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Contents

Editorials
Denying the Lord of Glory ............................................... 179
Fraternizing with Liberals ............................................... 179
Indictment by a Suicide .................................................. 180
The Dutch Have Done It .................................................. 180

Articles
Organization of American States......................................... George N. Monsma 182
The Need for Understanding............................................... Henry J. Ryskamp 185
Was Calvin a Philosopher?—A Symposium................................. W. Stanford Reid 187

From Our Correspondents
Letter from Holland .......................................................... 192
A Letter from South India .................................................. 193
Foenander Ordination at Wolvendaal Church .......................... 193
Reformed Church Life in Canada ......................................... 194

Book Reviews
Christ: Human and Divine .............................................. 195
Theology and Philosophy ................................................ 196
Towards Standards .......................................................... 198
Christian Dogma and History .......................................... 199
Free Enterprise and Cartels .............................................. 200

Verse
Brief Season ................................................................. 191
EDITORIALS

Denying the Lord of Glory

IN THE matter of preaching, worship, and church activities there can be no fellowship between those who honor the Word of God and the Christ of the Scriptures, and those who in word or deed repudiate that Word and deny the Christ of God. It would seem that this standpoint is simple to live up to and to apply to conditions of our day. Surely for the Bible-believing Christian this means that he cannot cooperate with any modernist church or group of churches in worship or prayer or promotion of mission work. How anyone who is in earnest about the testimony of the Church before the world and over against apostate churches can vacillate on this point is hard to understand. Yet precisely that is being done even by members and leaders of some churches whose creed and testimony is clear and strong. Is it because some people live by emotion rather than by conviction that they fall for the blandishments of modernist churches and their leaders to join hands with them in religious and missionary projects?

An especially flagrant form of violation of this simple principle we witness almost every year in communities where orthodox and liberal churches are found together. Liberal churches of many such cities join hands to observe Good Friday in a three-hour service with the usual number of seven speakers—each assigned a word of the cross—and forthwith they proceed to invite an orthodox minister or two to participate in such a service. This is entirely in harmony with the strategy of modernism, with the tactics of “winning” the orthodox and of breaking down the wall which separates those who profess and those who do not profess the divine Christ of the Scriptures. But it is beyond comprehension how ministers who glory in maintaining the Gospel of salvation according to the Scriptures can fall for the gag and seat themselves on the same platform with men who deny the very essence of the Gospel of Calvary. The claim that this offers them an opportunity to preach the true gospel and that they thus bear testimony to the true Christ of Calvary is so specious that it is hard to see how thinking men can utter it without blushing. Does anyone believe that joining in a worship service in which the real significance of Calvary and the death of our Savior is to be the object of preaching and meditation—that joining in fellowship, preaching, and prayer in one and the same such service with those of whom it is known that they deny the very Lord who died on Calvary, can be pleasing to the Lord? The orthodox and the liberal preacher do not preach the same Lord. To the liberal preacher Calvary is at best the place where our noble teacher died a martyr’s death. Can one have any fellowship in preaching and meditating upon the Lord of Glory and His mediatorial work of atonement on Calvary with such people? Yet in some of the finest communities this very thing is being done and is being defended by men of unimpeachable orthodoxy. Those who fall for these invitations from the liberal camp are called broad-minded. I wonder what the Lord Jesus Christ would call them.

C. B.

Fraternizing with Liberals

THERE is another form of fellowship practiced between orthodox and liberals that cannot stand the test of the Word of God. The city or county council of churches such as may be found in most American communities is usually controlled by the liberals. Behind these local organizations stands the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ with its promotion literature thoroughly saturated with the humanistic, man-centered teachings so familiar to every student of contemporary American Christianity. These organizations bring constant pressure to bear upon the orthodox churches of the community urging them to join in their activities and to have fellowship with them. This, of course, is not done by inviting such people to their worship services. That would be unethical. They have their own services. But the wall of separation is broken down by joint activities through representatives of the various churches of the community. A particularly insidious form of modernist propaganda for fraternization of this type is operating through the Councils of Church Women. These Councils of Church Women are local organizations of leading church women in the liberal churches, and they invite the women of orthodox, yes, also Christian Reformed, churches into some of their group activities.

Under date of March 4, 1949, the Grand Rapids-Kent County Council of Church Women, in response from headquarters of the United Council of Church Women, held the World Day of Prayer. On the list of women constituting what is called on the back of this program the Spiritual Life Committee I find among a generous number of women from liberal churches also the names of the wives of two
Orthodox ministers, the one Reformed and the other Christian Reformed. One cannot help asking whether such women or their husbands do not know that the organization under whose auspices and at whose call and in whose company they are praying for missions on this World Day of Prayer, and to which they lend their name, is a thoroughly liberal organization, an affiliate of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ. It is a notorious fact that the President of this United Council of Church Women, Mrs. Harper Sibley, is one of the outspoken modernist women leaders in the country. Witness the fact that she has publicly condemned even the liberal Federal Council for refusing to admit the Unitarians to membership. It hurts to see the names of prominent orthodox Church women listed on cooperating committees of such a movement.

What aggravates the matter is that this liberal organization, without any authorization, lists such orthodox church women on their official announcements as representing their denomination. In this unethical fashion the impression is created that such a denomination as the Reformed and the Christian Reformed—to mention no others—are as a group cooperating in the project of this liberal church organization. There is only one thing to do for all who have any regard for the purity of the Gospel and of the testimony of the Church in these days of apostasy and Christ-denial: to stand apart and tell them there can be no fellowship in worship, prayer, or missionary activity with those who serve not the Lord of the Scriptures. Let them call us Pharisees. Let them mark us as self-righteous. Let them brand us bigoted. We are in the company of Paul and Peter and John. Yes, in the company of our Lord! C. B.

**Indictment by a Suicide**

LAST week a soft-spoken, kindly-faced, sixty-nine-year-old man by the name of Thomas C. Williams shot himself only a few feet outside of the visitor’s gallery of the United States Senate chamber. He was apparently depressed and stated in the letters found on him that he had taken his life on this spot to draw the attention of the public to the sad conditions obtaining in our national and social life today. He said he did it to “shame” the world. “If I die as an example, surely some among you can try to lead America back to the path of virtue.” There is something deeply pathetic and touching in this scene of this suicide at the door of the United States Senate chamber with the message for the American public in his pocket which was soon released to the one hundred reporters that gathered about his corpse.

Yes, he was a suicide. He was perhaps also a psychopath. But he also wrote words of sober truth as his parting message to America. They were words of indictment. Yet there was no bitterness in them. His message is not that of a rabble rouser, of a revolutionary, of a cynic. He speaks as one of the perplexed and disappointed sons of a perplexed and disillusioned generation. He said he was “shamed by the world’s lack of progress morally, ethically, politically.” He went on to write that he was likewise pained by “the greed, selfishness, deceit and downright ignorance of some trade union bosses, the selfishness and obtuseness of some swollen-profits-seeking employers, the apathy of some clergymen.” In his lengthy letter intended for publication and addressed to the United Press he held up “to shame” “men who do not really believe that soldiers who never left the United States and those who were not actual combatants deserve a pension, and who nevertheless vote a pension or certain other gratuities merely to win the veterans’ vote.” I am ashamed,” he added, “of pork barrel politicians.” What an indictment of those spineless Washington politicians who are convinced the proposed extravagant old age pension for veterans is wrong but have not the courage to register their convictions for fear of incurring the displeasure of some of their constituents and failing of a majority vote at the next election! Or, listen once more to this dead man as he grows eloquent on paper. “You politicians, listen: There are millions in the country who are, like Diogenes, looking for a really honest man to lead them. If there are some among you at Washington who have brains and courage and honesty, I say to you, seek each other out, combine and speak up, fearing no one!”

These pleading, pathetic, incriminating words went on news wires all over the country while the United States Senate droned on hour after hour in an inane, stupid, utterly senseless filibuster. This dying man with a bullet in his breast lying in the corridor near the Senate chamber’s door seemed to be speaking more sense than the august legislative body in the chamber. Decent, self-respecting Americans may well turn in shame and indignation from the sorry spectacle of that empty senate procedure, but they cannot so easily get rid of the pleading words of this suicide . . . “pained by greed . . . selfishness . . . apathy . . . Millions looking for a really honest man to lead them . . . If there are some among you . . . speak up . . . fearing no one . . .”

**The Dutch Have Done It**

WHEN last December the Dutch army on Java seized Jogjakarta, the capital of the Indonesian Republic, imprisoned the recalcitrant leaders, and by what it called police action restored order, safety, and responsible government among the millions of Javanese, the reaction of the outside world was highly diverse.
Most Western nations, as reflected in the U.N.O., condemned the action and accused the Dutch government of a serious breach of promise. On the surface the Dutch were breaking both the Linggadjati Agreement of March, 1947, and the Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948, under the terms of which both the Indonesian Republic and Holland were to cease fighting and cooperate in arriving at a peaceful setup of the United States of Indonesia. All that was beautiful on paper, and it was not surprising that many uninformed Americans were filled with indignation toward the Dutch who last December ostensibly committed illegal acts of aggression against the Indonesian Republic. To the uninformed this looked like a simple case of resurgent imperialism, of unjustifiable oppression of a weaker race by a stronger, of a serious breach of faith on the part of a responsible Western government with its liberated former colonials. So it was viewed and interpreted by the overwhelming majority of Westerners, and the Americans were most outspoken among these. The Dutch were compared to Hitler and his gang. A certain Chicago paper with large circulation editorially had the temerity to suggest that Queen Juliana ought to be strung up on a tree. The religious liberals rushed to the defense of the poor oppressed natives who were robbed of their freedom and were again enslaved to the imperial Dutch crown!

What these American leaders did not say was that there was only one way of making possible the realization of the agreement to establish a united Indonesia that should live in freedom and voluntary cooperation with the Dutch nation, and that was to establish order in the Republic which could not establish order itself by reason of the hostility of alien elements in its own army. This the Dutch did by their police action of last December. From the moment they struck, order was established. The majority of natives hailed them as deliverers from their own extremist forces, which with great irresponsibility had kept the country in turmoil and spread terrorism wherever they went. That is the reason why bloodshed did not begin, but ceased with the police action of the Dutch. With a very small loss of life this police action made an end of what was daily murder and terror among the natives by their own extremists and terrorists which their government could not control.

For this the Dutch deserve credit instead of blame. In days of terrorism and irresponsibility there is such a thing as hanging yourself by your own agreements. Here, if ever, the distinction between the letter and the spirit of the law has meaning and force. By this brief and effective police action, which actually cost less lives than would have been lost in case the sorry state of affairs under the extremists had continued for that same period, the Dutch have accomplished what should have been accomplished over a year ago by the Indonesian Republic, then helpless and at the mercy of its unruly army leaders. The Dutch should not be penalized but praised for this action of theirs. Let the peaceful ordering of the United States of Indonesia and its proper relation as free states with law and order and alongside—not under—Holland go forward. That freedom Queen Wilhelmina pledged the Indonesians when she still sat upon the Dutch throne. That freedom her daughter and successor, Queen Juliana, has reaffirmed. The Dutch are keeping their word.

It is regrettable that Americans were not at once better informed about the real issues of justice, peace, and order at stake in the police action of the Dutch army on Java. Those who suspected the deeper background should possibly have spoken up sooner and louder. Our American State Department hardly did its duty on this score, though we now realize its predicament in the U. N. Security Council. We honor such a commentator as Mr. Kaltenborn for his clear and fearless elucidation of the issue. He, who had traveled widely in Eastern Asia, knew what was at stake and vindicated the Dutch from the start. The Grand Rapids Press among independent dailies has spoken up likewise and clarified the issue. We fondly hope the American people in general may soon all realize that the Dutch have performed one of the greatest services to the world of any nation in the last two years. For though the Dutch by this action served both themselves and the Indonesian Republic best, they also performed a greater service, the value and significance of which may not yet be properly appreciated today. Their police action in Indonesia constitutes the most courageous counterblow to Communism in Eastern Asia. While Russia in '47 and '48 was constantly extending her tentacles over Europe, while China was crumbling before the onslaughts of its Communist armies and the whole of Eastern Asia threatened to be engulfed by the Reds, the Dutch army took its stand for peace, order, decency, freedom, and democracy by neutralizing the subversive, Communistically inspired forces operative in Indonesia.

History may yet prove that the Dutch last December were the pioneers in a new aggressive defense action against the red octopus. And in so doing the Dutch perhaps fought not only their own battle but the battle of every country that loves freedom and democracy.

C. B.
Organization of American States

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IN THE midst of the unsettled world conditions it is heartening to remember that there is an association of nations which has stood the test of almost 60 years of existence and today is stronger and more virile than ever before. The Organization of American States is the oldest organization of independent, sovereign nations in existence, although it has been known by various names during these years. The American Republics are a family of nations, and, as in all families, there may be some disagreements and misunderstandings from time to time, but it is all in the family, and underneath is the firm ground of family unity.

United States Policy

It was early recognized in this country that the interests of the American Republics are inexorably tied together by geographic propinquity and common ideals, such as love of freedom and democratic aspirations. The United States policy with respect to the other American Republics has developed through the years in accordance with the eb and flow of national and international events of history. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 has been a unilateral doctrine which says in effect that the United States would consider it dangerous to its security if European powers were to seize further territory in or impose further political control over any portions of this hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement of United States policy rather than an inter-American pronouncement. The era of multilateral cooperative arrangements between the American Republics such as we have witnessed during the past 60 years had not yet arrived.

The basic friendship between the nations of the Americas weathered the frictions of our period of "manifest destiny," when the United States was expanded to the Pacific and when Texas and California were added to the Union. This basic friendship has survived in spite of the irritations and frictions of the early part of the present century, when the United States intervened from time to time in the affairs of the other American Republics.

The 1930's and 40's have been characterized by an intensification and broadening of cooperation with the other American Republics, with a resultant feeling of good neighborliness and good will.

Characteristics of the Inter-American System

If there is a key word for the inter-American system, if there is a word that can summarize the attributes of the system, that word is cooperation—cooperation in all of our relations, political, economic, and cultural. The inter-American system possesses numerous characteristics, all of which together form the pattern of cooperation.

One of these characteristics is solidarity. Inter-American solidarity is revealed in numerous ways, but perhaps in no sphere is it more strongly evident than in the field of common defense. In 1940 at the second meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at Habana, when World War II had commenced in Europe, the American Republics agreed that an attack by an non-American state upon an American state would be considered an attack against all the American Republics and that in the event of such an attack, the American Republics would consult, to agree upon measures that should be taken. The month following Pearl Harbor, the Foreign Ministers met in Rio de Janeiro to outline cooperative measures, and the period of the war was one of unprecedented cooperative activity among the American Republics.

The solidarity of the other American Republics in the matter of defense was further implemented recently by the treaty of Rio de Janeiro. In addition to enunciating the principle that an attack on one of the American states is an attack on all, the treaty provides that in case of an armed attack by any state against one of the American states within the geographic limits specified in the treaty or within the territory of an American state, the contracting parties are obligated to render immediate assistance, the nature of such assistance to be determined by each state. The contracting parties are also obligated to consult, in order to determine what collective measures will be required of all. In the case of armed attacks outside of the region defined in the treaty or outside the territory of the American Republics, and in the case of aggression or situ-
ations that endanger the peace of America anywhere in the world, there is an obligation on the part of the contracting parties to consult for the purpose of deciding which of the collective measures specified in the Charter will be taken by all. Decisions on the specified collective measures under the treaty will be made by a vote of a two-thirds majority and will be binding on all states with the one exception that no state will be required to use armed force without its consent.¹

A second characteristic of the inter-American system is the recognition and respect for the equal sovereignty of each American nation. In inter-American assemblies each country has one vote, the small as well as the large. There is no attempt of the larger nations to lord it over the smaller ones. All members of the system are equally sovereign.

Going hand in hand with the principle of equal sovereignty is the principle of nonintervention, which is a third characteristic of the inter-American system. The American Republics agreed at Montevideo in 1933 that no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another American Republic. The United States scrupulously observes this commitment in its relations with the other American Republics. Intervention has no place in a cooperative system, such as the inter-American system.

Consultation is a fourth characteristic of the system. The American Republics subscribe to the principle that they should consult in regard to all matters of mutual concern, and they have been practicing such consultation for nearly 60 years on an ever-increasing range of subjects. Consultation has had special significance in the inter-American system since 1936, when the principle of consultation was given treaty form. Consultation between sovereign equals is, of course, the very antithesis of coercion by a powerful nation of weaker neighbors.

A further characteristic of the system is the desire of the American Republics to settle by peaceful means any disputes which might arise between them. The inter-American machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes has its roots in the Gondra treaty of 1923, which has been amplified and strengthened by subsequent agreements.

The inter-American system places great emphasis on cooperation for the general welfare. It is an accepted principle that cooperation among all the states is necessary for the advancement and welfare of the peoples of the Americas. It is important that there should be a satisfactory standard of living in all the American Republics. A standard of living compatible with the dignity of human personality is imperative not only because of humanitarian considerations and sociological principles but also be-

¹ The Rio Treaty came into force on Dec. 8, 1948, when two-thirds of the American Republics had deposited their ratifications. The United States deposited its ratification on December 30, 1947.

Organization of the System

The characteristics of the inter-American system find their expression in the organizational setup of the system. The name, "Organization of American States," was selected in Bogotá in the spring of this year, but the organization or association of American states itself dates back to the First International Conference of American States held in Washington in 1889-90. At this conference the International Union of American Republics came into being. The present Organization of American States is the lineal descendant, or perhaps it would be more accurate
to say the reorganization of the International Union of American Republics of 1889-90.

One of the main purposes of the Bogotá conference was to work on a reorganization of the inter-American system. The system had experienced a spontaneous growth from the days of its inception and the need was quite generally felt for integration and coordination of the various inter-American organizations and agencies that had developed. The Bogotá conference prepared a charter for the Organization of American States which provides an integrated system for the various agencies of the Organization.

This charter provides for the following organs of the Organization:

a. The Inter-American Conference
b. The Council of the Organization
c. The Pan American Union
d. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
e. The Specialized Conferences
f. The Specialized Organizations

The Inter-American Conference is the supreme organ of the Organization and decides the general action and policies of the Organization. All member states of the Organization are represented at the Inter-American Conference and each state has the right to one vote. The conference will meet every five years in regular session; however, special sessions may be called with the approval of two-thirds of the governments. There have been nine inter-American conferences of this type in the past, beginning with the one in Washington in 1889-90, the most recent one being at Bogotá.

The Council of the Organization is the permanent executive body of the Organization. The Council is composed of one representative of each of the member states. The Council meets at the Pan American Union building in Washington at regular intervals—in the past usually once a month, but in the future it will probably meet twice a month. Many of the countries are represented by a full-time representative, with the rank of Ambassador; others have appointed their Ambassador to Washington to serve as their representative on the Council. The Council makes recommendations to the governments, to the Inter-American Conference, and to the agencies of the system. It serves as a point of coordination for the functioning of the whole system, acts as provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, and promotes and facilitates collaboration between the Organization of American States and the United Nations and other international agencies. The organs of the Council of the organization are the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Inter-American Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council. The first of these has been in existence for some time, the other two are to be established in accordance with provisions of the Bogotá Charter.

The Pan American Union is the central and permanent organ and general secretariat of the Organization. It promotes economic, social, juridical, and cultural relations among the member states. It also does preparatory work for inter-American conferences and serves as secretariat for the Council of the Organization and various inter-American conferences. It has five departments—International Law and Organization, Economic and Social Affairs, Cultural Affairs, Information, and Administrative Services. The Pan American Union had its inception in 1890 when the First International Conference of American States established it as the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics. In 1910 it was given the name Pan American Union.

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs considers problems of an urgent nature and serves as the Organ of Consultation under the Rio treaty. An Advisory Defense Committee, composed of the highest military authorities of participating American States, will advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation.

Specialized Conferences are conferences of the American Republics which meet to consider technical matters or to develop specific aspects of inter-American cooperation. These conferences are called when the need for them is felt, or pursuant to provisions in existing inter-American agreements.

Specialized organizations are inter-American organizations which have been established by mutual agreement and have functions with respect to a given field of common interest to the American states, such as health, transportation, commerce, geography, and history. Agreements are to be entered into between the Council and specialized organizations defining the relations that shall exist between the respective agencies and the Organization of American States.

The foregoing is a summary of the organization of the inter-American system as contemplated by the charter signed at Bogotá. The charter is a treaty, and hence will have to be ratified by the Republics in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. It will enter into force among the ratifying states when two-thirds of the signatory states have deposited their ratifications. However, since the charter is actually a reorganization of an existing system rather than a completely new organization, and since all of the American Republics signed the charter, the Bogotá conference felt that there was every reason for placing the organizational set-up in effect immediately, so that the benefits of the reorganization could be attained immediately, without having to wait for the necessary 14 ratifications. The Bogotá conference, therefore, passed a resolu-

2 President Truman submitted the charter to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on January 13, 1949.
tion which places the organizational setup of the charter in effect provisionally and also specifies that the new organs provided for in the charter shall be established on a provisional basis.

The inter-American system is a mighty bulwark of solidarity in a turbulent world. Here equal sovereignty is recognized, countries avoid intervention in each other's internal affairs, but consult on matters of mutual interest. Here we have peaceful settlement of disputes and cooperation for the general good. Such a system, such an organization of states, such a free community of neighboring nations, is a tower of strength to the United Nations and to the world.

[This article also appeared in less condensed form in the State Department Bulletin of November 14, 1948.—EDITOR.]

The Need for Understanding

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I HAVE before me a copy of Understanding, "a publication devoted to cooperation between clergymen and businessmen," issued by the National Association of Manufacturers; also a notice of a series of discussions on, "what every man should know about business," sent out by a local chamber of commerce. I have, on the other hand, recently read full page advertisements by management criticizing labor because of certain strikes and because of labor's attitude toward the Taft Hartley act. I have before me copies of a C. I. O. paper which pointedly criticizes management for its attempts to turn the tide of unionism back a generation or more by destroying effective collective bargaining, and for opposing labor's attempts to increase the measure of economic and social security it now enjoys. I have just read articles in the Survey and in Harper's commenting favorably on socialized medicine, and I have before me not only criticisms of health insurance by the American Medical Association, but also information concerning the fund it is raising to oppose the extension of socialized medicine, and I have before me not only criticisms of health insurance by the American Medical Association, but also information concerning the fund it is raising to oppose the extension of the social security act to include it.

Surely we need understanding, not only between clergymen and businessmen but between clergymen and labor, between businessmen and labor, understanding that is based upon a full statement of the facts concerning any issue and upon fair-minded discussion of such facts by all the parties involved. We sorely need such understanding now that issues are coming to a head between the two parties in Congress and between labor and management. With uncertainty as to continued prosperity increasing, we need to be levelheaded, fair-minded, and willing to know and to face the truth.

Economic Depression?

Are we now in for a depression? The evidence is not clear but certainly does not at present support the pessimism of those who are greatly disturbed by declining consumers markets and by increasing unemployment. The basic industries, construction, housing, steel and others are still in a very healthy condition. The savings of our people are enormous. Prices are going down, which should be a cause for joy. Strangely enough, however, the fact that prices are going down seems to inspire fear. Is our economy one that can continue only if characterized by the feverish pace set by rising prices? We know better. An outstanding characteristic of free enterprise is this that it has in the past increased human welfare by making more and more goods available at decreasing prices. But, at the moment, lower prices, indicative of slackening demand as well as increasing inventories are noticeably affecting our economic equilibrium. We fear and immediately begin to look for factors and parties responsible for our fears, and we find scapegoats upon which to vent our wrath and thus to relieve our fears.

We will have a depression if taxes are increased, if labor continues its belligerent and its feather-bedding tactics, if the number of socialistic experiments such as health insurance is increased. This is the way some argue. Others say that another depression caused by lack of understanding of labor's needs and by lack of cooperation between labor, management and the government will certainly bring us nearer to socialism, if not to communism.

If ever we needed to see the light and by common action to move toward it, that time is now. The darkness of communism and of paganism is moving across much of the civilized world. We still enjoy a large measure of economic, political, and religious freedom. But in a rapidly changing world each concept of freedom must constantly be re-examined, as well as cherished, in order that it may be put into practice in such a way that it may continue to have real meaning and not to lose it.

The Taft Hartley Act

The fight to retain the Taft Hartley act is undoubtedly a fight against the obstructionism that has characterized labor's attempts since 1933 to...
gain a higher standard of living. Labor's interference with the even flow of production in order to gain its demands for higher wages has turned from rather cautious defensive tactics in the thirties to bold and powerful offensive tactics in the forties. Labor has of late been charging against management with the strength and the suddenness of a powerful task force, and not only management but also the general public is interested now in rules of economic warfare that will prevent the economic loss that strikes have caused. Confident, therefore, that it had the backing of the country the last Congress passed the Taft-Hartley act. In the main the provisions of the act are good but it has destroyed some of the gains that labor had made before the bitter thirties and forties, gains that may especially be threatened if the act is administered by an administration unfriendly to labor. Labor fears that restrictive laws may make of collective bargaining a process bereft of the freedom of action that both labor and management have wanted in the past. If the differences between labor and management can only be composed by law we may need all of the controls of the Taft-Hartley act, but if the two parties can reach understanding by a large measure of free bargaining some tempering of the act should be possible.

Management contends that the wages of labor are higher than they ever have been before and that they cannot be increased because the present condition of business is such that they cannot be increased. Labor has before it, however, the example of industrial executives who, though they complain that taxes are so high that their incomes are reduced to a small fraction of their original amount, live on a scale of abundance that men have seldom witnessed before. And labor wonders about profits which, though reduced by heavy taxes, are nevertheless large enough to create reserves of all kinds at inflation levels and to provide for expansion of industry without resort to much, if any, outside financing. Union leaders are therefore restive, even though their followers may not be, and they are eager to use the present opportunity to press for advantage.

The real nub of the issue is that labor is thinking of more than just raising wages to match the rise in the price level—it is thinking also of increasing the share of the returns of industry that shall go to labor. In the past decision in a matter such as this would have come as the result of the action of the forces of supply and demand, with the weight of influence, however, on the side of management. Now labor occupies a strong position and is ready to use not only its own influence but also that of the government to gain its end. No wonder that charges of socialism are now being hurled at labor, just as charges of economic royalism have so often been hurled at management. Not only the economic betterment of labor is at stake in the present fight but also the continuance of a large measure of freedom in our economy. This will require the vigilance of labor as well as of management. Both sides should see the need and value of such understanding that the fight for present gains may not plunge us into a future in which so much for which we have struggled has been lost.

**Socialized Medicine**

Labor wants not only more of the income of industry, it wants a greater measure of security. Just as the employer has always wanted to be secure against too much interference by the government, employees want the security of government-sponsored insurance, against the hazards of old age, unemployment, and now sickness and hospitalization. Our President appears to be committed to take action in favor of health insurance. It is to be hoped that the issue that this raises may generate as much light as heat. The heat is already on. We wait for more light.

Obviously our generally accepted and well tested public health programs to fight contagious diseases, to provide for various types of clinics, and to provide for the extension of health services to rural areas prove that the government as well as other agencies must do something to supplement the efforts of private practitioners to minister to the physical well being of our citizens. In spite of earlier opposition of doctors and others, group hospitalization plans are now in operation all over the country. Although the result has been overfilled hospitals, and consequently some criticism that hospitals are at times used unnecessarily, the net effect has been that people, who otherwise could not have gone because they could not have paid, are now going to hospitals by the thousands. It has not only meant more complete hospitalization but also insistence on more and cheaper medical and surgical care for the poorer classes. When the trend toward group hospitalization in this country proved too strong for opposition, the members of the medical profession changed their course of action in order to direct and gain some control over the movement. The best plan in operation today is one that has the approval of the medical profession and was really sponsored by the hospitals.

The American Medical Association has consistently fought the introduction of health insurance in this country. Now that there is danger that Congress may take action, the association has decided to raise a fund of $3,500,000 to oppose the passage of the bill in Congress. This action has aroused criticism even among a minority of the members of the profession. The attitudes and practices of many of the members of the profession have been so negative, if not hostile, to any kind of plan that one often hears the remark: "If socialized medicine comes, the members of the medical profession will have brought it upon themselves. They have
really been asking for it.” Not only does the standard of income which the profession seems to set for itself arouse antagonism, its criticism of plans for socialized medicine is often so onesided as to strike proponents of such plans as little more than propaganda. Whereas the A. M. A. condemns health insurance in England as causing a lowering of the standards of the medical profession, and as causing the public to hurry to the doctor with every ache and pain, other reports, such as have frequently appeared in the Survey and as the one which is currently published in Harper’s Magazine, point to what seems to be a fact, that the people of England are better fed, in better health, and consequently in better condition for work than before. They are reported as throwing themselves into the work of economic recovery with real zest.

There is great need for some kind of cooperation in providing for the health of our people as well as for their education. The doctors should help us to find the right kind of cooperation. It does not seem that the government can be kept out of this field altogether, not in a country in which the agent for common action is a democratic government. It is certain that proponents of government action will for socialized medicine is often so onesided as to strike proponents of such plans as little more than propaganda. Whereas the A. M. A. condemns health insurance in England as causing a lowering of the standards of the medical profession, and as causing the public to hurry to the doctor with every ache and pain, other reports, such as have frequently appeared in the Survey and as the one which is currently published in Harper’s Magazine, point to what seems to be a fact, that the people of England are better fed, in better health, and consequently in better condition for work than before. They are reported as throwing themselves into the work of economic recovery with real zest.

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not be thwarted by onesided and consequently unfair criticism. The real question in this matter of providing health insurance is this, how far can we go without defeating what we want to accomplish, not only for the present good of the individual but also for the continuing good of the individual as well as of society. In arriving at an answer we must have the facts. The A. M. A. can help greatly to solve the problem, but if it at first bitterly opposes and then gradually modifies its position, the public will wonder what its motives really are.

It would seem that we would try to proceed cooperatively and constructively now that we are living so well. We can see that certain measures now being proposed to improve the lot of the poorer classes, if pushed too far, will lead to socialism and communism. But is that all we can see? Can we not see that if we do not succeed in acting together, that if instead we cause economic difficulties and depression, we shall be giving the forces of subversion their real opportunity? We should not give to the advocates of some other system than democracy any occasion for taking over the use of this concept and then subtly changing its meaning and its form.

Was Calvin a Philosopher?

A Symposium

In last month’s issue we presented the article of Professor John P. Le Coq which originally appeared in THE PERSONALIST entitled, WAS CALVIN A PHILOSOPHER? Our readers know that he argued a decided negative. In that same issue we also placed a reply by Professor Carl F. H. Henry, who took up cudgels for Calvin. In the present symposium the discussion is carried forward. Our readers will discover that the various contributors bring out some valuable aspects of Calvinism as a philosophy of life, which lend an interest and value to the discussion far beyond the contentions of the original writer on the subject.—EDITOR.

W. Stanford Reid
Assistant Professor of History
McGill University
Montreal

Professor Le Coq has written an interesting and stimulating article to show that John Calvin was not a metaphysician or a logician. To prove his point, Calvin has been subjected to rigorous comparisons with, and criticisms from various philosophers from Anax-

agoras to Bertrand Russell. As a result, Professor Le Coq, adopting the position that a true philosopher necessarily does and says what other philosophers have done and said, without, however, proving that any of them were right, declares Calvin eliminated. One almost staggered at Professor Le Coq’s rather naive approach to the subject. He blandly assumes that all philosophers are purely empirical or purely rational, despite the fact that every philosopher actually commences with faith, argues by faith and so concludes in faith. Whether it is a faith in universal flux, in an ideal world, in sensation, in categories or in logical atomism, they all start by assuming, although they may not be willing to admit as much. It is rather hard, therefore, even on purely philosophical grounds to dismiss Calvin in quite such summary fashion.

But let us ask what Calvin would say if he could this day read Professor Le Coq’s article. He would probably agree heartily with the professor. “If that is philosophy, and it is,” he would say, “I am glad that my concern is not with that sty of swines.” 1 He would frankly state that all such philosophy is man made, and is therefore ineffectual in its attempts to arrive at the source and

1. Institutes, I, v, 5.
nature of truth. Philosophy is merely man's finite speculation on his own experience, which left even Plato lost in his round globe. In much the same state is man's logic, for he has only frail human logic which does not extend beyond human experience and which can enable man to reason to nothing ultimate. Moreover, coupled with man's finitude is his sinful character. Man is interested not in God, but only in worshipping himself, and so does not want to see straight even if he could. Calvin would, no doubt, be quite relieved to hear that Professor Le Coq had banished him from the Athenian Academy, for he would say that he lost nothing by his exile.

But if being a philosopher is more than attempting to conform oneself to the pronouncements set forth by others, if it is a matter of seeking for an understanding of the world, life and death, then Calvin may well claim to be a philosopher. He would hold with the psalmist and with Solomon that the "fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." As he states at the beginning of the Institutes (I, i, 2), "no man can arrive at the true knowledge of himself without having first contemplated the divine character, and then descended to the consideration of his own." Thus man cannot know even himself, let alone the world in which he lives, without grasping the nature and meaning of his ultimate environment. This, as a sinner, he can do only when he has laid hold upon Christ as his Savior and his Lord. Only then will he see and understand the Scriptures to be the Word of God, and only then will he, through the Scriptures, be able to obtain an understanding of the world, the immediate environment, in which he lives.

This point of view comes out very strongly in both Calvin's metaphysics and his epistemology. In philosophizing man is attempting to reach the ultimate, to give a rationale of the essence of things. This, he would maintain very strongly, cannot even be touched unless we turn to God, for He alone is ultimate. He alone has already interpreted all ultimate, to give a rationale of the essence of things. Moreover, coupled with man's finitude is his sinful character. Man is interested not in God, but only in worshipping himself, and so does not want to see straight even if he could. Calvin would, no doubt, be quite relieved to hear that Professor Le Coq had banished him from the Athenian Academy, for he would say that he lost nothing by his exile.

Calvin would hold that such a Christian metaphysics should result in a type of logic different from that of the non-Christian philosophers. It must be a Christian-theistic logic. It must commence by presupposing the Triune God, it must work itself out, by working itself into God's self-revelation, and it must have as its ultimate conclusion God and His glory. True logic is to think God's thoughts after Him. This may mean that we cannot always follow our argument through in a completely "rational" manner, for as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His thoughts above ours. Such a position is manifested by Calvin in dealing with the subject of predestination. He would acknowledge that he cannot rationalize the relationship of responsibility and foreordination. He can but accept what God has said. His whole concept, therefore, of logic is different from that of the non-Christian philosopher. The latter attempts by logic developed out of experience to reason to the ultimate, not knowing that he never in actuality reasons beyond himself. Sometimes he sees his folly and when he does, he often ends by denying the existence of logic anywhere.

Was Calvin a philosopher? No, not if one limits oneself to a meaning of the term derived from the history of philosophers. He had no confidence that the finite, sinful, human intellect could by itself attain to truth. He would laugh at such thinking as no real philosophy, but merely diletantism and self-delusion. If a philosopher, however, is a man who seeks for a true understanding of the universe by coming to an understanding of his ultimate environment, then Calvin was a philosopher. Such an attitude as this will, of course, be laughed out of the philosophical schools as being irrational, but then we must remember that to the non-Christian the Christian approach is automatically foolishness. Professor Le Coq has shown quite clearly that there can be no common philosophical ground between the consistent Christian and the non-Christian. They start with different presuppositions, use different methods, and consequently come to different results. Was Calvin a philosopher? It all depends upon one's views of the nature of philosophy.

Cecil De Boer
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University of Idaho
Moscow, Idaho

HAVING READ both articles, I can do little more than offer a few incidental impressions, the most important of which is that in my estimation the chief value of Dr. Le Coq's article lies in the fact that it elicited Dr. Henry's brilliant and scholarly response.

Personally I can't get very excited about the question of whether Calvin was a logician and philosopher. Calvin, of course, never wrote a book on
the principles of logic, and if on that account he cannot be called a logician, to me that merely puts him in a class with Cicero, St. Augustine, Luther, Darwin, Einstein, and a host of other important historical figures who never wrote a book on logic.

Having read Calvin's *Institutes*, I am personally satisfied that once you accept Calvin's premises, his conclusions follow with logical inevitability. Nor did he ever write a systematic philosophy based on wholly secular principles and assumptions for the express purpose of demonstrating to everybody, Christian, Jew, and Pagan, the existence of God. Which, of course, takes him out of the class of Aquinas and the modern Scholastics, but still leaves him in a class with St. Paul, Erasmus, Grotius, Shakespeare, Milton, etc., etc. The fact remains that in his *Institutes* Calvin shows that he saw through all these so-called proofs and demonstrations, whether ancient or medieval, and that he recognized that up to his own time philosophy had neither proved nor disproved anything worth proving or disproving in the Christian religion.

Logic, says Dr. Le Coq, quoting Mr. Bertrand Russell, "is of the essence of philosophy." Well, all that statement can possibly mean is that if an alleged system of philosophy isn't logical, it isn't worth considering—a statement which obviously applies with equal force to physics, geography, and systematic theology. (Of course, the statement might be interpreted to mean that philosophy can be reduced to logic; and that to me is pure nonsense.) And I know of no secular philosophy which is completely logical—in fact it is my impression that the only philosopher who could possibly claim to be completely logical, would be one who, aware of all the problems and difficulties and paradoxes involved in any philosophy, had decided not to open his mouth.

"The domain of philosophy is reason," says Dr. Le Coq. Frankly, I don't understand a statement such as that at all. Logic, reason, the rational, or whatever you want to call it, in itself tells you very little. If east means one direction and west the opposite, then logic, reason, and the rational will tell you that the further east you wish to get, the more you had better keep going east; but logic, reason, the rational doesn't tell you that, as we know to day, you can also get as far east as you wish by going west. How can "the essence of philosophy" tell you that the earth is a globe, and that it is a comparatively minor object whirling around another comparatively minor object within a system of physical objects, and that this system of physical objects is moving toward another system of physical objects called a constellation? In short, I am getting very, very tired of such assertions as "the basis of his (Calvin's) system is faith, whereas the domain of philosophy is reason."

**DURING THE** past fifty years it has become fashionable to heap ridicule upon Calvinism. For example, Arnold Toynbee, in his horribly defective and fantastic (though highly tauted) book, *A Study of History*, has nothing favorable to say about John Calvin. After having disposed of Martin Luther with a smear in a brief comment at the end of a section entitled "The Japanese Interior Proletariat" (where he mistakes repentance for penance and makes Luther appear immoral), he casually turns to Calvinism. He quotes with approbation the following nonsense: "To become a popular religion, it is only necessary for a superstition to ensnare a philosophy." Equally misleading is the following quotation: "Calvinism is only one of several notable examples of a fatalistic creed which is apparently in contradiction with the conduct of its votaries." In short, the Calvinists stupidly let themselves drift along. Calvinism expresses "that sense of drift which is one of the psychological symptoms of social disintegration."1)

In the magazine *Life* for January 10, 1949, we read this extraordinary statement about Calvinists: "The emphasis on discipline and thrift led the sanctimonious leaders of congregations to consider that they were the elect by virtue of position and wealth." (p. 84.) In other words, those who accumulated the greatest amount of material possessions were favored by God far above those who were poor until the end of their lives. The janitor in a school building had much less chance of being saved than the principal of the same school. When careless critics think of Calvinism as the chief basis of Capitalism and the leading deterministic creed, what fruitful results can we expect for the general public?

The author of the article entitled "Was Calvin a Philosopher?" which we are analyzing at the present time, seems to be a disciple of Arnold Toynbee and R. H. Tawney.2) These two British oracles have had a great name and can expect thousands of credulous admirers to swallow their superficial ideas. Professor Le Coq does not even give us a thorough discussion of his own subject. Instead of that he presents quotations from Cicero, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Saint Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Saint

1) Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Abridged edition, ed. by D. C. Somervell (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 383. Toynbee, in his hatred of orthodox Christianity, goes so far as to say about Luther: "With his own interpretation of the Pauline Justification by Faith and His *Pecca Fortiter*, he laid himself open to the charge of treating morality as a matter of indifference." The idea is that Luther advised his followers to "sin plenty," for the more they sinned the more grace would abound. That is the exact opposite of what Luther actually taught.


3) R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York, 1926), supposedly a profound book, highly praised by Toynbee, who quoted him as a brilliant authority on Calvinism, but Tawney simply refused to study Calvin, and he made Luther appear like a semi-barbarous opponent of capitalistic society.
Augustine, John Locke, Hegel, Loisy, Pascal, and Bergson. None of those quotations show that Calvin was not a philosopher. Famous thinkers deserve to be quoted, but what good does it do when their remarks are miles away from John Calvin?

As for Professor Henry, he makes a noble attempt to defend poor Calvin. We need not repeat his arguments, which upon the whole are sound and to the point. What we need most of all, however, are quotations from Calvin himself. The great masters who sway the masses seldom quote pertinent sources. Perhaps they know so much that they need not prove anything. Most of them do not even believe that there is such a thing as absolute truth. Many of our leading historians glibly argue that truth is relative. Whatever we think is true must be truth. So why should they quote Calvin? Besides, Calvin's language is either old French or Latin. Great interpreters today do not bother to read such old-fashioned stuff.

When we let Calvin speak for himself, as Professor Q. Breen did in his penetrating study entitled, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism (1931), we find that he was a profound thinker. His first work dealt with Seneca, the great Roman philosopher. His second book treated the condition of the soul after death. In this learned work he attacked the careless doctrine of the Anabaptists. Two years later (1536) followed the publication of his masterpiece, The Institute of the Christian Religion. At that time he was only twenty-seven years old. Contrary to his learned critics, he said nothing worth noting about the doctrine of predestination. In the later editions he did add a very brief description, presenting a much milder view than Luther had done as early as 1516. But today almost every American student when he hears about Calvin, concludes that this reformer produced a system of theology centering around the idea of predestination. According to Calvin man is a helpless tool of fate, and consequently Calvinism is sneered at as a system of thought that has long outlived its usefulness.

Nevertheless, only mediocre scholars would argue that Calvin was not a great thinker. He stands out as a first-class theologian. But was he also a philosopher? The historian must answer this question in the affirmative. Calvin will receive much credit for his great interest in humanism. The sound historian must emphasize Calvin's profound theories about political philosophy, as explained in the last part of his most famous book. Moreover, he will analyze with Professor Breen Calvin's doctrine of common grace. Calvin appeared at his best as a true philosopher. He said that men like Aristotle and Seneca, pagans though they were, showed in their brilliant philosophy the illumination of divine wisdom. Philosophy makes much of reason, while theology depends more upon grace and inspiration. Calvin did both to perfection.

What simpletons those men are who agree with Toynbee that Liberalism was the historical link between Calvinism and Communism! What fools are those slippery scholars who dangle before the eyes of their bewildered students fantastic notions about Calvin as a symptom of social disintegration! Calvin is said to have done for the bourgeoisie what Karl Marx did for the proletariat. These blind leaders of the blind merely exposed their ignorance of Calvinism. If they were truly familiar with Dutch history, they would see in the Dutch Reformed churches marvelous results of Calvin's power of reasoning in the field of philosophy, but very little of active support for rampant Capitalism. Calvinism flourished the most among the masses of the people. The Arminians were the extreme Capitalists in the Dutch Republic, while the orthodox Calvinists were noted for their adherence to the teachings of Jesus Christ.

We are told over and over again that a fatalistic creed undermines the human reason. But Calvinism is not such a creed. Let our critics read Calvin's commentaries on various biblical books and see how he employs reason and thinks of man as cooperating with God. Calvin said that businessmen had to obey the laws and regulations of their respective countries. Reason demanded such action. Calvin was known as a master of logic, even more than Luther was. The present writer has quoted a number of statements from Calvin's works which indicate clearly that he was not only a keen thinker but also a great philosopher. It is his honest opinion that Calvin as a philosopher ranks with Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.

Averill Gouldy
Fort Worth, Texas

THE SUMMER issue of The Personalist was intensely interesting, especially the Editor's appraisal of the new concepts of science, particularly current theories of evolution as expressed by Du Nouy, and the paper on the question as to whether Calvin was a philosopher. Surely the author's conclusions will be challenged by questioning his assumptions that as he approvingly quotes Russell—"Logic is the essence of philosophy"; that the basis of Calvin's philosophical ideas was faith as opposed to reason; that inconsistency proves logical incompetency (what about Plato and current theories of the nature of light?); that lack of definitions in terms which are clear to Mr. Le Coq and the failure to develop a foolproof solution of the problems of freewill and determinism, and of the limitation of powers together with responsibility; prove logical inconcoherency. What phi-

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THE CALVIN FORUM * * APRIL, 1949
thosopher has accomplished the latter? Not even Kant, and certainly not Russell, the darling of the logicians, who made a geometry to take the place of thinking, evidently because he was too tender-minded to struggle with the complexities of meaning and of human expression, as stronger men have struggled, but has preferred to give up and run away to the fantastic security of mathematical formulae.

Logic is no more the essence of philosophy than wiring is the essence of electricity. It is a tool, a method, a limitation for a purpose, but, because it is a limitation, it lacks completeness. Logic helps knowledge but it is not knowledge, still less wisdom. A fool or ignoramus, with neither knowledge nor judgment, could juggle Russell’s theorems and equations if he happened to have a peculiar type of intelligence, just as there have been morons who could perform prodigious feats in rapid calculation and solve intricate mathematical problems without having sense enough to come out of the rain, or being in any sense whatever pursuers of truth, as philosophers are said to be.

Certainly Calvin’s motivations in philosophy were religious and the outcome of his reasoning was the validation of faith; at least it was so to many minds. But he by no means discredited reason. Rather, he dignified it, as truth which proceeded from God. I wonder where Dr. Le Coq thinks it proceeds from—some neat invention of men? All conceptual and analytical thinking must rest on assumptions; if Calvin’s rested on the assumption that revelation is not only possible but actual and experienced, his assumption may or may not be correct, but it is not the same thing as uncritical acceptance of authority from above or from anywhere else. He was a very critical man, given to flouting authority and a vociferous exponent of dissent. One of his ways of seeking truth was upon reasonable grounds, as every philosopher must unless he be a complete nihilist and deny the possibility of knowing.

Faith and reason are not opposite terms, though they are not identical, and the philosopher’s solution of problems, or rather his approach to solution (since there is no finality in the sense of completion for any living problem), may and does embrace both. Faith may be held on either rational or irrational grounds, usually is held on both. Reason may lead either to or away from faith, which is essentially an emotional state, and a choice of possible interpretations of known facts. Or, to put it another way, reason represents a highway with faith at one end and unfaith at the other, the destination being determined less by the individual’s use of the highway than by his personal and emotional choice of direction. The scenery along the way will include the same objects, but will be seen in different aspects by travelers moving in different directions. Religion can and does use reason to apprehend truth, but reason cannot use religious belief as the sole means of reaching after truth, because reason is a tool, not an accomplishment, a chisel which gives form to thought, and cannot be greater than the purpose for which it is used; while, being only a tool, and thus limited in capacity, it also is ideally neutral. It does not choose sides, when honest, though its user’s choice of assumptions and premises may make it appear to be partisan. But it is not fair to judge the value of a method by the errors it participates in, and reason is not to be condemned, only seen and loved for what it is without any attempt to embellish its functional starkness with our fancies.

Dr. Le Coq errs perhaps in reading Calvin out of the assemblage of the philosophers because Calvin did not know, or did not emphasize, some things which have been brought to our attention by Spinoza, Hegel, and Bergson. Granting Calvin’s ignorance and failures, granting that he was a religious rather than a political or scientific or aesthetic philosopher, and granting that his methods and conclusions are excellent targets for criticism, we need not deny a man who thought as much as he thought, and to as much effect, the name of philosopher. Rather, we should question the author’s underlying assumption that to be a philosopher, a man must be completely consistent in his thought, aware of truth, several hundred years in advance of his time, obedient to whatever may be the currently popular theories of logic and definitions of terms. May we hope to have a paper from Dr. Le Coq on a philosopher who is free from the faults he finds with Calvin?

(Letter reprinted by permission of author and of editor of The Personalist.)

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**Brief Season**

We could not know how brief the hour
Till we felt Spring returned this way
Who once knew Winter’s fiercest blasts
November month through May.
We could not know our one regret,
When Spring returned too soon,
That we had missed the silver sleet
That used to fall at noon.
Now only memory is ours
Of winter hills and fields drift high.
We could not know how brief the hour
Till we felt Spring, too, slipping by.

MARIE J. POST

Grand Rapids
From Our Correspondents

LETTER FROM HOLLAND


Dear Editor:

It is Monday morning. Before I busy myself with other matters calling for attention, I shall first ease my conscience by writing this belated letter to our esteemed CALVIN FORUM. This should have been done much sooner. But I trust you will understand and pardon my tardiness when I tell you that I have just returned from a three and a half months’ absence from my congregation and my other work here and things have piled up during that time. Besides, a real shortage of ministers exists among us nowadays. Often we are called upon to preach and write even four times on a Sunday. I have the pastoral care over 1400 souls, and there is always, in addition, work to be accomplished for the denomination as a whole. And then the correspondence to be carried on! That has increased appreciably since my return from America. People seem to think that, because I have crossed the ocean a few times, I am now just returned from a three and a half months’ absence from my congregation and my other work here and things have piled up during that time. Besides, a real shortage of ministers exists among us nowadays. Often we are called upon to preach three and even four times on a Sunday. I have the pastoral care over 1400 souls and there is always, in addition, work to be accomplished for the denomination as a whole. And then the correspondence to be carried on! That has increased appreciably since my return from America. People seem to think that, because I have crossed the ocean a few times, I am now

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enjoyed by its author. I believe, however, that we are the ever maintained, a colonial despotism or tyranny in Indonesia. The Javanese are being treated with much more respect by the Dutch than the Negroes in the States by the whites! You may be sure of that! I had to get this off my chest, especially because often CALVIN FORUM readers ask just what the facts really are. The Indonesian problem has become more complex because of the unintelligent interference of other countries, among which America is foremost. I have profound respect for America in many ways, but surely not on this issue.

Enough of this. There is still a shortage of fuel, and so we are glad that our winter has been a mild one. The first spring sunbeams are playing on the square just outside my study window. In our church life a few rays of welcome sunshine are already noticeable. In the little town of Oosterbeek a group of brethren of the Reformed Churches have for the first time met as brethren about a common table with those who are members of the now separated Reformed Churches (Schilder). This is hopeful. Not that a solution is in sight. Far from it! However, these rays have cheered and warmed the hearts of many on both sides!

Hearty greetings from

PIETER FRANS,
H. W. Mesdagplein 2,
Groningen, Netherlands.

A LETTER FROM SOUTH INDIA

The Editor-in-Chief,
THE CALVIN FORUM,
My dear Dr. Bouma:

ALLOW me to felicitate you on the honorary professorship conferred on you on September 16th, by the Sárospatak Seminary. It is indeed good to have this fresh evidence of the esteem you are held in by Christians living far beyond the confines of the land of your domicile. I believe that the honor done you by the Hungarian Reformed community is one which every well-wisher of Calvin College and Seminary may be pardoned for taking thereof a very small share unto himself. If you are planning to cross the broad Atlantic in a few months in the course of your well-earned Sabbatical Year’s leave of absence, you will no doubt personally visit Sárospatak. [Hardly. Not before the iron curtain is lifted.—EDITOR.]

When pondering the Christian Reformed Communion’s spiritual and cultural connections with some of the older churches in the Netherlands, Britain, and Hungary, one is impressed and heartened by her steady reaching out also to non-Christian lands. For, after your continental South-West, small sections of South America, China, and West Africa, comes what I take to be a missionary “Advance Guard” in South Asia. With Drs. Vroom and Blokma operating in Pakistan, the Revs. Schuring and Foenander in Ceylon, and ourselves in South India, the Calvinistic world and life view should be getting propagated slowly but surely in this part of the world, although none of those named are as yet laboring directly under the aegis of the denomination. I believe, however, that we are the pioneers whom God is pleased to use in blazing the trail, so to speak, for others of His choice to follow with a full-orbed presentation of the Gospel, the establishing of the Church and the provision of Christian schools and hospitals along with facilities for training the native ministry.

PIETER FRANS,
Telugu Village Mission,
Adoni, South India,
February 3, 1949.

February 3, 1949.
The Telugu Village Mission, which your correspondent is privileged to serve, has for the past quarter of a century preached the unsearchable riches of Christ, bringing just over 7,500 souls into the Good Shepherd's fold. The Christians on the Central and Mysore mission fields live in 105 separate communities, the groups ranging in size from perhaps two or three families to congregations comprising 55 similar units.

Apart from a couple of dozen elementary Christian schools and two very small rural Bible schools where teacher-evangelists are taught the rudiments of their vocation, the Mission's resources of personnel and finance have not permitted the operation of Christian hospitals and schools of "middle" and "high" categories. Our basic problem has been not so much the difficulty of reaching pagans with the Gospel and bringing them to Christ, but of taking adequate care of the large numbers of catechumens who keep pressing into the Kingdom. Our average intake for the past decade has been five hundred annually on the two mission fields my wife and I are responsible for. The year 1948, for instance, saw 135 families from six separate communities evangelized, with almost an equal number under instruction at this writing. And as far as one can see, there is no slackening in the tempo of this steady Christ-ward stream. But in the territory under review, there are about three-quarters of a million still outside of Christianity, though some of these must undoubtedly have heard the "good tidings of great joy".

My personal reactions to the situation are two-fold: a feeling of humility and awe at the manifest outworking of the gracious purposes of our sovereign God in the redeeming of His elect in our midst; and nextly, a realization of the tremendous challenge this corner of India presents to the Christian Reformed Church back in favored America where, in theory at any rate, everyone is in a position to hear the message of hope and salvation.

However, I take courage from the conviction that most of our friends and many of the people we met and spoke to during our 15 months in America are aware of the bright prospects South India holds out for a vigorous missionary campaign with, very probably, immediate and encouraging results and for an outlay comparing very favorably with the cost of other Kingdom projects nearer home.

**Two Significant Trends**

The past three decades have witnessed among the small educated minority in India the development of two rather significant trends. We find, on the one hand, a steady decline in orthodox and the traditional power of Hinduism in the lives of the people and, on the other, an equally steady growth of a species of religious tolerance and what might be termed secularism. The latter, I hasten to add, is far removed from Hitlerian Nazism and Marxist Communism in as much as it does not deny the existence of God. Indeed, the Hindu Pantheon remains a reality to the masses of India, only the intelligentsia regarding this grotesque assemblage of gods, goddesses and godlets with good-humored tolerance.

Doubtless in anticipation of the ushering in of a free, self-governing India, outstanding leaders of national thought like the late Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan who, until recently, had the honor of occupying the chair of Oriental Religions at Oxford, and many other influential Hindu professors, have been at pains to teach young people of college and university status that modern Hinduism is a supremely elastic faith, giving freely of its philosophic treasures to the world and borrowing with equal alacrity the best there is in other religions. To be orthodox, they declare, is to be archaic and far too rigid. The teachings of Confucius, Zoroaster, Buddha, Christ and Mohammed have been lauded and incorporated into the new cult of secularism in which a cosmopolitan collection of ethical truths and moral values are substituted for the old *Vedic* concepts of polytheism. In short, we have with us today an easy-going, broadly-tolerant monotheistic universalism with a distinctly humanistic flavor.

Meanwhile the Christian community and other religious minorities in India are evidently not to be discriminated against, at any rate, in theory. In the recently drafted new constitution for Free India, steered through by a special committee at New Delhi, all persons are to enjoy freedom of conscience, to "freely profess, practice and propagate religion, subject only to public order, morality and health." The architect of this Article of the Constitution is Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the triple doctor of Harvard, London and Heidelberg, who used to be described by damboyoan journalists as "India's Number One Untouchable". The measure which will soon become law is alright so far as it goes, but it remains to be seen whether lesser politicians in the provinces will faithfully implement the terms of this remarkably equitable statute.

Since secularism appears to have come to stay in India, one naturally wonders just how it is going to affect Christians as regards their worship, sectarian education, denominational hospitals, and their existence as a community. My answer to these and kindred questions, after some study of the situation, would be that the secular state of the immediate future probably will not have any appreciable effect on the life and well-being of the Indian Christian community since the country has apparently arrived at the stage of development where it is beginning to matter little what a man's religion may be so long as he is a good citizen and loyal to the powers that be.

But Christian India cannot avoid the conclusion that secularism does constitute a menace for her: the danger, unfortunately, coming from within the community. Years of theological loose thinking, secularized education, and failure to honor God in the home have led Christians, by and large, to entertain a more or less pessimistic outlook as to the future. And like a flock of shepherdless sheep, they turn feverishly to the doubtful security of church union schemes as a possible panacea for all internal ills of the community. But, save in the truly evangelical churches where Christ is preached and the Word of God believed as being inspired and infallible, there is little of either unity or missionary zeal. Those of us who have at heart the interests of the Kingdom can only pray that Christ's true, visible Church in India may be so purified of apostasy and built up in faith and doctrine, that in the crucial years lying ahead, she may stand four-square against every scourging blast emanating from the pagan wilderness around us.

With warm Christian greetings to the "FORUM family",

Fraternally yours,

Arthur V. Ramiah.

**POENANDER ORDIATION AT WOLVENDAAL CHURCH**

ORDINATIONS are not events that occur frequently. They are obviously few and far between. But when an event of this significance takes place at our good old Mother Church, the congregations of the various branch churches muster loyalty in force. The recent ordination of Mr. A. G. W. Poenander held on 20th October was no exception. An assembly of about 400 were present. If there was one disappointment felt by all, it was the unavoidable absence of two Ministers—Revs. R. V. Metzeling, Moderator, and J. G. W. Hendrie of St. Andrew's Scots Kirk, Colpetty, who were down to take part in the service—the former owing to illness, and the latter to an unfortunate motor mishap. At the last moment, however, Revs. L. N. Hitchcock, ex-Moderator, and D. E. Joseph loyalty filled the breach. On occasions like ordinations, certain ceremonial garments come into play. For instance, the entry into the Church in a procession of commissioned Elders followed by all the Ministers. Secondly, at the end of the Ordination prayer, the laying on of Hands on the head of the Ordinand by all the Ministers, the Elders standing in a circle round him. This ceremony is the most solemn and impressive part of the service. Rev. L. N. Hitchcock conducted the first part of the service. The Narrative portion was taken by Rev. A. Vandergeert, Acting
Clerk. Rev. S. J. Gadsden, acting Minister of the Scots Kirk, Kandy, delivered the sermon. Rev. Joseph was responsible for the charge to the Congregation, and Rev. Vandergerdt delivered the charge to the Minister. After the Ordination prayer, he extended the Right Hand of Fellowship to the Ordinand, followed by all the Elders—Mr. Keneth de Kretser, Dr. H. E. Schokman, Mr. W. B. de Zilva of the Galle Consistory, and Mr. L. G. Vollenhoven. Rev. Gadsden for his sermon took as its text 1 Tim. iv., 12: “Let no man despise thy youth”. In the course of his address he emphasized the point that youth was not to be over-confident and boastful, but should seek the advice of his Elders. It was not self-confidence that helped youth but experience, the Holy Spirit and the Grace of God. One listening to the Preacher felt that that was wholesome advice. Rev. Joseph in his charge to the congregation called for co-operation and helpfulness on their part to the new Minister. Rev. Vandergerdt in his charge to the Ordinand offered solemn advice based on his own experience. The following hymns were rendered by a combined choir. Ps. 100, hymns 209, 182, 333, and 388. The Te Deum, too, was sung. At the end of the hymn: “Pour out Thy Spirit from on high,” the pulpit robes, subscribed to by the ladies of the congregations, were presented by the mother of the Ordinand. The new Minister in a brief speech thanked the ladies of the congregations. The whole service came to a close with the singing of the hymn: “Lord speak to me”, followed by the pronouncing of the Benediction by Rev. Foenander from the pulpit.

— The Herald.

CEYLON.

REFORMED CHURCH LIFE IN CANADA

Dear Editor:

The influx of new blood into Canada has given new impetus to the evaluation of its several Protestant churches. We were alerted to this by the secession of the Edmonton Bible Presbyterian Church from the Presbyterian Church of Canada. I had personally wondered with whom Calvanistic new immigrants might affiliate in case they should come to a close with the congregation called for co-operation and helpfulness on their part to the new Minister. Rev. Vandergerdt in his charge to the Ordinands offered solemn advice based on his own experience. The following hymns were rendered by a combined choir. Ps. 100, hymns 209, 182, 333, and 388. The Te Deum, too, was sung. At the end of the hymn: “Pour out Thy Spirit from on high,” the pulpit robes, subscribed to by the ladies of the congregations, were presented by the mother of the Ordinand. The new Minister in a brief speech thanked the ladies of the congregations. The whole service came to a close with the singing of the hymn: “Lord speak to me”, followed by the pronouncing of the Benediction by Rev. Foenander from the pulpit.

RENEWED CHURCH LIFE IN CANADA

Dear Editor:

THE influx of new blood into Canada has given new impetus to the evaluation of its several Protestant churches. We were alerted to this by the secession of the Edmonton Bible Presbyterian Church from the Presbyterian Church of Canada. I had personally wondered with whom Calvinistic new immigrants might affiliate in case they should settle beyond the range of our churches and missionary work. It will be clear from the earlier part of this letter, that our ministry in Canada, although appreciative of the hospitality of the United Church, does not favor the affiliation of the Reformed people from Holland with that denomination. We cannot forget the case of the Rev. Perry Rockwood, in which the heretical teachings of Dr. McGiffert, United Church Professor, loaned to the Presbyterian College at Montreal, were exposed; which professor, though taken to task by the Rev. Rockwood (at the cost of the latter’s virtual expulsion from the Presbyterian Church as a “divisive”), has evidently returned to his position in the United Church, nobody bothering him on account of his rank modernism. Our convictions were strengthened not only by a revealing picture of the United Church drawn by The Contender, but also by the very defence of Dr. Starn who tried to bring about that affiliation.

Naturally our attention was also directed to the Presbyterian church. We knew that there are positively sound ministers and members in that church. However, the evidence of clear-cut modernism there, presented also by The Contender, is very damming indeed. Bold denial of essential doctrines is permitted without disciplinary action. And where there is a swing to the left, it is in the direction of Barth, which is really to the left. From the evidence presented it would seem that the Presbyterian Church in Canada can hardly be recommended to our newcomers except with considerable reserve.

This is written in the realization that Bible Christianity, Rev. J. Marcellus Kik, Editor, and in it men like Dr. W. Stanford Reid, gave a splendid account of the faith that is in them and should be in their church. One also appreciates the evidence these brethren produce of improvement accomplished in their church. They hold that the latest General Assembly was a good one because it was more conscious of its duty to give a positive Presbyterian testimony; because it decided to continue to support only those missionaries who are already in the (Modernistic) Church of Christ in China, but would make no further commitments to that organization; because developments in connection with the church college at Montreal, as they see it, promise an “opportunity as a church to build up a college which will have not only a scholarly reputation, but which will have an evangelistic zeal which may in time bring about a revival among modernists everywhere, even those brethren who are members of their churches in Montreal, loyal to the Word of God, faithful to the standards of (their) church and prepared to set forth the Christian Faith with all the scholarship and zeal possible, could work marvels within and without the denomination” and finally, that the report of the committee on Articles of Faith, to which Bible Christianity objected because of the formulation of the doctrine of “Election and Predestination”, was sent down to the Presbyteries for consideration.

Now these things from which the brethren Kik and Reid take encouragement do not make much of an impression on Dr. Malcolm R. MacKay, editor of The Contender. He holds that the position of the brethren Kik and Reid is definitely compromised by their remaining in the Presbyterian Church. In fact, in the latest issues of The Contender this editor evidently takes a position which makes every orthodox Christian without or within the Presbyterian Church a compromiser if he in any way or place cooperates with an organization which counts modernists among its membership. Even membership in the Canadian Protestant League as it is constituted now means compromise. On that score yours truly is a compromiser, too,—a matter which can and will be looked into by the Canadian Calvinist. However, even though we believe that Dr. MacKay is going too far in his wholesale labelling of men and organizations, it cannot be denied that conservatives in the Presbyterian Church in Canada are pretty well on the spot if it be true what The Contender maintains in its June '48 issue; namely, that among other things, the substitutionary atonement is denied by four New Brunswick ministers in the May, 1947, issue of the Presbyterian Record, and that nothing is being done about it. One would expect that clearcut denial of a Presbyterian church’s essential doctrine would lead to a definite demand for disciplinary action on the part of the faithful. While the heresy has centered itself in high places, we wonder whether and when not only one but both the Presbyterian church colleges will actually return to the faith of the fathers so soundly set forth in the Westminster Confession.

As to the brethren of the First Bible Presbyterian Church in Edmonton, they have company now. The Westminster Church of Sidney, N. S., Dr. Alexander Murray, Minister, has severed its connection with the Presbyterian Church of Canada. At their congregational meeting it was unanimously resolved that this was solely “on the ground that it permits teachings in its colleges that are at variance with the Word of God and the Westminster Confessions of Faith; and because it refuses to take disciplinary action against certain ministers who deny the virgin birth of our Lord and His subsequent death on the cross as an atonement for sin; and further because it is a member of the World Council of Churches, a council headed and controlled by modernists, who disavow the historic Christian faith; and further, because budget money, given expressly for the support of the historic faith and its work, is being devoted to help support projects that are permeated with modernism.” Responsible reports say that these two Bible Presbyterian churches plan to organize a Canadian Bible Presbyterian church in affiliation with the similar church in the U. S. A. Moreover, the Edmonton Church has a considerable amount of money available for the expansion of its denominational program along home missionary lines, by which they will lend a helping hand to those who desire to organize churches of similar testimony. They also hope to establish as soon as possible, an evangelical seminary for the training of ministers not only for their own
CHRIST: HUMAN AND DIVINE


CHRISTOLOGY today is at the crossroads. It must seek for itself an approved avenue for its future development. Such is the thesis of the learned author in what he calls an essay on Christology. His treatment is stimulating and refreshing. His incisive thought is presented in clear and concise language.

The old errors of Docetism, Arianism, Apollinarism, Nestorianism and Adoptionism are to be avoided. The “historical Jesus” is not enough but neither can we follow Form Criticism in denying the Jesus of history. Both are over-simplifications, since our very God-concept depends upon our Christology (p. 63). In Christ we learn to know a “prevenient God,” one who always is beforehand with men, who seeks and saves the lost sheep. A true Christology will not merely tell us that God was with Christ (Cf. W. Temple and Dean Inge) but that God was in Christ (p. 66).

Moreover, the modern view of history (Tillich, c.e.) indicates that we need an absolute vantage point to gain meaning for history. This can be found in Christ alone (p. 78). History remains a vast and undifferentiated chaos of non-significant detail unless some point in it has eschatological significance. Christology furnishes our Christian view of history, for it transcends the ancient, cyclic theory and gives us a real time scheme. Christology professes to portray the divine action from Creation to the Consummation.

The author envisages pushing beyond the historic creeds, “which have enthroned the mystery without explaining it,” in trying to understand how Christ was the God-man (p. 83). In passing he offers us a critique of several inadequate Christologicals—viz., Anhypostasis, “the old conception that in Christ there was no distinct human personality, but divine Personality assuming human nature”; the Kenotic Theory; and the Leadership-Lordship concept of Karl Heim.

At this juncture a creed-nurtured theologian begins to demur. Suddenly one finds himself in strange theological waters. Both H. R. Mackintosh and R. C. Moherly are quoted with approval to the effect that a human nature which is not personal is not human. Christ could not be Man without being a man. As such He lived in complete dependence on His Father. “But such dependence does not destroy human personality” (p. 98, reviewer’s italics).

In this connection the central contribution of the author is made and it is illuminatingly elaborated in the following chapter which deals with the paradox of the incarnation. The paradox of grace as stated by Paul and experienced by every Christian is the humble confession “yet not I, but the grace of God which is in me” (I Cor. 15:10). So too, Jesus disclaimed any credit for Himself and was willing to give all the glory to God. Christ is presented as in some sense the prototype of the Christian life since His earthly existence is the human side of a divine reality (p. 130). The lesser paradox of grace, then, illuminates the supreme paradox of Christianity—the Incarnation.

In my judgment the author, in trying to go beyond Chalcedonianism, has stressed the human consciousness that He has quite reduced the divine Person, the eternal Logos, to the divine influence which every Christian acknowledges in his own life. In spite of the gallant beginning with its emphasis on a real Christology the “historical Jesus” of the liberals with his highly accentuated God-consciousness finally emerges. It is assumed that no paradox in theology can be justified unless it can be shown to spring directly from what H. R. Mackintosh calls “the immediate utterance of faith.” This pragmatic subjectivism is fatal, for it denies the ultimacy of the objective Word revelation. This is univocal reasoning—i.e., applying our ordinary scientific categories without qualification to all reality. John Wild calls this naturalism, “the attempt to apprehend God by means of those univocal categories which apply to the finite things of nature” (Science of Philosophy, p. 8).

A further instance of this sort of reasoning may be found in the author’s definition of paradox as a self-contradictory statement. Indeed, the Christian faith is beset with seeming contradictions because of the limitation of our understanding. Must we not believe that these are all resolved in the mind of God and do we not accept God’s revelation on these matters as true quite apart from our ability to experience or to rationalize these truths?

We appreciate the author’s opposition to every form of Adoptionism, but his tendency to swallow up Christ’s Messianic self-consciousness into his human God-consciousness is to be deplored. Here Baillie seems to follow H. M. Reitsma (A Study in Christology) in equating consciousness with person, thereby losing the duplex-consciousness of the Creeds. This human person (Christ) does not make any claims for Himself as God but ascribes everything to the Father, as every Christian conscious of the grace of God also does. Christ’s experience of God and ours is equated but ours depends on His. “If God in some measure lives and acts in us, it is because first, and without measure, He lived and acted in Christ. And thus, further, the New Testament tends sometimes to say that as God dwells in Christ, so Christ dwells in us” (p. 128). Here
we meet the common liberal tendency to identify the religion of Jesus with that of Christians, but in Christ "the divine prevenance was nothing short of Incarnation" (p. 131).

In fairness to the author it ought to be pointed out that he does say that we cannot do justice to the Incarnation "without speaking of it as the coming into history of the eternally pre-existent Son of God." But he adds significantly—thereby denoting the above confession, "This does not mean, it need hardly be said, anything like a conscious continuity of life and memory between Jesus of Nazareth and the pre-existent Son" (p. 180).

One is certainly non-plussed, to put it mildly, by this bold departure from Chalcedon which was characterized by B. B. Warfield as "a very perfect synthesis of biblical data" (Christology and Criticism, p. 263). And has not historic Protestantism ever maintained that "the Christ of history was not unconscious, but continually conscious, of His deity, and of all that belongs to His Deity" (I dem, p. 309).

In the last chapter the Incarnation is related to the Atonement. Its relevancy to modern life is indicated in trenchant language. To ignore the need of reconciliation for man is to betray a profound ignorance of human nature and modern psychology. The moral-failure complex of modernity is covered by the veneer of secular complacency. The technique of psycho-analysis may succeed in dragging the bêtes noires of frightened humanity out into the open but it does not remove the sting of an accusing conscience nor the stain of a tarnished character. Is there, then, no medicine for minds diseased with a sense of guilt? Indeed, but forgiveness calls for a divine act of inexorable love.

After thus setting the stage with consummate skill, the author again fails to follow through with the consistent Supernaturalism of the Scriptures by questioning the Messianic consciousness of Christ in His profound predictions and priestly interpretations of His vicarious suffering. "We can hardly do more than reverently conjecture as to how far it was given Him by faith to grasp the divine purpose that would use His death for the salvation of sinners" (p. 183). Atonement must be eternal since it is God who makes it, thereby confronting our sins with His infinite love. The author concludes this section by denying both the doctrine of the impassibility of God and the historic doctrine of expiation, for which he gives the readers the moral influence theory. In the Epilepsia the essence of sin is designated as selfishness, the "universal aberration symbolized in the 'myth' of the Fall of Man" cannot be conceived "as an event that occurred at a particular date in human history on earth, but as something supra-historical infecting all our history" (p. 204). This denial of the relevance of historic facts for the Christian faith is also indicated in the author's unwillingness to accept the physical resurrection of Christ. Instead of the resurrection the author mentions His spiritual presence; for, "God had brought Him safely through death and raised Him up, and gave Him back to them in an unseen way (reviewer's italics) through what they called the Holy Spirit" (p. 208). And after Pentecost the "myth" of Jesus developed, "Others were drawn in, and the community grew; and they kept thinking and saying ever more and more stupendous things about the man Jesus and His crucifixion: that this was God's sacrifice of His own Son for the salvation of men; that this was the eternal divine Word becoming incarnate and suffering as the Lamb of God that bears the sin of the world" (p. 208). Comment is superfluous!

But I must desist for lack of space. One regrets that he could not, as sharply with the author of such an excellently written theological "essay". But it is my conviction that the occasional high supernaturalism of the author is vitiated by his consistently naturalistic approach to the 'Infallible Word' and his uncritical assumption of the autonomy of human reason. Thereby the Christology of the Creeds is reduced willy-nilly to a portrait of the liberal Jesus, who is not the eternal Son of God come into the flesh to take away the sin of the world, but merely the first Christian, who succeeded in establishing a community of 'good men'.

HENRY VAN TIL.


In this volume Professor Jaeger of Harvard University presents his Gilford Lectures of 1936. Delivered at the University of St. Andrews, they have been amplified, especially by many invaluable scholarly notes which take up sixty-two pages of the total and frequently are of equal importance with the text itself. Two indices are provided for English and Greek terms. This is a scholar's book of the highest order; I am not qualified to criticize it in this respect.

Since readers of these pages may have only a limited interest in the comparatively undeveloped theology of the pre-Socratics, I shall invite their attention to some of Professor Jaeger's outstanding and valuable publications. In my judgment, Jaeger is a writer some of whose chief works merit assiduous study among FORUM readers and whose forthcoming investigations should be awaited with eagerness. "In order to convey the quality of Jaeger's scholarship I shall give liberal quotations.

In 1923 Professor Jaeger published his influential Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. Two English editions have appeared (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press), translated by Richard Robinson, the first, in 1934 and the second, in 1948. The latter incorporates several alterations and the addition of two appendices which, though addressed to highly special topics, we are fortunate to have in accessible form. Aristoteles is a superb piece of research into a specific problem, how the thought of Aristotle developed from his student days under Plato to his last years as leader of the Lyceum. It is worked out with the finesse of the expert philologist. No single book has had greater influence during the past quarter century on students in Plato and Aristotle.

Jaeger's Plato in Aufbau der griechischen Bildung appeared in 1928. Perhaps it will not be translated, for it seems to have been a preliminary to composing what is till now Jaeger's greatest study, his Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture (Oxford University Press, translated by Gilbert Higley).

Paideia is a monumental three volume work. Volume I appeared in Germany in 1933, and a second edition eighteen months later in 1935. The two editions appeared in English in 1939 and 1945, the second having been modified only slightly in the text but greatly enriched by copious and important notes, in which respect it is now uniform with Vol. II and III, which appeared in English in 1948. I give the American publication dates. In the course of seeing these volumes published, Jaeger transferred himself to the United States, taking a position at the University of Chicago in 1936 and at Harvard in 1939.

To this point Paideia is Jaeger's magnum opus, sufficiently vast and significant to establish his reputation as the foremost living interpreter of the early development of Western culture in all its aspects. It is an account of the subject named by the title, i.e. Greek paideia, culture or education, conceived as the conscious specification by the West's earliest teachers of that ideal which ought to guide all individual effort and social practice. The method is historical, moving from Homer through Hesiod, the first philosophers, early Athenian life, the drama-thens, the Sophists, and Socrates, to Plato, Isocrates, and Demotes, who stood at the moment when the might of empire engulfed the externals of their world. Paideia gives us a sympathetic but objective analysis of a development which will remain one of the fundamental sources of Western culture and a paradigm for the effects and proper treatment of a cultural crisis such as now exists once more.

In 1943 Jager delivered in Milwaukee the Aquinas Lecture, published as Humanism and Theology (Marquette University
Great is as Paideia, Jaeger speaks in it and in other places of a further study which may turn out to be of equal scope and weight. This is to be a study of the development of philosophical theology extending into the Christian era. I now give several passages in which Jaeger reveals the formation and growth of his plan. In the Preface to Paideia, I, he says after completing the present work he intends "to show how Rome and early Christianity were drawn into the cultural process which started with Greece" (p. ix). Jaeger says in the Preface to Paideia, II, that "it is tempting to plan a continuation of the work" (p. ix) in order to reach the transformation of Hellenistic paideia into Christian paideia. In fact, he says, this transformation, though not the express topic of study, "is the greatest historical theme of this work" (p. xi), "if it depended wholly on the will of the writer," he adds, "his studies would end with a description of the vast historical process by which Christianity was Hellenized and Hellenic civilization became Christianized. It was Greek paideia which laid the groundwork for the ardent, centuries-long competition between the Greek spirit and the Christian religion, each trying to master or assimilate the other, and for their final synthesis. As well as treating their own separate period of history, the second and third volumes of this work are intended to bridge the gap between classical Greek civilization and the Christian culture of late antiquity" (pp. xi-xii). Elsewhere in the same volume he states that his 1936 Gifford Lectures are to be followed by a study of Greek theology down to Plato (pp. 414-415, in notes 39 and 39b). This theological development he calls a "second current in Greek thought" (p. 414) and says that its apex was reached in Plato—"Plato is the greatest of all classical theologians" (p. 285). And in Paideia, III, Jaeger points out that Plato's remarkable discussion of God in Laws X is supported by an entire theological system which he hopes to treat in his history of Greek philosophical theology (p. 261). A passage in The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers shows that Jaeger plans to produce a sequel to this book which will examine the theology of Plato and Aristotle (p. 194, note 13). The Preface to this volume uses more precise and ambitious terms: "In the present book I have traced this (theological) development through the heroic age of Greek cosmological thought down to the time of the Sophists. In a second volume, against the pre-Socratic background, I should like to treat the period from Socrates and Plato down to the time when, under the influence of this tradition of Greek philosophical theology, the Jewish-Christian religion transformed itself into a theological system in the Greek manner, in order to force its admission to the Hellenistic world" (pp. v-vi, parenthesis mine). Let me express the devout wish that Professor Jaeger be spared to complete this massive task, and say that I should be gratified in case the second volume he mentions turns out to be two volumes, if not three.

Because we face a culture which is consolidating its drift toward humanism and naturalism, we ought to see the relevance of Jaeger's projected study. Plato faced a similar context and attacked it with the requisite weapon, a philosophical theology. The Sophists who produced fifth-century humanism proved incapable of providing a solid reason for protecting the very thing they claimed to cherish and teach, viz., virtue, culture, the ideal type of human life. Understanding their weakness and its source, their naturalism and scepticism, Plato offered the means of salvation: apart from a philosophy of the human, humanism is crippled and insecure. Thinking of Protagoras, the greater of the eldest Sophists, he says in his old age, "God is the measure," not man (Laws IV, 716c). Because the early Christians, without Plato's contribution, would not have had the means to complete their own theological structure, we are obliged to retain, in every generation, an understanding of the classical background. Augustine, "the greatest of western Christian theologians," realized his dependence on Plato. "There was no one better fitted to appreciate" Plato's value as a model. "In the eighth Book of his City of God or rather State of God, which he deliberately composed as a Christian counterpart of Plato's Republic, he puts Plato at the head of all pre-Christian theologians. Christian theology as practiced by the fathers of the Church was really the result of treating the problems of Christianity with the concepts and methods of Platonic theology" (Paideia, II, p. 414, note 39a). Augustine recognized the continuity in the development from the Greeks to Christianity; he began his survey of the history of theology with the Milesians. Christian theology he conceived as perfecting the deepest insights of the Greeks, and of Plato chiefly. Jaeger therefore says, "I . . . am impressed by the continuity of the fundamental forms of thought and expression which triumphantly bridges the chasm between these antithetic periods (Greek and Christian) of the human mind and integrates them into one universal civilization" (The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, p. 9; parenthesis mine). A culture which loses its memory will lose itself. I find that Mr. T. S. Eliot has urged the same point in his early essay (1917) on the "Deception and Error of Platonism and St. John the Evangelist" that we do not know more than the ancient writers unless we first know them (Selected Essays, 1917-1928, p. 6) and I conjecture that his own poetic power stems partly from observing the precept. In short, the value of knowing the tradition is the opposite of merely antiquarian. Jaeger repeats the basic lesson that, as is true of poetry, philosophy and theology cannot be strong and living unless they constantly return for a model and for inspiration to the classic productions of the past (op. cit., p. 1).

All of Jaeger's writings attest his fitness for his theological study. His own testimony may be cited. "I long ago started my work on pre-Socratic philosophy under such men as Hermann Diels and Wilamowitz . . . but I have also spent a whole life on the study of Christian tradition, especially in its ancient Greek and Roman phase" (op. cit., p. 9). Furthermore, he is completely conscious of the nature of historical analysis. Refusing to follow the positivist practice of reducing all human currents to identical terms, he insists that there is no genuine culture in a society or epoch which does not consciously reflect on the ideals which ought to guide all human effort. So-called "primitive" or pre-Hellenic societies did not think about paideia and are not properly cultures at all (Paideia, I, 2nd. ed., pp. xvi-xvii). Plunging into the life and emotion of another era, the true historian calls back both its men and its ideals to life again. He tries "to use the criterion of Thucydides to give a transcendent continuity on a large scale to mark out the main lines of a historical pattern, a true cosmogony of values, an ideal world which will survive the birth and death of states and nations. Thereby his work becomes a philosophical drama born of the spirit of historical contemplation" (Paideia, II, Preface, p. xiii).

I now present a few important phases of The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers. This book, to begin with, is designed to counteract the positivist reading of early Greek thought. Burnet and Gomperz, e.g., sought to spread the view that the earliest philosophers were akin to rational thought. But the earliest thinkers were akin in spirit to the secular modern mind. In comparison with their physical science and cosmology, they considered their religious utterances as only half-serious. Springing from the anti-metaphysical scientism of the 19th century, positivism overlooked the facts. An old tradition, of which Cicero and Augustine were aware, regarded these earliest thinkers as the first theologians of the West. Also, philosophy directly, modified the development of Greek religion.

Another object of Jaeger's study is to resist the widespread view that the mystery religions were chiefly a threat to rational thought, that they contributed to Greek life only an uncontrolled
tendency toward myth-making and an irrational cult practice. The author shows that the Orphic theogonies of the sixth century B. C. corrected the Hesiodic pattern in a manner suggesting the influence of philosophy. E. g., they refuse to repeat the older view that the ultimate principle of the changing world itself came to be. Though their vehicle is a lavish anthropomorphic mythology, the mysteries struggle toward a concept of eternal reality. More than this, by their labors to conceive of the nature and destiny of the soul, they are the sources of an immeasurably significant contribution to later thought. Their ideas about the soul provide the impetus toward fixing the superiority of soul to body, toward establishing the doctrine of personal immortality (cf. Pindar’s second Olympian ode), and toward framing a code of conduct befitting the man whose life is not lived out inside the bounds of bodily existence. This concept of the soul, it seems, helped toward the formation of the Nous-theology of Anaxagoras and the perfecting of Plato’s theology, which succeeds in approaching the Christian doctrine of the divine transcendence.

There is an interesting feature in Anaximander’s theological thought. Setting aside the Homeric mythology of numerous personalized deities and seeking by reason a primal source and ground of all natural being and flux, he names it the Apeiron or Boundless. Next he specifies its properties. The Apeiron has had no beginning or end, it is eternal, unborn and inexpressible; from it all things rise, and to it return; it encompasses and governs all things. The conclusion follows: This is the Divine. Anaximander, as Jaeger points out, derives the divine nature of the Apeiron from its properties, in virtue of which it deserves to take the place of the inferior Homeric deities. His approach is completely objective and was repeated by many later Greeks, including the Stoics. The mind seeks to know the ground of empirical existence, and its properties warrant the ascription of divinity; thus philosophy and religion converge on the same object and end. A very different approach, originating with the Sophists and using some form of the argument ex consenso gentium, begins with human psychology and is eventually sceptical.

Passing over almost the whole of Jaeger’s rich analyses of the individual thinkers of which he treats (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, etc.), we may conclude by reviewing the cultural crisis of the sophistic age. The Sophists of the fifth century were “the real fathers of rational anthropology” (p. 175) because they cultivated a livelier interest in man’s possession of beliefs than in the meaning of the beliefs themselves. Protagoras, in his belief that religion is a product of man’s constitution and a basic component of civilization. This novel attitude is quite legitimate, of course; the reason why the Sophists constitute the most significant ancient paradigm of our modern culture lies in what they did after having adopted this attitude. Doubtful of the power of reason to find light on the intellectual claims of moral and religious beliefs, they assumed that explanations in terms of physical, psychological, and sociological factors give an adequate account of the phenomena they studied. Prodicus explained how primitive man looked on the natural forces producing food and warmth as gods. Democritus (in many respects) replaced the idea of personal immortality and associated the occurrences worked on man’s emotions, between fear and awe, to produce religion. At this point occurs a crisis in morals. No longer are the teachings of religion about man’s nature and duties objectively valid or true; their mode of existence is conventional merely, i.e., a useful fiction. But then Callicles, the typical latter-day Sophist in Plato’s Gorgias, can draw the proper conclusion: human nature is not moral but selfish; men obey the moral code only by compulsion; and where there are no witnesses no man will scruple to perform any act he calculates to serve his interests. This is the background for Critias’ satyrs (mostly lost) in which one speaker eulogizes the idea that political organization of society consciously invented the fiction of the gods as invisible witnesses in order to keep their subjects in check. Thus the outcome of the sophistic theory is the fictionalizing of moral precepts; and in practice there resulted the demoralization of public life into factional struggle and international violence. Properly diagnosing the actual context and its intellectual source, Socrates and Plato defined the only answer. Starting from practical life, precisely where the new theory was busily creating evils, they labored to restore the nature and end of human life and found that only theology could complete the task.

University of Kentucky.

TOWARDS STANDARDS


This latest publication by Sir Livingstone of barely twenty-five pages is a right handy booklet for study clubs interested in the essence of a good education.

Here we meet a brief, incisive criticism of the grave weaknesses in the English system of university education—particularly on the undergraduate level.

Since universities everywhere occupy central and strategic positions in the social structure as moulders of the outlook of all educated men and women the author sounds the alarm by giving both general and specific criticisms together with remedies for a new solution.

The over-all weakness of undergraduate education on the college level in his judgment is that it is too little concerned with ends, human values, and a philosophy of life. With Communism and Nazism proving without a doubt that our gravest present-day problem is moral and spiritual, universities do not today exert the spiritual influence they should and which they once did assert from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century.

Specifically he argues that at present the English universities reveal little or no concern for checking that wholesale surrender of traditional restraints and traditional ideals of a Christian code of ethics. They have no interest in spiritual ideals born of the Christian heritage to formulate a clear, rational ideal of a nobler view of life than either Communism or Nazism can or does offer.

On the whole front the author observes indifference, partly brought about by the argument of some that a university is a liberal-bourgeois institution and for the rest by the prevailing custom within college halls—the failure to bother about giving any Christian interpretation of life or any guide for conduct.

Sir Livingstone rightly contends that in the present critical stage of world anxiety and paralyzing fear a university or college of all institutions should profoundly concern itself with the deeper issues and values of life. The spectre of Statism is so real that unless universities and colleges forthwith assume a more serious role, mankind may drift into no philosophy at all or into one doomed to prove absurd.

And why don’t modern higher institutions take the bull by the horns? Details are stressed, innumerable courses are offered, specialization is on the march, highly specialized scholarship examinations compel concentration on parts, and in all these instances there is no concern for what is indispensable in a full education. All of these tendencies make for a haphazard and segmental growth; yet the whole is lost. The author quotes page 53 of the Harvard report, “specialism enhances the centrifugal forces in society.” According to him this danger is all the greater in scientific and mathematical specialization—not concerning itself with the human problem, nor with good and evil. “The scientist explains everything but himself” (p. 14).

That same specialization is similarly harmful if in the humanities humanity is lost. “It is possible to read in it without divin-
ing the deeps that lie beneath” (p. 16). “The mass of the material may crush the student and the dust stifle him” (p. 17).

The author concludes here that the problem both in England and in America (where the same loss of education of the whole is so ably analyzed and the same danger of specialism so pointedly set forth in the Harvard report on General Education in a Free Society), is to bring home to the student the greatest of all problems—the problem of living or as Plato diagnosed it, “The noblest of all studies is the study of what a man should be and how he should live.”

In prescribing a remedy the author directs his readers to the advice given by Bishop Berkeley, the advice of making students meditate upon God, the human mind, and the Summae Bonum. The words of warning from Berkeley are given, “If a man ignores all these he may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will certainly make a sorry patriot or a sorry statesman” (p. 21).

When your present reviewer read this quotation he was no longer surprised that Mr. C. S. Lewis chose as a title of one of his books dealing with trends in modern education the significant words, The Abolition of Man.

Again, the author suggests a remedy offered long ago by Burke, who reminded his contemporaries of the old warning of the Church: Sursum Corda.

Throughout, Sir Livingstone wants universities and colleges to restore a sense of perspective, and an awareness of the permanent, of all time, of existence, of “in the beginning,” and of setting one’s life in order.

He is not completely satisfied with the solution presented in the Harvard Report with its compulsory course in the humanities by studying the “Great Texts of Literature” with religion ignored and philosophy left as an optional subject. Instead, he greatly prefers the more direct study of religion or of philosophy, “The former the most important of all subjects” (p. 25).

He has no patience with two objections against this more immediate remedy. He brushes aside the complaint, “There is no time for it” by the pertinent remark that “time can always be found for what is essential!” and that the objection that “many students will get nothing out of it” may be true for some but that all need it” (p. 26).

In finishing his plea at this climax of his reasoning he rivets the attention of the readers on the inestimable value of Plato’s Republic, a book “In Goodness” with an urgency and earnestness from practical need. That need is now; it is how to check further corruption of a great ideal: the just man in a great state.

This same urgency on the same need one can also directly face in reading Dr. Fosdick’s article in the Reader’s Digest, February, 1949, on “Our Religious Illiterates,” or in a speech by Dr. Hutchins where he insists that a university should quit the prevailing attitude among the professionals toward any Christian interpretation of history.

Professor Latourette groups his material under the following three lines of thought:

(1) What is the Christian understanding of history?

(2) The degree to which this understanding eludes modern professional testing methods.

(3) The grounds on which this understanding may be tested by modern methods and the conclusions which may be drawn from these tests.

Recognizing first that there are many important issues on which Christian historians disagree, Professor Latourette then proceeds to state the salient tenets to which a majority of Christian historians give assent, which, obviously, is a statement of his own belief. Sweeping the field of Christian understanding of history with broad strokes, he posits such basic tenets as: God is the creator and sustainer of the universe; man is created in the image of God—therefore mankind is one and Christian history is universal; man has abused this image and seeks to do his own will and not God’s will; God meets this perversion by judgment and mercy; history moves toward a culmination which will be achieved either within or beyond time when the will of God shall be completely accomplished.

Oneonders what reaction Professor Latourette’s address created in this audience of America’s foremost historians. His treatment of theological terms must have left most of them a mile behind and gasping for breath. He does not stop to define his terms. This provokes innumerable questions as to his intended meaning. That he sidesteps the Reformed position on two essentials is very obvious, however. The first occasion is his clearly implied but not carefully stated belief in creative evolution. The second concerns the degree of the freedom of man’s will. The former does not constitute a major premise in his presentation, but the latter assumes increasing importance as the author approaches his conclusion. Only in his conclusion does Latourette define the degree of freedom of man’s will when he states that it is sufficient for man of himself to accept or reject God’s love.

Having covered the field of Christian interpretation of history in broad generalizations, the author returns to point out the real distinctiveness of the Christian position. He finds this in the Christian historian’s insistence that Jesus, who is God incarnate, is the pivot upon whom all history turns. Jesus gives to history a unifying core. This unifying core Latourette defines succinctly: “God’s grace, the love which man does not deserve and cannot earn, respects man’s free will and endeavors to reach man through the incarnation, the cross, and the Holy Spirit.”

Such an understanding of history, states Professor Latourette, eludes the scientific testing methods employed by modern historians along four lines. First: historians who wish to test the validity of the Christian interpretation are faced with a perspective and a set of values which are diametrically opposed to those which mankind usually esteem. “We are told,” states Professor Latourette, “that unless a man is born again not

CHRISTIAN DOGMA AND HISTORY


Among modern historians proponents of a Christian interpretation of history have been regarded as decidedly inferior members of their craft. Some regard the Christian historian as an intellectual throwback. Others, more charitably disposed, view the Christian historian with sympa-

thetic indulgence, expecting him to grow up as soon as he catches up with the modern age. It takes real courage to proclaim among ranking historians a belief in a supernatural force in history, let alone adherence to a Christian interpretation of history. Such courage was displayed by Kenneth Scott Latourette in an address delivered at the recent convocation of the American Historical Association. As recently elected President of that Association he gave the presidential address on the subject, "The Christian Understanding of History." President Latourette is Professor of Missions and Oriental History in Yale University.

Although there is a su...
only can he not enter, but he cannot even see (or presumably recognize) the Kingdom of God.” The foci for the Christian historian are upon events which most historians normally ignore.

Second: the critical historian must acquiesce in that Jesus, the individual, is of prime importance to all history.

Third: Christianity has been a molding force in history, but this force is of such a nature that it cannot be analyzed, weighed and measured from evidences upon which a scientific historian usually relies.

Fourth: the Christian historian views history as prefaced by and culminating in eternity. The modern historian must, therefore, do what he considers an impossible task—go beyond time “in order completely to see God’s dealings with man.”

Thus far Latourette’s address carries the quality of a strong fortissimo. His concluding attempt to demonstrate the validity of the undeniable, as far as modern scientific historical method is concerned, destroys the effect of the resounding climax. The evidences he gatherer for averring the probability of the Christian understanding of history are not impressive. For his primary evidence he leans heavily upon the gradual moral improvement which follows in the wake of Christianity. Such moral advancement he finds in society at large, in special groups, and in the lives of outstanding individuals. This moral improvement Latourette sees as waxing, if not steadily, then at least by pulsations. More impressive is his statement that “the Christian conception of man provides an intelligible and reasonable explanation of the tragic dilemma in which man increasingly finds himself... The more his knowledge and mastery of his physical environment increase, the more man employs them on the one hand for his benefit and on the other for his woe. Indeed, through misuse of that knowledge he threatens the existence of the civilization which he has created and even the race itself. In this, the Christian sees the judgment—by which God seeks to constrain man to do His will.”

Differences in belief among those who subscribe to a Christian understanding of history are indeed important and weighty. However, the orientation of the reader of this address must go beyond these doctrinal differences in order to catch the real significance of this startling presidential address. The honored position of President of the American Historical Association, the importance of a conclave of this association, as well as the prevailing professional attitudes toward any Christian interpretation of history form part of the evaluation of this address. It should be a must on your reading list.

WILLIAM SPOELHOF.

FREE ENTERPRISE AND CARTELS


Cartels or Competition is the second of a series of three reports growing out of a survey by the Twentieth Century Fund on the subject of monopolies. The first volume, Cartels in Action, gives a case study of various international cartels. Cartels or Competition gives an appraisal of the cartel movement as a whole.

The book deals with two alternatives: centrally planned and directed programs for the production and distribution of goods as a means of achieving economic adjustments and stability; or competition in free markets to effect these economic adjustments and stability. The question whether these two methods are mutually exclusive is also posed.

In discussing the direct economic consequences of cartels, the authors leave little doubt as to their championing the Free Enterprise system’s superiority over cartels. Both competitive enterprises and cartels are interested in making the greatest possible profits. In a competitive system a firm can increase its profits only by lowering its costs. A cartel will increase its profits by raising its prices. In the first case the consuming public will benefit; in the latter they will suffer loss. From this analysis comes the traditional anti-monopoly argument that the cartelization of an industry restricts investment and labor opportunities and causes misallocation of resources. The contentions of the authors are made pertinent with historical evidence of cartels maintaining high profits through their control of output and prices.

From the selected evidence one might infer that most cartels are able to raise prices and improve profits, at least in the short-run. Perhaps a wider selection of evidence would have shown that the profit rate of cartels may have been lower than the profit rate of competitive firms. The gaining of a degree of monopoly is not per se the assurance of monopoly profits. It is very well possible that output would be restricted to the point where costs per unit would be so high as to preclude monopoly profits. However the elimination of competition, although not specifically benefiting the producer, often does result in a loss to consumer.

The chapter dealing with cartels and economic stability is one of the more significant in this work. Two important questions are posed: First, what is the relation of cartels to the volume of income and employment in the economy as a whole? and, second, what is their relation to the business cycle?

As a background for this chapter the authors give a cursory explanation of the Keynesian analysis of the importance of investment to income and employment. The Keynesian thesis—that producers will invest in new facilities as long as the marginal efficiency of capital exceeds the market rate of interest—does not apply to an economy dominated by monopoly. Simply stated, the marginal efficiency of capital is the return made by the added investment in capital goods. Monopolies can make greater profits stopping short of equating the marginal efficiency of capital to the rate of interest they underinvest. This, according to most economists, results in lowered income and lowered employment. Herein, then, lies one of the main faults of cartels. Because of their market control, cartels refuse to expand production, or do their best to prevent the development of productive capacity by outsiders. This is a barrier to the proper allocation of our resources.

Recognizing the evil of the cartels, the authors propose a number of alternative cartel policies. From a fairly large number of possibilities two alternatives are selected as the most feasible: First, Government regulation of cartels or participation in them; second, the complete outlawing of cartels. Both measures have weaknesses which are inherent because of the present world situation, but have at least a chance of resulting in beneficial action. The implications of effecting any restriction on cartel action are great. Not only is there to be a direct attack on cartels themselves, but supplementary action along political and broad economic lines must be taken. Specifically, the nationalistic drift of the 1930’s must be supplanted by an international approach. Broad policies must strengthen, not debilitate, the specific action against cartels. This is truly a colossal undertaking.

When confronted with some of the seemingly insoluble problems, such as post-war adjustments, national interests, and ideological differences, one must conclude that the magnitude of the task of promoting free trade in “one world” is gigantic. Some specific proposals are made throughout the book. The mechanics of putting into effect these proposals, assuming them to be correct, is a herculean task in itself.

Not touched in this defense of competition and free trade is freedom of human movement. If we defend freedom of trade must we not logically defend the right of men to move where they can make the greatest return?

JOHN VANDEN BERG.