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Kant on Recognizing our Duties as God's Commands

John Hare

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Kant both says that we should recognize our duties as God’s commands, and objects to the theological version of heteronomy, ‘which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will’. In this paper I discuss how these two views fit together, and in the process I develop a notion of autonomous submission to divine moral authority. I oppose the ‘constitutive’ view of autonomy proposed by J. B. Schneewind and Christine Korsgaard. I locate Kant’s objection to theological heteronomy against the background of Crusius’s divine command theory, and I compare Kant’s views about divine authority and human political authority.

1. Kant on Religion and Morality

I am going to focus on Kant’s view that we should recognize our duties as God’s commands, and on how this fits with his more familiar objection in the *Groundwork* to the theological version of heteronomy, ‘which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will’. But before we get to that, I want to make a general point about Kant’s view of the relation between morality and the Christian faith. We have tended to secularize Kant in a way that distorts the meaning of the texts. There has been a tendency to see modern philosophy as teleological, headed towards the death of God and the death of metaphysics heralded by Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth century. The modern classics have accordingly been trimmed to fit this model by their twentieth century admirers. What we need to do is to recapture what I call ‘the vertical dimension’ of their thought. In the case of Kant, he is, in his own phrase, a ‘pure rationalist’.

Implicit in this description is a distinction between two kinds of religion. In his second preface to *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* Kant suggests we think of revelation as two concentric circles. Historical revelation (for example, Scripture), which is given to particular people at particular times, belongs in the outer circle. Kant’s project is to see if he can translate the items in this outer circle into the language of the inner circle, which is the revelation to reason, and is the same to all people at all times. Being a pure rationalist means that the items in the outer circle are not rejected, but they are held not to be necessary for all rational beings to come to saving faith. They are, Kant says, vehicles of the religion within the limits of reason.
alone. He himself and his European contemporaries have been introduced to God’s requirements by this historical revelation, and Kant thinks it important that biblical preaching should continue and be kept under discipline, so that this vehicle can be maintained. He is not, then, rejecting special revelation in favor of morality. But Kant wants to use morality to translate as much as he can of special revelation into the language of reason. The translation exercise is going to show, if it is successful, that the two circles are indeed concentric, which is at least to say that they are consistent with each other. More than this, a life centred in one will also be centred in the other.2

On my reading of Kant’s project, he finds that there are some items in the outer circle which he cannot translate, but which he needs to continue to believe in order to have morality make rational sense. Conspicuous among these items is the belief in divine grace. Kant believes in a strong version of the doctrine of original sin, that we are born under the dominion of the ‘evil maxim’, which makes us subordinate our duty to our own happiness. Kant also believes that we cannot by our own devices overcome this dominion, because it already underlies all our choices. We therefore require assistance from outside ourselves to accomplish what he calls ‘the revolution of the will’, by which the ranking of happiness over duty is reversed. Kant’s candidate for this outside assistance is what he calls ‘a divine supplement’, and he holds that we have to believe that this is available if we are to hold ourselves accountable to the moral law. Twentieth century exegetes have tried to rescue Kant from these views by what I call ‘cushion hermeneutics’. This is the strategy of suggesting that he did not really mean some of the things he says, but was saying them merely to cushion his disagreement with the authorities.3 But this kind of interpretation should be adopted only as a last resort, if there is no straight-forward interpretation which fits the text. Especially this is true of Kant, who placed such a high value on sincerity.4 We should not use cushion hermeneutics except as a last resort, if it is the only possible way to make sense of the text.

II. The ‘Constitutive’ View of Autonomy

Contemporary secular Kantians have interpreted Kant’s views about autonomy as a form of creative anti-realism. I will interpret him, rather, as what I will call a ‘transcendent realist’, namely someone who believes that there is something beyond the limitations of our understanding.5 In particular there is a God who is head of the kingdom of which we are merely members. When we recognize something as our duty we are in some way recapitulating the will of this head of the kingdom just as when we believe something true about the world we are in some way recapitulating the way things are in themselves. This is a traditional picture of Kant as an empirical realist, a transcendental idealist, and a transcendent realist. But interpreting Kant’s view of autonomy as a form of creative anti-realism has been typical of Rawlsians such as Christine Korsgaard and J.B. Schneewind, and this interpretation has become very influential.6

Christine Korsgaard takes the view that our reflective endorsement of a prescription makes that prescription normative; it is the source of obliga-
tion, or even of all value. Thus if a Mafioso can endorse reflectively the judgement that he should go out and kill, then he should. If human beings decided that human life was worthless, then it would be worthless. She says, ‘The point is just this: if one holds the view, as I do, that obligations exist in the first-person perspective, then in one sense the obligatory is like the visible: it depends on how much of the light of reflection is on.’ I hasten to add that Korsgaard goes on to say that the Mafioso has a deeper obligation to give up his immoral role. But she feels that she has to concede initially that the Mafioso has the obligation to do the hideous thing, because of her position that ‘it is the endorsement that does the work’ (that is, the normative work).

J.B. Schneewind’s magisterial history of modern ethics leading up to Kant lays out, in Kant’s name, what Schneewind calls a ‘constitutive’ method of ethics. Here is a statement of this view from an earlier article, ‘Reflecting on one’s motives one finds oneself giving them a unique kind of approval or disapproval; in any particular situation one is to act from the approved motive or set of motives, and the act so motivated is the appropriate action. There is no other source of rightness or wrongness in actions.’ Schneewind thinks this endorsement is the source of the rightness of the action. That is what makes his method ‘constitutive’, or a kind of constructivism or creative anti-realism. Schneewind goes on to use the language of creation, saying that our possession of a constitutive method of ethics ‘shows that we create the moral order in which we live, and supply our own motives for compliance.’ The view is that if any other will, or anything external to us, or even our own non-rational appetites are the source of the normativity, then we are not free but slaves.

I have doubts about this kind of creative anti-realism in ethics, both in itself and as an interpretation of Kant. The best place to see why it does not fit Kant is those passages where Kant, throughout his writings, describes God as the head of the kingdom of which we are mere members, and where he says we should recognize our duties as God’s commands to us. In these passages Kant denies that God is the author or creator of the moral demand, because Kant thinks this demand does not have an author at all. But if it does not have an author, then we cannot be either its author or its creator. One passage is from the report of his lectures on ethics from 1775-80, ‘No one, not even God, can be the author of the laws of morality, since they have no origin in will, but instead a practical necessity. But the moral laws can nevertheless be subject to a lawgiver (unter einem Gesetzgeber stehen). There can exist a being which has the power and authority to execute these laws, to declare that they are in accordance with his will, and to impose upon every one the obligation of acting in accordance with them. This being is therefore the lawgiver, though not the author of the laws.’

Kant revises this position in the Groundwork (1785), but what looks like a radical revision is not. He says, it is true, that we are authors of the law. But this is because he has made a distinction not present in the earlier discussion between two kinds of author. There is the author of the law and there is the author of the obligation in accordance with the law. Put carefully, it turns out that God and we can be seen as jointly authors in the one sense, namely authors of the obligation of the law,
and neither God nor we can be seen as authors in the other sense, namely authors of the law directly.11 I think this is Kant's view at the time of the *Groundwork* and throughout his ethical writing thereafter. Moreover, saying that God and we are jointly authors of the obligation of the law does not mean that we are on an equal footing with God as authors in this sense. It does not mean that our contributions are symmetrical. Even in the *Groundwork* Kant makes this clear. He distinguishes between the king of the kingdom of ends and the rest of the membership of this kingdom, 'A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head, when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other'.12 Kant goes on to say that a rational being can maintain the position of head of the kingdom only if he is a completely independent being, without needs and with an unlimited power adequate to his will. There is no doubt that Kant is talking about God here, as head or king of the kingdom, and without a king there cannot be a kingdom. There is the following asymmetry between the king and his subjects: We ordinary moral agents have to see our role as recapitulating in our own wills the declaration in God's will of our duties. This is how we are lawgivers; we declare a correspondence of our wills with the law (which we do not create). For me to will the law autonomously is to make it my law. Kant has similar language in the Second Critique about willing that there is a God, which sounds at first hearing like blasphemy.13 But Kant means that we make God our God. He does not mean 'create' in either case, either that we create the law or that we create God. Neither God nor the law can do the job Kant needs them to do if we do create them. Autonomy on this reading is more nearly a kind of submission than a kind of creation. In what follows, I will use autonomy with this understanding, though I do not want to deny that the term has been used by others, especially by followers and interpreters of Kant, in a creative anti-realist way.14

The constructivist account of Kant has fallen into the trap of a false dichotomy. It is easy, but a mistake, to assume that if values are not entirely independent of or external to the will, they must be entirely dependent on it or internal to it. One way to think of this false dichotomy is to suppose that if values are not like armadillos, things we discover in the world outside us, they must be like armchairs, things we put into the world or create, our artefacts. What lies behind the appeal of this dichotomy is what John Austin called 'the descriptive fallacy', appealing to Kant as the philosopher who first uncovered it.15 One way to be guilty of the descriptive fallacy is to assume that to know the meaning of a normative word like 'good' is just like knowing the meaning of 'red', namely to know what things we may or may not apply it to.16 But the assumption is a mistake, the mistake of thinking that language always works in the same kind of way. This is the mistake of those who think they have to move from a rejection of substantive moral realism, where the normativity is entirely external to the will, to a creative anti-realism, where the normativity is created by the will. I am encouraged here by Karl Ameriks's response to Schneewind, rejecting what he calls 'the false trichotomy: either imposed by us, or
imposed by another, or simply “perceived” as a natural feature’. Kant’s theory is, I believe, an example of a theory which resists such a dichotomy or trichotomy.

III. Christian August Crusius

An important figure for us to consider here is Christian August Crusius. Kant needs to be understood against the background of the discussion of divine command theory in the Pietist circles he was familiar with. Schneewind’s history of modern ethics, together with his earlier articles, gives Crusius a key place in the development that led to Kant’s views on autonomy. Crusius’ views were influential in Königsberg at the time Kant was writing, and provided a Pietist alternative within philosophy to the rationalist doctrine of Christian Wolff. Kant’s teacher, Martin Knutzen, undertook the project of reconciling the two. Crusius is presented by Schneewind as making two central points against Wolff’s moral philosophy. First, he introduced what Schneewind calls ‘a quite novel distinction’ between two kinds of things we ought to do; there are actions that we ought to do as means to some end of ours and others we ought to do regardless of any ends we have, even the end of our own perfection. It is only this second kind of obligation that Crusius is willing to call ‘moral obligation’. Here, says Schneewind, is the origin of Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative. Second, Crusius tied this distinction to the notion of freedom. He said that the will is free only because it can choose in accordance with this second kind of obligation. That is to say that even if we perceive something clearly as required for an increase in perfection, we can choose either for it or against it. This is contrary to Wolff because Wolff taught that by nature the availability of increased perfection necessarily moves us, and we are always obligated to pursue it. We are always drawn to act so as to bring about what we believe is the greatest amount of perfection, and Wolff says we are bound or necessitated so to act.

Now it may seem churlish to say of a 600 page history that it has not given us enough of the historical context, but I think in this case it is true. Schneewind is wrong to say that it is ‘a quite novel distinction’ to distinguish being drawn to some end of ours as ours and being drawn regardless of any ends we have, even the end of our own perfection. Both this distinction and the distinctive tying of this distinction to freedom come from Duns Scotus, and before Scotus from Anselm. Duns Scotus holds that there are two affections of the will, the affection for advantage, directed to one’s own happiness or perfection, and the affection for justice, which is directed to what is good in itself regardless of one’s ends. For Scotus we are only free because we have the affection for justice. This distinction between the affections is to be found in both Lutheran and Reformed theology. Scotism was a widely accessible option in the intellectual milieu in which the Reformers lived. Luther makes the point repeatedly that one who does the good in order to promote his own blessedness is still not devoted to the good itself; rather, he is using it as a means for ‘climbing up to the Divine majesty’. Perhaps Crusius came to the distinction by reflecting on Luther.
In Scotus and in the Reformers and in Crusius, this distinction is tied into a version of divine command theory. Scotus thinks that God necessarily loves God, and then wills to have co-lovers (though God does not will this necessarily). Moreover God necessarily orders these creatures towards union with God, their primary good. From this come the first group of the ten commandments. But the route to this end is not necessary, and is within God’s prescriptive discretion. Here we have the second group of the ten commandments specifying our duty to the neighbour, and these are binding upon us because God has chosen them; though they are not arbitrary, because they lead to our final end. Now Schneewind, like Socrates in the Euthyphro, presents us with a choice: ‘whether morally right acts are right simply because God commands us to do them, or whether, by contrast, God commands us to do them because they are, in themselves, right’. But the Scotist form of divine command theory does not fit this dichotomy. Our duties to the neighbour are right both because God chooses that route and because it is a route to our final good. In Crusius there is the same kind of structure as in Scotus. God has an essential tendency to self-affirmation and when God creates us (which is not necessary) God must desire that our strivings should be directed in accordance with our highest objective end, which is union with God. But this means, Crusius says, that our highest formal end is compliance with God’s will and command.

Crusius does not merely recapitulate Scotus, however; he adds to him. I want to emphasize one such addition, and I want to claim that this addition is the focus of Kant’s famous objection in the Groundwork to the theological version of heteronomy. The addition is most clearly seen in the way Crusius divides up the basic human desires. Scotus was concerned to deny eudaimonism, the view that all our motivation is directed towards happiness. He therefore divided up the affection for advantage and the affection for justice. Crusius is likewise opposed to eudaimonism. But for him there are not two but three basic categories of desire. The first is the drive to increase our own appropriate perfection, and from this come the desires for truth, clarity, good reasoning, the arts, bodily improvement, freedom, friendship, and honour. Second comes the disinterested or impartial drive for perfection, and from this comes a general desire to help others. But third, and distinct and incommensurable with these first two, is what Crusius calls ‘the drive of conscience’ which is ‘the natural drive to recognize a divine moral law’. His idea is that we have within us this separate capacity to recognize divine command and to be drawn towards it out of a sense of dependence on the God who prescribes the command to us, and will punish us if we disobey (GRL 132). It is a good thing, Crusius thinks, that we do have this drive of conscience. For there is no way that most of us could most of the time reason out what we ought to do. God therefore gives us a ‘shorter path’ to knowledge of the divine law, and this makes God’s will evident in such a way that it can come to everyone’s knowledge (GRL 135). In this way, no-one is excused from accountability.

What Crusius is doing is to propose a capacity humans have for receiving divine command as such, and he separates this from the mere disinterested desire for perfection (or what Scotus would call the affection for justice). He is giving a particular reading of Romans I and II in which the law
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is written ‘on our hearts’ and even those who ‘suppress the truth’ are ‘without excuse’. This drive of conscience is supposed to be a sense which humans quite generally have of being dependent on some higher being and therefore of having obligation to do what that higher being tells them to do. But recognizing the commands of this being and being moved to obey is supposed to be a different drive from recognizing intrinsic good and being moved to pursue it.

Schneewind puts the distinction between Kant and Crusius this way. He thinks Kant is trying to show how we as moral agents can be independent of divine legislation, and how morality can be a human creation. Schneewind takes Crusius, on the other hand, to be arguing that we are dependent on God. Here is Schneewind’s dichotomy: Either there is independence of morality from God or there is a Crusian dependence. I am going to suggest that Kant’s actual view is neither of these, and that we should follow Kant in this respect.

IV. Kant’s Argument about Divine Commands in the Groundwork

What I want to do next is to return to the brief (and famous) argument in the Groundwork which is often taken to be an argument against divine command theory. Since Kant’s argument is brief, I will quote it in full. Kant rejects ‘the theological concept which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will; not merely because we cannot intuit God’s perfection and can only derive it from our own concepts, among which that of morality is the most eminent; but because, if we do not do this (and to do so would be to give a crudely circular explanation), the concept of God’s will still remaining to us—one drawn from such characteristics as lust for glory and domination and bound up with frightful ideas of power and vengefulness—would inevitably form the basis for a moral system which would be in direct opposition to morality.’

This argument has been taken, together with a brief and impenetrable passage in Plato’s Euthyphro, as a decisive rejection of the whole idea of divine command theory. But I think the argument sounds quite different, and is a better argument, if we construe it as an attack, not on divine command theory in general, but on Crusius’s particular form of it. I think the heart of Kant’s objection is to the separation of the ‘drive of conscience’ as a separate capacity.

The typical reading of this argument in twentieth century analytic philosophy takes it as a refutation of the divine command theory of ethical obligation in general. Here, to give just one example, is R. M. Hare’s verdict, ‘Ever since Kant, it has been possible for people to insist on the autonomy of morals - its independence of human or divine authority. Indeed, it has been necessary, if they were to think morally, in the sense in which that word is now generally understood.’ The claim here is that Kant has made it possible for us to think of morality as independent of divine or human authority, and that we now have to think of it that way if we want to use the moral words in the way most people understand them. R. M. Hare talks also of a ‘God, whom Kant would have liked to believe in.’ Similarly Lewis White Beck takes Kant to be arguing that moral duties do not owe
their authority in any way to being divine commands. After conceding
that Kant talks as if he were a divine command theorist (in this sense), Beck
says on Kant's behalf, 'It is not that (duties) are divine commands, or that
they owe their authority over us to their being decrees of a divine lawgiver
who also created us; for in that event, we should have to know about God
before we could know what our duty is, and we do not know God, while
even the most unphilosophical person knows his duty. Moreover, such a
theory would be incompatible with moral self-government, or autonomy.'
So Beck interprets Kant as saying that we should regard the moral law as if
it were a divine command, and the people under this law as if it were 'a
people united by common allegiance to a supposed author of these com-
mands, namely God'. But the 'as if' in these contexts is stressed in such a
way as to deny that we should believe in the actual existence of such
divine commands or their legislator. God's existence is not, however, for
Kant, 'as if'. Kant is not an agnostic, except that he does not 'know' in his
own very restricted sense of 'knowing', according to which we can only
know what we could possibly experience with the senses or what is apod-
ictically certain. We do not in this sense know that God exists. But Kant
holds that we are required to believe that God exists. In just the same sense,
he holds that we are required to believe that God is (with us) the legislator
of moral law, and (unlike us) the rewarder and punisher of our lives as a
whole in relation to this law. We have to deny knowledge in order to
make room for faith.

If, like most contemporary exegetes, one reads Kant's argument as an
attack on divine command theory in general, it will naturally be construed
as presenting the following two-horned dilemma. We have two choices
on the divine command theory: Either we derive the notion of God's per-
fection from our moral concepts or we do not. If we do (the first horn),
then the derivation which the divine command theory proposes is crudely
circular. It says we have moral obligations because God commands them,
and we should obey God's commands because they are morally right. But
if we separate (on the second horn) our notion of God's will from the moral
concepts, then the explanation of our obligation will depend merely on our
ability to please God and God's ability (if we do not) to hurt us. The rela-
tionship between us, when stripped of right, will reduce to one of power.
But then morality will be based on self-interest, and will not be what (on
Kant's view) morality in fact is. So neither choice is available to us, and so
the divine command theory should be rejected.

This is an important argument, and I will come back to it at the end. But
it cannot be, if Kant is consistent, Kant's argument. For Kant accepts the
view throughout his life that we should recognize our duties as God's
commands. For example, there is the passage in Lectures on Ethics, 'Our
bearing towards God must be characterized by reverence, love and fear -
reverence for Him as a holy lawgiver, love for His beneficent rule, and fear
of Him as a just judge' (which is different, Kant says, from merely being
afraid of God when we have transgressed). 'We show our reverence by
regarding His law as holy and righteous, by due respect for it, and by seek-
ing to fulfil it in our disposition.' I have already mentioned the passage in
the Groundwork about God as the head of the kingdom of ends, and there
are passages in the Second Critique and *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* about recognizing our duties as God’s commands. Because this is a sustained theme in Kant, we are better off regarding his attack in the *Groundwork* as directed at some more specific target. The theory of Crusius is an excellent candidate.

Kant objects to Crusius’s theory on three grounds. He starts the argument by saying that we cannot intuit God’s perfection. This starting point makes sense if it is Crusius he has in mind. Crusius had proposed that we have a separate access to divine perfection through ‘the drive of conscience’, separate from the general moral love or the disinterested drive for perfection (*GRL* 132). Kant’s position is, rather, that we cannot intuit God’s perfection, because human intuition is limited within space and time. This is his first objection. Our access is, therefore, through concepts. Either these will be the moral concepts, or some other. This presents a Crusius-type divine command theory with a dilemma.

Suppose we take the first option, and reply that we *can* know what God wills, since he wills what the moral law prescribes. Here is the second objection. This would be, Kant says, *crudely* circular. He may be objecting to just such a crude circle in the passage from Crusius I quoted earlier, ‘Finally, the third of the basic human drives is the natural drive to recognize a divine *moral* law’ (*GRL* 132, emphasis added). Crusius adds in the word ‘moral’ at a key point in his definition without showing how he can simultaneously insist on the separation of the three basic drives. It is a crude circle to prove that A is B by adding B to the definition of A. What is needed is a ‘third term’ C, which can be connected first with A and then with B. In Kant’s own account the third term is provided by our membership with God in the kingdom of ends. But Crusius just gives us the crude circle without such mediation.

Finally, there is a third point Kant makes against Crusius. If we think we can understand what God is telling us to do *without* using the moral concepts, we will be left without morality at all. Kant must have in mind as his target a form of the divine command theory which forbids us to justify obedience on the grounds that God cares for the well-being of the whole creation. In other words, we are forbidden by this form of the theory to appeal to God’s practical love. A Crusius-type divine command theory insists that we should obey God’s will *just* because it is God’s will, *whatever* our direct intuition tells us that will is. This makes a nonsense of morality. The point of morality is to further one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. The kingdom of ends is the place where these two goals coincide. A morality which ignored one’s own perfection and the happiness of others would be unintelligible. But this is just the kind of morality Crusius seems to be asking us to adopt as our own. It is not that Crusius is here making the gross claim that what should move us to obedience is hope of reward or fear of punishment. Indeed, I started from his insistence, which he holds in common with Scotus, that we have sources of motivation other than our happiness or perfection. It is notable that Kant also, in his reply, does not say that his opponent bases morality on hope of reward or fear of punishment, but rather ‘that the concept of God’s will remaining to us will be drawn from such characteristics as lust for glory
and domination and bound up with frightful ideas of power and vengefulness'. What Kant is interested in is what our idea of God will be like if we separate out the drive of conscience from the disinterested desire to help other people, as Crusius suggests. And we find that Crusius does emphasize that it is a God who will punish us if we do not obey, even though this is not to be our motivation for obedience.\footnote{It would have been easy for Kant, if he were making a general attack on divine command theory, to make the point about not basing morality on fear or hope of reward, and I suspect that is the way his argument is in fact usually taught. I used to teach it that way myself. But it is not what Kant says. So all three steps of the argument are specifically tailored to attack Crusius.} It would have been easy for Kant, if he were making a general attack on divine command theory, to make the point about not basing morality on fear or hope of reward, and I suspect that is the way his argument is in fact usually taught. I used to teach it that way myself. But it is not what Kant says. So all three steps of the argument are specifically tailored to attack Crusius.

Is Kant taking us back in this argument to a pre-Crusian Scotist form of divine command theory? In some ways, yes. Kant shares with Scotus the view that there are the two basic affections of the will, and that we start with the wrongful ranking of them. He shares the view that our freedom is tied to the good will. Two major differences are that in Kant there is no distinction in terms of necessity and contingency between the first and second tables of the law. And he describes our final end not as being co-lovers with God, but as a perfect combination of virtue and happiness. But there are two similarities I want to stress. In both Scotus and Kant, we share our final end with God, in the sense that both we and God aim at our own perfection. And in both Scotus and Kant God's willing is constrained by necessity, despite the Scotist emphasis on God's choosing the second table. I will return to these points at the end.\footnote{Is Kant taking us back in this argument to a pre-Crusian Scotist form of divine command theory? In some ways, yes. Kant shares with Scotus the view that there are the two basic affections of the will, and that we start with the wrongful ranking of them. He shares the view that our freedom is tied to the good will. Two major differences are that in Kant there is no distinction in terms of necessity and contingency between the first and second tables of the law. And he describes our final end not as being co-lovers with God, but as a perfect combination of virtue and happiness. But there are two similarities I want to stress. In both Scotus and Kant, we share our final end with God, in the sense that both we and God aim at our own perfection. And in both Scotus and Kant God's willing is constrained by necessity, despite the Scotist emphasis on God's choosing the second table. I will return to these points at the end.}

V. Autonomolls Relations to Political Authority

We can see that Kant is not making submission incompatible with autonomy if we compare what he says our relation is to political authority. Autonomy is being both legislator and subject to the law. One source of this idea is the tradition from Aristotle and the scholastics of seeing the good citizen as possessing 'the knowledge and capacity requisite both for ruling and for being ruled. The excellence of a citizen may be defined as consisting in a practical knowledge of the governance of free men from both points of view'.\footnote{We can see that Kant is not making submission incompatible with autonomy if we compare what he says our relation is to political authority. Autonomy is being both legislator and subject to the law. One source of this idea is the tradition from Aristotle and the scholastics of seeing the good citizen as possessing 'the knowledge and capacity requisite both for ruling and for being ruled. The excellence of a citizen may be defined as consisting in a practical knowledge of the governance of free men from both points of view'.} Kant believes that the autonomy of a good citizen is not only consistent with submission to political authority, but requires this submission. He argues that coercion by the state is necessary in order to prevent coercion by individuals, which would be an obstacle to the external exercise of autonomy. External compulsion by the state is thus 'a hindering of the hindrances to freedom'.\footnote{Kant believes that the autonomy of a good citizen is not only consistent with submission to political authority, but requires this submission. He argues that coercion by the state is necessary in order to prevent coercion by individuals, which would be an obstacle to the external exercise of autonomy. External compulsion by the state is thus 'a hindering of the hindrances to freedom'.} To quote Mary Gregor's introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, 'It is only within a civil condition, where there is a legislator to enact laws, an executive to enforce them, and a judiciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public laws, that human beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to do in accordance with moral principles'.\footnote{To quote Mary Gregor's introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, 'It is only within a civil condition, where there is a legislator to enact laws, an executive to enforce them, and a judiciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public laws, that human beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to do in accordance with moral principles'.} The justification of the state then rests for Kant on moral grounds, on the freedom of each individual person and our obligation to respect this in each other. A citizen is in this way morally justified in adopting into her own will the will of her ruler. The analogy with God's rule is systematic. Kant gives God executive and judi-
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cial as well as legislative functions within the kingdom, and God has to exercise those functions in order for the subjects in this kingdom ‘to do what it can be known a priori they must be able to do in accordance with moral principles.’ The analogy in fact goes beyond this, though I will not spell this out. Just as in God’s kingdom, so in an earthly kingdom there are three kinds of mistake a citizen might make in claiming justification for her obedience. They are the same three kinds of mistake Crusius makes in analysing our relation to God. The point I want to make here, though, is that Kant cannot mean to construct an argument from autonomy against all forms of external authority. The opposite is true. He thinks that autonomy requires submission to at least one kind of external authority, namely the authority of the state.

The analogy with political authority is helpful in understanding the role of sanctions in our relation to God. As we have already seen, this is not supposed to be the ground of our obedience. But it is essentially tied to the way in which God can be the author of the obligation to obey the law in a way that we are not. Christine Korsgaard says, ‘Why then are sanctions needed? The answer is that they are necessary to establish the authority of the legislator ....The legislator is necessary to make obligation possible, that is, to make morality normative.’” She gives the example of a student who takes a logic course because it is required by his department. It might seem that he acts more autonomously if he takes it because he independently sees its merit. But he acts autonomously out of his practical identity as a student only if he places the right to make and enforce some of the decisions about what he will study in the hands of his teachers. Similarly, a good citizen as a citizen does not pay her taxes because she thinks the government needs the money. She can vote for taxes for that reason. But once the vote is over, she must pay her taxes because it is the law. To extend this analysis to the context of divine command theory, we could say that an agent acts autonomously out of her practical identity as a citizen of God’s kingdom only if she acts out of obedience to God. In none of these three cases (the student, the citizen of an earthly kingdom and the citizen of God’s kingdom) is there any inconsistency with the agent sharing the ends of her superior. But in all three cases there is a true duty ‘which must be represented as at the same time that (superior’s) command.’ (Rel. VI, 99).

The role of the sanctions is to make the kingdom possible, and the ground of obedience is not fear of the sanctions but membership in the kingdom. It is worth spelling out why the kingdom of ends has to be a kingdom and not, for example, a republic. Kant’s view is that the only earthly constitution that accords with right is that of a pure republic. The difference between republic and kingdom matters to him. It is therefore misleading to gloss the kingdom of ends as ‘the republic of all rational beings’, and to call a friendship ‘a kingdom of two’. Between friends there is no king. J. L. Mackie is more accurate here. He says, ‘But for the need to give God a special place in it, (the kingdom of ends) would have been better called a commonwealth of ends.” In Kant’s theory God has combined in one person the legislative, executive and judicial functions which Kant thinks should be separated in a well-run earthly republic. In brief, ‘We must conceive a Supreme Being whose laws are holy, whose government is benevolent and
whose rewards and punishments are just."50

The legislative function we have already met. But there is a key differ­
ence from the legislation of an earthly state. Ethical legislation concerns
the heart, and not merely the behaviour of the citizenry. Kant accordingly says
that the ruler of the ethical realm 'must be one who knows the heart, in
order to penetrate to the most intimate parts of the disposition of each and
everyone and, as must be in every community, give to each according to the
worth of his actions.' God's promulgating the moral law to the heart is what
Kant describes in the preface to the second edition of Religion as the revela­
tion to reason. There is an additional point here. God, as legislator, will not
ask us to do what is impossible for us, though God may ask us to do what is
impossible for us on our own. The point is that God offers us the so-to­
speak executive assistance to do what God as legislator calls us to do.

God's executive function can be divided into various parts. One part is
the execution of the rewards and punishments which God declares in the
judicial function. There is also, however, the 'maintenance' of the law
(Lectures p. 81). We have to believe that a system is in place and is being
maintained in which the ends of the other members of the kingdom are
consistent with each other and with ours. This is what we might call a co­
ordination problem. The world might be the kind of place in which I can
only be happy if other people are not, or in which some of the people I
affect by my actions can only be happy if other people I affect are not. Kant
says that I am, as a creature of need, bound to desire my own happiness in
everything else I desire, (though my happiness is not the only source of my
motivation).51 And I am required to pursue the happiness of others as
much as my own, since we ought to share each other's ends as far as the
moral law allows.52 But we can only do all this if there is a system in place
in which others' ends are first consistent with each other and, second, con­
sistent with our own happiness.53 Since we do not know the contents either
of our own happiness or that of others, we cannot see by inspection
whether these consistencies obtain.54 We need to presuppose, Kant says,
the idea of a higher moral being, 'through whose universal organization the
forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a com­
mon effect.' (Rel. VI, 98) The common effect Kant has in mind here is the
highest good, in which all are virtuous and all are happy. This is his trans­
lation of the psalmist's idea of righteousness and peace embracing each
other (Psalm 85: 10). Kant's point is that we have to believe in God's execu­
tive functions in order to have the faith that such a good is possible. In fact,
with this belief we can have not merely moral faith but moral hope,
because God as Lord of history is bringing the kingdom to fruition.55

Finally, there is the judicial function. This is already implicit in what I
have said. We have to suppose that God can see our hearts and can justly
separate the sheep and the goats. It is not merely that God applies justly
the standards, but that the standards God applies are just. I will sum up by
quoting from the Second Critique, in which Kant stresses that moral right­
ness is an end common to us and to God, but that God's role is different
and non-symmetrical with ours and is nonetheless essential to our moral
life. 'Religion', Kant says, 'is the recognition of all duties as divine com­
mands, not as sanctions, i.e. arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a for­
eign will, but as essential laws of any free will as such. Even as such, they must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being, because we can hope for the highest good (to strive for which is our duty under moral law) only from a morally perfect (holy and beneficent) and omnipotent will; and, therefore, we can hope to attain it only through harmony with this will’ (KpV V, 130, emphasis added).

VI. Conclusion

I have tried to show that Kant does not intend a general argument against divine command theory. I want to end by showing that the general argument usually but wrongly read into the *Groundwork* does not work. We can see this if we hold onto Kant’s and Scotus’s view that we and God are jointly but non-symmetrically engaged in our moral life, and that we share our final end with God. Autonomous submission, I want to say, is recapitulating in our wills what God has willed for our willing. This kind of mutuality is present in the idea of a covenant, because a covenant is between people who share commitment to the kind of life the covenant sets up as normative. This allows us to endorse a divine command theory which is what Robert Adams calls ‘theonomous’. He says, ‘Let us say that a person is *theonomous* to the extent that the following is true of him: He regards his moral principles as given him by God, and adheres to them partly out of love or loyalty to God, but he also prizes them for their own sakes, so that they are the principles he *would* give himself if he were giving himself a moral law. The theonomous agent, in so far as he is right, acts morally because he loves God, but also because he loves what God loves.’

I want to connect this idea of theonomy with the Scotist distinction between our final end of union with God and our route to that end. It needs a different paper to describe and evaluate the details of Scotus’s account. But the key idea is that the second table of the law, the specification of our duties to the neighbour, is binding on us because God has selected it. Contrary to some versions of natural law theory, this part of the law is not deducible from our human nature. God could have chosen a different route for beings with our nature to reach our final end. I am not attributing this view to Kant. But I am suggesting that if Scotus is right about this, then autonomy can be reconciled with a version of divine command theory. If we try to mount the argument from autonomy that is usually (but wrongly) associated with Kant, we will fail. This is because there is nothing heteronomous about willing to obey a superior’s prescription because the superior has prescribed it, as long as the final end is shared between us. The dichotomy which the usual version of the argument relies upon is false. The dichotomy is the one I mentioned before in connection with Schneewind’s view of Kant: Kantian independence or Crusian dependence; either our own wills entirely or entirely the will of another. What human moral life is actually like on the Scotist picture is a complex and rich mixture.

The notion of recapitulating God’s will in ours is, however, vague in various ways. There is a range of cases here. Willing is always under a description, and the descriptions under which two people share an end
may vary. Take the following example, which I owe to Robert C. Roberts. A teenager’s mother wills that her son not sleep with his girlfriend, and in willing this she wills that her son live a fully chaste life by Christian standards for the spiritual union properly surrounding sexual intercourse. Suppose her son does not share her Christian understanding. There is a range of possible ways in which the son might nonetheless repeat his mother’s will. Perhaps he does not want to lose his inheritance. This would be crude form of heteronomy. Perhaps he respects his mother, though not her view. He does not want to hurt her, and he is grateful to her. This is neither heteronomy nor autonomous submission, but somewhere in between. Or perhaps he does accept the Christian teaching about sexuality, but barely understands it. He abstains because he wants to be a good Christian, but the proscription makes no sense to him. Here the mother and the son may even share a description under which something is willed, but it is not equally resonant for the two. Finally the son may share his mother’s understanding as well as her prescription. But on Christian doctrine this kind of shared understanding is one we can never have completely with God, even in heaven. It is possible, then, to share ends with another person, or with God, with many different degrees of clarity and fullness.

Suppose the son shares an end with his mother, but does not understand it very well, certainly less well than she does. Is his response autonomous or heteronomous? For Schneewind, the answer is a matter of degree, as in the story I have just told, but will tend towards heteronomy. He constructs a picture of what he calls ‘the Divine Corporation’. He imagines a large corporation, the sort of corporation in which Dilbert is employed. The ordinary employees understand very little about each other’s jobs or the purposes of the whole corporation, there is a strong back-up system so that failures by others will be remedied and ordinary employees do not have to feel responsible for the remedy themselves, and the supervisor has made it clear that they are paid for carrying out their duties strictly, ‘looking neither to left nor to right’. This, he says, is the traditional Christian picture of the kingdom of God, with God as the head of the firm. Schneewind thinks progress towards autonomy occurs in the history of ethics as each of these three conditions weakens. First, we come to see the purpose of the ‘corporation’ as promoting human happiness. Second we see ourselves as the major instruments in producing this end or failing to produce it. Third we see ourselves as cooperating with each other in producing this end, and as responsible for repairing each other’s omissions. In summary, ‘As God’s supervision and activity lessen, man’s responsibility increases.’ I do not want to deny that this movement of thought has occurred within academic philosophy in the last two hundred years. But as far as I can see, there is no way to determine whether this movement is progress towards a desirable kind of autonomy without settling first whether there is a God who has created us and rules the world providentially in the way the traditional picture and Kant himself suggest. If there is, and we decline to relate ourselves to God as God’s subjects, this is not a desirable form of autonomy but it is like the graduate student in Korsgaard’s example refusing on the grounds of autonomy to take the
required courses for the degree. My main point has been that this is not Kant's notion of autonomy; and that if we want to say it is nonetheless a desirable notion of autonomy, we will have to do some prior dismantling of traditional theism.

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NOTES


2. Religion VI, 13. I will be making references to Kant by using the page numbers of the relevant volume of the Academy edition.


4. e.g. *Conflict of the Faculties* VII, 10, and *KrV* III and IV, A748-50=B776-8.


6. I am going to mention Christine Korsgaard again at the end; but for an extended review, see *Faith and Philosophy*, volume 17, 3, (July 2000) 371-83.


9. Ibid. 302, emphasis added. In *The Invention of Autonomy*, Schneewind does not emphasize the language of creation, but he does say that Kant agrees with his predecessors who hold that moral approval is 'like the Pufendorfian divine will that creates moral entities', so that 'our approval is what makes some motives good, others bad', op. cit. 524.


11. Kant says that practical reason (the will) should be allowed to 'simply
manifest its own sovereign authority as the supreme maker of law', and earlier he glosses this notion of the will making the law in terms of the will being its author, GI IV, 441 and 431. Patrick Kain has traced with great elegance the emergence of the new way of making the distinction, in the fifth chapter of his dissertation from the University of Notre Dame (1999). For example, in the fragment of lecture notes referred to as 'Moral Mrongovius II', Kant is reported to have said to his students in 1785 (while he was writing the Groundwork), 'The lawgiver is not the author of the law, rather he is the author of the obligation of the law (Autor der obligation des Gesetzes)', XXIX 633-4. The new way of stating the distinction becomes standard for him, as in the following passage from the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), 'A (morally practical) law is a proposition that contains a categorical imperative (a command). One who commands (imperans) through a law is the lawgiver (legislator). He is the author (autor, sic) of the obligation in accordance with the law (Urheber (autor) der Verbindlichkeit nach dem Gesetz), but not always the author of the law. In the latter case the law would be a positive (contingent) and chosen law. A law that binds us a priori and unconditionally by our own reason can also be expressed as proceeding from the will of a supreme lawgiver, that is, one who has only rights and no duties (hence from the divine will); but this signifies only the Idea of a moral being whose will is a law for everyone, without his being thought as the author of the law.' Here we have essentially the same distinction between lawgiver and author, but now expressed in terms of two kinds of authorship (MM VI, 227).

12. GI IV, 433-4.
14. See Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, (London: SCM Press, 1980, 9), 'A modern person must not any more surrender the apex of his self-consciousness to a god. It must remain his own.'
18. Paton already remarked on this importance, see Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. and analysed by H. J. Paton, Harper, New York: 1964, p.141. For Crusius's views, see the selection from 'Guide to Rational Living', in Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, vol II, ed. J. B. Schneewind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 568-585 (henceforth GRL). See also Giorgio Tonelli, 'La Question des bornes de l'entendement humain au XVIIIe siecle', Revue de metaphysique et de morale (1959), 396-427. In the Second Critique (KpV V, 40), Kant mentions Crusius as the source of the view which locates the practical material determining ground of morality externally in the will of God. See also Moralphilosophie Collins, KGS 262-3, 'Crusius believes that all obligation is related to the will of another (die Willkür eines andern)'.
20. For Luther, the route is through Ockham. The nominalist tradition or via moderna was adopted by Gregory of Rimini, who was General of the Hermits of St. Augustine, which was Luther's order a century and a half later. Gabriel Biel, at Tubingen, wrote an influential exposition of Ockham's system, which was taught at Erfurt (by two of Luther's professors, Jaaokus Truffetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi) and at Wittenberg (where Luther did most of his teaching). See especially Heiko Oberman, Luther: A Man Between God and the Devil, Eileen Walliser-Schwarzenbart, trans., New York: Doubleday, 1989, 118-

21. WA 2, 493, 12ff.


23. GRL 176 and 216.


25. For a statement of the problem with understanding the passage in the *Euthyphro* 10a1-11b5, see John E. Hare, *Plato's Euthyphro*, Bryn Mawr Commentaries, 1985, 21-25.

26. Crusius also took the extreme position on the authority of Scripture that no rational criticism of the Bible was permitted, and that its meaning could be penetrated only by a kind of empathy or inner light. Kant objects to this claim as well, but not in the same argument.

27. R. M. Hare in 'The Simple Believer', reprinted in *Essays on Religion and Education*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 30. This argument in the *Groundwork* has had the same kind of status in Ethics as the treatment of the Ontological Argument in the First Critique has had in Metaphysics.


30. Lewis White Beck, *Six Secular Philosophers*, New York: Harper, 1960, 72-4. But it is not in general true for Kant that a prescription has authority only if we know about its source. As I shall argue, Kant thinks that the prescriptions of a legitimate political ruler have authority and have their source in his will; but we do not have knowledge about this will.

31. Kant does use the 'as if' locution counterfactually, but to express what our moral lives would be like without God, 'each must, on the contrary, so conduct himself as if everything depended on him.' (*Rel. VI*, 101, where the point is that everything does not depend on the agent). At *Rel. VI*, 154 Kant makes the point that no assertoric knowledge is required in religion so far as *theoretical* cognition and profession of faith are concerned, since all that is required is a problematic assumption; but with respect to the object towards which our morally legislative reason bids us work, what is presupposed is an *assertoric* faith. He goes on (it is true) to say that this faith needs only the idea of God. But this again is an epistemological limitation, not a point about what we should
believe exists.


33. There are problems with the argument on this second horn. What needs to be attended to is the different ways in which we can separate God's will from the moral concepts. On God's side we can distinguish the claim that the divine will is inconsistent with what is morally right from the claim that this willing, though consistent, does not go through the moral concepts. On our side we can distinguish the claim that we have to obey even if God's will is inconsistent with what is morally right from the claim that we must obey even in cases where we cannot determine whether it is consistent with what is morally right or not.


36. See Lewis White Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960, 107, 'Either Crusius surreptitiously introduces ethical predicates into the concept of divine perfection' (and Beck refers to this passage of Crusius), 'with the result that theological perfection no longer grounds the moral principle but presupposes it; or a hedonistic motivation is postulated as the ground of obedience to God.' But Kant is not exactly accusing Crusius of this second error, as I will argue in the following paragraph.

37. 'It is thus not specially necessary to show that the drive of conscience is distinct from the previously distinguished basic drives, as its object is so very different from those of the other drives.' (GRL 134)

38. An instructive comparison is Kant's fear in the third section of *Groundwork* that he may have argued in a circle about morality and freedom (Gl IV, 450). Kant thinks he has extricated himself from the viciousness of this circle when he later points out that 'when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members' (Gl IV, 453). He gives us here a third term which mediates between morality and freedom, namely our membership in the intelligible world.

39. See Robert M. Adams, 'Autonomy and Theological Ethics', in *The Virtue of Faith*, Oxford University Press: 1987, 123-7. Adams approves of Tillich's notion of theonomous ethics, 'The theonomous agent acts morally because he loves God, but also because he loves what God loves.' Kant on my reading, but not Crusius, has a theonomous ethics. I will return to Adams at the end of this paper. Crusius himself would not be worried by this objection. See Tonelli, op.cit. 410 (my translation), 'Crusius underlines the importance of *mysteries of reason*, mainly theological doctrines which have to be admitted, even though we do not understand how certain things can be joined together or separated in such a way.'

40. This is to put the point in terms of the *matter* of morality, rather than its form (which is more usual in the *Groundwork*). See the *Metaphysics of Morals* VI, 398.

41. 'The motive of conscience', he says, is therefore merely a motive to recognize certain indebtednesses, that is, such universal obligations as one must observe even if one does not wish to consider the advantages and disadvantages deriving from them, whose transgression God will punish and, if his law is not to be in vain, must punish.' (GRL 133, emphasis added).

42. In the *Lectures on Ethics* (op. cit. 22) Kant distinguishes between positive (or contingent) obligation and natural obligation, which arises from the nature of the action itself; and then complains, 'Crusius believes that all obligation is related to the will of another. So in his view all obligation would be a necessi-
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It may indeed seem that in an obligation we are necessitated per arbitrium alterius; but in fact I am necessitated by an arbitrium internum, not externum, and thus by the necessary condition of universal will.

What Kant is objecting to here, on my view, is not in itself the appeal to a superior will, but to making this will merely external, or separate from the universal will. In Kant’s own way of recognizing our duties as God’s commands, this can be and should be consistent with seeing them as permitted by the moral law, and thus the universal will. To put this more simply, what Kant wants in our autonomous submission is both our will and God’s together, neither of them being sufficient without the other.

43. Aristotle Politics III, 2, 1277b14-16.
44. MM VI, 396. See also MM VI, 231, ‘(Whatever) counteracts the hindrance of an effect promotes that effect and is consistent with it.’
46. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, op. cit., 25f and 105-7. She goes on to argue against Hobbes and Pufendorf that our moral obligations have authority because of the internal sanction of a painful conscience. But Kant, I am arguing, preserves the need for an external imposition of sanctions, though they are not arbitrary sanctions (KpV V, 130). The fact that we feel badly if we break the law is not, for him, enough. The presence of these sanctions does not by itself lead to heteronomy, unless the ground for obedience is the fear of hell or hope of heaven.
47. See MM VI, 340-42. It is significant also that Kant denies that the church should have a monarchical constitution, Rel. VI, 102.
48. See Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, op. cit., 99 and 127. Note also R. M. Hare, Sorting Out Ethics, op. cit., 26, ‘The Kingdom of Ends is not really a kingdom, but a democracy with equality before the law.’
50. Lectures on Ethics, op. cit., 79-80. See also Rel. VI, 139.
51. KpV V, 25. There is an apparent difficulty here about whether Kant’s argument is consistent. I have tried to lay out the argument in The Moral Gap, op. cit., 69-96. Kant wants to say both that we inevitably desire our own happiness and that this desire should be subordinated to duty, which has (as in Crusius) a separate spring of motivation.
52. This is one of the two ingredients in the matter of morality described in the Metaphysics of Morals (VI, 385-6).
53. If one holds, like Thomas Reid, that there are many self-evident but logically independent moral axioms, then God is required to ensure their consistency.
55. Kant says that the kingdom of heaven is represented ‘not only as being brought ever nearer in an approach delayed at certain times yet never wholly interrupted, but also as arriving’, Rel. VI, 134.
56. Adams takes the term ‘theonomy’ from Tillich in the article already referred to. There are also two important papers, ‘A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness’ and ‘Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again’, both of which are reprinted (the second only in part) in Helm, op. cit. See also Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Other contemporary philosophers have defended versions of divine command theory. Baruch A. Brody’s views can be found in ‘Morality and Religion Reconsidered’. Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Baruch A. Brody, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974, 592-603. Philip Quinn’s views can be found in Divine Commands and Moral Requirements,

57. Adams, *op. cit.* Autonomous submission to political authority has the same structure.

58. Scotus says, *nihil volitum quin praecognitum*, (nothing is willed but what is pre-cognized), *opus oxon.* II, d. 25, q. u. n. 19.