot be properly understood apart from the pneumatological aspect of Christ’s own mission. Christ is not only the \textit{bearer} of the Spirit but also the \textit{sender} of the Spirit.\(^{24}\)

The Spirit who worked in the earthly mission of Christ is the Spirit who is present, works,

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\(^{24}\) Del Colle, \textit{Christ and the Spirit}, 27, 29.
and empowers in the life of the believer. Thus, though the Scriptures are relatively silent on the Spirit’s role in the *pactum*, it should be understood to include the soteric dimension of the Spirit as well as the christological aspect. When the *pactum* is recognized as an *ad intra* trinitarian grounding for the *ad extra* work of salvation, the Holy Spirit cannot be omitted for the *pactum* inasmuch as the Holy Spirit makes effective the temporal administration of the *pactum* for the believer. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is not just christological but pneumatological in its full meaning.

7.1.5. *Contingentia Creaturae* (Contingency of Creatures)

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* has been a target of criticism as implying a deterministic idea. To some critics, the doctrine mars the inherent freedom of the intratrinitarian relationship as well as human free will. This criticism corresponds with the persistent misunderstanding about the Reformed view of freedom and divine decree. Cocceius’ doctrine of the *pactum salutis* satisfactorily dispels the above misunderstanding. His vast knowledge of the Greco-Roman, patristic, Jewish, Roman-Catholic, and Protestant writers as well as admirable erudition of the Scriptures helps him to formulate a much nuanced view on the relationship between freedom and the *pactum salutis*. His delicate interpretation of the Augustinian works makes his doctrine of freedom more convincing. Augustine is not only his constant dialogue partner but a common basis for the discussion against the Socinians, the Molinists, the Remonstrants, and the Tridentine theologians.

Cocceius, first of all, tries to understand freedom from the *spiritual* state of human beings (*de hominis statu spirituali*). Sinners are never free, since they are in servitude of
sin, death, and Satan. Their will is not a free will but concupiscence. Only the people of God enjoy true freedom—a freedom to love God and to live a holy life. Secondly, Cocceius underscores that human will is not indifferent, either in the prelapsarian or postlapsarian states. Freedom does not arise from an indifference of the will but comes from the spiritual holiness and righteousness that God gives. Moreover, divine foreknowledge and sovereignty do not permit the indifference of human will. Thirdly, the fall of humans is ascribed to the mutability of human will. The Socinians, the Molinists, and the Tridentine theologians consider freedom as the cause of the fall; whereas, Cocceius, depending on Augustine’s works, sees mutability as its cause. The origin of the fall of human beings is the mutability of human free will, so the author of sin is not God but humans. For these three polemical issues, Cocceius endorses only the spiritual understanding of freedom. Fourthly, Cocceius appropriates the notions of concurrence to explain the relationship between the divine decree and human free will. For this explanation, Cocceius utilizes a more generic conception of freedom. Cocceius acknowledges that both believers and non-believers have a natural, civil, and external freedom in God’s providence to protect the world. The divine will concurs with both the spiritual freedom (liberum arbitrium ad spiritualia) and the natural, civil, and external freedom (liberum arbitrium ad naturalia, civilia, externa). It does not encroach on the creaturely enjoyment of freedom. It occurs with the creaturely freedom as an efficacy of primary cause. Fifthly, the concurrence of the divine will ensures the contingency of creaturely actions. An event or thing either might not exist or could be otherwise in the contingency. The divine will qua the primary cause does not annihilate the freedom of creatures qua the secondary cause.
Cocceius connects his doctrine of freedom with the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. First, Christ follows the will of the Father willingly both in the transaction and fulfillment of the *pactum*. Cocceius, citing Augustine, contends that it is absurd that Christ is not free when he sets us free. Second, Christ declares spiritual freedom for the people of God in the *pactum salutis*. The people of God are liberated from the power of sin through his accomplishment of the *pactum salutis*. Christ paid to God the payment for the sin of the people of God and claimed their liberation according to the stipulation of the *pactum salutis*. The *pactum salutis* is an intratrinitarian covenant for the freedom of believers. Third, there is a concurrence between the divine will and human free will in the *pactum*. This concurrence secures the contingency of human free will in the administration of the *pactum salutis*. Fourth, the abrogation theory of Cocceius expands the understanding of freedom in the doctrine of the *pactum*. The gradual abrogation of the covenant of works and the ongoing establishment of the covenant of grace allow more freedom for the people of God. In particular, the believers of the New Testament are set free from the Old Testament ceremonies as well as the servitude to sin and death. The New Testament people of God can enjoy more freedom than the Israelites of the Old Testament inasmuch as they live in the Holy Spirit through the redemptive work of Christ. The increase of freedom is also effective in accordance with the *ordo salutis* of the Christian. The abrogation theory of Cocceius matches well his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, since both doctrines contain the two aspects of the salvation history and the *ordo salutis*. In the harmonization of these two doctrines, Cocceius maximizes the soteriological relevance of his understanding of freedom. By so doing, he compellingly demonstrates that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* never leads to determinism. The above five basic elements (i.e.,
collation of the Scriptures, close relationship of the Trinity, Christ’s voluntariness, 
concurrence of the Holy Spirit, and contingency of creatures) will help formulate a robust 
d Doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. The ramification of this analysis suggests that a solid 
pactum doctrine can enjoy a firm biblical base, a safe position within the boundaries of 
traditionary orthodoxy regarding the Trinity, Christology, and Pneumatology, and, finally, 
the ability to turn back unwarranted complaints that it succumbs to determinism.

7.2. Practical Implications of the *Pactum Salutis* for Theology and the Church

The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* ought to be affirmed not only because it can be 
defended from biblical, trinitarian, christological, pneumatological, and soteriological 
perspectives, but because it can contribute to enrich various theological loci. First, the 
d doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is appropriated to support the doctrine of particular 
redemption against the Arminians and universalism, as exemplified by Dickson, Owen, 
and Cocceius.\(^{25}\) Dickson argues against the Arminians that according to the doctrine of 
the *pactum salutis*, the salvation of the elect is not in any way fortuitous or uncertain.\(^ {26}\) 
In his view, Christ paid the price of redemption to the Father for the elect. The doctrine 
assures the elect that God “knows them, while he calls them to his kingdom of both grace 
and glory; he knows them, *when it was agreed betwixt him and his Son about the price of 
their redemption*, when he gave them to Christ, and Christ took in hand to satisfy for 
them.”\(^ {27}\) Thus, for Dickson, the Arminian view of conversion and salvation, which keeps

\(^{25}\) Other theologians of this study (i.e., Witsius, Owen, and Goodwin) also argue the same point.

\(^{26}\) Dickson, “Speech before the General Assembly,” 158.

\(^{27}\) Dickson, *Select practical writing*, 1:101 (italics mine).
the salvation in suspense, is erroneous. Along the same lines of thought, Owen’s refutation of universalism is based on the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Owen contends that nothing is bestowed through Christ “on those that are his which he hath not purchased.” In the covenant between the Father and Christ, the price was made for the purchase of those “that were given unto him [Christ].” Likewise, Cocceius appeals to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* as a powerful artillery against the Socinians, the Remonstrants, the Jesuits, and the Tridentine theologians. He endorses the doctrine, in particular, to refute the universalism of the Remonstrants (*Summa Doctrinae*, chapter 5, §§108-149). For him it is very clear that the Bible does not teach universalism, since Christ cannot be the Second Adam for those who are not predestined in him. The *pactum salutis* pertains only to the elect for whom the Father and the Son arranged a kingdom by testament. In the *pactum salutis*, as Horton puts it, “the Father elected a certain number of the human race and gave them to his Son as their guardian and mediator, with the Spirit pledging to bring them to Christ to receive all the benefits of his mediation.” As long as the *pactum salutis* has a part in it for the confirmation of the price of redemption of the elect, it cannot be reconciled with universalism.

Second, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* provides additional ramifications to federal theology. As Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius would affirm, the *pactum*

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30 Cocceius, *SD*, §112 (p. 65).

31 Cocceius, *SD*, §150 (p. 69).

*salutis* is the ground and efficacy of the covenant of grace, and the covenant of grace is the fulfillment of the covenant of redemption. For them, the *pactum salutis* is an eternal transaction between the Father and the Son to appoint the mediator, and the covenant of grace is based on the transaction and fulfilled by means of the mediator. The *pactum salutis* serves to manifest the eternal foundation of the temporal administrations of the covenant of grace.33 Thus, the *pactum salutis* firmly secures the gracious characteristic of the covenant of grace and its certainty. It is the basis for all of God’s redemptive works in nature and history. The basis of all covenants in time was found, as Bavinck puts it, in the stable and eternal covenant between the very persons of the Trinity—the *pactum salutis*.34

Third, the *pactum salutis* protects the assurance of salvation. The *pactum* makes the salvation of the elect inviolable because it is not conditioned on the human side but on the immutable will of the triune God.35 Human beings are not even a part of the eternal intratrinitarian pact. Salvation starts not from human effort but bursts from the heart of the Trinity. The will of the three persons of the Trinity is one in the *pactum salutis* to cure the tragedy caused by the fall of human beings. From the perspective of the *pactum salutis*, the salvation of the elect is not a possibility but a certainty, as the five theologians of this study emphatically contend, since the Son was constituted as its surety and mediator in the *pactum*. It is Christ who eternally secures the salvation of the elect in the *pactum salutis*. Christ, as Witsius well formulated, accomplishes the threefold office of

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33 Muller, *PRRD*, 316n484.


prophet, king, and priest owing to the pactum. Although believers cannot know that they are among the elect, they can certainly know that they belong to the covenant of grace of which the foundation is the pactum salutis. All those who are members in the covenant of grace can believe Christ is the executor of the pactum salutis, and are assured thereby of final salvation because of the certainty of the promise of the pactum. The promise is not a fiction or a pretense. It is God’s decision in eternity and in the present that the person who believes in Jesus Christ is a member of the covenant family, whose sins have been dealt with by the Surety and who is therefore assured of eternal life in the comfort of the Spirit. It is precisely at the center of the trinitarian promise of the pactum salutis that believers are assured that they are indeed the people of the one true God, revealed in the works of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, and can have courage and confidence to trust him and live according to his words in the world. The doctrine of the pactum salutis will shed light on those Christians who really did believe in Jesus Christ as their Lord, but who failed in this life to enjoy the assurance of salvation which is theirs for the taking, because they were never told that the triune God already transacted a divine covenant for them in eternity and accomplishes it for them in the present because of his absolute and changeless decision.36

Fourth, the pactum salutis offers a vivid dynamic for the sanctification of the believer. In the pactum salutis, Christ died for the sins of his people and was raised for their

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justification.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, the \textit{pactum salutis} establishes the unconditional ground for the salvation of the believer. As God’s true people, they are therefore assured of eternal life, based on the covenant blessings of forgiveness and the Spirit. It should be also noted, however, that the \textit{pactum salutis} is administered in the process of sanctification in the covenant of grace. Spiritual grace and mercy of both justification and sanctification, as Owen summarizes it, flow from the \textit{pactum salutis}. Owen argues that in the historical unfolding of the \textit{pactum salutis}, God sanctifies his people by purging away the uncleanness and pollution of their sins, renewing in them the image of God, and supplying them with the graces of the Spirit of holiness. Dickson stands along with this idea that according to the \textit{pactum salutis} the believer will be converted and sanctified owing to the Son of God’s satisfaction and obedience. According to Goodwin, as is shown above, the Holy Spirit promises to sanctify the people for whom Christ gave his life as ransom. He also points out that the most important promise of the \textit{pactum salutis} is the union with Christ, which is the first fundamental thing of justification and sanctification. In the covenant of grace as the accomplishment of the \textit{pactum salutis}, argues Goodwin, Christ first unites himself with believers and then sends his Spirit to sanctify them. The \textit{pactum salutis} ensures that our unfaithfulness will not have the last word.\textsuperscript{38} When believers realize that the passion of the three persons of the Trinity accomplishes the promises of the \textit{pactum}, they will do their best in the life of sanctification in their friendship with God.

Fifth and lastly, the trinitarian characteristic of the doctrine of the \textit{pactum salutis}


\textsuperscript{38} Horton, \textit{The Christian Faith}, 870.
demonstrates the significance of the *trinitarian* approach in the formulation of *soteriology*. The five theologians of this study do not omit any person of the Trinity in their *pactum* doctrine. They claim that the three persons of the Trinity mutually committed themselves to the redemptive work from eternity in the *pactum salutis*. The mediatorship of Christ reflects the nature of the triune God as well as the voluntary decision of the three divine persons. The most perfect union of the three persons of the Trinity is revealed from the beginning of soteriology—in the *pactum salutis*. The doctrine exemplifies and confirms the oneness and threeness of the Godhead. It teaches us that any of the three divine persons should not be ignored or omitted in the work of redemption. The close mutuality of Father, Son, and Spirit is clearly demonstrated in the *pactum*. The eternal transaction of the *pactum* and its execution in history can be accomplished only from the Father, in the Son, through the Holy Spirit. These five aspects point to the usefulness of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Therefore, the evidence from this study suggests that although the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* basically belongs to one locus of covenant theology, it has many practical implications for theology and the church. It is a doctrine both promised and promising.
APPENDIX: THESSES FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE

Theses Pertaining to the Ph.D. Dissertation

1. Although the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* can be traced back to Jerome and some indications of the doctrine were found in medieval theology, it received the most attention from seventeenth-century Reformed theologians such as Dickson, Cloppenburg, Cocceius, Goodwin, Baxter, Owen, Witsius, Ames, Bulkeley, Patrick Gillespie, Burman, Vitrinja, Turretin, Leydekker, Mastricht, à Brakel, Thomas Brooks, Blake, Rutherford, and Essenius. Many modern researchers of the doctrine have a consensus that Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius were the great codifiers of the doctrine.

2. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* was criticized and almost totally forgotten in dogmatics since the eighteenth century mainly for five reasons: (1) the doctrine lacks biblical evidence; (2) it incurs suspicion of tritheism; (3) it leads to subordinationism on the part of the Son; (4) it omits the role of the Holy Spirit; and (5) it brings about a perverted view of human freedom. However, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* formulated by Witsius, Owen, Dickson, Goodwin, and Cocceius can not only give satisfactory answers to the above five criticisms but has very highly useful implications in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, Pneumatology, and soteriology.

3. Witsius uses a distinctive strategy to give scriptural evidences for the doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. First, he draws on directly related biblical verses (i.e., Luke 22:29, Galatians 3:17, Hebrews 7:21-22, Psalm 119:122, Isaiah 38:14, Jeremiah 30:21, and Zechariah 6:13) and offers his own comments on them. Second, he points to the most crucial theological terms and conceptions in these verses—in particular, the mediatorship and suretyship of Christ. Third, he finds other scriptural verses that contain these theological themes and other relevant ideas such as the threefold office of Christ, the voluntary character of Christ’s salvation, and the relationship of the law and Christ. Fourth, he relates these verses and ideas toward the formulation of the doctrine. Witsius demonstrates the biblical foundation of the *pactum salutis* by this method of cross-referencing and collation of related scriptural passages.

4. Witsius’ exegesis of Zechariah 6:13 and Galatians 3:17 in relation to the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* can still find similar voices among modern biblical scholarship such as Marko Jauhiainen, Charles Wright, William Lowe, Edward Pusey, David Baron, and Steven Baugh.

5. In his trinitarian theology, Owen maintains, following the Augustinian doctrine of inseparable operations, that the three persons are distinct but work inseparably in *opera ad extra*. Like Thomas Aquinas and early modern Reformed theologians, Owen argues that although the three divine persons of the Trinity determine
economic works in one decree and will *ad intra*, the undivided *ad extra* works of the three divine persons manifest one of the persons as their end or limit of operation (*terminus operationis*).

6. The two doctrines of inseparable operations and *terminus operationis* are endorsed in Owen’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis*. Owen argues, according to the doctrine of inseparable operations, that the three persons of the Trinity are the common cause of the *pactum salutis*. He claims, applying the doctrine of *terminus operationis*, that the distinctive work of the persons of the Trinity is revealed in the stipulations of the *pactum*.

7. Dickson’s doctrine of the *pactum salutis* makes it very obvious that the *pactum* does not entail the danger of the immanent subordination of Christ. Rather, it confirms the divinity of the Son, for the mediatorship and suretyship cannot be accomplished without the full divinity of the Son.

8. In his comments on Matthew 20:28 and Mark 10:45, Dickson points out that Christ willingly gave his life as a ransom (λύτρον) for many. His *pactum* doctrine explains the logic of the economic subordination and obedience of Christ to the Father in three points. First, Dickson highlights the divinity of Christ both in the transaction and fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. Second, he argues that there is a definite distinction between Christ’s natural consubstantiality with the Father and his voluntary subordination to him for the fulfillment of the *pactum salutis*. Third, he relates the covenantal characteristic of Christ’s redemptive work with the idea of the self-emptying of Christ.

9. Dickson argues that although Christ hated the cup of the wrath of God, he emptied himself of natural abilities and voluntarily chose to receive God’s wrath owing to the *pactum salutis*. Christ, per Dickson’s *pactum* doctrine, did not exert his majesty by virtue of the *pactum*. This does not indicate subordinationism because it is an economical humiliation based on Christ’s voluntary transaction of the *pactum*.

10. When the *pactum* is recognized as an *ad intra* trinitarian grounding for the *ad extra* work of salvation, the Holy Spirit cannot be omitted for the *pactum* inasmuch as the Spirit makes effective the temporal administration of the *pactum* for the believer. Goodwin makes it very clear that the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is not just christological but pneumatological in its full meaning.

11. In his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, Goodwin appropriates the trinitarian logic in which the three persons of the Trinity concur in every redemptive work *ad extra*. He offers three arguments to demonstrate the role of the Holy Spirit in the *pactum salutis*. First, the Holy Spirit is one of the legal partners of the *pactum*. Second, the Spirit concurs in every step of Christ’s earthly works. Third, the role of the Holy Spirit is prominent in the application of the *pactum* for the believer.
12. Cocceius connects his doctrine of freedom with the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* in four points. First, Christ follows the will of the Father willingly both in the transaction and fulfillment of the *pactum*. Second, Christ declares spiritual freedom for the people of God in the *pactum*. Third, there is a concurrence between the divine will and human free will in the *pactum*. Fourth, the abrogation theory of Cocceius expands the understanding of freedom in the doctrine of the *pactum*.

13. In the *pactum* doctrine of Cocceius, the gradual abrogation of the covenant of works and the ongoing establishment of the covenant of grace allow more freedom for the people of God. In particular, the believers of the New Testament are set free from the Old Testament ceremonies as well as the servitude to sin and death. The increase of freedom is also effective in accordance with the *ordo salutis* of the Christian. The abrogation theory of Cocceius matches well his doctrine of the *pactum salutis*, since both doctrines contain the two aspects of the salvation history and the *ordo salutis*.

14. The doctrine of the *pactum salutis* ought to be affirmed not only because it can be defended from biblical, trinitarian, christological, pneumatological, and soteriological perspectives, but because it can contribute to enrich various theological loci. First, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* is appropriated to support the doctrine of particular redemption against the Arminians and universalism. Second, the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* provides additional ramifications to federal theology. Third, the *pactum salutis* protects the assurance of salvation. Fourth, the *pactum salutis* offers a vivid dynamic for the sanctification of the believer. Fifth and lastly, the trinitarian characteristic of the doctrine of the *pactum salutis* demonstrates the significance of the trinitarian approach in the formulation of soteriology.

**Theses Pertaining to the Ph.D. Coursework**

15. Augustine stresses the importance of humiliation in the study of Scripture in *De doctrina christiana*. He regards the duplex commandment of love in Matthew 22:37-40 as the heart of Christian faith. Although he emphasizes the importance of the knowledge of signs, oratory, literature, and philosophy, he more underscores the meaning of diligent study of the Bible and prayer. He also encourages the interpreter and preacher of Scripture to seek a good manner of life and, most of all, to love God and neighbor.

16. The notion of pilgrimage is essential for understanding the political thought that Augustine develops in *De civitate Dei*. Augustine’s ideas of pilgrimage stem from his “pilgrim eschatology,” which regulates the entire political aspect of the Christian’s life. He does not lay any neutral realm between the city of God and the earthly city. The political work of the pilgrims of the city of God for the citizens of the earthly city is associated with evangelism (persuasion to love God), peace (the mutual aim of the two cities), justice (which starts from true worship), and prayer (which is intending toward the final perfection).
17. De origine animi Augustinus quattuor sententias proponit in opere eius *De libero arbitrio*: traducianismus, creatianismus, incarnatio a deo, voluntaria incarnatio animi antecedentis. Quamquam de hac rogatione sententiam sine dubitatione quadam affirmare non potest, ubique tamen Augustini enarrationes in Scripturam malle primam sententiam testantur. Quemadmodum ratio traducianismi peccatum originale Adami explicare melius quam alias potest, Augustinus hanc sententiam esse veritati proximam sugerit. (English Translation: Augustine suggests four hypotheses for the issue of the soul’s origin in his work, *De libero arbitrio*: the traducianist view, the creationist view, the theory of embodiment by God, and the theory of voluntary embodiment of pre-existent souls. Although Augustine does not arrive at a definite conclusion on the issue, he tends to support traducianism in his biblical exegesis. He regards this option as most plausible because it has strong points in its favor by explaining the original sin.)

18. Voetius and Descartes were significantly different in their understanding on the relationship of faith and reason, and theology and philosophy. Voetius pursued the faith-seeking-understanding program whereas Descartes repudiated the faith-lacking-understanding project. Descartes insisted that the article of faith did not fall under the regime of human reason because faith was something one could not fully grasp with reason. What Descartes desperately defended was the autonomy of human reason and its proper use. In his philosophical enterprise, faith seemed to hinder the autonomy and the use of reason. Voetius, however, argued that human reason was surrounded by error and sin, so that perfect knowledge was impossible for humans. He maintained that human beings would be able to learn the truth from divine revelation, which was the only principle in the pursuit of truth. Therefore, the primary concern of Voetius was not to preserve Aristotelianism but to keep the biblical truth that, as he put it, was received from orthodox tradition.

19. Turretin’s understanding of covenant, merit, and grace cannot be harmonized with Scotus’ notion of merit and his *facientibus* principle whereas it is compatible with Thomas’ idea of merit and grace. Furthermore, Turretin’s doctrine of the covenant stresses the centrality of Christ’s merit and sovereignty of God in covenantal relationship. The conditionality of Turretin’s federal theology can be fully understood in this point of view.

and wendet sie in einem größeren Kontext an. Das bedeutet nicht, dass Barth Kierkegaard mehr oder weniger missversteht, sondern vielmehr zeigt es die rezeptive und kreative Kraft der frühen Theologie Barths. Seine ambivalente Haltung gegenüber diesem melancholischen Dänen kann in dieser Hinsicht adäquat verstanden werden. (English Paraphrase: The early Barth read at least three volumes of Kierkegaard’s works: *Practice in Christianity*, *The Moment*, and an *Anthology* from his journals and diaries. Almost all key terms from Kierkegaard which had an important role in Barth’s *Romans* can be found in *Practice in Christianity*. The concept of the indirect communication, the paradox, and the moment of *Practice in Christianity*, in particular, confirmed and sharpened Barth’s ideas on contemporary Christianity and the Christian life. Barth does not fail to understand Kierkegaard’s ideas; rather, he endorses and applies them in a wider context. Barth’s ambivalent attitude toward Kierkegaard can be adequately recognized in this stance.)

21. Barth’s doctrine of objective atonement develops as he distances himself from Anselm’s doctrine of the atonement. In his *Romans*, Barth endorses Anselm’s idea that God who is robbed of his honor must punish those who robbed him. In *Church Dogmatics* I/2, Barth advocates divine freedom in the incarnation with the support of Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo*. The positive endorsement of Anselmian motives in *Cur Deus Homo* continues in *Church Dogmatics* II/1. Barth maintains with Anselm that the sin of humanity cannot be removed by the merciful act of divine forgiveness alone. In *Church Dogmatics* IV/1, however, Barth finalizes the necessity of God’s mercy at the place where Anselm firmly establishes the dignity and freedom of the will of God. In Barth’s view, God’s mercy is identified with God’s righteousness in a distinctive way where God’s mercy always takes the initiative. The change in Barth’s reception of Anselm’s doctrine of the atonement shows that Barth’s doctrine entails support for universalism.

22. Both Herman Bavinck and Karl Barth sensed the open question caused by the subjectivistic tendency of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation. Barth argues that Schleiermacher ignores the objective feature of revelation by orienting the basis of revelation to the subjective consciousness and experience of faith. To evade this subjectivism, he tries to put the foundation of revelation on the three forms of the Word of God (i.e., revelation, Scripture, and proclamation), which are unveiled in an actualistic and dynamic way. By contrast, Bavinck, deeply concerned with the problem of objectivism and subjectivism in the doctrine of revelation, employs Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation in his own way, and regards Scripture as the objective standard for their theological work. Bavinck also stresses the importance of the church, which forms the Christian consciousness and experience. Although both Bavinck and Barth attempt to overcome the weakness of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of revelation, Bavinck’s ecclesiological doctrine of revelation overcomes it more effectively than Barth’s actualistic understanding of revelation.

23. The ethics of Wolfhart Pannenberg has a nomological dimension at its center. Based on the history of the natural law tradition, Pannenberg maintains the possibility of the
natural law theory on the following five grounds. The theological ground is his understanding of the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Pauline interpretation of the law. For its historical ground, Pannenberg articulates the natural law theories of patristic theology and the theologies of Troeltsch and Brunner. The ontological ground is the order of the world, which God established in the process of history. The anthropological ground is the mutuality of human society. The latter two dimensions are related to the epistemological ground, which is based on the hermeneutics of universal history. Pannenberg attempts to combine the law, the gospel, and love in relation to the Kingdom of God. Thus, Pannenberg’s Kingdom ethics is nomological as well as eschatological.

Miscellaneous Theses

24. “Writing a book is a horrible, exhausting struggle, like a long bout of some painful illness” (George Orwell, “Why I Write”). “Nevertheless I am continually with thee: thou hast holden me by my right hand” (אָחַזְתָּ בְּיַד־יְמִינִי וַאֲנִי תָמִיד עִמָּ; Psalm 73:23, KJV and BHS).

25. Family is the richest language of love.
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