Church and State:
From Separation to Isolation

Protestantism and the
Evils of Capitalism

Educating Today's Women
for Happiness

"In a College Chapel"

Correspondence

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Church and State in a Secularized Society

Traditionally the American state has not, in contrast with the practice in many European countries, ignored the churches and isolated itself from religion. In fact we may say that although in America the state does not recognize any specific religion, it does recognize—or in the past has recognized—the value of religious belief and religious institutions. On the other hand, the unprecedented secularization of American society in the course of the last seventy-five years has fixed a gulf between the America of the dissenters and the America of the present, so that perhaps the most we can say is that today in America the state does not seem to be hostile to the churches. And, after all, there is a comforting difference between a state which is neutral in the sense of taking no sides and one which is neutral in the sense of virtually promoting the secularization of what was originally a Christian political society (although the language of the opinions recently handed down by the Supreme Court would lead one to suspect the latter).¹

I

In a political society largely Christian in its presuppositions the problem of the relation of church and state readily finds a theoretical, if not always a practical, solution. However, with the increasing secularization of life now going on in America the problem becomes more and more difficult in every respect. How does a political society largely secularized in outlook view the problem? It very probably regards the churches as nothing more than associations of people interested in religious and moral values. Inasmuch as these values belong to our cultural heritage they may to some extent be considered useful to political society—in much the same way as artistic scientific, hygienic, and other values are useful. The churches, therefore, should be accorded the same privileges and prerogatives as, say, associations for the advancement of science, philosophy, or art. The state should not interfere with them just so long as they tend to their own affairs and do not meddle with things beyond their province. When our Revolutionary fathers made the principle of the separation of church and state a part of our fundamental law, they simply meant that the legislator and the policeman, like the preacher, should mind their own business, and that no minister or priest should tell the legislator and the policeman what to do.

For the sake of convenience Americans with a secularized outlook may be divided into two groups, namely, the moderates and the radicals. Although the difference between these groups is somewhat more than merely a matter of degrees, perhaps most secularized Americans represent a somewhat inconsistent mixture of the two. The moderates realize that inasmuch as the men who drew up the First Amendment, designed to separate the state from the church—or, better, the church from the state—were the products of what we today would call religiously affiliated schools, their obvious intention was to insure that the United States Government would maintain an attitude of appropriate neutrality regarding religious differences. The state should not concern itself with a man’s conscience unless its dictates became the source of acts in disturbance of the peace. That, however, was not to say that the state has no interest in religion. Churches and the influence they exert are either good or bad for political society and, therefore, of as much interest to the state as, say, the fact that people think rightly or wrong-headedly about labor problems, or that they are serious or irresponsible in regard to the duties and restraints of family life. Such things tend either to weaken the state or to constitute a source of its dignity and power.

The political objectives at the basis of the First Amendment, so these moderates hold, were simply the demands of the common good in a society religiously divided, objectives such as political equality, political unity, the autonomy of ecclesiastical authority, and the free exercise of religion. The separation of church and state, therefore, should be regarded as simply a means to the end of freedom of worship.² It was certainly not intended to confine the exercise of religion to the realm of the purely personal and the purely private; nor was it intended as a means of prohibiting the application of religious principles to public problems. There are areas in which church and state share common interests and in which both, therefore, may properly make demands—as may the family, industry, science, commerce, and so on. In short, the principle of the separation of church and state does not

¹ In the now notorious McCollum case the Court virtually decided that the American state is neutral in the sense of favoring progressive secularization in the field of education. Meanwhile see Everson vs. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and McCollum vs. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

² The expression “separation of church and state” is nowhere used in the Constitution.
prohibit co-operation between the two since the Constitution nowhere explicitly prohibits public aid to religious societies and institutions any more than it forbids public aid to industry and commerce. All that it prohibits is the identification of the state with any of these interests.

The problem of the relation between the state and the churches as it applies to the field of education finds these moderates taking the position that inasmuch as the state and the churches here share a common interest, the work of the state and that of the churches should be complementary. Since the future citizen must be trained for membership in a free and democratic society, all his powers and functions as a human being should be given a chance at something like adequate development. This involves much more than merely filling his head with facts. If in the future we wish to have justice, liberty, and domestic tranquility, the educational process must make for something like emotional sanity, a thing impossible without the devotion and loyalty of the citizen to something within his world and his society which he can really value and respect. Inasmuch as this calls for that spiritual development which is the particular province of the churches, there is good reason why the attitude of the state toward the churches should be one of encouragement.

Accordingly, the moderates would disagree with the Court’s decision in the McCollum case. The Champaign “released time” program, so they would hold, can by no stretch of the imagination be called “an establishment of religion.” As an aid to religion it could not possibly have hurt anyone’s freedom of religion or irreligion sufficiently to justify the Court’s interference. It was nothing more than a local attempt on the part of tax-payers to solve the difficult problem of the role of religion in public education, and to solve it in a way which reasonable men would regard as on the whole fair to everybody. It certainly did not give any sect or denomination anything like a preferred juridical status. The Constitution, in guaranteeing freedom of religion, guarantees the right of parents to the free exercise of religion in the rearing of their children, a right not confined to parents who can afford to send their children to religiously affiliated schools. The Court, therefore, in depriving those parents who prefer to send their children to a public rather than a parochial school of the right to guide the education of their children so as to include religion, has really deprived them of the free exercise of religion.

They argue that state aid of any kind to any religion or all religions is public aid to the Catholic Church. In fact we may go a step further and argue that state aid to the parochial school is public aid to the Catholic Church. In fact we may go a step further and argue that state aid of any kind to any religion and, therefore, “an establishment of religion.” The parochial school, for example, is a vital part of Catholic education and, consequently, fundamental to the Catholic Church; accordingly, any kind of public aid to the parochial school is public aid to the Catholic Church. In fact we may go a step further and argue that state aid of any kind to any religion and, therefore, to a private interest, virtually means state interference with a private interest, something expressly prohibited by the Constitution.

The interests of a democratic society are best served by tolerance toward religious diversity, and the necessary tolerance is best served by the public school which, by counteracting the divisive influence of sectarianism, performs an indispensable unifying function. For here children representing the tremendous diversity of the component groups of American society come together as pupils in a common institution. Now our national experience has given us the wisdom to see that this common institution should confine itself to secular subjects. We have learned that personal and private matters such as religious commitments have no real bear-

Coming to the radical secular outlook in this country we find an attitude toward the problem of church and state which more nearly approaches that obtaining in many European countries, where separation means absolute isolation of the state from all organized religion. Despite the fact that the Northwest Ordinance states that religion and morality are “necessary to good government,” and despite the fact that the framers of the Constitution realized that the schools of their day were practically all dominated by religious interests in one form or another, so that to them the First Amendment could only have meant what it said, yet today, so these radicals tell us, the First Amendment means that neither Federal nor state governments may pass laws which, in the language of Justice Black, give aid to any religion or all religions. This may not be what the Constitution actually says, but that is what by the inexorable process of juridical, cultural, and political “development” it now means. From the point of view of these radicals freedom of religion includes freedom of irreligion in the sense of freedom over against God. Religion and irreligions are private matters. Whenever they become organized and public, as they obviously do in the case of the churches, there should be a “wall of separation” between religion and the state. Inasmuch as religiously affiliated schools are at the foundation of some churches, Federal and state aid to such schools, however indirect, is state aid to religion and therefore, “an establishment of religion.” The parochial school, for example, is a vital part of Catholic education and, consequently, fundamental to the Catholic Church; accordingly, any kind of public aid to the parochial school is public aid to the Catholic Church. In fact we may go a step further and argue that state aid of any kind to any religion and, therefore, to a private interest, virtually means state interference with a private interest, something expressly prohibited by the Constitution.

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\[^3\] Some legal scholars maintain that the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to the states, is only a theory. The Fourteenth Amendment, so they say, does not prohibit the states from establishing a religion. All that this amendment says is that no state may deprive anybody of religious liberty. England and Scotland, for instance, maintain established churches, but no one acquainted with the facts would argue that these countries deprive people of religious freedom, however little they may care for the established churches.

\[^4\] In other words, although it may be an exaggeration to say, in the language of Mr. Dooley of cartoon fame, that the Supreme Court follows the election returns, it may not be an exaggeration to say that the Court’s opinion in the McCollum case reflects the growing secularization of a large and vociferous segment of American public opinion. Those who make up this segment no longer believe the doctrine expressed in the Northwest Ordinance, viz., that religion is necessary to good government.
ing on the common good. No public encouragement should be given, therefore, to religious beliefs, for they do not rank with truly social interests such as education, industry, science, and agriculture.

This thoroughly secularized point of view may not actually be that of the majority of American tax-payers today, but that it is fast becoming so is at least probable. Consider what the opinion of the Court in the McCollum case really means. It means that as the result of juridical and cultural development in the United States the simple statement in the Constitution that “Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” today means something altogether different from what the framers of the Constitution intended it to mean. Why? Because it is the function of the Court to reflect in its opinions the cultural, political, and economic development of our nation, a development which apparently demands that the state virtually penalize religious education on the one hand and go to particular pains to protect the rights of the irreligious and the anti-religious, on the other.

III

Drawing up a bill of particulars, the McCollum case can be seen to involve a number of interesting things. It means, for example, that by judicial fiat the American state will henceforth regard religion as a thing essentially personal and private. The Court has read into the Constitution a philosophy which teaches that religion is socially and politically an irrelevance and that, inasmuch as the values to be gained by religious education amount to personal luxuries, a person can be adequately educated without religion. We have virtually been told that the interests of our democracy are best served by educational institutions in which religion is ignored because religion has nothing to do with training the future voter for good citizenship and, therefore, nothing to do with the common good.

Obviously, this completely overlooks the fact that any religion worth its salt claims to be concerned with objective truth, something holding for all men irrespective of whether they know it or acknowledge it, and that this truth interprets and gives meaning to individual life, to social life, and to the world about us. It also overlooks the fact that it is of the essence of religion—or at least, of the Christian religion—publicly to proclaim its content and to apply it to all relevant areas. It is doubtful, therefore, that one could properly speak of the freedom of religion wherever the freedom to apply it in a particular field such as, for example, education, and to apply it without penalties, does not really exist.

The Court's interpretation means that by reason of our “development” the state has become the Constitutionally appointed educator of our children, and that in the United States faith in democracy is to control men’s consciences prior to its control by any other commitment. Accordingly, the public schools, being specifically dedicated to the principle of democracy, are the only schools which the state has the right—and the duty—to uphold. Officially, therefore, the attitude of the American state is to be one of tolerance toward parents who in a spirit un-American and perverse fail to appreciate the public school; that is to say, it will grant them immunity from prosecution only because in the name of liberty and democracy it wishes to exercise benevolence even to the point of granting wrongheaded parents the freedom of doing less than the best for their offspring.

It may be observed that this show of benevolence quite overlooks the possibility that it might be a superior show of democracy to grant all schools, public and otherwise, equal juridical status and thus to recognize the equality of parental rights in the rearing of American citizens. After all, democratic processes are an effect rather than a cause, and the mere belief in democracy seems to be an extremely variable kind of thing, as can be seen in the case of the Soviet Union, which apparently still regards itself as a union of democratic commonwealths. It is doubtful that a person really believes in the essential rightness of the democratic way of life unless he is actually committed to something in the nature of a religion involving strenuous personal convictions regarding the nature of man, or the nature of God, or the nature of the universe, or all three together.

In practice the ruling of the Court in the McCollum case means that parents who insist upon the right to guide the education of their children so as to include religion must resort to religiously affiliated schools. Since this means that they must pay the educational bill twice it is clear that those who cannot afford this will be compelled by law to send their children to schools that are not of their choosing. Those who do not approve. In other words, those who feel that a secularized public school does not adequately prepare for citizenship because it denies the principle that men do not recognize their full obligations to their fellow men unless they first acknowledge their obligations to God, will be penalized for their religious conviction. Freedom of conscience in that case would seem to mean only the negative freedom of taking something which in conscience you must reject or taking the penalties. That an American citizen should be made to pay for a school the character of which he must reject does not seem to be essentially different from the former.

54 They could as an alternative avail themselves of the subterfuge of requesting that a child be excused from class in order to take lessons in religion, just as a parent may request that his child be excused in order to take music lessons from a private teacher.

55 In the case of Federal aid to public schools they would actually be compelled to pay it three times; once for the support of their own schools; again for the support of the public schools; and finally as tax-payers to the Federal Government for Federal aid to the public schools.
European practice of making a citizen pay for a church the doctrines of which he could not believe. To argue that in the McCollum decision we have a violation of religious liberty is at least as sound as to argue, as the Court does, that released time in public schools for religious instruction and limited state aid to religiously affiliated schools constitute "an establishment of religion."

According to the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, tax supported schools may no longer be used for the purpose of making religious principles and ideals more effective as means to the end of public welfare as any local majority of parents see it. Naturally, this means that a large percentage of our American youth will be trained to regard religion as educationally irrelevant. That this will not noticeably promote irreligion seems an absurdly optimistic sentiment. By virtually ordering the public schools to ignore religion the Court has taken upon itself the responsibility of protecting the unbeliever to the extent of weakening the right of the believer to exercise his religion in accordance with the dictates of his conscience. It has construed the First Amendment to mean that the state must ignore religion not only by penalizing religious education but also by providing a privileged place in our educational system for irreligion. What we have now, therefore, is something like this. Religion and irreligion are personal and private matters. Accordingly, the state may not give aid to religion. Therefore, it must give aid to irreligion (despite the fact that irreligion is also a private matter).

We all realize that the Court has reversed itself before. However, if its opinion in the McCollum case really reflects the "development" of our nation, it may never have occasion to do so. At any rate, if on the question of religion in education the Court does not in the future find it necessary to reverse itself, the only conclusion to be drawn is that in America there does not seem to be a significant demand for religion in education.

Finally, just how much is religious freedom worth if it guarantees nothing more than the freedom of a private belief (the Russians permit that much) but penalizes the exercise of the public obligations which religious belief imposes upon the conscience of the believer? This is by no means to assert that in America the Church of Christ is undergoing persecution. Nevertheless the fact remains that in case of a severe national crisis probably no modern state, including the United States, will acknowledge any authority above itself or recognize any good beyond its own—irrespective of what constitutions may say about the sovereignty of God. Accordingly the church considered merely as one of many other institutions operating for private benefit may find itself subjected to the same coercive measures as the others. To avoid this the churches have but one weapon, namely, the gospel. From the Christian point of view the relation of church and state ought to be one of co-operation; that is to say, given a Christian political society, the relation between church and state would be one of co-operation. Unfortunately, as the result of our growing secularization in America, that relation is rapidly becoming one of mutual isolation. Whether this will ultimately develop into a relation of antagonism will depend in part upon how effectively the church can proclaim the gospel and thus prevent the total paganization of American political society.

C. D. B.

The Old, Old Story

IN THE attempt to perpetuate Calvinism we are, in a very real sense, presenting nothing that is new. Fundamentally, it is indeed an old, old story. So old, in fact, that it takes us all the way back to the original story of the creation and fall of man. And though the essence of that story is entirely the same, ever again a new generation arises, and to that generation the same old story must be brought home. To it the old must be presented so that it is alive and full of meaning. Therein lies the secret of the perpetuation of the Truth.

In the attempt to convey this old, old message it seems to me that studied effort must be made to find the proper mean between two extremes. That, by the way, strikes me as one of the things which characterize that very Calvinism itself for which we are seeking a continued vigorous life, namely a sanity of outlook which finds the truth as avoiding the extreme and therefore partial and one-sided view. It seems to me that it is incumbent upon us to do the same when it comes to the formal expression of what we say or write.

Always the Same

Remember now that I am discussing the formal side of the matter and not the content. Since there has been a rich and full history of Calvinism, a history in which sainted forebears wrestled heroically with the Truth, forebears with very keen and active minds, with hearts deeply humble and obedient to the Word, led into the riches of the Word by the Spirit, there has come in and through that history a definite conception and formulation of the Truth. That history which reveals the struggle for and the formulation of the Truth the modern adherent and advocate is called to know. As an heir to a great and rich inheritance he joyfully works himself into
it, and, even before that, has been led into it by his parents, teachers, pastors, and so appropriates to himself not only the content but the form also. There is a vast amount of it which becomes his, and he in turn again is striving to hand the torch on to the next generation. But therein lurks a danger. It is this, that the expression of the Truth by him always falls in the same mould. It is the same old story in exactly the same old way. The expression is fixed, stereotyped, and hackneyed. It sounds almost ritualistic. I am not thinking of definitions or the like, in which case the formulation is of necessity required in a very exact way. But when the form deals with other matters, and nonetheless repeats and repeats endlessly the same words in the same way, erelong it loses its effectiveness. To be sure, the hearer or reader may even repeat them verbatim, but it becomes a mere mouthing of shibboleths. The real meaning and significance is not grasped, and there is not a vital gripping of the soul. It has become a kind of historical faith and that is dead orthodoxy.

The Ever New

Let us now turn to the other danger. It is found in the other extreme. As the former keeps saying the same thing and always in the same words, the latter never says the same thing in the same words. That gives evidence of a lively, personal, individual understanding of the Truth, which in turn expresses itself in a fresh, interesting, and arresting way. But therein too is a real danger. Accepting that the hearer or reader is none too well informed about Calvinism, it needs little argument to prove that such a rich variety will not be conducive to clarity. Just because he does not see or grasp the fundamental truth involved, the multitude and richness of words will hardly give him understanding but rather will lead to confusion.

Thus the conclusion is that one must exercise himself to find a way between the extremes. Of necessity he will often feel compelled to say the same thing in the same way, but also he should strive to avoid mere repetition. Either extreme falls short of the objective of having the hearer or reader truly comprehend what is being said. And in so far it falls far short of really perpetuating the Truth. The whole matter was stated in the days of old Socrates. A smart young man who had not understood Socrates in the past and had been absent from Athens for a while, upon his return found Socrates still discoursing in the agora, and said, “I see you are still saying the same things about the same things.” “Yes,” said Socrates, “do you always say different things about the same thing?”

Ralph Stob

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**Capitalism and the Reformation**

**Introduction:**

**Weber's Thesis**

With the publication of his celebrated essay, *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,* in 1904-05, Max Weber introduced a subject which aroused an interest which extended far beyond the ranks of the historical specialists to whom it was originally presented. The interest has continued unabated, and discussions of Weber’s thesis still are lively some fifty years after its appearance.

The question to which Weber addresses himself in his essay is one dealing with the psychological conditions which made possible the development of the capitalistic civilization. Specifically, Weber seeks to trace out the connection between the psychological forces unleashed by the Protestant Reformation and the emergence of the capitalistic civiliza-

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1 First published in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,* Vol. 21 and 22, for 1904-05 and reprinted in 1929 as the first study in the series *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie.*

2 This introduction is included in the English translation of Weber’s essay.

conception of capitalism as "... an economic system, resting on the organization of legally-free wage earners, for the purpose of pecuniary profit, by the owner of capital or his agent." It is this economic system which has left its imprint on the whole of the society within which it finds itself.

Weber acknowledges that although "the development of economic rationalism is partly dependent on rational technique and law" it is at the same time determined by the ability and disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical conduct. When these types have been obstructed by spiritual obstacles, the development of rational economic conduct has also met serious inner resistance." In short, it was the removal of these spiritual obstacles as a result of the Protestant Reformation that brought into existence the capitalistic spirit and the capitalistic society peculiar to the Western world.

Much of the literature written on Weber's thesis has been of a critical nature. Unfortunately, some of the criticisms are irrelevant, for they fail to meet Weber on his own ground but rather set up "strawmen" as objects of criticism. To focus attention on what, precisely, Weber was attempting to expound in his essays, it seems pertinent to indicate what Weber was not trying to expound. A summary statement should suffice to make this clear. Weber was not trying to prove that the Protestant Reformation was the cause of the rise of capitalism. Weber himself makes this amply clear and one could do no better than to quote him on this point. "We have no intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as that the spirit of capitalism (in the provisional sense of the term explained above) could only have arisen as the result of certain effects of the Reformation, or even that capitalism as an economic system is a creation of the Reformation. In itself, the fact that certain important forms of capitalistic business organization are described in terms analogous to that of the human body. Each member has its own function; prayer, or defense, or..."

The idea of religion embracing all of human life was revealed in the medieval conception of society and in its doctrine of economic ethics. Society is described in terms analogous to that of the human body. "Society, like the human body, is an organism composed of different members. Each member has its own function; prayer, or defense, or merchandise, or tilling the soil. Each must receive the means suited to its station, and must claim no more. Within classes there must be equality; if one takes into his hand the living of two, his neighbor will go short. Between classes there must be inequality; for otherwise a class cannot perform its functions, or enjoy its right. Society was interpreted, in short, not as the expression of economic self-interest, but as held together by a system of mutual, though varying, obligations. Social well being exists, it was thought, in so far as each class performs its functions and enjoys the rights proportioned thereto."

Professor Tawney suggests that "there are four main attitudes which religious opinion may adopt toward the world of social institutions and economic relations. It may stand on one side in ascetic aloofness and regard them as in their very nature the sphere of unrighteousness, from which men may escape—from which, if they consider their souls, they will escape—but which they can conquer only by flight. It may take them for granted and ignore them, as matters of indifference belonging to a world with which religion has no concern; in all ages the prudence of looking problems boldly in the face and passing on has seemed too self-evident to require justification. It may throw itself into an agitation for some particular reform, for the removal of some crying scandal, for the promotion of some final revolution, which will inaugurate the reign of righteousness on earth. It may at once accept and criticize, tolerate and amend, welcome the gross world of human appetites, as the squalid scaffolding from amid which the life of the spirit must rise, and insist that this also is the material of the Kingdom of God." Each of these attitudes could be found in the Middle Ages, even as they are found today. It was the ascetic temper which predominated in the early Middle Ages, but the attitude which was most characteristic of the late Middle Ages was the fourth suggested above. Religion embraced all aspects of human life and "the Church in its wider sense is..."

The Medieval Background

If the religious outlook on economic matters identified with the Protestant Reformation made such a sharp break with that of the Middle Ages, it is essential that we see wherein these two differed.

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6 Forward to Weber's Protestant Ethic, p. 1 (c).
7 See pages 24 and 25 of the Protestant Ethic for Weber's discussion of these two aspects of economic rationalism.
10 Ibid., p. 27.
11 Tawney, op. cit., p. 35.
12 Ibid., pp. 27 and 29.
The medieval doctrine of economic ethics stems from the economic environment of the time. It is preeminently an ethic applicable to personal economic contact, for there was little of the impersonal, mechanical contact so characteristic of the highly specialized industrial society of today. For the medieval writers there were two basic assumptions upon which they built their structure: "1) economic interests are subordinated to the real business of life which is salvation and 2) economic conduct is one aspect of personal conduct, upon which as on other parts of it, the rules of morality are binding." Economic activity, unrelated to a moral end, finds no place in medieval theory. (Obviously, such activity did exist in practice!)

On every hand, economic activity is fenced in, for it must not interfere with the pilgrimage to eternal salvation. The acquisition of wealth is condoned to the extent that one's station in life requires it; further acquisition is greed, and greed is sin. Trade is legitimate but a dangerous business. Private property is a concession in a fallen world, but woe to the man who fails to consider the public benefit in its use. The greater the pecuniary interests in economic activity, the greater the danger in these activities. All economic activity must be measured by the yardstick of morality; justice is the concern of everyone.

The Impact of the Protestant Reformation

The beginning of the 16th century finds social theory permeated with doctrines drawn from the sphere of ethics and religion; but with the coming of the Protestant Reformation all of this changed, says Weber. No longer do we have the church crying out against the sin of avarice, but rather religion has consecrated money-making, and it becomes the chief aim of economic activity. Protestantism not only permitted practices not permitted by the Catholic church but positively turned religion to capitalistic ends, according to Weber. The chief instrument effecting this radical change was the doctrine of the calling. Citing Weber, we find that "the earning of money within the modern economic order is, so long as it is done legally, the result and the expression of virtue in a calling . . . And in truth this peculiar idea . . . of one's duty in a calling is what is most characteristic of the social ethic of capitalistic culture, and is in a sense the fundamental basis of it. It is an obligation which the individual is supposed to feel and does feel toward the content of his professional activity, no matter in what it consists, in particular no matter whether it appears on the surface as a utilization of his personal powers, or only of his material possessions (as capital). It is unmistakable that in the word calling a religious conception, that of a task set by God, is at least suggested."12

Luther, says Weber, believed that the fulfillment of worldly duties is under all circumstances the only way to live acceptably to God. Essentially this concept of the calling was traditionalistic, i.e., it was something which man has to accept as a divine ordinance and to which he must adapt himself.

The new and revolutionizing concept of calling came from Calvinism. Calvinism emerged in an environment where economic organization was relatively advanced, and it had to make terms with its practical necessities. "Early Calvinism had its own rule, and a rigorous rule, for the conduct of economic affairs. But it no longer suspects the world of economic motives as alien to the life of the spirit, or distrusts the capitalist as one who has necessarily grown rich on the misfortunes of his neighbor, or regards poverty as in itself meritorious, and it is perhaps the first systematic body of religious teaching which can be said to recognize and applaud the economic virtues."13

Having accepted economic activity as the legitimate domain of Christians, Calvinism stands on the side of the activities which were to be most characteristic of the future. And if, as Calvinists believe, each individual has been called to serve in some capacity within the structure of society, it is his duty to perform that duty to the very best of his ability. To succeed in one's calling was a sign of God's blessing and an assurance of salvation.14 According to Weber "the attainment (of wealth) was a sign of God's blessing. And even more important: the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of Capitalism."15 There, then, you have the great catalyst in the growth of capitalism, for no longer is the pursuit of wealth condemned, but rather condoned, and ultimately sanctified as the evidence of activity most pleasing to God.

A Critique of Weber's Thesis

And what is there to say of this thesis? There seems to be little doubt that its proponents were excessive in their claims while its opponents were equally, or more, excessive in their attempts to

111 Tawney, op. cit., p. 34.
12 Weber, op. cit., pp. 54 and 79.
13 Tawney, op. cit., p. 93.
15 Weber, op. cit., 112.
obiterate it. The middle ground seems the best to occupy.

To say that the change in attitude toward economic activities is peculiarly Protestant is an error of significance in Weber's development of his thesis. Both Hyma16 and Robertson17 lay much emphasis on the similarity, indeed, even on the precedence, of Catholic thought on economic matters with that of the early Protestants. Both of these works may be consulted for details; here it will suffice to cite only a few lines from these authors.

From Hyma we glean these statements. During the 14th and 15th centuries in Italy "the following factors were and still are the proper symptoms (of Catholicism), namely, the duty of working hard, as a form of penance and not as a means of making money; the desire to live frugally, and to save, in order to give alms to the poor or do anything else to better social conditions generally; the hallowing of one's vocation; and the belief that a Christian may acquire more of the world's goods than he needs for his own family" (p. 119). "The more is said about the problem of usury in the sixteenth century, the more certain it appears that Protestantism either was more conservative than Catholicism or else it merely accepted as proper what the civil governments had enacted. The duty of the Christian to labor as hard and as well as he can was recognized by the great Church Fathers and the medieval doctors" (pp. 122-123). "During the sixteenth century both Catholics and Catholics gladly sought justification for their beliefs and actions in the writings of Augustine" (p. 124).

Robertson has similar things to say about Catholic thought. "The Catholic Church had been moving towards the modern theory of interest in the latter part of the fifteenth century" (p. 133). "The Jesuits had introduced a greater degree of liberty in assuming individual opinions into the Catholic Church . . . than was to be found in the Reformed Churches" (p. 155). "The attempts at strict regulation of the economic life made by the Calvinistic churches were definite hindrances to capitalistic development and the spread of capitalistic ideas which formed a strong contrast to the comfortable and accommodating religion of the Jesuits" (p. 160). "As a rule the Calvinistic contribution to the capitalist spirit was the same as that of the Jansenists or stricter school of Catholics, consisting of the encouragement of industry, thrift, order and honesty; while the Jesuits went further and favoured enterprise, freedom of speculation and the expansion of trade as a social benefit. It would not be difficult to claim that the religion which favoured the spirit of capitalism was Jesuitry, not Calvinism" (p. 164). Certainly one would not take these evidences as conclusive, but they do indicate that the Weberian thesis does not necessarily hold exclusively to Protestants.18

The relationship between the Protestant Reformation and capitalism also may be questioned on another account, namely, on its presentation of the doctrine of the calling. For Weber the doctrine of the calling was interpreted to mean a sacrifice of self-indulgence and unremitting industry in one's calling, these being promoted to a religious exercise with success in one's calling being a visible sign of spiritual grace. How far from the doctrine as expounded by the early Reformers! It was precisely the converse of this that was taught. To the early reformers the concept of the calling was a doctrine to be employed on the side of conservatism; the advice of these reformers was always, "Be content in your calling." The calling was not an invitation to amass and continue to amass great wealth, but rather an invitation to live the orderly life ordained for one by God, and to perform all of the duties pertaining to it. "If (the calling) encouraged industry, it did so to a much smaller degree than it discouraged covetousness and ambition."19

Weber ascribes to the early reformers what is really a Puritan characteristic of some two centuries later. Basically the social theory of the Reformers was traditionalistic, for "apart from a few extremists, the first generation of reformers were rarely innovators in social theory, and quoted Fathers and church councils, decreets and canon lawyers."20 Professor Tawney goes on to make this very strong statement: "The practical implications of the social theory of the Middle Ages are stated more clearly in the 16th century than even in its zenith, because they are stated with the emphasis of a creed which is being menaced."21 Religion continued, theoretically, to have primacy over economic activity and social institutions, and if the Reformation released forces which burst the bonds of traditional religious thoughts on these matters, it did so incidentally and against the wishes of most reformers. It was after Protestantism had been submerged in a milieu of economic activity for a century and a half that the doctrine of the calling became perverted and acquisition per se accepted.

The basic conservatism of early Protestantism must have impressed Weber, for he makes no appeals from the writings of early reformers to substantiate his thesis. In fact, unbelievable as it may seem to a Calvinist, he takes the writings of deist Benjamin Franklin as the starting point of his analysis of the relation between Protestantism and capitalism. From Franklin's Advice To a Young Tradesman numerous quotes are taken which add up to the above citations from Hyma and Robertson are summary statements. The documentation of these statements can be found in the works from which they were taken.

Robertson, op. cit., p. 14. I am indebted particularly to Robertson's chapter on the Puritan concept of the calling for the above ideas.

20 Tawney, op. cit., p. 21.
21 Ibid., p. 62.

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to “Time is money” and “Honesty is the best policy.” Franklin’s strict avoidance of time—and money—wasting habits may have been typical fruits of his Puritan upbringing, but they had no religious significance to him.

In addition to Franklin, from whom Weber received much of his inspiration, other sources are cited by Weber to substantiate his thesis. Chief among these is Richard Baxter’s Christian Directory. In this work is found the same emphasis on not wasting time as is found in Franklin’s work, and repeated admonitions to work hard. “The Christian life, in short, must be systematic and organized, the work of an iron will and a cool intelligence.”

But, just as Weber uses the works of Baxter to support his thesis, the same works are used by the opponents of the thesis to prove it untenable. Instead of highlighting Baxter’s statements on time and work, Hyma and Robertson stress his emphasis on the dangers of accumulating wealth, the need of considering the public good above one’s own good, and the admonition to “choose that employment or calling (so far as you have your choice) in which you may be most serviceable to God.” The quotations from Baxter made by the critics of Weber do weaken considerably Weber’s assertion that the making of money was the reason for assiduous application to one’s calling. On the other hand, it is a fact that Baxter and his contemporaries, indeed all of Reformed persuasion since him, did stress the virtue of work and thrift and these are also precisely the cardinal virtues of capitalism.

The relationship between Protestantism and capitalism is best illustrated, so says Weber, in the Calvinistic branch of the Reformation. If this is true, the rise of capitalism should have been particularly rapid and pronounced in the countries which are most Calvinistic. The records indicate that this was not always the case. Specifically, the spread of Calvinism either did not coincide with a burst of economic activity or it coincided with a decline in economic activity in Hungary, Scotland, South Africa, France and the Netherlands.

The most flourishing period of Calvinist theology in Hungary was in the first half of the 17th century, but it was at the same time that Hungarian commerce, which flourished in the 16th century, was declining. Even the enthusiastic Calvinist, Professor Emeric Rıvzı of the University of Debrecen, admitted in his study of Calvinism that Calvinism could not help the economic life of Hungary.

In Scotland, which became thoroughly Calvinistic in the 17th century, economic development failed to keep pace with the spread of Calvinistic doctrine. “The economic history of Scotland does not very easily support the theory that Scots Calvinism was a doctrine which favored the rise of a capitalist organization of industry. During the whole of the seventeenth century, and for a large part of the eighteenth century, Scotland remained poor and backward.”

France and the Netherlands both show a similar lack of impact on economic activity by Calvinism. “It can easily be demonstrated that during the second half of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century, when Calvinism was at the height of its power in France, economic expansion, growth of sea power and colonial expansion was in abeyance. Only the coming to power of the great minister Colbert, after the Huguenots had been greatly weakened by Richelieu, that is, after 1660, did France finally return to its status of leadership attained previously in the thirteenth century.”

In the Netherlands Calvinism was the strongest in the Northern provinces, but here too we find a declining commercial and economic power, rather than growth, just when Calvinism is strongest. Finally, we fail to find evidence of the capitalistic spirit among the Calvinist farmers of South Africa. Indeed, they “have never lost the non-capitalistic outlook which early conditions of settlement made inevitable.”

Conclusion

In seeking an explanation of the causes of the rise of capitalism one would be in error if he made the Reformation the whole story, for there were numerous other contributing factors. To deny, or even to belittle, any contribution by the Protestant Reformation would be equally in error. The specific contributions of the Protestant Reformation are two: Individual responsibility and Perfectionism.

The Protestant religion has an “unmediated” character, that is, salvation is to be worked out by the individual, not through “the intermediary of priest or prescribed ritualistic works . . . . Protestantism, that is to say, represents private enterprise in religion, as opposed to the great organized collectivism of the Catholic Church.”

Protestantism was also an attempt to return to the perfection demanded in the Bible, not an attempt to achieve perfection by escaping from the world, like the earlier monastic reformations, but rather “an attempt to lead the life of Christian perfection (which means the exercising of perfect love. See I Corinthians 13.—my insert. VDB) in the work-

221 Robertson, op. cit., p. 99.
222 Hyma, op. cit., p. 159.
223 Robertson, op. cit., p. 176.
224 For a discussion of some of these factors see Robertson, op. cit.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
Education and Woman’s Welfare in an Industrial Society

When Milton was writing his Paradise Lost in the middle of the seventeenth century he felt no hesitancy to analyze woman according to a set pattern of psychology that had been accepted since Eve first appeared on the scene. With his imaginative insight he daringly discussed the secrets of womanhood, undisturbed by militant feminists or by scientific psycho-analysts. He simply generalized on his observations and his particular experience with Mary Powell, his obstreperous, young, Royalist wife, and drew the picture of Eve. Before the fall the two sexes each reveal a distinct aspect of the image of God.

for in their look divine
The image of their glorious maker shone,
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure—Severe, but in true filial freedom placed,
Whence true authority in men: though both
Not equal, as their sex not equal seemed;
For contemplation he and valour formed,
For softness she and sweet attractive grace;
He for God only, she for God in him.
His fair large front and eye sublime declared
Absolute rule—
She as a veil down to the slender waist,
Her unadorned golden tresses wore
Dishevelled, but in wanton ringlets waved
As the vine curls her tendrils—which implied
Subjection, but required with gentle sway,
And by her yielded, by him best received
Yielded, with coy submission, modest pride,
And sweet, reluctant, amorous delay.

Milton gave to the two sexes a distinctive physique, a distinctive psychology, a distinctive function and a distinctive intellect all joined in one purpose: to praise God, to grow in the uniqueness of their abilities and to complete each other. That Eve was proud of her position of dependency on Adam is indicated in her speech to Adam in their evening colloquy when Adam thinks they ought to get some sleep:

“My author and disposer, what thou bidd’st
Unsign’d I obey, So God ordains:
God is thy law, thou mine: to know no more
Is woman’s happiest knowledge, and her praise.
With thee conversing, I forget all time.”

But sin enters the world and in place of the mutual trust and admiration we get recrimination, spiteful name-calling, and buck-passing; Adam lashes out at Eve

Out of my sight, thou Serpent! That name best
Befits thee, with him leagued, thyself as false
And hateful; nothing wants, but that thy shape
Like his, and colour serpentine, may show
Thy inward fraud, to warn all creatures from thee
Henceforth, lest that too heavenly form, pretended
To hellish falsehood, snare them. But for thee
I had persisted happy, had not thy pride
And wandering vanity, when least was safe,
Rejected my forewarning, and disdain’d
Not to be trusted—longing to be seen,
Though by the devil himself; him overweaning
To overreach; but, with the Serpent meeting,
Pooled and beguiled; by him thou, I by thee,
To trust thee from my side, imagined wise,
Creator wise,—not fill the world at once
With men as Angels, without femininity,
Or find some other way to generate mankind?

Gradually Adam is restored to some degree of intellectual honesty and before long he admits his own guilt; the memory of his first love and his essential chivalry come back to mind and he accepts the overtures of a penitent Eve. Not until this admission of mutual guilt is there reconciliation and repentance, and man and woman together are able to face a world in which man shall find thorns and thistles and woman shall bring forth children in pain and in sorrow. In this spirit of mutual guilt and yet mutual dependency the two “hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow” leave the bliss of Eden.

Whether this projection of a seventeenth century mind into the mysteries of history’s first recorded mistake is the only interpretation compatible with the Biblical narrative is difficult to say. The facts in the Scripture are not supported by a dramatist’s insight into the motives of human conduct. There is disobedience and there is penitence in the Bible story; but there is no psycho-analysis of desire and of guilt.
If there is this continuity in history that permits Milton to superimpose his seventeenth century views of women on the first woman without serious anachronism, it is interesting to conjecture what a surprise would be in store for him if he could foresee the twentieth century. Not only has woman become emancipated; she has become a mighty conqueror. Her presence is felt, seen, and heard in every activity known to man. Every closed gate has served but as an invitation to assault by organized feminist bands who ruthlessly destroy every barrier behind which the non-plussed male may take refuge. She can vote, hold office, make or break a nation; she can take any job, claim equal pay, hold her own in industrial production; she can study for any profession, dictate styles for any commodity, drink at any bar; her attractive figure can make or ruin any magazine; she can begin or end a war or do about anything she has a mind to do in this world of ours.

I

What has produced this marked change in position and attitude that is apparent when one compares the mid-twentieth with even so late a century as the mid-nineteenth? There have evidently been conscious and unconscious forces in history that will explain this reversal in woman’s status. That the industrial order under capitalist control is one factor is obvious. The machine is no respecter of persons or of privilege. It thrives on manual skills, cheap labor, docile workers and an ever expanding market. Woman has been exploited to lower the cost of production and to increase the demand for the goods produced. A high standard of living may become so costly that women are forced to add their earnings to those of the husband to maintain a balanced budget. When this point is reached, industry can force its female customers back into the cycle of production, marketing, consuming. The woman must take a job with industry in order to buy the things industry wants to sell her. As families retreat from the farm, the home becomes a place to spend rather than to earn wealth. The woman has no economic function to fulfill in the home such as she had on the farm, and she will turn to a job as an outlet for her energies. In 1946 industry in the U. S. employed 16.5 million women, 30 per cent of the peace time jobs in industry. That this is not limited to any particular type of job is shown by the fact that in the 1940 census 451 occupations were listed of which only 9 had no women employees.

The twentieth century also manifests a changing concept of the nature and function of the family. The working women are no longer the unmarried, widowed or divorced ones. The most rapid increase of employment has taken place in urban homes where mothers have gone to work after the youngest child has started school. This increase has been fairly constant regardless of the increased demand for laborers during the two periods of all-out production for victory. The money evidently meant more than the victory because the employed woman continued her job if the job remained open after the armistice. Even the increased opportunities for additional schooling have not retarded the increase of job-hunters sufficiently to offset the trend for the girl to seek a job outside the house. The burdens of the mother too have been lightened by the decline in the size of the family. Urban fathers and mothers have an average of one and one-half children apiece as compared with two and one-half for their grandparents. The fact that babies come earlier in the post-war period is no proof as yet that there will be more of them in the total size of the family. If anything, these young mothers will be through with child bearing at a younger age and will be more likely to take on jobs when the children are in school.

With the increased opportunity for employment has come a change in status or prestige for the working woman. Economic independence is a great prop to prestige. Motherhood has its charm but women do not look with pity at the career woman who “never had a chance.” The sense of achieving equality with man does something to the ego that compensates to some degree for the admission that she never bore any of his children. This desire for professional recognition is strong enough among many mothers to have them place their children in nursery schools and country-day schools which will make it possible for the mothers to carry on their careers.

Woman has been given equal status with men in suffrage. As the number of women employed increases, the demands for privilege and protective legislation will increase. The participation of women in government has increased immensely since 1920 when they were given equal suffrage. Women now hold important elective and appointive offices in state and nation. They are given equal status in labor unions and before long they will be voting at the congregational meetings of the Christian Reformed Church. During the last war, women insisted that service units corresponding to those for men be set up with full military protocol. They could be grease-monkeys or majors; they were in the air, on the land and on the sea.

All of these changes toward complete equality were promoted by powerful women’s organizations and feminist movements. First the feminist movement worked for 50 years to obtain equal suffrage rights; then it sought to eradicate all discriminating legislation; it sought to establish equality of educational opportunity and to protect women from unscrupulous exploitation. Since 1923 the National Woman’s Party has sought to enact a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equality of rights under state and national law. The party lists 1,101 statutes
in 48 states that still involve discrimination. The General Federation of Women's Clubs, claiming two and one-half million members, represents the upper class of intellectual and professional women who in theory oppose all special protective legislation for women, contrary to the expressed interests of a number of women in industry. Opposing the adoption of the amendment were the American Association of University Women, the League of Women Voters, the Young Women's Christian Association, The National Council of Catholic Women, the National Council of Jewish Women, the National Women's Trade Union League and some twenty-six other trade union groups.

The feminist movement under the direction of such leaders as Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Ida Husted Harper, Lucy Stone, Carrie Nation, and Carrie Chapman Catt carried the fight for equality of suffrage through to its triumph in 1920. Their thinking about the nature of women was based upon a strong prejudice against all marks of political, social, and intellectual inferiority. They were not governed by psycho-analytical theories concerning a weaker sex, nor were they inclined to accept any differentiation of psychology. Their drive to power could be compromised by nature if they should be overly concerned with the question of happiness. The ideas of John Milton were thoroughly repugnant to them. Man had long held woman in subjection and all his theories about differentiation of sex were only rationalizations to justify his conceit, so they said.

"Close, close he bound her, that she should leave him never; Weak still he kept her, lest she be strong to flee; And the fainting flame of passion be kept alive forever With all the arts and forces of earth and sky and sea"

Mrs. Gilman in "The Forerunner"

All their thinking was couched in a fallacy: that equality must be expressed as identity with the exception of biological function. They argued that works written by men in the area of sociology were always colored by the masculine conceit. Most of the historians were men and wrote history from a man's point of view. The desire for political and social recognition was still stronger than the desire for sexual gratification, and the impact of such civic and social emancipation upon the morals and mores of society was not anticipated. To speak of basic laws a defense for his sweet sense of superiority. Their drive to power could be compromised by nature if they should be overly concerned with the question of happiness. The ideas of John Milton were thoroughly repugnant to them. Man had long held woman in subjection and all his theories about differentiation of sex were only rationalizations to justify his conceit, so they said.

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II

All these changes, if wisely directed for the improvement of the human race, particularly the female half, should spell out an assurance of happiness, a great sense of achievement, and a secure position in the social order for the women. In the more enlightened milieu of the United States where she has experienced the least resistance to these innovations she should be most assured of her happiness. But when we speak of happiness we are shifting ground from education, earning power, social recognition, and equality of suffrage to an inner citadel that may defy all the attacks of the feminists. It is the psycho-analyst who has questioned all the progressive acts by which women have acquired freedom and equality in terms of their ultimate end. Perhaps he came to the kingdom for just such a day as this. Like Esther of old he may have to risk his profession and his prestige to save woman from herself, from the suppressive male, from the misdirected efforts of her own leaders, and from the blind educationists who sold her short.

Here is the testimony of a psychiatrist practicing in the New York Psychiatric Institute, Dr. Marynia Farnham, M.D., coauthor of the book Modern Woman: The Lost Sex, 1947. She is one of the contributors to the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science for May, 1947, an issue given over entirely to the subject of women's opportunities and responsibilities. Her article is entitled "Battles Won and Lost."

In achieving equality, the methods chosen were those of emulation and imitation . . . . Identification is a process of coming to feel like and with another individual. Men, as representing maleness, are as much the result of biologic and social evolution as women representing femaleness. Therefore the possibility of identification as the instrumentality of women's accomplishment of their goals
is strictly limited. They are left with imitation. This latter
process can be used only in relation to exteriors — what is
seen. It is demonstrably impossible to imitate feelings,
since the facilities are lacking to know them . . .

They have achieved their aimed-for equality in most,
if not all the spheres of their determination, and it would
appear that the time has come for re-evaluation of the
consequences of their achievements. Their undertakings
were avowedly in pursuit of happiness: discontent and the
conviction of oppression had been the breeding ground of
their revolt. Therefore the question to be answered in at-
tempts to any evaluation in, to what extent have women
enhanced their happiness through their achievements? If
they have not done so, to what can be ascribed their fail-
ures?

The evidences of enhanced happiness appear to be diffi-
cult to find. All the reliable indices and available social
measurements point to a decided and conspicuous trend in
the opposite direction. It is not to be denied that many of
these indices apply as cogently to men as to women, and in
fact we may find that, in general, the index of personal
happiness in modern culture has diminished rather than
increased. Making allowances for that, however, we can
point to some very conspicuous testimonials to the fact that
women particularly are suffering from some severe dis-
turbances in their adaptations. These disturbances are re-
lected in results which are statistically measurable as well
as directly observable.

The evidence for serious disturbance among wom-
en is all about us. It is evident that to win the
prestige which her economic and social independ-
ence has given her she is paying a long price for
this prestige in terms of human happiness. Though
by nature she demands security and relaxation, by
choice she has entered a competitive field in which
drive, self-assertiveness and aggression are the
means to success. For a glamorous existence she
has violated her deepest needs. The divorce rate
keeps climbing. Since 1867 the divorce rate has in-
creased five times as fast as marriage in proportion
to married population. The rate has increased over
marriage 30 percent each decade. At that rate by
1965, 51 percent of our marriages will end in divorce.
Despite all the opportunities society offers in educa-
tion and recreation for children, juvenile delin-
quency is increasing. Behind most delinquency
there is a mother who failed in her parental duties,
one who failed to provide an atmosphere of love in
the home. The tests for the armed services show
an alarming number of people psychologically
maladjusted to a point where they are incapacitated
for military service. Modern literature and art is
a testimony to the ubiquitous frustrated female suf-
f ering mental and psychical anguish from sexual or
spiritual aberrations. Despite the fact that there is
increasing sexual promiscuity outside of wedlock
for both sexes, neither the unmarried nor the mar-
rried have found it a solution to their frustrations.

The rage among men for pin-up girls, sentimental
movies, girlie shows, salacious advertising portraying
curvaceous sirens, and sexy magazines shows
distorted concepts of sexual gratification. On the
other hand the women drool over soap opera and
melodramatic fiction to get vicarious romance and the
security of love. The high incidence of nervous
disorders, psychoses, emotional illnesses that fill
our institutions and keeps society building more and
more hospitals is evidence of an unwholesome state.

The emancipated woman tries to assert her inde-
pendence by vulgar exhibitionism in smoking, drink-
ing, swearing, and immodesty of dress—all com-
penations, the Freudian would say, for a haunting
feeling of insecurity and of an empty heart. In
many cases she is totally unwilling to assume mother-
hood and often becomes sexually cold and ulti-
ately barren.

In light of evidence, all statistically corroborated,
is it a wonder that Dr. Farnham concludes, “Unless
an individual is placed in an environment in which
she can function with some chance of satisfaction
which can secure inner happiness, her preoccupation
with herself, her frustrations and resultant hos-
tilities will prevent her from functioning properly
in the body social.”

III

There are three twentieth century forces that
have tried to cope with the problem on a broad
scale, broad enough to make for improvement in
the adaptation of the woman to her environment.
The first is Catholicism. Every papal encyclical on
the social and political life has warned against the
price women will have to pay for this freedom.
They have insisted on a distinct psychology, have
forbidden birth control, have encouraged mother-
hood, have resisted divorce, have established girls
colleges and high schools with distinctive programs
for women, have boycotted immoral movies, books
and stage productions, have discouraged careers for
women. The Catholics have given women a philo-
sophy of life that permits them to be respected for
fulfilling their unique function to society. Though
men and women are equal in their salvation, in their
eternal destiny, and in their respect for the judg-
ments of God, they are different manifestations of
the image of God. The universal motherhood that
the nun espouses is the only adequate substitute for
the satisfaction of holy marriage. Says Clara Booth
Luce, now a Catholic with a considerable career
behind her in theatre and in politics, “I think that
women’s active participation—at a career level—in
politics, except in cases of unmarried women,
widows with grown children, or in certain other
rare circumstances, should be marginal . . . . This
does not apply to voting or community participation
in good government. But it does apply where wom-
en leave home to run for political office.”

The second attempt was fascism under Hitler and
Mussolini. Says Professor Maria Costallani, the
spokesman for Mussolini, “Fascism recognizes wom-
en as a part of the life force of the country, laying
down a division of duties between the two sexes,
without putting obstacles in the way of those wom-
en who by their intellectual gifts can reach the
highest positions.” Hitler thought only of exploit-
ing women for his military and political purposes.
but he did instill a loyalty toward a new program
that enlisted the full capacities of womanhood.
They set the pace for the sacrifices demanded from all. Women orators attacked the old feminism and dedicated themselves to the cultivation of a super race of warriors. Girls upon reaching puberty were put into youth camps for breeding. The huge Nordic Gertrude Scholtz Klink became the lady Führer who regimented the lives of the women down to the smallest detail supported by 50,000 zealous Nazi women, the Frauenchaft.

The third attempt is that of Russia today where women are sought to carry the burdens with the men. Stalin gives equal recognition to women in Soviet politics. Women are given protective labor legislation: they are rewarded for childbearing. Marriage has been restored to protect the home. Organizers are women if they have the capacity. Wanda Wasilewska is the leading communist in Poland, former editor of a communist newspaper in Moscow. Anne Pauker, though now relieved, was the leading communist in Rumania. Mrs. Mao Tse Tung is highly influential in communist China. All these attempts may look highly reactionary to us but the point is they are an organized attempt to find a new role for women in the social order. To them the capitalist order is the enemy of woman’s welfare.

These three attempts are all coercive and authoritarian—to them the American woman will make very little response. In fact, she is likely to become more determined than ever to follow an opposite course, if she recognizes the insidious male-dominated and dictated program. The American turns to education as the means by which all wrongs can be righted. It remains to be seen in how far education has been able to cope with the problem and to what extent education could possibly address itself to the problem if it were consciously directed toward a solution. It will not be necessary to examine elementary and high schools for they have given but little thought to sex variation in their programs. Even in separate girl-schools and boy-schools, little effort is being made to find a distinctive program geared to future needs. It is at the college level that there has been an uneasy suspicion that our programs do not meet the particular needs of the girl graduate. There are three types of college education open to the girls today: The traditional, liberal arts program such as is given at Calvin and Hope, a feminist-directed liberal arts program such as is common to the women’s colleges of the East, and an experimental program based upon recent social research. This last program can be found at Stephen’s College, Bennington, Sarah Lawrence, Mills College and the University of Illinois.

IV

There are two kinds of evidence to show the failure of the usual four-year college program to contribute to the happiness of their women graduates in making the necessary adaptations to the serious business of living in our modern industrial society. The first is the honest confession of intelligent female critics and the second is the facts and figures that have been gathered by scientific research.

Pearl Buck is very critical in America’s Medieval Women. She writes, “To educate women, therefore, to think so that they need the personal fulfillment of activity and participation in all parts of life is acute cruelty, for they are not allowed this fulfillment. As a result she is unhappy and her children are deprived of the sunshine of her gayety ...”

“If the intelligent woman obeys the voice of tradition and limits herself to the traditional four walls, she joins the vast ranks of the nervous, restless, average American women whose whimsies torture their families, who spoil the good name of all women because they are often flighty, unreliable, without good judgment in affairs and given to self-pity.” A young mother, a college graduate, replies in a questionnaire: “I have come to realize that I was educated to be a successful man and now I must learn by myself to be a successful woman.”

Dorothy Thompson writes as follows in an editorial in the Ladies Home Journal:

But part of the curse of modern women is that they apparently admire in woman what is actually at variance with their own natures, considering the unnatural to be the “advanced” and “superior.” They still, I am convinced, have the unconscious sense of inferiority of a long-suppressed race. They do not assert their own experience, affirm their own instincts, believe in their own wisdom, or struggle for their own values. And therefore they do not release for society the unique power which is in them....

As I look back on my life and work, furthermore, I find that events have proved me oftenest right when I permitted myself to follow immediate, powerful, and thoroughly feminine hunches and then submit them to intellectual analysis.

Women will, I think, have fulfilled the woman’s revolution when they are not only equal in external status, but when they dare to be equal in real power—when they are not only equal in external status, but when their deeds are not only equal in real power. It is the power generated in their wombs, their nerves, their maternal experiences, and not only in their heads. Then they will contribute to bring humanity into equilibrium, which is harmony and peace.

Now for a few facts based upon statistical studies conducted by Time and by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company: “The native white woman with four years at college has less likelihood of getting married than her stay-at-home or employed sister. In 1947 the year of the post-war altar rush 87 out of 100 of the non-college eligibles were being married and of the college women only 69 out of 100. Of the college graduates, 35% of the women are not married by the time they pass the 50 year mark and 8% of the non-college women.”

The women who had graduated from college were producing one and one-fourth children per mother; Forty-five percent were failing to replace themselves by the necessary two for husband and wife. To judge the number that have achieved a fair degree of success in life the Time study set up a scale of 7 points to measure achievement. Such points as “still living with first spouse,” “own your own home,” “have three children,” “satisfied with your career,” etc.
were used. Twenty-three percent of the male graduates over 40 scored a perfect 7 but only 12 percent of the female graduates. At the other end of the scale 6 percent of the men had failed to achieve even a 2 point success whereas 34 percent of the women graduates fell in this class.

It becomes quite evident that in a capitalist society where women hold 70 percent of the fluid capital, where they are faced with a life expectancy seven years longer than that of the male, where woman has educational opportunities equal to the men, where any number of careers are open to her, she is still in a sorry plight and the rest of the social order is bound to suffer with her. On the other hand she is endowed with the capacities to save capitalism from its own faults. Man in his desire to achieve in a competitive society may become so deeply absorbed in creating wealth that he is blind to the finer values that give significance to life. These are the values that are fostered through art, religion, love, sacrifice, child nurture, and domestic peace. When men become blind to the ends for which wealth is produced, woman may yet retain her interest in persons and happiness. Her biological function is to share life, to protect life, to want the protection against forces that may destroy her family. She spends most of her time with non-consumable values when she lives for her husband and her children. When she is diverted from these goals she testifies to her failure by wasted afternoons at bridge games, movies, or gossip parties. These substitutes offer no satisfaction. No matinee is equivalent to the joy that should be the mother's in the children's return from school; no finery of dress is the equivalent of a zestful, life-giving body which loves and is loved. It takes a Willa Cather to put this type of joy back in good taste in a literature sniveling with frustrated heroines.

V

What shall be included in a program of college education suited to the needs of women who are likely to spend the first twenty-five years of married life on cooking, cleaning and children. The woman must train for active participation in twentieth century society and for this she will need the same broad non-professional general education that the liberal arts college demands of the men. Perhaps about 60 hours out of the 120 required for an A.B. degree should be given over to this grounding in academic subjects. The remaining 60 hours should be just as carefully directed to the specialized life needs of the woman as the major's courses are for the training of the man. To offer a woman courses in education and school-room techniques is no fair substitution for the pre-law, pre-medic, or pre-seminary program offered to the man. When we think of a course for women we should not think of a course in home economics as being the first essential for charming femininity. Let us assume that most women graduating from college can read a cook book. Nor should it be our concern to train woman for paying jobs and thereby entice them away from the duties that are rightfully theirs.

The woman should take a series of courses centering around the family and taught by those who can understand feminine psychology. Around the core of the family we can readily group such respectable studies as Woman's Role in History, The Family in Various Cultures, Anthropology, Heredity, Courtship and Marriage, Social Problems, Child Training, Consumer Economic Investment, Family Recreation, Religion in the Home, Care of the Sick. Dr. Paul Popeneo, director of American Institute of Family Relations, states that in 80 percent of the cases seeking divorce, the marriage difficulties can be ironed out by counseling, if it comes early enough; in fact, he recommends pre-marital counseling to insure a fair degree of mental happiness.

Another group of studies can be centered around the cultivation of personal health, hygiene and happiness. The satisfaction of homemaking in which the taste of the woman is brought to full expression is a delight to which girls should be introduced in their college years. Interior and exterior decorating, gardening, music, literature, charm in conversation, responsibilities of leadership in church and community, grooming, house planning, table service, diets—all these are worthy of serious study to the woman who wishes to make her home her career.

We have failed in our educational program thus far because we have had no regard for the uniqueness of the image of God as it is expressed in women. By putting the woman against the man in activities that disregard her uniqueness, we have created an attitude suggesting that she can have more prestige in a career than she can in homemaking. Thus she leaves college with a false set of values for the life she is to enter.

It has been proved by the psychologists that there is a direct correlation between attitude and accomplishment. To create in the college girl an attitude that motherhood is her highest self-expression will decrease the number of childless homes among the college graduates. When once we have agreed that equality of worth is not to be confused with identity of function, we may get fewer shrews and termagants at home and fewer "old-maid school-marms" to foist upon our children. For woman to seek for equality of achievement in areas where she is essentially handicapped leads to frustration and failure and a smarting unconfessed sense of inferiority. This is the tension under which many of our career women must work and it is no wonder that the incidence of neuroticism continues to climb.
SCRIPTURE records many tragedies. Not all are of the same scope. Nor do they all have the same significance. Some are described in greater detail; others are compressed into a few verses.

One of the latter is swiftly-told in the last verses of I Samuel 4. In fact these few verses recite a number of tragical events. And there is wide variation in the scope of their tragical consequences. In quick succession there is the description of an impending national calamity, the announcement of a military debacle, the revelation of a religious fiasco, the death notices of several people: two ecclesiastics fatally wounded in battle, a religious leader tumbled to his death, and a pregnant mother dying of news-shock, besides the announcement of a newborn child saddled for its lifetime with a name that characterized the entire episode.

Like every tragedy, this one too does not stand isolated. It is related not merely chronologically but internally or causally to many others events. Human living is that way. Thus, for instance, the causating events leading to this compound tragedy do not even stop with this episode. The ear-tingling predictions the Lord made to Samuel concerning the house of Eli are re-echoed in another tragedy some eighteen chapters later when at King Saul’s command the priest Ahimelech, nephew of the orphaned Ichabod, was killed—he and all his family (except a single son, Abiathar, who slipped away to David), and eighty-four other wearers of the linen ephod, besides all the other inhabitants of the city of Nob, both young and old, male and female, human and animal.

So too, the tragedy leading to the pre-mature birth of Ichabod does not stand as an isolated episode in the doings of ancient Israel. The contributing factors are clearly detailed in the preceding passages. Some of the details recorded by Samuel help to blunt the sharp feelings aroused by the multiple tragic endings: the two husbands reaped the reward of their profligate living, their father suffered but the final consequences of his paternal laxness, and Israel’s glory eclipsed because of its continued gross transgressions. But there is another factor that makes the tragedy more piercing: the expectant mother shocked into child-delivery and then dying brokenheartedly, not because of her doings but as a consequence of the actions of others.

It is this last feature which seems to make the tragedy so heart-searing. A child-laden wife shocked to death by the announcement of three catastrophes—none of these the result of her direct doing, but each the direct results of the doings of others. “Death by Social Consequences,” could well be the epitaph on her grave-marker.

Though in this case the effect is startling and sad, each of us both actively and passively is continually in similar situations. Our actions too have social consequences. Inevitably so. Designedly or otherwise; with our acquiescence or without it. Each of us is inescapably involved in social contexts. Guardedly or unguardedly we influence the lives of others and are influenced by their lives in many more ways than we are conscious of or purpose to do or be. In short, no matter how much we at times may wish it otherwise, we simply do not live by ourselves. We do not live only our own lives, exclusively so. Our doings inevitably affect others.

Nor is this at all strange. Holy Writ clearly indicates that it is part of our very nature to be social, that is, to have dealings with, to influence and to be influenced by fellow beings. We simply cannot become actually what we potentially are, if we do not exercise and reflect also this aspect of the Divine image. In this matter too there is a real, an inner relationship, though separated by thousands of years in time, between what God said about the first Adam: “It is not good for man to be alone” and what the Second Adam said in that most tragic utterance in the universe's greatest tragedy on Calvary's mound when the soul rending agony of utter loneliness pressed forth the cry, “My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?” Loneliness is totally alien to the human soul.

Holy Writ is likewise shot through with intimations that our actions and words have social consequences as well as personal ones. The “fruits” by which we are known include also the fruit our own doings produced in the lives of others. Our acts follow us not only as so many bits of information to which others or even our own memories can refer, but they follow us by insinuating themselves into the very lives of others. Much of what we do and say somehow and someway molds the living-shape of others. We do not always know which of our sayings and doings will be socially effective, nor can we always tell who will be affected, nor how. But it is a fact that none of us escape being ineffective or unaffected socially.

A brief message presented in the faculty conducted chapel "hour" at Calvin College.

THE CALVIN FORUM * * * APRIL, 1953
The daily practices of Hophni and Phineas finally issued in a cataclysmic crash of tragic social consequences. By contrast, the daily practices of the early Christians also wrought a revolution freighted with social consequences. Of them it was said that “They turn the world upside down!” And the context is clear that this was done not merely by what they said but by what they did. Even hostile observers were sufficiently influenced by the daily doings of those early Christians that they reported, “See how they love one another!” What is the main thrust of the influence that our daily doings and sayings have on others? It is not a question of whether—it is inevitable that there are and will be social consequences—it is only a question of what kind.

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From Our Correspondents

FROM THE NETHERLANDS
Cliostraat 21,
Amsterdam-Zuid
The Netherlands
February 16, 1953

Dear Friends,
In every paper and in every broadcast one could hear mention of the Netherlands these past two weeks. For the terrible catastrophe of February 1st has been the subject of innumerable people’s interest, and it still is perhaps. It is not my intention to tell you some more news about it, but I do want to tell you that we are very grateful for all the spontaneous help and the sincere sympathy which we have received from all parts of the world. Many of your American soldiers came over from Germany and have saved a great number of people. The iron curtain kept Russia’s feelings hidden from us. At least we did not hear anything from that nation until now. Why? Nobody can tell. About two thousand people were drowned in the turbulent waves and still an unknown number of people have not been found. “And also much cattle.” Of these last words written in the book of Jonah considerable use is made in the new communications about the catastrophe. God’s mercy with Nineveh was great; therefore these cattle were mentioned in the book of Jonah. But was not God’s mercy with the Netherlands great? And particularly with those parts of the Netherlands which have suffered so terribly during the war and had recently been reconstructed? This is the question that puzzles us continuously. We are confronted with the terrible reality, of which we would like to have some account from God. Last Sunday we had a day of national mourning, and in many churches Psalm 77 was read. My own sermon was taken from Psalm 68:22-a: “I will bring (my people) again from the depths of the sea.”

Since the “Flood of Saint Elisabeth” of November 18, 1481, when seventy-two villages disappeared and about 100,000 people were drowned, there has not been such a tremendous flood, and therefore there has not been such an immediate need to realize what these words do mean. By means of such Psalms we receive some indication of God’s purpose.

We express the hope that every reader who has not suffered from storm and flood will thank God for this and that he will pray also for those who have lost family, relatives, and possessions!

Thanking you all again for your sympathy and help, I remain
Sincerely yours,

Pieter Prins, D.D.
AN OUTSTANDING BOOK

De Zonde Van Jan der Kindere. By Klaas J. Popma.
208 pages. 5.40 florins.

THIS is a first novel by Dr. K. J Popma, professor of Calvinistic Philosophy in the University of Groningen, Netherlands. The author has made a name for himself by several significant works on general, historical, and literary philosophy; by poems and literary essays; and by books and articles even of a theological nature which have aroused a good deal of interest since they refer to the relation of general and particular revelation, and of theology and philosophy. This erudite and exact scholar has recently drawn the attention of Christian, Catholic, and liberal philosophers by an article in which he defends the scientific character of a work on the pre-Socratic philosophers (History of Philosophy, Vol. I) by Professor Vollegenhoven of the Free University of Amsterdam. He has accomplished this defense in such an able and objective way that two mixed groups, though dominated by liberals, have made him respectively a member of the Dutch Society for Philosophy, and of the Dutch Society for the Philosophy of Law. And finally he has surprised the Dutch public with an exceptional Christian novel which has already won its laurels among friends and foes, thereby illustrating anew that Calvinism is not an enemy of art, as many small-minded humanists of the last century have tried to make us believe.

The theme of this novel is very original, for it relates the development of the romantic love of a step-brother and sister who imagine themselves to be blood relatives. When the children come to the age of discretion they are not fully aware of the implications of their mutual love. The young man later marries a beautiful and kindhearted maiden, and his so-called sister chooses to remain single. When the young couple are afflicted with the care of a "Mongolian" child, and the mother at last has to find recuperation in the home of her mother-in-law, the sister takes upon herself to attend to the unfortunate little girl. Then the platonic lovers begin to realize that there is something unnatural and even sinful in their relation, but the woman is not cured of her passion till she is on her deathbed, and the man cannot conquer his heart till his pitiable offspring has died in a sanatorium. Meanwhile the "brother" and "sister" fight the good and sincere fight against their wrong inclinations by the means at their disposal — prayer and comfort from Scripture — and by the magnificent aim of the wife and of a young minister who is deeply in love with the "sister." The story, then, is a real tragedy, but the struggle of the soul is heroically carried out by all four in a superlative Christian fashion, and thus has excited the admiration and sympathy not only of true believers, but even of several humanists who through God's common grace have not lost their sense of religion and decency. The problem is real, the development natural, the divine aid supernatural, the human restraint miraculous but not improbable, and the outcome both predictable and unpredictable. As an analysis of Christian suffering under a heavy cross, the story is a jewel. It is the victory of faith over anxiety. From the viewpoint of psychology as well as from that of Christian religion the book is a masterpiece. It keeps the reader spellbound until the end because of its profound tensions and its sincere solutions. It is a genuine document of human tragedy, and yet it keeps the flame of real hope alive through the wonderful power of simple Christian faith.

So much for the content and spirit of the novel, which elements are after all the basic and final aspects of all art.

As to its artistic structure and style the author naturally tries to be as sober as possible. In a work of such a tragic nature one expects only a sprinkling of humor, a touch of adventure, and a limited number of characters. The reader, developing reverence for the characters as well as for the author, expects conciseness, direct and exact language, clean and delicate imagery, simple and short sentences, abbreviated paragraphs and chapters, and in everything a reserve which is entirely proper. Still the story is not monotonous and depressing; the style is not choppy, or flighty. The vitality of style and structure competes with the vitality of sentiment and faith. This novel must have been written under the impact of post-war misery — social and economic, psychological and religious, cultural and moral. No period of prosperity could have produced such optimism, enthusiasm, and profundity of childlike faith.

The author made the most of his time, his experience, his talent, and his Christianity. We can only wish for another novel of such sincerity and ability, another with perhaps a smaller measure of adversity and a larger measure of humor and brilliance. But, of course, this will depend on the history of the times. And — there can be no turn in history unless there is a return of mankind to God.

Henry J. Van Andel
Calvin College

INTRODUCING DR. BERKOUWER IN TRANSLATION


DR. BERKOUWER introduces this work with an analysis of the "Crisis of the Providence Doctrine."

We are shown that the crisis is most particularly a twentieth century problem. The optimistic eighteenth and nineteenth centuries found the doctrines of Substitution and Satisfaction particularly repugnant. The doctrine of Providence, however, could pass, especially if a beneficent Providence was considered. To be sure, there were dissenting voices in the face of isolated catastrophic events. Yet it was felt that men were co-workers in the ascent of evolution. Providence was lending a hand.

The church, of course, could not adopt the nomenclature of Darwin. It busied itself with talk of fulfilment and purpose. Purpose was the catchword of the optimism of the nineteenth century. God was leading the world to His own beneficent ends.

But ours is a century of crisis phenomena. We have seen depressions, wars, pogroms, and concentration camps.
The doctrine of Providence is again called into question. New definitions are propounded. Perhaps there is truth in Berdyshev's assertion that catastrophe is a goad to speculation. But it is also true that this speculation results in a turning away from the "speculations" of the Christian Faith. Twentieth century man "chose consciously for the existential reality of today and tomorrow even though the last word in this reality must be meaninglessness and absurdity." With this and much more by way of introduction Berkouwer goes on to an analysis of some of the principle motifs which give expression to the present defection away from the doctrine of Providence.

There is the scientific motif. Science persistently attempts to reduce to natural causes the "hypothesis" of God's preservation and rule of the world. Thereby it would render the Providence doctrine effete. The projection motif explains religion as nothing more than a projection of man's own subjectivity. With this explanation it not only quietly gets rid of God but it also gives a reason for the persistence of religious feeling. To the Marxian this subjectivity becomes a dangerous bromide. It takes the miserable into an delusive escapism when there ought to be a revolt against capitalistic oppression. The catastrophic motif suffices into a resignation towards the complete meaningless of existence. It is nihilistic. Man has a choice of orgy, boredom, or resignation. Yet in spite of his denials, man abors a windowless universe. Hence an increase in the devotees of astrology, spiritism, and more recently, para-psychology.

Berkouwer ends this first discussion on a note of optimism and praise. Thanks be to God! The Christian is not limited to a "self-made refuge, spineless resignation or fatalistic capitulation." His is the call to the Prophetic Word. "Jehovah of hosts, him shall ye sanctify; and let him be your fear, and let him be your dread. And he shall be for a sanctuary." The second chapter of this volume treats "The Knowledge of Providence." Here Dr. Berkouwer sweeps aside all rationalism and science. He repudiates the natural theology of the Scholastics; clears Bavinck and Kuyper of any suggestion of Scholasticism in their use of the "mixed articles" concept; agrees with Barth in his assertion that there can be no belief in the Providence of God without knowing the way to God through Jesus Christ; disagrees with Barth's identification of Providence and God's free grace; rejects the manner in which Barth's idea of our knowledge of Providence defines and limits its nature; insists on the soteriological nature of the knowledge of Providence throughout.

The next chapter in its discussion of "Providence as Sustenance" leads inevitably to the subject of Common Grace. Berkouwer rightly affirms that Schilder and Hoeksema fail to do justice to the concrete testimony of Scripture. "In Matthew 5:45, for instance, we are called to love our enemies so that we may be children of our Father in heaven who, without distinction among men, causes his sun to rise and the rain to fall on both the evil and the good." Berkouwer agrees with John Murray's contention that it is impossible to separate the gifts of God from His disposition. Berkouwer would not gloss over the speech of God in time in order to deduce conclusions for His eternal decrees of election and reprobation. He approves of those criticisms which charge Hoeksema with a neglect of the time element and the significance of earlier and later history. The neglect of the historical aspect must, by implication, involve the conclusion that God's wrath can never, in time, rest upon the believer, just as his favor can never rest upon the reprobate. Berkouwer concludes that "we do not deal with wrath and grace as two balanced terminants in history, but as a message that comes to the world so that mercy may turn away anger, and that wrath be not accumulated unto the day of judgment... He who knows God in His grace and forbearance with the world knows that the confession of sustenance is not a theological refinement, but a call to preach."

With this Berkouwer moves in succession to the treatment of "Providence as Government," "A Third Aspect," namely Concurrence, "Providence and History," "Providence and Miracles," and finally "The Problem of Theodicy." In breadth and depth these all reflect the perspicacity of this devoted Reformed theologian. He stays close to the Scriptures. Proof texts abound.

The last chapter most particularly answers those detractors who would call God's role of the world into question. Yet this chapter is most particularly addressed to the Christian. The problem of theodicy is a real problem for him as well. It is a real problem when the Christian is caused to pass through the deep waters, even though in the end there will be the confession, "He is my rock, and there is no unrighteousness in Him."

Berkouwer calls up various theodicies and rapidly dismisses them as unbiblical. The dualistic interpretation is broken on the unibiblical doctrine of co-eternal evil. The harmonistic approach of Leibniz breaks down into unequivocal rationalism. The teleological approach suffers from over-simplification and fails to appreciate the awful reality of sin, suffering, and death. The theodicy of Wilfred Monard is little more than an attempt to rehabilitate Marcion.

Finally the criticisms terminate with a consideration of Barth. Barth lays a heavy hand on Leibniz for rationalizing away the shadow side of creation. The optimism of Leibniz is "A creature's judgment on itself and on the rest of the world." Leibniz's God was only "the mirrored image of the perfection that man first ascribed to himself" Yet for Barth as for Leibniz this is the best of all conceivable worlds. Leibniz's optimism had no place for Christ. Barth insists that that which is true in Christ is false and meaningless outside of Him. Barth speaks of the "mystery of iniquity." Man must not seek consistency here. We should accept the apparent paradox. Through Christ God has become the "subject of both aspects of existence." It is thus in Christ that "the created world, here and now, is already perfect in all its imperfections." But Barth errs in his teachings concerning the attributes of God. For him the world is not confronted by the righteousness of God but is only enveloped in His love. All men share in the redemption and election in Christ. He would deny the distinction between an Esau and a Jacob. There can be no serious talk of judgment since all judgment has been fulfilled in Christ. The situation becomes static. The here-and-now events are stripped of final significance. Time has again lost its value. To this reviewer, it seems that in this respect a comparison might be drawn between the systems of Barth and Hoeksema. Though going in different directions they both fail to give time its due. For both the significance of history seems to be less than biblically significant.

In giving his answer to the problem of theodicy Berkouwer also gives an unequivocal statement of his apologetics. There can be no sitting down with the unbeliever for a rational discussion of the problem. It is basically a question of faith, as was the problem of the knowledge of Provi-
dence. "The apologete will have to advance into the struggle with modern thought from a position of faith, profoundly convinced that the logic of modern empirical thought, of neutral analysis and induction, is the corrupted logic of sinful thinking." This is a refreshing reemphasis of the Reformed approach in the face of Carnell's recent attempt to sit down with the unbeliever and beat him at his own game.

We are indebted to the author for this masterful work. We are indebted to the publisher for bringing it to the Netherlands. We are especially indebted to the translator for giving it to us in our own language. Those who followed the author's transliterated Dutch at the lecture podium will be delighted to learn that they can now enjoy him in lucid English and that in their studies.

If we were to qualify our praise of this volume at all, it would be to suggest a little more elaboration in criticism of the author's transliterated Dutch at the lecture podium will be delighted to learn that they can now enjoy him in lucid English and that in their studies.

NICK VAN TIL
Grand Rapids, Michigan

THE INSPIRATION OF PROPHECY

In recent times, many voices have been raised in explanation of the prophetic phenomena described in the Old Testament. Almost without exception, these voices have been those of men who would explain the data upon a naturalistic basis. How different is Dr. Young's approach! "... it is necessary to postulate the existence of Jehovah as the true God, who could reveal His will unto His servants, and they in turn gave utterance to that which had been spoken to them" (p. 149).

The fashion of Old Testament scholarship has long been to derive a pattern from pagan cultures and to attempt to show that Biblical data about the religion of Israel conforms to it. One or more results are generally evident: (1) Exegesis is forced; (2) Scant heed is paid to the larger context; (3) Similarities are stressed, while differences are ignored; (4) Evidence which does not harmonize with the investigator's theory is labeled as spurious. Dr. Young follows a different procedure. Knowing that the Bible claims for itself a special, divine character—that it purports to be a supernatural revelation of God, and so unified and with a teleological purpose—he proceeds on the assumption that its claims are true. He finds that its parts do fit together and that the religion of Israel is essentially different from that of any other ancient people.

One by one, he discusses the prevailing theories of Liberal writers and tests them not only by the exegesis of individual passages but by the over-all character of the prophetic institution as it appears in the Old Testament. Whether it be Gunkel with his form criticism, or Holkar with his idea that both priests and prophets were cultic officials or Mowinckel with his view that the pre-exilic prophets had "the Spirit of Yahweh" whereas the later prophets had "the Word of Yahweh," the scholar who argues against the uniqueness of Israel's religion is weighed and found wanting in the light of Biblical testimony.

The weapon which the author uses to contend against his opponents is that of exegesis. He inquires into the meaning of the many passages of Scripture which deal with the prophets and shows that their witness has been distorted by those who look upon the prophetic institution as a man-made affair. Prophecy, says Professor Young, was a gift of God. God ordained that His people should not consult heathen oracles, but that they should hear the revelation of His will from the lips of chosen, inspired men. The basic function of these men, the prophets, was to declare the message which had received from God.

Like Dr. Young's other works, My Servants the Prophets gives evidence that the author is conversant with the significant literature in the field, whether modern or ancient whether in English or in other languages. His approach is humble rather than pretentious. Sometimes he indicates that we do not know the meaning of a passage, but he is steadfast in his contention that the Bible leaves no doubt as to the supernatural character of true prophecy.

In a few instances, we wonder whether Dr. Young has not been guilty of overstatement, as when he says that Elijah had "doubtless" resided at Mt. Carmel for some time prior to the contest with the prophets of Baal (p.101), that "without doubt" pious Israelites in the Northern Kingdom "resorted to the houses of the prophets" on holy days (p.99), or that "evidently" Samuel "brought into being the bodies known as schools of the prophets." Such statements rest upon questionable grounds and are debatable, to say the least.

The book is well written and characterized by clarity of expression. The reviewer noticed only one grammatical infelicity. The external appearance is quite satisfactory. The words on the jacket, "an authoritative interpretation...," might raise the question as to the source or ground of the authority, but the text of the book itself makes it clear that if there be authority behind the interpretation, that authority is but the Word of God.

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REFORMED FUNDAMENTALS

THE MEANING OF BAPTISM. By M. Eugene Osterhaven.

THE MEANING OF BAPTISM. By M. Eugene Osterhaven.

THE MEANING OF THE LORD'S SUPPER. By George C.

DONNA

RELEVANCE OF THE PIVOT POINTS OF THE REFORMED FAITH.

By John E. Kuizenga.

All these pamphlets are printed and distributed by the Society for Reformed Publications, 1519 E. Fulton Street, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Let it be said at the outset that this is an excellent undertaking. The purpose is to give a brief statement on the fundamentals of the Reformed faith for its own members and all who may be interested in it. The pamphlets under review are just that. They are brief and sound. Let us consider them one by one.

The author of the first is professor of Bible in Hope College. He first presents an Abridged Form for the administration of the sacrament and then the Form as it is read in our churches. The meaning of the sacrament is well presented. Its exposition is sound.
The author is especially strong in presenting the arguments for infant baptism. They are five in number: (1) the covenant with Abraham and his seed is universal in intent and includes the New Testament Church; (2) this covenant includes the children and these received its sign; (3) the New Testament Church is the spiritual successor of Old Testament Israel; (4) circumcision was replaced by baptism and both signify the same thing; (5) no period in the early history of the church does exist where infant baptism was not in vogue. Abundant Scriptural proof is given for his contentions. Osterhaven contends, and rightly, that the burden of proof against infant baptism rests with those who deny it. Proof must be presented that the grace of God in the New Testament is more restricted than it was in the Old. And then Jewish converts would have been most reluctant to affiliate with the church they had been told that now their children were no longer covenant children. Finally, the author binds upon the hearts of believing parents the solemn obligations they assume at the baptism of their children. How imperative that our homes be Christian homes! “The law of spiritual harvest prevails. What is sowed in the child’s mind, that is reaped . . . If anything but tares were to be reaped after such a sowing, the Lord of the harvest would have to change the spiritual laws of the universe” (p. 46). Amen!

While we enthusiastically endorse this document on baptism, yet we would ask a few questions. Why the Abridged Form? Why are the prayers of the Form optional? Do they not form an integral part of the administration? Moreover, the author leaves room for the suspicion that the sacrament may be administered in places and gatherings other than public worship. What is the meaning of “An Exhortation to the Parents, And Those Who Come With Them to Baptism”? (italics ours). Is that the congregation? It is not altogether clear.

Of course, our enthusiasm for this excellent pamphlet is tempered by its inconsistency. Eloquently it pleads for Christian homes, but it seems to be of no consequence to surrender this covenant child to a system of education that is essentially godless and does not even stand in the Christian tradition. Osterhaven evidently would not subscribe to Dr. A. Hodge’s assertion made many years ago when he said: “I am as sure as I am of Christ’s reign that a comprehensive and centralized system of education, as is now commonly proposed, will prove the most appalling enginery for the propagation of anti-Christian and atheistic unbelief, and of anti-social nihilistic ethics, individual, social, and political, which this sin-rent world has ever seen.” Who will gainsay that this prophecy has been tragically fulfilled? And if these covenant children can be exposed to such education with impunity, then too “If anything but tares were to be reaped after such sowing, the Lord of the harvest would have to change the spiritual laws of the universe.” What joy there would be in heaven if, in this respect at least, the author and many of his colleagues would repent.

As to The Meaning of the Lord’s Supper we shall be brief. Rev. Douma has done a good job. It is exposition, not argumentative or controversial. And to his exposition no Reformed Christian will take exception. The self-examination, the spiritual character of the transaction, the attendant blessing, and also the sin of disobedience by ignoring or neglecting the sacrament—all these elements are very well presented. And this is done in a form which every man in the pew can understand. Anyone who does not understand this manifestly does not belong at the Lord’s table.

If criticism be called for, also here we would raise questions about the Abridged Form. Evidently it is the only form that is used in the Reformed Church. If so, why speak of the Form as abridged? Some day, no doubt, the Christian Reformed Church will abridge its Form. Yet we must be very careful that abbreviation does not become mutilation. Many things are left out of the Form under consideration that we would consider most essential. To mention but one: The specific sins mentioned in the traditional Form are all omitted. In the pamphlet (this section) it is referred to but that is all. Again, as in the above pamphlet, the prayers are optional. Also, at the close of the Form and before the prayer, the following is inserted: “Here the invitation to partake of the Sacrament may be given to Communicants present who are not members of that particular Church.” It is not indicated whether this is interdenominational or restricted to members of the Reformed Church. If it is not “open communion” it surely approaches it.

But, all in all, it is a good document, and it is to be heartily recommended.

The third title mentioned above is an address delivered in Baltimore, in February, 1941. Europe was at war. We were still blissfully ignorant of the events that were to come.

Anyone who has ever heard or read Kuizenga knows what a master linguist he was. In this address he is at his best. In language that is gripping, in prose which sounds like a rhythmic poem, and on a theme as majestic as the grandeur of a cathedral, Kuizenga presents the relevancy of the Reformed Faith in our day as only he could do it. What are these points? The first is that the Reformed Faith is a Religion. It is a totalitarian religion. The weakness of democracy lies at this point. “Unless and until democracy becomes a symbol of loyalty to something higher than democracy, democracy cannot endure. Until we get ready to die for God, we shall never be ready to die for our neighbors, not even for our own highest life” (p. 7). “Then the following points are discussed: The Sovereignty of God; The Reformed Conception of Sin; The Reformed Conception of Grace; The Lordship of Jesus Christ. These are the relevant points of our faith in this present age, or in any age.

This writing is beyond criticism. No Reformed man would take exception to the contentions of the author and no one could express them more cogently and forcefully.

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FOR SUNDAY SCHOOL TEACHERS

This volume of 470 pages is the thirty-second annual commentary on the International Sunday School lessons. The author is Dr. Earl Leroy Douglass, a graduate of Princeton University, recently retired from the active pastorate to give his full time to writing. This is his thirteenth annual edition of the Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons.
Some very fine things can be said about the commentary. The "notes" are well written. One can tell that the author writes easily and masterfully, as a Christian scholar. He bridges the gap between the scholarly interpreters and the rank and file Sunday School teachers. He writes in a concise and readable style—each lesson containing about eight or nine pages. There are also about two pages of "hints to teachers" which are helpful in getting to the heart of the lesson. Besides there are a great many quotations and seed thoughts, so helpful to the teacher.

What was of special interest to me was the "concept method" of outline for each lesson. Children are taught by stories built around the concepts in the teacher's mind, as he or she has grasped God's Word and seeks to retell it.

Besides the commentary itself, the bibliography of books for the Sunday School teacher drew my attention. Among others, I was pleased to read the title, *Bible Survey* by our own Dr. Wm. Hendriksen.

All of this was fine in the volume, but there is something so disappointing too. I know Dr. Douglass was limited to the International Series of lessons, and he is not responsible for the strange series in the last quarter on "Bible Teachings for a Better World" with lessons on "God's design for a better World"; God's design for New Men," etc., but all in all the teachings and selections are quite "moralistic." Our fathers warned against mere "ethical preaching and teaching" and that seems to be all the modern church has to offer. Oh, for a Self-revelation of God emphasis in our Bible lessons! Men, women, and children today must still "Behold Your God!" I am happy that our church has its own Sunday School lesson series.

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**MASS CHILD EVANGELISM**


THIS book is an effort to defend, promote, and give guidance in the conducting of children's revival campaigns. It is, I believe, a well worked out handbook on the most effective techniques for conducting such activities. For us, however, its whole purpose is open to two basic objections. (1) In urging the use of children's revivals the writer is completely oblivious to even the possibility of there being any such thing as a covenant approach to working with the children of believers. The book is strongly on the defensive against those who criticize the revival procedure in dealing with children. It accuses them of holding the position that Christ cannot save children. It attempts to defend the procedure by pointing to children who responded in such a campaign and did as a matter of fact continue to remain in the Christian faith. Throughout the book there is no suspicion that there might be a possibility of such procedures being unnecessary or inferior to sound training in dealing with children who are from birth members of the covenant and church of the Lord. (2) A second objection may be raised against the whole revival theory and technique. The emphasis is on mass evangelism. Much attention is devoted on the most effective means of getting and maintaining crowds, and of expecting and working for immediate results. The Arminian theological assumptions of the systems are apparent in such statements as these: Children "are capable of appreciating the claims of God upon them, of understanding the great doctrines of Gospel truth, when clearly and forcibly explained, and of yielding themselves up heartily to their Savior." In dealing with the after-meeting the writer says that apart from the very young children. "We are justified in expecting every child in our group to let the Lord Jesus into their hearts" (pp. 72, 83). While we may well rejoice whenever the gospel is preached, and appreciate the need too of persuasion in dealing with the lost, yet the whole system of mass revivalism usually leads to many immature decisions which later prove disappointing and load the churches with members who prove to be unbelievers. Perhaps one of the best correctives to the evils of the system is found in the teachings of our Lord in Luke 14:25-35 where, immediately after having taught the need for "constraining them to come in," he calls attention to the need of men counting the cost of their action.

In spite of these weaknesses the book may be of some value to us (1) in stressing the need for personal conversion. We certainly need to emphasize that also when dealing with covenant children. Where we fail in some degree in doing so, it remains open to question whether we ought to move in the direction of adopting such techniques as these even in modified form to compensate for the failure. It would appear preferable to try to correct what may be lacking in church and home christian training. (2) The book also emphasizes the need for bringing the gospel to non-Christian children as well as grown-ups, a need we ought to recognize and which our covenantal system of training cannot meet. Even in trying to meet that need, while we appreciate every effort to bring the gospel, we should beware of the abuses to which mass meetings are susceptible, the cheap and sensational advertising, the high pressure methods, and the temporary conversions that only too often result.

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