Editorials by
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The Ministry and Scholarship
A Chapel Sermonette
Peace and Faith

Letters to the Editor
Book Reviews

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The Destructiveness of Courses in Religion

The contemporary advocates of religion in education on the college level see in religion an indispensable means to the end of insuring those loyalties without which no institution, whether social or political, can exercise any real authority. They overlook the fact that religion deliberately used as a means, whatever it may be, is not religion, and that religion cannot be effective unless it embraces the whole of our interests and invests all experience with meaning. Unless one lives into religious truth with deep subjective concern, with complete engagement of personal appropriation, one stands outside it. Meanwhile one stands within some other truth, whether it be the doctrines of the natural sciences naturalistically interpreted, or those of the arts conceived as ends in themselves, or those of this or that philosophy regarded as the final criterion of truth. Thus in view of the secularism prevalent in our state universities the student who happens to elect some course or other in the school of religion tends to examine religious notions in terms of an unquestioning belief of ideas presented to him by the biologist, the psychologist, the social historian, and the philosopher. Since he never seriously examines these ideas, they may be said to constitute his real outlook upon life.

Consequently, the mere addition of courses in religion or Bible to a curriculum definitely pointed in the direction of secularism and agnosticism only reinforces the student's original suspicion that religion is of little or no consequence. Furthermore, it is just about a foregone conclusion that these courses will be taught from the standpoint of comparative religion and the higher criticism, since any other approach will be regarded as unscientific. The result is at best a conglomeration of theoretical truths impersonally apprehended together, of course, with a complete absence of spirituality and moral wisdom. For, obviously, there can be no real religious integration of the self until the thinker or the learner himself is involved in his thought, and that is exactly what the university wishes to avoid at all cost lest its reputation for fostering independent and objective thinking be tarnished. 1 It is no exaggeration to say that courses in Bible as they are taught in the state university leave the student more skeptical than he was before.

The Spirit of Christian Education on the College Level

CHRISTIAN education on the college level, although certainly concerned with the integration of courses of study, is primarily concerned with the integration of the student around a central purpose. From the Christian point of view the situation is this. As there is no real integration of the self unless the thinker is involved in his thought—just as there is no real knowledge of God unless it is personal—so also there is no real knowledge of fact unless it is seen as a manifestation of the power and wisdom of God. Inasmuch as human reason here functions as an instrument of personal involvement, the resulting knowledge of natural fact is only partially separable from faith. In fact, where human reason does not so function we do not really know; we lack "the truth which edifies." Furthermore, reason by itself tells us very little; for no more than it can tell us that there must be a solar system with just so many planets revolving about the sun, can it tell us that there must be a God such as Christianity conceives Him and as He is revealed in Scripture. Our knowledge of God, like our knowledge of the facts of His creation, is always based on something in the nature of a given, of which human reason at best enables us to achieve a partial and working understanding.

The Christian view of God and the world gives tone and point of view to all instruction, thereby removing many internal discursive conflicts. That, however, does not mean the final removal of all theoretical problems. For the truth is that from the facts of nature as they are known to the scientist one can hardly infer the existence of God, unless by faith one has first experienced the presence of God, any more than from the fragment of a bone one can

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1 Not long ago the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan released a statement in which the Institute's basic aims were defined as "the application of scientific method to the study of social behavior. Underlying this aim is the faith that scientific methods (in particular, the use of quantitative measurement intimately linked with social theory) can make a major contribution to human welfare."
infer the existence—or past existence—of a human being with his capacities for religion, moral, judgment, science, and art unless one already knows a good deal about human beings. (It is a pity that the philosophers and theologians who invented the traditional arguments for the existence of God seem to have been innocent of this simple item of common sense.) For in order to prove the existence of God one would have to show that nature as a whole is shot through with purpose, that the end purpose is inherently valuable, that everything in nature leads to that value, and that, consequently, it would be more reasonable to believe in the existence of a guiding intelligence than to believe otherwise.

Now the fact seems to be that neither science nor philosophy can tell us anything about a final purpose. Flowers may be good for insects and insects for flowers, but what is the purpose of there being flowers and insects in the first place? No, the Christian thinker will have to begin with what he considers to be the indubitable realities of the supernatural, that is, with a vision of God. After that he may reasonably hope to see evidence of God's presence which would otherwise most certainly escape his attention. Here we can do no better than ponder the words of Pascal: "Willing to appear openly to those who seek Him with all their heart, and to be hidden from those who flee from Him with all their heart, He so regulated the knowledge of Himself that He has given signs of Himself, visible to those who seek Him, and not to those who seek Him not. There is enough light for those who desire to see, and enough obscurity for those who have a contrary disposition." 1

And from here on it would seem to be advisable to try to be sensible rather than "deep," since there seems to be a point beyond which the human mind cannot attain depth without incurring the danger of becoming correspondingly silly. One should not expect, for example, to find evidence for the doctrine of the Trinity in this or that logical, grammatical, or natural curiosity. The Trinity like the Triadic formula). 2

3 Isaiah 45:15.

1 Pensees. Fragment 430. (Everyman's ed.)

2 Other supposedly evidential triads are: subject, predicate, and object; past, present, and future; length, breadth, and thickness; sun, moon, and stars; gas, liquid, and solid; and so on. One is tempted to add: Jew, Christian, and gentile; cold, warm, and hot; "three is a crowd"; two fires and a bankruptcy—and you're rich (according to a well known and suspected triadic formula).

And so although it is true that the Christian educator has the mandate to see God everywhere, it is also true that the explanation of man and the universe in which he lives places him within an area of study so utterly difficult and complex that today only the foolhardy will try their hand at complete integration and system building. To say that we see God everywhere is and must remain an article of faith, for when we consider details we must in the end admit that in terms of discursive reason we are frequently unable to unify the presuppositions of the religious and the moral life with those of our knowledge of nature. This should not, however, bother us too much, since the same difficulty holds with regard to the postulates of the various sciences—the fact, for example, that it is hard, if not impossible, to adjust biology to physics does not reduce either to a questionable source of knowledge.

In fact, a flawless synthesis of science and the Christian religion ought to make any intelligent and honest man suspicious. Sin and the remission of sins are presented to us by God as real facts. Now the fact that the biologist can dispense with these notions—if indeed he can—in no way gives him the competence to pronounce upon them. And so the proper attitude of a Christian educator toward any scientific theory which seems to go counter to Scriptural truth would seem to be something like this. In the first place, no science can give us final conclusions about the universe as a whole, since all the facts are never in; and in the second place, the facts and inferences of such a theory are at least no more certain than the empirical certainties upon which moral and religious notions are based, the certainties, namely, of moral obligation, of human responsibility, and of the content and quality of the lives of the saints. In other words, the most effective Christian apologetic here would seem to consist in meeting the appeal to the certainties of one order of knowledge with an appeal to the certainties of another order. No artful and irrelevant rhetoric will do here.

Much in life requiring action is not knowledge and much of genuine knowledge is not science; in fact, the more scientific our knowledge the more abstract and hypothetical it is apt to be. And, anyway, the natural sciences have nothing to say about the validity and inherent reasonableness of Christian belief. The integration of the declarations of
faith and the propositions of science will never be complete. And the difficulty of the problems involved will doubtless remain with us, for a completely comprehended world is a dead world. We may conclude that education is Christian when in the face of all the difficulties, problems, and apparent antinomies in the realm of facts and ideas it is guided by this truth: Nevertheless “the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof” so that even “the wrath of man shall praise Him.”

C. D. B.

From One to Another

Our object in these editorials is to call attention to the task of transmitting Calvinism from one generation to the next. That task calls for consideration because Calvinism does not just perpetuate itself. It simply is not so that youth sees the gleam in the eyes of the parents, and as butterflies are drawn to the light. The evidence rather points the other way. Therefore real efforts must be put forth to pass on the torch. The rising generation does not eagerly grasp it, and is not driven by a consuming eagerness to lay hold on the torch.

Let it be assumed that one has a fairly good comprehension of and an enthusiasm for Calvinism. But let it not be forgotten that in the attempt to comprehend there lurk certain dangers. Systematization, no matter how good and necessary, brings with it possible hindrances to the propagation of the truth. There are numerous pitfalls, briefly described in the previous issue as Too Little and Too Much. Let it be assumed that one has in his own heart and mind avoided these pitfalls. It does not then follow that you need have no worries about passing on the torch. To be sure, the torch can be passed on only then when one himself has hold of it. But we cannot assume that therefore, because he has hold of it, it will pass on to the followers. How then can we pass it on so that the next generation shall get a firm hold of it?

Textbooks

There are, of course, external means. A clear, simple, forceful, and interesting account can contribute much. If they are available, let us by all means make use of them. And if not available, let us try to produce good, yes excellent manuals, textbooks, and books. They constitute some thing of a sine qua non to be put in the hands of parents, teachers, elders, and pastors. But these very things can become just the opposite of what they are intended to be. Without something else they can become dead wood. They are the true mechanics if properly used. But if not properly used they bring about just the contrary of the desired result. To use the external means properly there must be an individual who himself has appropriated, made his own the very things expounded in the manual. They must be part of himself. That does not mean that he has mechanically memorized the text. What the text says should be a formulation on the printed page of what he himself holds. If that is not the case, it becomes mere mechanical transmission. And not only must be himself hold those, but he must accept them wholeheartedly and enthusiastically.

Two Requirements

In the light of what has been said, especially also in the editorial of the March issue, I would point out two things to begin with, viz., a grasp of fundamentals and an enthusiasm for them. The truth has so many ramifications, so many facets, that it requires some real effort to get hold of what is basic. With so many facts, so many particulars, one can easily be engulfed by them. From the point of view of transmission it not only is impossible to pass on all the little details because of lack of time, but the effort itself leads to confusion. What the rising generation needs and needs desperately in this age of limitless details is to see clearly what is basic, what is fundamental, what is primary. One can be disturbed about it if youth is not acquainted with all the details. But is that not much less serious than if youth does not see the fundamentals? And the other side is this, that if youth does see the basic truths, all others will in time and often of their own accord fall into their proper place. In a world of minute specialization one can well afford to lose sight of many items of lesser importance in order to concentrate on the really big, the really important. To do so requires native ability, but also implies effort for oneself to see the fundamentals.

The second requirement is a depth of conviction, a warmth of enthusiasm for those very fundamentals; to let it be seen and felt by the hearer that these are true not only in the abstract, but true for the individual who speaks of them; that they are the truths he lives by and lives for; that they are the inspiration and the directives of his life.

Why these two? The aim is to pass on the torch; to pass on comprehension of and enthusiasm for the truth of Calvinism. We hope and should hope to steer clear of the twin rocks of Scylla and Charybdis. To avoid mere intellectual assent, mere historical faith, dead orthodoxy there must be revealed to the individual who speaks of them. The truths he lives by and lives for. To do so requires native ability, but also implies effort for oneself to see the fundamentals.

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rabid enthusiasm which has little content besides, there must be revealed too a real understanding, a real grasp of basic truths. We must aim at and be content with not one but both. The next issue will carry us further. Ralph Stob.

Self-Examination

In one of the forms used by many of the churches of Calvinistic persuasion in the observance of the Holy Communion, there is a statement to the effect that the participants should, if they desire to receive a blessing, "rightly examine themselves." This is always a wholesome exercise, even though it is exceedingly rare. There are perhaps many reasons why we are reluctant to direct the spotlight to ourselves. One of them is that it is never very flattering. We do not like to think that the doctrine of total depravity has any relevance to ourselves, yet it should forewarn us as to many moral, intellectual and other forms of deficiency which are ours. But that very discovery is good for us. In fact the beneficial aspects of self-examination according to the form referred to above is that of self-abhorrence and self-humiliation. Such prospects we shun even though they may be the conditions without which we shall not become the recipients of divine blessing in the form of balance, tolerance, humility, and forbearance.

It is, of course, always a great deal more acceptable to find the beam in the eyes of others who do not see eye-to-eye with us. And there are beams there. We need but single them out and focus the spotlight upon them and we shall easily and quickly become enamored of ourselves. There are, of course, flaws in other systems of thought, and we feel that we are doing a constructive piece of work in exposing them and in becoming crushingly critical of them. All the while we have failed to examine our own bastion with painstaking care. We kept ourselves blind to the crumbling parts of our defenses. We have not made satisfactory readjustments to the new lines of attack. The greatest danger of Calvinism is not from the side of other "isms" with which it has to cope but from internal flaws and inadequacies which a frank self-examination would reveal and which would call for repairs and readjustments. Calvinism is not hide-bound. It has manifested a remarkable resiliency to adjust itself to any new enemy that may wish to betray it. It has taken on with remarkable credit to itself the Roman Catholic emphasis, the modernistic attack, the Arminian insistence, and others. It is virile. But its virility may be lost for the want of proper spiritual exercises.

It is therefore a wholesome indication that a couple of leaders in the Netherlands have written a volume in which they take the Reformed tendency under scrutiny and have found it wanting. I am in no position to judge in how far the authors are correct in their *Gereformeerden, Waarheen?* They may even be unjust in their appraisal. But the fact that there is a beginning of self-examination is promising. Let us hope that other Dutch leaders will not too readily leap to the defense of their deficiencies, but will candidly acknowledge them where the facts call for it, and resolve to a collective strengthening of their Calvinistic thinking and living where the Word, the accepted basis of their thinking and living, warrant it.

We Calvinists are a proud people. Even if our self-examination humbles us, and it will if we are objective, we are even proud of our humility. It remains only an intellectual acknowledgment which we have no difficulty in bolstering with numerous Scriptural references. We generalize it with the explanation that all men are proud, which alleviates the stricken condition of our conscience (if we are bothered with it) and deprives us of the attitude of mind and heart that makes us fit to receive the blessing in the form of enlightenment, correction, and generally divine grace which are so sorely needed.

It is not incidental that many of the enemies of Calvinism have discerned this weakness as distinctly characteristic of the group referred to under discussion. Pride is there I fear, even though we agree with the adage "Pride precedes the fall." We are proud that we are men of principle. We often fail to hide a bit of boasting about it. By principle we mean a fundamental proposition which controls our thinking and living. We assume the principle as expressed by some of our revered fathers, never thinking of rechecking it as to its accuracy and applicability in a given situation. And surely a proposition as vital as we make it in our lives must be directly and indubitably traceable to and demanded by the Word of God. There is an inductive method of gathering Scriptural teaching under the direction of the Holy Spirit by which we can come to certainty about a principle which usually serves as a point of departure deductively.

There are Calvinists that speak occasionally obviously about the warmth and practicality of others devoted to a line of Christian thinking. They recognize these fellow believers as living closer with God, as more devoted in Bible reading and prayer, and as more active in Christian service. Some Calvinists are ready to acknowledge the deficiency, but find solace in the declaration that they have perfect principles that are beyond human attainment. "Of course, we are deficient. Our practice does not square with our principle. We are so situated that we can go on through life confession..."
peccavi,” they assert. This is true, but what is tragic indeed, is our apparent complacency with the discrepancy between faith and practice. We may even gone so far as to accuse a member of the same faith as being activistic, when he manifests a great deal of interest in the practical emphasis of religion.

This unwholesome complacency will not long endure. Men’s souls will cry out for an adjustment even though such a cry may not be articulated. Every denominational group has seen evidences of the truth of Professor Ten Hoö’s declaration that changes in principles follow changes in practical living. The practical aspect of religious living which we condemn on the basis of principle is liable to replace the very principle by which it was condemned. Perhaps such principles should be modified but surely not in response to the practical exigencies of the moment.

It is to the credit of Calvinists that they have made adjustments. But when such adjustments are made in response merely to practical considerations, they are betraying the characteristic which they think they have and of which they are proud.

It is not incidental that there are many Calvinists who have manifested opportunistic inclinations. A given situation may and does occasionally modify a principle. This is sometimes recognized and more frequently not. It is far better to reexamine the confessed principle than to allow the inconsistency which the Calvinistic coloring abhors. Calvinists will do that, but often not until they are driven to it by some exigency that has arisen.

They permitted the declaration about the state’s obligation to promote the Gospel to rest comparatively undisturbed in the 36th Article of the Belgie Confession until some of the leaders became a bit alarmed about the consequences of such a position in the present tense situation between church and state. Self-examination in the form of checking and rechecking our confessions would have taken care of this matter. Calvinists bow in humble submission to the Word. It behooves them to make sure beyond the shadow of doubt that the divine injunctions are truly reflected in the statements of principles.

It is, of course, to the credit of Calvinists that they recognized practically the possibility of error in the statement of principles. They have in their acknowledgment of this possibility even prescribed methods by which a modification of a fundamental confession may be effected. They admit the possibility of error because of the sinful defection of human thinking. From an inductive study of the Bible which is the only source of the Divine will relative to their willing and thinking they arrive at their principles and by a deductive process they make their applications. Of course there is possibility of error, error of emphasis, error of incomplete induction, unwarranted deductions, and ambiguous applications. Calvinists as well as other groups need a humble willingness to yield to the Holy Spirit and a readiness to let the Scriptures speak to them rather than to read into the Bible what they would like, against which St. Paul warned because he saw it as a characteristic of the human mind and spirit in general.

It is to the credit of Reformed leaders that they have repeatedly urged revision of their confessional standards. The urge for revision does not proceed from the conviction that the confessions do not reflect the meaning of the Spirit but from the conviction that they were formulated centuries ago and can no longer provide the maximum service for the thinking and living of today. Even Reformed or Calvinistic ecumenical Synods have skirted the necessity of modification or revision in the Confessional Standards. But action will be slow. On the one hand this is admirable. One must not too readily change the color of the guide posts lest they no longer serve, but on the other hand let them not make something akin to a fetish of the propositions which they label principles. The very fact that Calvinists are men of principles and attach such great significance to such principles should move and does move them in an incessant process of self-examination in which checking, rechecking, and re-applying constitute no mean part.

H. S.
One Great Need:
An Appeal to Seminary Students

J. K. Van Baalen
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Buildings: schools and churches. New structures; additional wings to existing edifices. Junior Colleges; a College and Seminary at Edmonton, oil capital and second university center of Canada. More ministers for the United States; bilingual preachers for Canada. Missionaries and nurses to Africa, Japan, India, and New Mexico. These and more will be needed by our growing church. But none of these things move me; for our people have a heart for the Lord’s work, and all will come in due season.

There is a matter that is urgent at present, namely, a resolution by some one hundred twenty-five seminary students, and such ministers as are not too old to check up on their own mental processes. It should be understood that in saying this I no more denounce all ministers and students as lacking this than I am saying that we have no school buildings when I state the necessity of erecting such structures. However, I am apprehensive lest what I plead for is somewhat on the way out; yet it should be found not less commonly but rather more generally in the near future. As to this I want to state my case, and give my reasons.

I

Our paramount need today is for scholarly ministers. Not scholars in the pulpit and class room; for a minister’s time is so much taken up with practical work that he can hardly become a scholar in the strict sense of that term. Yet without becoming a scholar—such as, e.g., a seminary professor ought to be—a minister may yet develop, and should nurture at all costs, scholarly mental habits. By this is meant all that is opposite to slipshod, easy, superficial methods of gathering and delivering one’s material. A teacher and preacher of the inexhaustible Word of God should, above all others, foster a habit of studious, accurate, thorough-going, earnest endeavor to master his subject material. Such mental habits must be acquired during the period of preparation for one’s great life’s task, which is to bring out of one’s treasure things that are at once new and old: old truths applied to new circumstances and ways of thinking.

And why should this need be stressed today in particular? The anti-intellectual spirit of the times, so eloquently bemoaned a generation ago by the late J. Gresham Machen, has wrought havoc all about us. Even though our Christian schools admittedly compare more than favorably with most public institutions, it is no more possible to escape altogether from the impact of “progressive education,” radio, and television upon our mental atmosphere than one may evade the totalitarian tendencies that infest our political climate.

Many are the temptations that beset seminary students and ministers. A student often has to do work on the side to pay his way through school. He has to acquire a smattering knowledge of many subjects that interest him but little, and which it is difficult for him to connect with the goal he has in mind. Be it only to develop mental habit, however “whatevery thy hand—in casu mind—findeth to do, do it with thy might.”

Another temptation arises soon after one has entered upon the ministry. One suddenly becomes far more independent. There are no more prescribed courses of study, no further examinations; there is no time clock to punch. Perhaps some one will say, “Dominie has studied so much already; we are not learned folk; it is soon good enough for us.” The “popular man” will receive many tokens of affection that are withheld from the man who applies himself to study. The latter may be thought unsocial while the former will be considered “such a nice man; he is so common.” And there lies your temptation. The coffee drinker may fill his home with material evidences of the people’s favor, but he must needs neglect the deeper things of God. Rarely do the two go together.

You will get into your second charge. More temptation! “I have a little barrel full of sermons now; what was good enough at ‘A’ is good enough for ‘B’; let me take it a little more easily now!” Yet stale bread is not the same as fresh, and most people prefer their bread “ovenfresh.”

Meanwhile the family is perhaps growing. Financial needs become greater. Even the minister does not escape from the temptation to make a living rather than to mold people’s thinking. “Come and harvest your own, and you can have as much as you want!” Or else a larger congregation, a “bigger crowd” on Sundays looks so inviting, regardless of whether one has taken sufficient time to mature toward the added work. Why not let the pulpit work suffer somewhat? And there will always be those who will give the preacher credit for being “so deep” when he is merely foggy because he has
failed to master and digest his subject and to develop a clear style. The shouting that is born of nervous improvisation too often is taken for warmth of genuine inspiration.

A third great period of seduction arises when the minister has finished his first twenty-five years in the pulpit. “My sermons took me much time, but now they are made. It is time for me to turn to my hobby.” Hobbies are presumably good; but the work bench in the basement should not have more and more up-to-date tools than the professional workshop upstairs, as is sometimes the case.

So there are many inducements to unfaithfulness, and they will be with us until we lay down our exalted office. I have pointed out only a few.

II

If, however, it is admittedly hard to develop and maintain the scholarly mind-set, why should not the minister today yield to the many invitations to be satisfied with quantity of work rather than quality? There are many solid reasons. Let us consider just a few.

First and foremost is the fact that the strength of the Reformed faith has always lain in its intellectual approach to truth. And this cannot but be a virtue, for truth itself is an intellectual concept. Think only of this, that the Second Person of the blessed Trinity is introduced under the name Logos, that is to say, the very contents of the Divine Mind uttered in speech. And the object of His coming to earth was that He might cause the Light of God’s truth to shine and reflect itself in the minds and consciences of men in whom God’s likeness had been distorted by sin. Preaching, then, and teaching are the serious efforts to distill from the infallible Scriptures the core of this divine fullness of truth, and cause it to reflect itself in human minds and hearts, thence to permeate all of human relationships. Indeed, Reformed thinkers saw well when they conceived of truth as an intellectual concept, and of preaching as being intellectually determined.

A second, and less abstract, reason for our thesis is that our people have always looked to their ministers as to leaders in thought among many lines, and feeders of the mind. This is historically so obvious that it requires no further elucidation. But our Christian Reformed constituency is at present growing numbers of earnest-minded people, and growing addition of earnest-minded people, and young ministers may well foster the habit of study. To become somewhat proficient in one or two of these requires much arduous labor, and even so one remains at best somewhat of an amateur; and besides that there is the necessity of reading several hours, recently admitted to the writer that he is so busy “that I myself still look for my spiritual and intellectual food to the pulpit.” Paul himself stated that to us “the deep things of God” have been revealed (I Corinthians 2). This is certainly not to be ignored, sidestepped, or brushed aside in a shallow manner. To be sure, there are children in “the audience,” and few adults are theologians. Hence, Wm. A. Sunday advised us seminarians long ago, “Do not study too much; do not starve all the sheep in your flock for the sake of one or two hungry giraffes.” However, there are two sides to most questions; and of the late Dr. Herman Bavinck it was stated that he could express the most profound thought in words which the most simple could grasp. Moreover, Billy Sunday left in six weeks, whereas the minister in the pastorate may well make his best contribution after six years.

A third reason for continued diligent study undoubtedly lies in this that our churches at present receive a vast influx from the Netherlands, and only petty and exaggerated “Americanitis” could conceivably deny that from the first grade of grammar school up, the European system of education is more thorough than the American. The late Dr. V. Hepp of the Free University quizzed one candidate for the doctor’s degree in theology four and one half hours on the theology of Harnack alone in an oral examination. This is not said to approve or disapprove of so much learning for future pastors of average congregations; it is merely cited as a statement to corroborate the thesis that not only is the theological preparation in the Netherlands longer in duration, but it is also more thorough. The enormous competition among an overpopulated citizenry over there makes the process of elimination well-nigh a necessity. This being so, we might well rue the day, should it ever arrive, when this promising and growing addition of earnest-minded people, nurtured by scholarly trained men, should be compelled to say that the Christian Reformed ministers compare favorably with graduates of a typical Bible institute, but do not rank with the men they were wont to hear in the Old Country.

A fourth reason (to let it go at that) why students and young ministers may well foster the habit of thorough study is that there is so much to do and so little time in which to do it. Dr. Abraham Kuyper’s noted Encyclopaedia of Sacred Theology lists no fewer than fifty-six separate branches of theological studies. To become somewhat proficient in one or two of these requires much arduous labor, and even so one remains at best somewhat of an amateur; and besides that there is the necessity of reading several papers and magazines, a theological journal or two, a few weeklies, as well as some current lighter material—the latter were it only to know what the people whose mental outlook on life he fails to understand?
My last question is this: Since superficiality is easier than thoroughness and if there are many incitements toward the almost universally prevailing spirit of easy-goingness and when the immediate results and reactions to hastiness frequently appear to be more gratifying, is there a reward attached to the more arduous and laborious way? In other words, let us leave the higher altitude toward which we have soared, and come down to the thoroughly American level of contemporaneous pragmatism by asking that inevitable question: Does it pay?

Unexpectedly, perhaps, it is exactly here that I score my innings. Nothing pays greater dividends. Consider the following: First of all, there is the result of improved and enriched personality. "Omnia mea mecum porto," said the Greek philosopher whose house was burning, as he fled naked from the scene. "My mind to me a kingdom is," was spoken in truth by another thinker.

Secondly, there is the fruit of sanctified personality. A mad dog may chase its own tail in a fruitless round of legwork; but no man can apply himself studiously while emotionally disturbed by besetting sin.

Thirdly, we shall have the consciousness of divine approval. "When the preacher is discouraged by reason of a small attendance, let him take heart from the consideration that where God's Word is preached, the very angels are present." So wrote that paragon of ministerial effort and accomplishment, the late J. Van Andel. He might have added that Christ Himself is there (Matthew 18:20). Imagine the minister who has been remiss in his duty to prepare his message adequately, whining in his pastoral prayer for the Holy Spirit to take over (thus substituting for his deficiency!) and then turning to some cheap antics of a hallow and bombastic delivery to hide from the people that he has shirked his God-ordained duty! And meanwhile posing as Verbi Divine Minister!

Fourthly, there is the ultimate appreciation and confidence of God's people. It is bound to come. And it is eminently worth striving for, because "They are the excellent of earth; In them is my delight." Understanding and proper evaluation may come more slowly in the case of the thorough and conscientious minister. But in the end it will be realized that he has been a builder who did not leave behind the same congregation that he found upon arrival. "Them that honor Me I will honor, and they that despise Me shall be lightly esteemed."

Fifthly, the scholarly man is remembered longer than the man who has been careless in the performance of his greatest task. Some former high-school or college student will hold him in grateful remembrance as the man "who helped me over my difficulties." He has fashioned pillars as well as laid bricks and mortar, and one pillar is worth much brick and cement.

IV

And so, my young brethren, after thirty-five years in the pastorate, and now that the requirements for pre-seminary students have just been slightly raised (though even now not yet on a par with other pre-professional students), I have taken time out to appeal to your more noble Christian nature.

There never was a time when the things I advocate were more sorely needed than they are today, for the simple reason that there never was a time when Satan employed to such an extent these two trump methods (1) of keeping the masses sadly uninformed concerning all religious truths, and (2) of looking wise and profound while peering out of the portholes of a ship laden with a cargo of exploded, oriental, pagan nonsense.

Indeed, we need studious, conscientious, plodding ministers who will salvage time for study. Will you, Seminarians, ministers of a future day acquire the virtue of self-discipline with the aid of God? Or are you going to be satisfied to "get by"? Will you redeem your time, budget your hours and employ them seriously, because the days are evil?

"The heights by great men reached and kept Were not attained by sudden flight, But they, while their companions slept, Were toiling upward in the night."

"The things of a man for which we visit him, were done in the dark and the cold."

These are great words. But they demand much. However, one advantage certainly is ours: Mental work does not wear one out physically as does the hard physical labor of him who lies on the damp pavement under a car, or of him who is exposed to all kinds of weather because he works out of doors. Ours is to a large extent the sheltered life. Go to it, then, for God does not waste His own tools. Be conscientious, and you may look forward confidently to doing your most valuable and most appreciated work after the age of fifty or even sixty.

However, there are even greater incentives. The inspired Word, the ultimate court of appeal, points the way. Luke, the beloved physician, so much in the limelight just now, concerning whom so many scholarly works come off our presses—Luke, admired by all for his uncannily literary skill and accurate historical sense, apologized at the beginning of the longest book in the new Testament by stating that he had not ventured to write till after "having traced the course of events accurately from the first."

And Paul, inspired almost beyond all others, when in a Roman dungeon, conscious of the fact that his course was finished, looking forward to a probable martyr's death, yet believed in sowing for himself that he might reap hereafter, and wrote, "Bring the books, especially the parchments."
Somewhat earlier he had admonished his favorite son in the ministry, "Till I come, give heed to reading."

Methinks, in this day of mental confusion and of loosely-used terminology, I hear the voice of Him Who sometimes quoted His own words from the Old Testament, but gave them a slight alteration to fit the occasion and the times. Today, it would seem, He speaks to us ministers of the divine Word: "Until I come and call for you, give heed to reading."

A Chapel Speech* Entitled: "Reticence Defended"

I understand that at the close of this chapel service announcement will be made that the Calvin Literary Review is off the press and that the Eerdmans' prizes will be awarded. So when I was asked by the boys to conduct your devotionals, I deemed it fitting that what I have to say should have relevance to the useful and noble art of writing as practiced among us.

The Beautiful, a Gift of God

Literature, as we know, is one of the fine arts. What distinguishes these from the practical and the liberal arts is the quality of the beautiful. Now beauty, whether we see it in nature or in the arts, is a creation of God and serves the purpose of enriching the life of men. It is a gift of God to man. Hence it follows that literature is also a gift of God and is a field of endeavor in which a Christian may be rightfully occupied. Nay more, it is the Christian's duty as well as privilege to claim this domain for Christ that His lordship may be recognized also here. At this point, I think we do well to remember that religion and art originally went hand in hand, that art was the servant of religion and that religion gladly accepted the service of the arts; also that in the triad of the good, the true, and the beautiful, the last named, though essential to a full-orbed life, is less insistent in its demands than the other two. These observations are for you, Calvin students, mere commonplaces, I know, and I can hear some one accusing me of doing nothing more useful than carrying furniture to Grand Rapids. I admit the justice of the accusation; nevertheless I make these general remarks, and I make them purposely. I wish to remove, if I can, whatever suspicion may lurk in the soul of any one of you that somehow the nature of religion and of the arts is such that the two are inevitably incompatible. Furthermore, I wish to remind ourselves of these simple elementary truths because it seems to be very hard to make the arts flourish in the soil of religion. In-

* Graciously submitted by Professor Vanden Bosch on the insistence of students and colleagues.

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A Misconception Concerning Christian Literature

Before I endeavor to offer an explanation I must remove a misconception harbored in the minds of many who honor the literary efforts of our young people by reading them. I have reference to the attitude of those, who, if the name of God or Christ is not used, or if a Christian moral is not appended, or if every line or stanza is not saturated with a very positive Christian flavor, forthwith condemn what they read. This view is, in my opinion, basically erroneous. Does a painter who succeeds in spreading on the canvas a superbly beautiful sunset cause his lines and colors to spell the words Christ or God? Do not even our precisionistic friends at times relish without qualms of conscience the telling of a realistic tale that appeals to this sense of humor? Are The Village Blacksmith, and The Children's Hour objectionable because Longfellow, the pronounced Unitarian, did not suffuse these poems with sentiments that are specifically Christian? Or to take an example from Scripture, does David's lament over his bosom friend Jonathan, which I consider beautiful, contain as much as a single word to describe the divine character of that intimate friendship? Instances such as these warrant the conclusion that a piece of writing can be acceptable even if there is no reference to Deity in it. I do not say that there never need be such recognition of Deity in a piece of literature. All I mean to defend
is that a poem or a novel can meet the requirements of the good, the true, and the beautiful without such reference.

**Why Young Writers Bungle Religious Subjects**

I now return to a discussion of the original question why young writers shy away from religious subjects, or, if they have courage to use them, bungle in the handling of them. I begin by suggesting that literature reflects life and that youth is not mature enough to portray life in its myriad of aspects with anything like adequate art. Nothing is more difficult to master than life, its commonplaces and its rarities, its frivolities and its seriousness, its shallowness and its profundities, its fickleness and its steadfastness, its contradictions and its consistencies, its sinuosity and its forthrightness, its failures and its successes, its passion and its calms, its humility and its pride, its bestiality and its sense of purity. It takes more than a lifetime to understand life. Great genius though he was, even Shakespeare knew not the whole of it. The human heart will always remain, at least in part, a mystery. It calls for more experience than youth has at its command to probe the forces that motivate human conduct, whether these be hereditary, environmental, or supernatural. Great novelists, so the history of literature informs us, do not produce their masterpieces before they have passed their fortieth milestone. Hawthorne was past forty when he wrote *The Scarlet Letter*; George Eliot was just forty when she wrote *Adam Bede*; and Dickens and Thackeray were, when they wrote *David Copperfield* and *Vanity Fair* respectively, only slightly under forty.

**Artistic Genius, a Slow Growth**

These names and their highest achievements show that not only insight into human nature, but also the ripening of artistic genius are matters of slow growth. Occasionally there appears on the pages of literary history a name whose art was precocious as was that of William Cullen Bryant, who produced his *Thanatopsis* at the age of seventeen, but never surpassed this early effort. A prodigy, however, is the exception, not the rule. It is highly improbable for teachers to discover among some five hundred young people taking freshman English, or even in a more select group taking advanced composition, a single prodigy like the precocious Bryant. What Longfellow says in his *A Psalm of Life* is still true:

Art is Long, and Time is Fleeting
Art is long, and time is fleeting

Not many students have the patience to work painstakingly at improving their writing as a Poe did who refined the technique of his *The Raven* by rewriting and polishing his verses more than a dozen times. How much manuscript Hawthorne threw into the fire nobody knows.

**Christian Experience Not Easily Transmuted into Literature**

Moreover, it is not easy to trace the influence of Christian faith and morality upon the workings of the soul and to do so in terms of good art. It can be done and has been done. In his *Pilgrim's Progress*, greatest of all allegories, Bunyan has most charmingly given us pictures of Christian experience. Christian truth, too, has been immortalized in prose and poetry. There is *Paradise Lost*. Its theme was the fall of man; its purpose was to justify the ways of God to man; its setting was the grandest conceivable—heaven, the universe, chaos, and hell; its characters ranged all the way from God and angels and men to devils; and, inspired by the Spirit of God, blind John Milton with the inner eye illumined and the soul set aflame wrote the sublimest poem ever written. And why make mention of the poetry of Dante, of Herbert, of Cowper, of Christina Rosseti, of Francis Thompson? Let no one ever have the hardihood to say that Christian material does not admit of poetic dressing.

And yet, though all this be true, I contend that life lived under the influence of the Holy Spirit, or unregenerate life viewed in the light of the Word, is not easily transmuted into literature. Only genius of the highest order is able to do it satisfactorily. If the writer looks at life purely from the soteriological point of view and tries to tell us what goes on in the experience of conversion and in what immediately precedes and follows conversion, he narrows his field and by so doing perhaps somewhat reduces the difficulty of his task. Even so, however, the performance of that task is seldom any more successful than is the effort of the psychologist who thinks he has given a psychology of religion when he gives the psychology of only the single experience called conversion. Religion covers far more than mere conversion experience.

But if an author is committed to the Biblical teaching that all areas of human activity are to be under the control of Christ, he makes his field very much larger and needs a much wider knowledge of life. His task, if not harder, is at least more comprehensive inasmuch as it involves sanctification as well as justification. To portray what a believing soul experiences when it attempts to do its share of the world's work in relationship with all manner of men calls for a high degree of spiritual insight. Sanctification, let us remember, is a long, subtle, and stubborn process. Always there are areas in a believer's life that are not completely sanctified. Human hearts are not easily probed, and the conflicts raging in them are not easily traced or exp-
plained. Sometimes the author has blind spots in his vision, and in crises when self-interest or reputation is at stake men often hide their real motives or deceive by presenting false ones.

**Why No Fiction Dealing Competently With the Christian Life**

Many years ago the editor of the *Sunday School Times* asked Edward Everett Hale, Jr., professor of English at Union College, Schenectady, New York, and a recent convert from Unitarianism to evangelical faith, why there was no fiction dealing competently with the Christian life. Professor Hale ascribed the fact to ignorance. At the time I thought this explanation altogether too easy. But the more I ponder it, the more I think that it was correct. It certainly explains why students do not choose specifically religious material for their themes.

True, they may instinctively refrain from exploiting material suggested by their Christian faith because they have a feeling that such material is too sacred to be used for class room assignments or in contests, too sacred also to be treated unworthily. They may, furthermore, not have the courage to witness for Christ with pen and paper. But basically, I am convinced, they are aware of their own immaturity.

However, I am not trying to manufacture an excuse for the publication of pieces that cannot measure up to the lofty requirements of the good, the true, and the beautiful, that condone questionable content in the name of beauty, or that exude the nauseating odors of the prevailing naturalism. Respect for goodness and truth and the honoring of Christ still remain our ultimate ideal. Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.

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**The Dynamics of Peace**

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It is a commonly heard observation that everybody—or practically everybody—wants peace but that nobody knows how to get it. Those who say this usually mean that they don’t want World War III, and they think that it is ignorance which jeopardizes their chances of preventing it. Permanent peace would be a virtual certainty, according to this line of reasoning, if we knew what settlement to make of the German question, what national policies are conducive to peace, what disposition should be made of armaments in general and atomic weapons in particular, what kind of international organization we need, etc., etc. Unfortunately, we do not know the correct answers to these and other similar questions. Our only chance, therefore, is getting good enough answers soon enough.

This appraisal of the problem of world peace is valid insofar as it shows how much we need to learn, reminds us of the inadequacy of our intellectual resources, and emphasizes the dangers of ignorance. There have been wars which would not have taken place had people been better informed, and there are undoubtedly many dangerous situations which would not have arisen or which would vanish promptly if all the relevant facts were generally known. Admitting all this, however, it is extremely important that the limitations of this appraisal be thoroughly understood. The fullest information might not suffice in preventing a war, and it is certainly no guarantee of peace. In every society and at all times there are some people who are impervious to facts and immune to reason. Many of them are lacking in information because they do not want it, and they will reject it if it is thrust upon them. Jealously, hatred, narrow-mindedness, greed, and prejudice are part of the data of politics no less than ignorance. Whatever its form, ill-will is one of the most determined foes of peace, and there is no more stubborn and seemingly insurmountable obstacle blocking the path of statesmanship than that one. Let men of ill-will become numerous or occupy key positions, and the outbreak of war is only a question of time. They will wreck the best conceived and most wisely planned measures for peace and discredit those who sponsor them.

There is no organization that they cannot misuse, no charter that is safe from their misinterpretation, no argument that cannot be twisted to mean something else or to prove the opposite from what was intended.

Direct sabotage of peace-making measures is not the only consequence of there being so many men of ill-will, for the discouragement and pessimism which their presence engenders in other people should be looked upon as a factor of prime importance. This ill-will is the obstacle which causes the faint-hearted to despair of peace and resign themselves to inevitable doom, and it constitutes the evidence which self-styled “realists” cite to justify their position that the time spent on peace covenants and peace organization is time wasted in trying to do what can never be done so long as men are
men. There is much that is sound in this reaction of the defeatists and pessimists, especially when ill-will has attained sufficient volume and intensity. It has at least the merit of facing facts. But it has a fatal defect too, namely that of supposing that facing facts is synonymous with accepting them. Man is not confined to the discovery, observation, and utilization of facts: he can also create his own facts.

This is a truth which scriptural and orthodox Christianity never forgot, even when perfectionism was at its height and an ultra-optimistic view of man's nature was fashionable. The Christian religion teaches that man was made of the dust of the ground and yet that he is also a living soul created in the image of God, and it recognizes both the depravity and the redeemability of human nature. It thereby avoids such arrogantly one-sided and extreme positions as that of Mary Baker Eddy who denies that matter has any existence or that of John Broadus Watson who insists that nothing exists except matter, and it sanctions neither the pessimistic view of Hobbes that man is naturally and completely evil nor the optimistic view of Kropotkin that man is by nature completely good. Because it has steadfastly adhered to this remarkable balance, the Christian religion far surpasses in genuine realism many of those very movements which pride themselves most on being realistic. It has consistently proclaimed, therefore, the feasibility of transforming the world and refused to believe in the supposed necessity of conforming to it by riding some spurious "wave of the future." The consequence is that those persons who are authentically Christian see in the existence of entrenched and rampant ill-will a challenge and not a death sentence. What else could they see who are followers of Christ if Christ overcame the world? Those who merely profess to be Christian may exclaim with the apostle Paul that "the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." 1

II

It is precisely this power to transform and regenerate which makes Christianity supremely realistic. Unless the rock of human ill-will is shattered by conversion and transformed by regeneration into a fertile soil capable of supporting the growth of the institutions of peace, the best plans of political scientists, economists, sociologists, and jurists are doomed to failure right from the start. It is easy to see why no other outcome is possible. If the plans prepared by these technical experts are really good, they will not help us because the statesmen and diplomats responsible for their execution will reject them or be themselves rejected by their own peoples. But if these plans are bad or mediocre, though they be accepted and carried out, they will not accomplish what is expected of them because it just isn't in them. The situation is like that of a critically sick man who is willing to take an ineffective medicine but won't take the one that could cure him. The most that can be said of a patient of this sort is that his chances of recovery are not good.

There is a well-known proverb that says: where there is a will there is a way. The problem of world peace—to a very considerable extent anyway—is to find that will. It is a question of finding the driving power to set the new international machinery in motion, encourage those who hunger and thirst after peace, overcome the selfish, convert the doubters, arouse the inert, enlist supporters, energize well-wishers, and strengthen the peace-makers. Quite a large order! Indeed, it is so large that many people will have nothing to do with it and doddle it altogether.

Not that they don't believe in that driving power. They do. But their attitude toward it could be stated approximately thus: "If it is there, all well and good. We will cheer for it and give it every assistance. But if it isn't, what can we do? We cannot do something with nothing and assist a power that isn't there. We are not God. We cannot clap our hands and say: Let there be peace and, lo and behold, there is peace!" We are not God and we cannot by a single decree of our will transform the world to suit ourselves. And what a blessing it is that we can't! Nevertheless, we are made in the image of God, and that is significant for our problem.

"You cannot deal with that," some will say, "because it isn't scientific." But what law is this which would restrict man's freedom of investigation to a particular kind of knowledge? It certainly could not be scientific law which is itself one of the achievements of the freedom of the human spirit to range far and wide in the unfettered pursuit of truth in all its forms. And are not the most eminent scientists the very first to recognize that science is not a net that catches all the fish in the ocean of reality? There are always some that weren't near enough to be caught, others which cannot be caught with that particular net, and still others that will never be caught by any net or contrivance that man can make. Science is a marvelous instrument for discovering some truths and for rendering great service to humanity, and it is a pity that some people seem to have no better way of showing their admiration for it than by making excessive and extravagant claims on its behalf. Science is great enough in its own sphere not to require misplaced recommendations.

Other refusals to deal with the problem of the dynamics of world peace come from people who sense its kinship with the realm of religion. Probably many more feel a certain shyness on the sub-

1 II Corinthians 3:17.
ject. They have no very firm religious convictions of their own and, most of all, they cringe from the criticism of those circles in which references to the Bible are unfashionable and appeals to Christianity do not sound quite respectable. What if somebody should think they are narrow-minded, old-fashioned, superstitious fools? Still other refusals come from people who are either religious or who do not mind taking shelter behind religious-sounding pronouncements whenever it seems convenient to do so. Both groups are apt to give utterance to the following pious sentiment: "We shall have peace in the world when everybody is a real Christian." The first group—the sincere kind—is composed of people who do not consciously harbor any ulterior motives. The second group is the insincere kind which subscribes to the statement for reasons of convenience. Its members do not see in it a challenge to do something but an excuse for doing nothing and, what is possibly worse, for discouraging others from doing anything.

III

All these groups are right in one respect: the great driving power urging men to work for peace is intrinsically a religious force. That force is faith. Well, then, what is faith? Common usage often treats it as a synonym for such words as opinion, belief, theory, dogma, and judgment. But there is something wrong with every one of these approximations. The words don't fit. Faith is too certain to be opinion, too firmly and deeply held to be belief, too vital to be theory, too dynamic to be dogma, and too forceful to be judgment. To get a more accurate answer to this question, one could scarcely do better than to turn to the apostle Paul who is perhaps the world's greatest authority on faith. Among the numerous statements Paul made on this subject, there is one definition which stands out as particularly enlightening. "Now faith," he said, "is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." 2 This is an illuminating and startlingly profound definition which deserves to be analyzed closely for the purpose of seeing where it will take us. There are four inter-related ideas here which, altering the order in which Paul named them, we shall analyze in the following sequence: 1) the things not seen, 2) the things hoped for, 3) evidence, 4) substance.

By the first idea Paul means those things that are not visible to our physical eyes. They are the realities of the spirit and the intellect which are perceived inwardly. They are the substratum of the material and human world and the meaningful content of innumerable familiar words. Patriotism, democracy, economy, justice, truth, peace, and money are all words which catch portions of great realities and refract them, albeit incompletely and flickeringly, into the consciousness of man. They are the basis of the work of parliaments, cabinets, courts, business establishments, and all kinds of human institutions. Not a single one of these realities is material in itself, however, and it is partly for that reason that they are the subject of unceasing debates about their existence, continuing differences of opinion about their meaning, constant struggles about their application. We are apt to lose sight of this truth about them when we live in a society in which there is general agreement on those points, but if we scrutinize these realities closely with the eye of pure intellect alone, their existence becomes uncertain and their meaning is suddenly very much open to doubt and dissension. The best way to make this clear is to take an example and pick it to pieces. Money is an especially appropriate selection for this purpose because we ordinarily take it so completely for granted and because it is for many people the quintessence of reality. They believe in it so much that the pursuit of money-making is often described as "materialistic" and some people go so far as to say that "money talks."

What is money? John Doe reaches in his pocket, pulls out a five dollar bill, and says: "Here is money. It's five dollars." A kill-joy, however, suggests: "Look here, my friend, you just read what it says on there." John Doe raises an eyebrow at such an unheard of suggestion, but he holds the bill up to the light. It is a Greenback (United States Note). He reads that it is a promise of the United States of America to pay to the bearer on demand the sum of five dollars. John Doe is shocked. Just an I.O.U! The suspicion is born in his mind that things are perhaps not what they seem to be. He reaches down in his pocket once more and comes out with another five dollar bill. This time it is a Federal Reserve Note. What! Another I.O.U? Yes, only this time it comes from a Federal Reserve Bank and—hold everything—it is Uncle Sam who will pay for it. What a sweet racket for the banks! John Doe begins to grumble that the only I.O.U.s that aren't money are the ones he writes. As he hazily day-dreams that he missed his calling in life and should have been a banker, his eye catches sight of some fine print in black on the upper left corner. It reads as follows: "This note is legal tender for all debts, public and private, and is redeemable in lawful money at the United States Treasury, or at any Federal Reserve Bank." John Doe is really disturbed now. What's this about lawful money? He had supposed all money was lawful except for what the counterfeiters make. He begins to worry a little about being the unlucky holder of money that is "hot" and wonders how he is going to pass it on to some unsuspecting person. "What rotten luck I have," he muses as he heads for home; "if it was only a dime I could drop it in the turnstiles of the subway like the Harvard boys when somebody slips them a Canadian dime. Or I could give it to the telephone company when I call up my best girl long distance from a pay station." But John Doe is

2 Hebrews 11:1.

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struck by a new thought. For the third time his hand reaches in his pocket and brings out five one-dollar bills. What he reads this time is this: “This certifies that there is on deposit in the Treasury of the United States of America one dollar in silver payable to the bearer on demand.” It appears now that what John Doe had in his pocket was two I.O.U.s, somehow or other not quite lawful, and five certificates. Did he have money in his pocket or didn’t he? John Doe arrives home now, and instead of coming in the front door, he walks across the lawn to talk to his neighbor who happens to be a professor of economics at the university. And this is where we had better leave him, because what he is likely to hear there is disturbing talk about “standard money” in bullion form which he can’t get and which he may see only by making a tour, under escort, of the nearest Federal Reserve Bank, not at all safe-sounding references to “token” and “subsidary” money, difficult explanations about managed currency, and shocking facts about bank reserves. John Doe’s mind is probably too illiterate to have that sonata further material-ized in recitals and concerts. The air will carry it to millions of listeners in auditoriums and symphony halls, over the radio, and from phonograph records. It will be distributed to thousands of people by copies of the printed score. This sonata will inspire other composers to creative activity, become a source of in come to its author, its publisher, and its performers. It will give rise to copyrights, bookings, concert tours, bank accounts, and library collections. From its non-material beginning it will be translated into sound, paper, wax, metallic rolls. Out of the creative and unfathomable depths of the man who conceived it, this intangible reality was ejected like a projectile which strikes the great pool of material reality and starts a series of ever widening and seemingly endless eddies. These eddies are the evidence of the things that were hoped for.

V

We come to the next idea in Paul’s definition of faith: evidence. Faith is the evidence of things not seen. How strange! And here we have been so engrossed trying to find evidence for faith and arguing about it that it never crossed our minds that faith is itself evidence. Perhaps we ought to look at it de novo with a fresh mind swept clean of the cobwebs spun by centuries of argumentation and cleared of the stale air left behind by generations of dead religiosity. Is it really so surprising that faith should be evidence? If faith isn’t, what other evidence could there be for things not seen? The trouble is that we are led astray without realizing it by the unspoken assumption that logical demonstration and evidence are the same thing, whereas logical demonstration is only one of several forms of evidence. Even this correction does not go far enough, however, because logical demonstraton is not strictly speaking evidence at all but a conclusion drawn from the evidence, a method by which evidence is brought to bear directly on the problem at hand. This is true even in the rigorous field of mathematics. When a proposition is proved, the evidence is already contained in the proposition itself, and what mathematical reasoning does is to extricate the evidence and put it on exhibit. Evidence is experiential, not a form of ratiocination. It is proof that something invisible or difficult to see really does exist, a proof sufficiently informative to enable one to reconstruct that something’s main characteristics.

Now, proceeding on a perfectly common sense basis, what is the best evidence of a thing not visible to the physical eye? What men do, using the verb broadly to include thinking, speaking, and writing. The foreign policy of a Secretary of State is one of those things not seen, and the best evidence of the existence and nature of that policy is the action he takes. Sometimes his speeches may suffice, but since they can also be very misleading, the surest way is to reconstruct the policy from his acts. The
most reliable indications are to be found in the type of person he appoints to high diplomatic posts, the character of the governments he recognizes, the political and economic aid he gives to some countries and denies to others, the people which he allows our occupation authorities to put into office in countries like Germany, the treaties which he negotiates and endeavors to get the Senate to approve, the votes he casts at various critical points in international conferences. In comparison with this accumulation of specific and tangible deeds, the practice of making a speech purporting to be a statement of foreign policy by citing and quoting copiously from his own previous official speeches is annoyingly uninformative in most cases, sometimes intentionally deceptive, and occasionally circum­spect or even crafty. The difference between a high official’s words and his deeds lies in the degree to which each engages his responsibility and reputation, and the one which goes furthest in this direction is the best evidence of what his policy is.

VI

It will be observed that all three otherwise wide­ly disconnected examples have one thing in common: they imply a commitment. A foreign policy in the true sense of a meaningful succession of deeds is a commitment. You cannot make what has been done be as if it had never been. It engages the responsibility and reputation of the official who directed it and willy-nilly identifies him with it. To write a book is a commitment—indeed, as some people put it, it is “sticking one’s neck out.” When men part with their valuable goods and valuable services in exchange for money, it is evident to them that the money is certainly money. Moreover, their acceptance makes that fact evident to others who see their faith in the paper bills and thereby actually tend to make these bills money. These commit­ments are evidence of things not seen and a mean­ingful indication of what they are. Things not seen are credible; their existence is evident; and their na­ture is intelligible when men are committed to them. When those who endorsed the American Declara­tion of Independence affirmed the existence of certain self-evident truths, they committed themselves to the hilt when they said that “we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.” They committed themselves still further by years of war and revolution followed by decades of successful government dedicated to these truths. It is a commitment of this kind which refutes those persons who say that there are no such truths and that they won’t work as a basis of government. Commitments are the outward manifestation of an inward process in which the former is directly traceable to the latter like the sparks and flames that leap from a hot fire. The truths of our Declara­tion of Independence were faith, not sight, and the signers made them evident.

The inward and outward aspects of commitment, therefore, are but one phenomenon, i.e., faith. It was faith that Jesus demanded of his disciples—not admiration, cheers, sympathy, approval, or interest. And what did he say to those faith­ful disciples when he sent them to evangelize the world? He told them—significantly—to be his witnesses. The greatest evidence of something that a man can submit to the Court of Common Sense is to pledge his faith to it in the exacting sense of full commitment, otherwise he is faith­less.

But this does not complete Paul’s idea of ev­i­dence. In fact, insofar as Paul himself is concerned, other references suggest that another phase of it was at least as important in his mind. Faith must be considered from an individual as well as a social viewpoint. What if the things not seen are not visible to the individual who is committed to them? That means he does not see with either his physical eyes or with the eyes of reason the kind of evidence he would ordinarily require before committing himself. And therein, says Paul, is he justified because there would be no merit in adher­ing to what we can see for ourselves. Right here, no doubt, is where the idea originated that faith and evidence are antithetical. Even so, one would still have to admit that faith has the function of evidence. The admission, however, does not go far enough to be satisfactory. The scientists who in­vented the atomic bomb had no evidence in the usual sense of the word. On that basis they could not have justified to themselves or to others the commitment represented by the time and energy they devoted to this project up to the time of its completion. They couldn’t have! Doubtless they had their reasons for making the commitment just as a Christian has for following Christ, but the evidence in the sense of an actual bomb manufac­tured and tested—a thing surely to be seen—had to wait. In the meantime the evidence was faith. Up to the time of the momentous experiment in New Mexico many people, had they known what was going on, would have said that the faith of these scientists was irrational and blind. They cannot possibly say so now. And it would be insulting to suggest that the scientists were merely lucky! The invention of the atomic bomb was a creative accompl­ishment which these scientists owe to their faith just as surely as they owe the ability to work out the details involved in making it to their technical training. It takes craftsmanship to make a bomb, and it takes insight or faith to discover how to split the atom. Though they were working on a problem of natural science seemingly quite alien to religion, these scientists too were justified by faith.

(To be continued)

THE CALVIN FORUM * * * APRIL, 1952
A brief note of appreciation for your excellent article on the Race Question, appearing in the recent issue of The Calvin Forum. It is the best that I have read on the entire matter. When I read such articles, I am strengthened in my conviction that the Christian Reformed church is on its way toward becoming a real leaven in the American world.

If ever we as a church have an opportunity to let our lights shine, it is now in the field of Negro evangelism.

Sincerely yours,

EUGENE S. CALLENDER

16 January, 1952

For reasons fully appreciated by the editor, the author of the following letter prefers not to have his identity disclosed. He is the editor of a widely-read religious periodical.

DR. CECIL DE BOER, Editor
The Calvin Forum
Calvin College and Seminary
Grand Rapids 6, Michigan

Dear Dr. De Boer:

I believe that this is the first time I have written a letter to the editor. What prompts me to write this time is the intelligent and perceptive analysis of the issue of the ambassador to the Vatican which appeared in the Calvin Forum of January, 1952.

We have taken a similar stand, one which I am convinced is the proper stand. I am sending you a marked copy of (name of periodical) in which you will see what we had to say.

I think that we both regret that Protestantism, as it has forsaken its moorings in a vital theology, has come at last to the sad condition of being left with nothing to do but protest. It is a shame that more and more the intelligent and decent pagan is being forced to choose between his paganism and Catholicism, with Protestantism disappearing from the scene as any serious tertium datur.

Very sincerely yours,

BELA VASADY

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
Knoxville
Department of Political Science
January 14, 1952

Dear Dr. De Boer:

I would like to ask a favor from you. Please send me five copies of the January number of The Calvin Forum.

In Hungary I had a very good brother and friend who was one of our leading laymen. His name is Dr. Alexis De Boer. I thought I would mention this to you, though I must presume that your European background points to a country other than Hungary!

For many years in Hungary I was the editor of a pastoral weekly as well as of a pastoral monthly. I was editor also of a theological quarterly. Thus I know what editing is! May God bless you in your good work!

Sincerely yours,

BELA VASADY

THE CALVIN FORUM * * * APRIL, 1952
The new monograph to be published is entitled, "The Eye as an Optical Instrument." Dr. Frank M. Allen, Professor Emeritus of Physics, the University of Manitoba, has written the monograph in answer to the claims of some scientists that the eye's defects make it not a credit to its Creator. Dr. Allen asserts that these alleged defects have a purpose.

The tract, "Fourteen Scientists Look at Life," has been compiled by Dr. Alfred C. Eckert Jr., research chemist at Batelle Institute, Columbus, Ohio, and will contain testimonies from fourteen top scientists.

The American Scientific Affiliation is a ten-year old non-profit corporation whose members are Christian scientific men devoting themselves to the task of reviewing, preparing and distributing information on the authenticity, historicity, and the scientific aspects of the Holy Scriptures, to aid in the establishment of a firm faith in Christ.

The current publications are in keeping with the Affiliation's stated objectives, (1) "To integrate and organize the efforts of many individuals desiring to correlate the facts of science and the Holy Scriptures, (2) To promote and encourage the study of the relationship between the facts of science and the Holy Scriptures and (3) To promote the dissemination of the results of such studies."

Other publications by A.S.A. members include two monographs and one book. The monographs are, "Christian Theism and Empirical Sciences," by Dr. Cornelious Jaarsma, Professor of Education at Calvin College and "Creation and Evolution," by Dr. Russell L. Mixter, chairman Department of Biology and Professor of Zoology at Wheaton College. The book is a symposium treatment entitled Modern Science and Christian Faith.

Book Reviews

HIS GORGE RISES


In this monograph an alarmed Liberal attacks the dogma in Eliot. Mr. Robbins, it is plain, does not like it one bit that this Eliot is grown so great. A regular cult is what Eliot's admirers are, and they have created an Eliot legend, an Eliot myth. The thing needs exploding, or whatever it is that ought to happen to a myth. Dissipating, maybe.

Robbins figures it is baffling that Eliot should have such immense reputation. No good reason for it, really. There is nothing much to Eliot. He speaks for a vogue of reaction, is all. True, he wrote a couple of pretty good poems before he took to religion. His Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats may still be read some decades hence. And there were elements in his technique, especially in that pre-conversion work, that were interesting. But when you come

to measure the body of his poetic work, just confess it, you will find it is scant. Take the tractates, masquerading as poems, out of it, and there is not much left. He took to writing religious and political things, you know, when the dogma hit him. It pretty effectively killed the poet, what little poet there was.

Strange, indeed, that formidable reputation. But, of course, the New Critics—Allen Tate, R. P. Blackmur, Cleanth Brooks, John C. Ransom, and such—want to establish their point of view, and they puff Eliot for prestige. They peddle his idiosyncratic views in their Little Magazines. Matter of fact, in England he is not such great shakes as he is here. Besides, a good many of the people who swear by Eliot do not read him, or if they read him do not understand him. A lot of them talk his technique and blink at his content. If they paid some mind to that content, they would see what kind of creature they were
dealing with. And, be it said, that content is hard to get. Eliot is obscure, and mind you, he is deliberately obscure. He scorns communication. The cultists like to think that they are extraordinary too. That also makes for his reputation. Absurd, really, those worshipful efforts to explain the Eliot text. And very little agreement yet.

Hence there is no good reason at all for the immense reputation. But he has it. No denying that. Matter of fact, he has influence. That is bad. It makes him very dangerous. For this Eliot is a religious man, and he writes out of dogma. A Liberal does not do that. And such dogma! You ought to know what kind of ideas it leads to.

Mark this:

—He once wrote: "Education is from top to bottom religious, or it is not education."
—He casts a slur on Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality.
—He has a bad jaw in one of his poems.
—he is a disciple of T. E. Hulme. Hulme wrote that "man is endowed with Original Sin. . . . A man is essentially bad, he can only accomplish anything of value by discipline—ethical and political . . . ." Eliot wrote: "I agree with what Hulme says."
—His main interest is "not mythological or psychological but religious."
—He actually said in so many words that it is "the Church's business to interfere with the World."
—He disparages the French Revolution.
—He keeps talking mortification and sacrifice; he "neglects the humanitarian and human aspects of Christianity."
—Once he said: "I think that the virtue of tolerance is greatly overestimated. . . ."
—His philosophy "can be summed up in one word: Anti-Humanism."
—There is in him an "unquestioning acceptance of authority and obedience in religion."
—The "last quarter of The Cocktail Party depends on acceptance of the doctrine of Original Sin, and of Grace and Atonement."
—He cannot see the "wonderful possibilities which are man's."
—He "has rejected in toto any rational or humanist explanations of existence."
—The "compulsion of dogma colors the intellectual background of all Eliot's writing. . . . The dogma influences even the handling of words."
—He does not think well of Bacon, Hobbes, Shelley, George Eliot, Whitman, Hardy, Wells, and Shaw.
—He is not in "the mainstream culture of tradition and enlightenment."

One thing, despite all his scrutiny of Eliot's work, Robbins missed in that work. It is the main theme in it. It is the message that Liberalism is a religion, and that Liberals write out of dogma. Robbins'(gorge rises at this truth.

Henry Zylstra
Calvin College

THE ART OF SPEAKING


The sole purpose of public speaking can be summarized in one word—communication. If a man does not communicate, he is not an effective speaker. In our present era correct speech technique is highly important, The speaker who is the master of speech delivery is the man who succeeds in putting his ideas across.

The author of this book is an Associate Professor of Speech at Northwestern Schools in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In this volume he treats the subject of public speaking in popular style. It is not meant to be a text book on the subject of speech, although it could well be used as such. It is designed for both those in the active ministry and in the laity with the emphasis falling upon speech in religious work. However, any one will enjoy reading it, and those who need it will derive great benefit. The author expresses the hope that "this book possibly may whet the desire of the ministry to produce great preachers. It may whet the desire of the laity to expect great preaching."

The Christian worker is always confident that there are spiritual powers at work empowering even the most feeble efforts that one makes. The Christian preacher realizes that no matter how fluent a speaker he may be, his real purpose in preaching is not accomplished unless the Spirit applies the Word to the hearts of the listeners. It is a natural presupposition that piety and consecration ought to be attributes of every Christian. Yet, the Christian must also be trained and educated so that he may find the most effective outlet for his experience. The author is aware of spiritual principles and their importance and precedence to all other things. Nevertheless, he rightly maintains that an appeal to one's spiritual experiences is no excuse for slovenly work. Says he, "Open your mouth and God will fill it,' cannot be the text or motto for the ministry or those engaged as members of the laity in Christian service. A better verse would be, 'Study to show yourselves approved unto God.'" Neither can a man excuse his mediocrity speaking with the statement that "Orators are born." While authorities in the field of speech do recognize differences in native ability, they are agreed that public speaking is an art. It is something we learn to do. For most speakers it is a result of hard work and self improvement.

In this volume Professor Lee covers the philosophy of speech, the content of speech, the language of speech, the use of voice in speech, and the use of action in speech. He calls the speakers attention to such matters as the importance of considering the forces which motivate people, the need for effective interpretation of the printed page, and the necessity of developing a modern vocabulary and style for effective speaking.

The book contains a number of unusual ideas and clever suggestions. Here one finds much grain with a minimum of chaff. It gives the beginning speaker many hints and helps for successful speaking, while it serves as a "refresher" for the professional speaker who may have unconsciously slipped into bad habits. Anyone who, upon a diligent study of this book, makes a practical application of the principles set forth will find his speeches becoming more interesting and effective.

Melvin E. Berghuis
Calvin College

CHRISTIAN PRAYER


This book was written during the years 1942-1943 while the author was interned along with a number of Roman Catholic priests in the parsonage of the Roman Catholic Church of Solo in the Dutch East Indies. It was during these trying days that he set himself the task...
The author does not pretend to offer a completely new approach; he acknowledges a similarity to the inductive method of W. R. Harper or R. D. Wilson, but he points out that these "lack a systematized description of the phenomena of the language which is both synchronized with the reading work the student is doing and is at the same time in Hebrew rather than in English categories." In how far the present book supplies the "lack" referred to above can be determined only by a trial in the classroom. The author has had eight years of experience in teaching Hebrew and is enthusiastic about his method. He acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Cyrus H. Gordon in the development of this method. The reviewer also had the privilege to spend a semester in the study of Babylonian and Ugaritic with Dr. Gordon, and he too feels that Dr. Gordon's method warrants enthusiasm. In his mind there is no faster or more satisfactory way to learn a language than to begin reading from the text (in Hebrew it would be the Hebrew Bible), and with the help of a good transliteration, read, translate and explain the phenomena by means of an adequate, well organized grammar.

This is the best way because thus one learns the language the more natural way and not through artificial constructions and an amassing of theoretical data.

Part I is comprised of thirty lessons, using the book of Ruth as text, and progressively acquaints the student with the language by means of normalization and translation, plus a faithful reference to the grammar section. There are also several questions in the lessons, which if the student can answer, is an indication that he is keeping abreast of the course.

However the contribution of this book does not end with furnishing a sound pedagogical approach. There are also things "new" in Part II, the Grammar. For instance, the explanation of the short vowel system on page 96 ff. is certainly far more correct and simpler than the unwieldy rules given in the older Grammars. He also has included the rather recent "find" (from the study of Ugaritic) of the phenomena that the inseparable prepositions, *beth* and *lamedh*, are also used in the sense of "from."

The reviewer is grateful for the appearance of this book. He hopes that it is an indication that the pendulum in Old Testament interest has begun to swing the other way, and that it will serve as a means to revitalize Old Testament exegesis. He has received the impression that in many seminaries and Bible Schools the Old Testament is more or less relegated to illustration purposes; or else it receives the "cold war" treatment of ignoring it. It is true that the New Testament gives us the fullness of God's revelation in His Son; but it is also true that the Old Testament is God's first and *Basic* revelation, and the New is not properly interpreted without the Old.

If we are really sincere in our Reformed principle of letting God speak," we must leave no stone unturned to discover what "God says." For the Reformed scholar and minister who purport to be God's mouthpiece to his people, no exegesis is too painstaking, no grammatical problem too wearying. Every contribution that sound scholarship offers will be received with joy and thanksgiving. Every Reformed minister who is eager to be more "at home" in the Old Testament will find this Grammar a worthwhile addition to his "exegetical tools."

Congratulations to Shelton College for an enthusiastic incumbent in the chair of Semitic Languages. Hearty com-
mandations to the publisher for undertaking this work which is long over due.  

Clarence J. Vos  
Duvall, Washington

SCOLARLY DISSERTATION COMMENDED


When the book editor of The Calvin Forum requested me to do a critical review of Dr. Runner's doctoral dissertation, he put me on a bit of a spot. Were I to do this review for one of the professional philosophical periodicals, I would feel free not only to slang professional jargon about with gleeful abandon but also to weight it down with as much Greek as Runner himself uses in the main body of the work. But I take it that this kind of treatment would not be satisfactory for the Forum. On the other hand, more is required for the Forum than would be sufficient for a popular review in a newspaper column. Hence, I shall attempt to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis.

Every historian and historiographer necessarily and inescapably is under the influence of some philosophy of history. Consequently also the history of philosophy requires and has a philosophy of the history of philosophy. This is not a mere generality but is a recognition of the fact that Dr. Runner in his treatment of the genetic development of Aristotle's thought is very consciously and admittedly influenced by a very specific philosophy of history. This, I think, will become evident when we consider the presentation which he gives of some of Vollenhoven's views.

The first part of this scholarly and very competent dissertation consists of a presentation of the present status of Aristotelian studies. It is especially after the appearance of Jaeger's *Aristoteles* that there was a remarkable revival of interest not merely in the general aspects of Aristotelian thought but in the technical problem of the chronology of Aristotle's works and of the psychological genetic development of Aristotle's thought. Runner presents an exposition and evaluation of Jaeger's pioneering work. With full appreciation of the scholarly contribution which Jaeger has made, Runner, nevertheless, agrees with those critics of Jaeger who call attention to several gaps, weaknesses, and inadequacies. This discussion of Jaeger's is followed by an account of the significant contribution made by J. F. C. J. Nuyens in his work on the factors in the development of Aristotle's psychology. Without entering into the technical details, suffice it to say that Runner considers Nuyens' contribution to the present Aristotelian studies to be very significant. The particular point which Runner appreciates is Nuyens' contribution to the problem of the validity of the genetic method in its application to Aristotle. But with all this appreciation of Nuyens' work and method, Runner is, nevertheless, convinced that it is inadequate and that the whole problem of the relation between the different works of Aristotle has been left in an unsatisfactory state and requires a better criterion for the determination of both the chronological order of these works and Aristotle's own development than Nuyens has employed.

This leads Dr. Runner to the consideration of the contribution that has been made both in a general philosophy of history and a specific treatment of early Greek philosophy by Professor D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, Professor of Philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam. In a compact condensation of the first volume of Vollenhoven's *History of Philosophy* and his article on the development of Aristotle in "Philosophia Reformata," Runner presents the following main ideas. The study of the history of human culture must be made in the light of what he calls "word-revelation," since ignoring this would be detrimental to the investigation. In other words, a religious and distinctly Christian philosophy of history must form the starting point, and the basis and the norm, for all treatment of history, and hence also of the history of philosophy. With this is not meant that we are to read back into pre-Christian history any content or impact of Christianity, but rather that even the religious nature of paganism must be taken into consideration. "While all Christianizing interpretations of heathen authors is thus once and for all rejected as a serious offense against the method to be followed by the historian, a proper interpretation of such writers will see them as men belonging to a particular time and milieu—both of which were religiously conditioned." This leads Vollenhoven to attempt a division of the history of philosophy which differs somewhat from the traditional one, namely, "the periods preceding, during, and subsequent to the rise and flowering of synthesis philosophy." By the last is meant "some kind of a synthesis between themes that are and those that are not in harmony with the word-revelation. (The use of this term "word-revelation" is undoubtedly understood in our circles, but I feel that the typical American or British reader may find this vague and ambiguous. Perhaps it would have been well to have presented a more specific explanation of the meaning of this.) Upon the basis of the view that there are three kinds of being, namely, that of God, that of the law which is authoritative for the cosmos, and that of the cosmos which is subject to that law, Vollenhoven concludes that the philosophy of the pagan world could not be complete. Consequently the main issue becomes that of the status of this cosmic law as being thoroughly distinct from and transcending the cosmos, or being merely inherently within the cosmos. The first is the position of the realists, the second that of the non-realists. Upon the basis of this Vollenhoven distinguishes six basic types of philosophic positions in pre-Socratic philosophy. These he describes in terms of subjectivism and objectivism, non-mathematical or mathematical objectivism, universalists and individualists, cosmological and cosmogono-cosmological, contradictory, non-contradictory and semi-contradictory types. This schematism forms the framework of Vollenhoven's treatment of the genetic development of the thought of Plato and Aristotle. I think it must be confessed that, at first blush, this terminology seems to be cumbersome, individualistic, and somewhat pedantic. Very likely, however, this is only 'appearance' and not 'reality,' and is the inescapable result of the compactness of Runner's re-presentation. One result of the application of this schematism to the Aristotelian problem is the rejection of the individualism of Jaeger's position.

Another and very important result is the recognition of the tremendous role which pre-Socratic philosophy played in the genetic development of both Plato and Aristotle. This, in turn, becomes very significant in the attempt to determine the chronology of the Aristotelian corpus, especially in relation to the Platonic and non-Platonic years, into which Vollenhoven divides Aristotle's career.

In applying his method and the terminology which he uses in labeling the positions and the development of pre-Socratic philosophy, Vollenhoven reaches certain conclusions concerning the dating of both the Platonic and Aris-
toelian works. Some of these conclusions are at variance with the findings of both Jaeger and Nuyens.

All of this forms the setting of the particular problem to which Runner now addresses himself. It is all preliminary to the treatment of the status of Aristotelian studies, and is but introductory to the real heart (and, incidentally, bulk) of the dissertation. The specific problem is the investigation of some of the books of the Physics in the light of Vollenhoven's method and schematism. The aim of this is to attempt to discover whether this will help solve the more difficult problems involved in the Aristotelian chronology and the relation to Plato's thought.

Runner's methodological procedure in his detailed analysis of Books VII, V, VI of the Physics is severely formal. First he presents a running analysis or resume of the argument of each book. This is followed by a statement of the philosophic themes developed in the argument. Then comes a critical and detailed investigation of the theory of the background and the theory of the foreground. By the theory of the background is meant the view that there is a law for the cosmos, a world of idea behind the cosmos, an intelligent world in the Platonic realistic sense. The theory of the foreground is the theory concerning the cosmos itself, particularly in terms of a universalistic cosmos, and the cosmogono-cosmological problem. This is then followed by a detailed comparison with the works of Plato, germane to the problem, and with other works of Aristotle. Such is the framework of his procedure in the main body of the dissertation.

In discussing the application of this procedure in the attempt to illustrate and determine the genetic development of Aristotle's thought, I wish to begin with certain generalizations, in the hope that they will not be looked upon as being merely glittering generalities.

Although Runner frankly admits that he applies Vollenhoven's method and schematism to his particular special problem, he does not merely slavishly follow his mentor. This is evident, not merely in the way in which he handles the technical aspects of his material, but also in his repeated statements: "If Vollenhoven's results are accurate ..." (p. 69) and "If Vollenhoven's results are correct ..." (p. 79). (This might lead one to speculate what conclusions might be reached if these results should not be correct).

In the whole investigation Runner reveals himself as a well-rounded, competent, and individual scholar.

In the technical field of textual criticism, it is customary to distinguish between external and internal evidence. In his analysis of the Aristotelian text, Runner skillfully blends these two. In those several instances in which he takes issue with the specific views of Jaeger or Ross or Nuyens, he makes telling use of both external and internal evidence in the analysis, either of the arguments, or of the proper reading of the text, or of the correct interpretation of Greek words and phrases. See in particular pp. 72-3, 83, 112-4, 120, 124. One significant evidence of the result of this kind of analysis is to be found in his rejection of certain parts of Book II as a later interpolation. This rejection, which is undoubtedly correct, is based upon internal evidence in the determination of historically correct text.

In his careful critical uses of the fragments, of doxographical material, and the niceties of philological distinctions, Runner reveals the caliber of a competent individual scholar.

I see no point in cluttering up this review with all manner of technical details and references to Greek terminology, professional technical labels, and finely-drawn technical arguments. There is one point, however, which it seems to me might have been more clearly worked out and presented, and that is the well-known departure from the Platonism. One aspect of that problem is, did Aristotle really reject, in his so-called non-Platonic years, Plato's doctrine of ideas in toto? Sometimes Runner seems to suggest, in the way he expresses himself that Aristotle did; for example, "absolute as is the break with those who hold to the ideas ..." and "We shall have something to say shortly about possible reasons for Aristotle's having broken at this stage of his development with the doctrine of ideas" (p. 121). On the other hand, in contrast to Platonism, Runner constantly speaks of the semi-realism of Aristotle. How are we to harmonize the statement concerning the complete break with the Platonic idea with this statement, "For we hope to show later that Aristotle taught a doctrine of ideas even after he came forward with a conception of his own" (p. 67). Might I suggest that a return to the older terminology of the extreme or excessive reality of Plato as distinguished from the normal realism of Aristotle might avoid this confusion and ambiguity. Without minimizing in the least the real departure from Plato, I would nevertheless like to point out that Aristotle probably never escaped from the Platonistic influence. To quote Ross, "To Plato's influence every page of Aristotle's philosophical writings bears witness. While he expresses a growing dissatisfaction with Plato's other worldliness, it would be true to say that almost everyone of his leading ideas is the modification of one inherited from Plato. His universals are Plato's ideas shorn of their separateness and asserted to express only 'in' things not 'over' or 'apart from' them" (Aristotle, Selections, vi). In making this comment, I do not at all wish to minimize the importance of Runner's real contribution in pointing out the but-too-frequently-neglected aspects of the influence of pre-Socratic philosophy upon Aristotle.

I have a few comments of another nature. One of my pet abominations is the reviewer who first heaps fulsome praise upon an author and then begins sniping at picayune details. Therefore I hope that none of these comments will be interpreted in this spirit.

Of course there are not only formal limitations to any academic dissertation, but there are quite naturally certain formal academic requirements. Undoubtedly this accounts, and quite understandably so, for the fact that a dissertation written in English has a Dutch title page. Now to this, of course, there is no objection because of the academic setting in which the dissertation was presented. It is very well possible, however, that this may create a strange impression in the English-speaking world. It is to be hoped that this scholarly work will receive the attention which it deserves, not merely in the Netherlands but also in this country and in England. One might wish that the copies destined for the English-speaking book world could be furnished with an English title page. But undoubtedly this was impracticable. The same is true of the bi-lingual dedication.

Another minor matter—very frequently Runner uses the word "vision" where we would ordinarily use the word "view" or "position." This, from the point of view of English usage, is a bit confusing. Is it perhaps the best result of an attempt to translate one of Vollenhoven's Dutch terms? I will not. Then, too, in several places such as pp. 40 and 42, Runner uses Dutch sentence construction instead of English. Again there may have been the difficulties and problems of translation.
However, be these things as they may, I wish to reiterate that Runner has done an original and a good job. I would emphasize particularly his contribution in showing that in the Books I, II, and VII of the *Physics* there is no evidence of the later Aristotelian doctrine of an unmoved prime mover. Further, I think that he has conclusively shown that the terms "matter" and "form" when used in Books I, II, V, and VI do not have the same meaning that these terms have in the later development of Aristotle's doctrine of matter and form, and potentiality and actuality.

An elaborate end-paper is a comparative chart of the chronological arrangement of Aristotle's works as presented by Jaeger, Nuyens, and Vollenhoven. This is extremely useful not merely for a general perspective, but also for clarifying the differences between Vollenhoven and the other two, both in the dating and the classification of the Aristotle corpus.

There are two kinds of book reviews. One of these leads people to say, "I have read the review, so now I don't have to read the book"; the other leads people to say, "I have read the review, now I want to read the book." May I hope that I have achieved the higher level of the second? Heartiest congratulations to Dr. Runner for an eminently scholarly performance.

And finally something that is really not unimportant: Orchids to the publisher for an attractive format, perfect typography, and impeccable proofreading.

**William M. Trap. Wayne University**

**WARFIELD REPUBLISHED: SUPERNATURALISM REAFFIRMED**


In view of the renascence of interest in the study of Biblical theology in our day (Arnold Nash's *Protestant Thought in the Twentieth Century* contains some revealing confessions and resolutions in this regard) the issuance of this work under review is both timely and eminently significant. It may serve to give needed direction in a time of ferment and readjustment. One of the wholesome and encouraging signs in the theological firmament today is that contemporary theologians are evincing new concern about the basic material and the abiding values of the contents of the Scriptures. What this upsurge of theological interest will lead to is something to conjure with. It is quite true that all scholars in our world who claim the Christian name are ready to concede at once that when it comes to depth of insight and nobility of moral and spiritual outlook, all other "sacred literatures" recede into the background and the Bible stands out pre-eminently re-splendent. It commends itself as the vastly superior to these other inferior, and as such it demands further investigation and study. But is that ascription of superiority enough? Will it suffice to say that as far as ethical, spiritual, and religious teachings are concerned the Bible is without a peer? The voice of Warfield, which is the voice of old Princeton, sounds a thunderous negative. No temporizing or compromising theology will do. So speaks Warfield once again to our bewildered and groping generation. This erudite and pious scholar, known as well for his consecrated loyalty to Christ as for his breadth of learning and exactitude of scholarship, made the transition in living and learning from the 19th to the 20th century. He saw with trepidation the mushroom growth of the empirico-scientific school of thought with its unabashed and thoroughgoing naturalism. He witnessed the large-scale substitution of a subjectivistic religious experience for the objective norm of the Word of God. And stirred in soul, he rose to the strategic occasion. Raised up in the crisis in the providence of God, Warfield assumed the role of a sturdy defender of and courageous contender for the evangelical, orthodox, historic faith. This Presbyterian Calvinist wielded the broadsword (hence, if a generality be permitted, he was more of a critical and polemical theologian than a constructive one) not so much against sacerdotalism, which, indeed, he did recognize as a serious perversion of Christianity, but against what he took to be the more formidable and dangerous foes, namely, a naturalism which falsified Christianity and a subjectivism which repudiated it.

Against naturalism and any form of philosophico-religious thought which tended to reduce reality to one piece, he took up the cudgels for supernaturalism. Upon it Christianity, (and by that token Calvinism, for it, said he, is but another name for consistent supernaturalism) stands or falls. "The confession of a supernatural God, who may and does act in a supernatural mode, and who acting in a supernatural mode has wrought out for us a supernatural redemption; interpreted in a supernatural revelation, and applied by the supernatural operation of His Spirit this confession constitutes the core of the Christian profession. Only he who holds this faith whole and entire has a full right to the Christian name; only he can hope to conserve the fullness of Christian truth" (p. 21).

Against a subjectivism which has run amuck and opened the door for all kinds of religious aberrations and a Schleiermacherian reverence for the authority of that which transpires religiously within a man's soul, Warfield asserted unequivocally that "There is nothing more important ... than to bear constantly in mind that all the Christianity of Christianity rests precisely on 'external authority.' Religion, of course, we can have without 'external authority,' for a man is a religious animal and will function religiously always and everywhere. But Christianity, no. Christianity rests on 'external authority' and that for the very good reason that it is not the product of man's religious sentiment but is a gift from God. To ask us to set aside 'external authority' and throw ourselves back on what we can find within us alone—call it by whatever name you choose, 'religious experience,' 'the Christian consciousness,' 'the inner light,' 'the immanent Divine'—is to ask us to discard Christianity and revert to natural religion." And natural religion, despite its valuable witness to the innate 'sensus divinitatis,' knows nothing about the salvatory and hence is woefully inadequate to reconcile the offending creature with the offended God. To embrace it and rest secure in it is repudiation of the essence of Christianity.

The subjects treated in this, the third of Warfield's republished works, comprise in the main the doctrines of the Trinity, the Deity of Christ, Predestination, Faith, and related themes. The value of this volume is enhanced by a fine sketch of Warfield's life and reprints of four of Warfield's masterful sermons. Students of the Scriptures will take note with interest that in breaking with Ussher's Chronology he sets the antiquity of man from 10,000 to 20,000 years and that he apparently regarded the world as being in its infancy since he terms the church of his day "primitive" and subscribes to the judgment of William Temple that the earth will in all probability be habitable yet for myriads of years to come.

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