Document Type
Article
Abstract
In The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Foley writes that the framing goal of epistemic rationality is, “now to believe those propositions which are true and now not to believe those propositions which are false,” with respect to non-trivial propositions.1 This “nowness” for truth distinguishes epistemic rationality from other domains of rationality, on the basis that epistemic rationality is concerned only with now believing what is true, regardless of what believing the truth will mean for one’s other goals as a person. Though very restrictive, this is the founding framework of the epistemic domain. Epistemic rationality being concerned only with the truth, regardless of the consequences of belief is so central to epistemology that it is the unifying ground from which all theorization about epistemic rationality diverges. All theories of justified, rational belief – different as they are – agree on the central point that only reasons which provide evidence that a belief is more likely to be true make one epistemically justified or rational in believing.
Publication Date
2022
Recommended Citation
Yakuber, Levi, "Justified, Evidently False Belief" (2022). Bouwsma Paper Contest. 16.
https://digitalcommons.calvin.edu/philosophy_bouwsma/16